82 FR 49194 - Arms Sales Notification
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of the Secretary Federal Register Volume 82, Issue 204 (October 24, 2017)
Office of the Secretary
Federal Register Volume 82, Issue 204 (October 24, 2017)
| Page Range | 49194-49197 | |
| FR Document | 2017-22984 |
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 204 (Tuesday, October 24, 2017)] [Notices] [Pages 49194-49197] From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org] [FR Doc No: 2017-22984] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Office of the Secretary [Transmittal No. 17-36] Arms Sales Notification AGENCY: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense. ACTION: Arms sales notice. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is publishing the unclassified text of an arms sales notification. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Pamela Young, (703) 697-9107, [email protected] or Kathy Valadez, (703) 697-9217, [email protected]; DSCA/DSA-RAN. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This 36(b)(1) arms sales notification is published to fulfill the requirements of section 155 of Public Law 104- 164 dated July 21, 1996. The following is a copy of a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Transmittal 17-36 with attached Policy Justification and Sensitivity of Technology. Dated: October 18, 2017. Aaron Siegel, Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense. BILLING CODE 5001-06-P [[Page 49195]] [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN24OC17.003 BILLING CODE 5001-06-C Transmittal No. 17-36 Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended (i) Prospective Purchaser: Government of Romania (ii) Total Estimated Value: Major Defense Equipment*................................ $ .900 billion Other................................................... $ .350 billion --------------- TOTAL................................................. $1.250 billion (iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase: Major Defense Equipment (MDE): Fifty-four (54) High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) Launchers Eighty-one (81) Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) M31A1 Unitary Eighty-one (81) Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) M30A1 Alternative Warhead Fifty-four (54) Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) M57 Unitary Twenty-four (24) Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems (AFATDS) Fifteen (15) M1151A1 HMMWVs, Utility, Armored Fifteen (15) M1151A1 HMMWVs, Armor Ready 2-Man Non-MDE includes: Fifty-four (54) M1084A1P2 HIMARS Resupply Vehicles (RSVs) (5 ton, [[Page 49196]] Medium Tactical Cargo Vehicle with Material Handling Equipment) Fifty-four (54) M1095 MTV Cargo Trailers w/RSV kit Ten (10) M1089A1P2 FMTV Wreckers (5 Ton Medium Tactical Vehicle Wrecker with Winch) Also included are thirty (30) Low Cost Reduced Range (LCRR) practice rockets, support equipment, communications equipment, sensors, spare and repair parts, test sets, batteries, laptop computers, publications and technical data, facility design, training and training equipment, systems integration support, Quality Assurance Teams and a Technical Assistance Fielding Team, U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support. (iv) Military Department: Army (v) Prior Related Cases, if any: None (vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None (vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex (viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: August 17, 2017 * As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act. POLICY JUSTIFICATION Romania--High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) and Related Support and Equipment The Government of Romania has requested the possible sale of fifty- four (54) High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) Launchers, eighty-one (81) Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) M31A1 Unitary, eighty-one (81) Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (GMLRS) M30A1 Alternative Warhead, fifty-four (54) Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) M57 Unitary, twenty-four (24) Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data Systems (AFATDS), fifteen (15) M1151A1 HMMWVs, Utility, Armored, and fifteen (15) M1151A1 HMMWVs, Armor Ready 2-Man. Also included with this request are: fifty-four (54) M1084A1P2 HIMARS Resupply Vehicles (RSVs) (5 ton, Medium Tactical Cargo Vehicle with Material Handling Equipment), fifty-four (54) M1095 MTV Cargo Trailer with RSV kit, and ten (10) M1089A1P2 FMTV Wreckers (5 Ton Medium Tactical Vehicle Wrecker with Winch), thirty (30) Low Cost Reduced Range (LCRR) practice rockets, support equipment, communications equipment, sensors, spare and repair parts, test sets, batteries, laptop computers, publications and technical data, facility design, training and training equipment, systems integration support, Quality Assurance Teams and a Technical Assistance Fielding Team, U.S. Government and contractor technical, engineering, and logistics support services, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The total estimated program cost is $1.25 billion. This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by helping to improve the security of a NATO ally that has been, and continues to be an important force for political stability and economic progress within Europe. The proposed sale of the HIMARS system will support Romania's needs for its own self-defense and support NATO defense goals. The Government of Romania intends to use these defense articles and services to modernize its armed forces and strengthen its homeland defense and deter regional threats. This will contribute to Romania's military goal of updating its capabilities while further enhancing interoperability with the United States and other NATO allies. Romania will have no difficulty absorbing this system into its armed forces. The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region. The prime contractors will be Lockheed-Martin in Grand Prairie, Texas and Camden, Arkansas. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale. Implementation of this proposed sale will require approximately the assignment of up to 10 U.S. Government or contractor representatives to travel to Romania for a period of up to one year for equipment de- processing/fielding, system checkout, training, and technical and logistics support. There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale. Transmittal No. 17-36 Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act Annex Item No. vii (vii) Sensitivity of Technology: 1. The High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS) is a highly mobile, all-weather indirect area fire artillery system. The HIMARS mission is to supplement cannon artillery to deliver a large volume of firepower within a short time against critical time-sensitive targets. At shorter ranges, HIMARS complements tube artillery with heavy barrages against assaulting forces as well as in the counter-fire, or defense suppression roles. The highest level of classified information that could be disclosed by a proposed sale, production, or by testing of the end item is SECRET; the highest level that must be disclosed for production, maintenance, or training is CONFIDENTIAL. Reverse engineering could reveal SECRET information. Launcher platform software, weapon operational software, command and control special application software, and command and control loadable munitions module software are considered UNCLASSIFIED. The system specifications and limitations are classified SECRET. Vulnerability data is classified up to SECRET. Countermeasures, counter-countermeasures, vulnerability/ susceptibility analyses, and threat definitions are classified SECRET. 2. The highest classification level for release of the ATACMS Unitary M57 FMS Variant is SECRET, based upon the software. The highest level of classified information that could be disclosed by a sale or by testing of the end item is SECRET; the highest level that must be disclosed for production, maintenance, or training is CONFIDENTIAL. Reverse engineering could reveal CONFIDENTIAL information. Fire Direction System, Data Processing Unit, and special Application software is classified SECRET. Communications Distribution Unit software is classified CONFIDENTIAL. The system specifications and limitations are classified CONFIDENTIAL. Vulnerability Data, countermeasures, vulnerability/susceptibility analyses, and threat definitions are classified SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL. 3. Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System Alternative Warhead (GMLRS- AW) M30A1. The GMLRS-AW, M30A1, is the next design increment of the GMLRS rocket. The GMLRS-AW M30A1 hardware is over 90% common with the M31A1 GMLRS Unitary hardware. Operational range is between 15-70 kilometers. Accuracy of less than 15 meters Circular Error Probability at all ranges, when using inertial guidance with Global Positioning System (GPS) augmentation. Uses a proximity sensor fuze mode with a 10 meter height of burst. The Alternative Warhead carries a 200 pound fragmentation assembly filled with high explosives which, upon detonation, accelerates two layers of pre-formed tungsten fragments optimized for effectiveness against large area and imprecisely located targets. The GMLRS-AW provides an area target [[Page 49197]] attack capability that is treaty compliant (no un-exploded ordnance). It provides a 24 hour, all weather, long range attack capability against personnel, soft and lightly armored targets, and air defense targets. The GMLRS-AW uses the same motor, guidance and control systems fuze mechanisms, and proximity sensors as the M31A1 GMLRS Unitary. The highest classification level for release of the GMLRS-AW is SECRET, based upon the software, sale or testing of the end item. The highest level of classification that must be disclosed for production, maintenance, or training is CONFIDENTIAL. 4. The GPS PPS component of the HIMARS munitions (GMLRS Unitary, Alternative Warhead, and ATACMS Unitary) is also contained in the Fire Direction System, is classified SECRET, and is considered SENSITIVE. To that end, no GPS PPS design information, including GPS software algorithms, will be disclosed in the course of this sale to country. Susceptibility of GMLRS to diversion or exploitation is considered low risk. GMLRS employs an inertial navigational system that is aided by a Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) equipped GPS receiver. To that end, this system requires encryption keys controlled by, and issued by, the National Security Agency. 5. AFATDS is a multi-service (U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps) automated, expert decision support system used for Command, Control, Communications and integration and synchronization of fires on ground targets during all phases of military conflict. AFATDS provides the automated tools that significantly augment the capability of fire support coordinators, fire support assets commanders, and their respective staffs at every echelon during the planning and execution of fire support on the dynamic battlefields in support of the Maneuver Commander and his plans. 6. The classification of the request for assistance and customized AFATDS with sanitized and customized JMEM and LMM, and/or with functionally compatible but UNCLASSIFIED modular substitutes for COMSEC, JMEM, and LMM capabilities, is available for Foreign Military Sales (FMS) with the following restrictions and caveats. The software source code and design specifications are UNCLASSIFIED but considered highly sensitive and are not available for FMS. The following items, while they are unclassified they are not individually freely and openly releasable, however, they can be offered for FMS as individually and specifically included items of complete system procurements: executable code, training manuals, user manuals, and system documentation such as external system architecture diagrams, high level internal software architecture diagrams, the Version Description Document, and the System Administrator Manual as customized for each individual FMS customer. The highest level of information that is necessarily disclosed during maintenance of these sanitized systems and applications is UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO. The highest level of sensitive information that is necessarily disclosed by the sale of these sanitized systems and applications is UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO. The highest level of information that is necessarily disclosed to allow system administration of these sanitized systems and applications UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO. The highest level of information that is necessarily disclosed in training of these sanitized systems and applications is UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO. The highest level of information that could be revealed by reverse engineering or testing of these systems is UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO. Through scanning or testing these sanitized systems and applications, specific vulnerabilities could be disclosed, and will be treated at UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO. The identification of these vulnerabilities with U.S.-only systems is CLASSIFIED, per Section 6.3. Participants of the FMS process shall not make references to U.S.-only system maintenance, administration, or technical details because they could be considered SECRET. 7. Susceptibility of ATACMS Unitary M57 FMS Variant, GMLRS M30A1 and M31A1 to diversion or exploitation is considered low risk. Components of the system are also considered highly resistant to reverse engineering. Detailed knowledge of the technical capabilities of the system could enable an enemy to tailor defenses and adjust tactics and procedures to minimize the effectiveness of the system. 8. Susceptibility of AFATDS to diversion or exploitation is considered low risk. Software of the system are also considered highly resistant to reverse engineering. Detailed knowledge of the technical capabilities of the system could enable an enemy to tailor defenses and adjust tactics and procedures to minimize the effectiveness of the system. Training and user manuals are unclassified but considered sensitive and not for general release to foreign nationals, except that they will be provided with the system when the system is procured through foreign military sales. Installation instructions are unclassified but considered sensitive and not for general release to foreign nationals, except that they will be provided with the system when the system is procured through FMS. 9. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of the specific hardware and software, the information could be used to develop countermeasures, which might reduce weapon system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities. 10. This sale is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the enclosed Military Policy Justification. Moreover, the benefits to be derived from this sale outweigh the potential damage that could result if the sensitive technology were revealed to unauthorized persons. A determination has been made that Romania can provide the same degree of protection for the sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. 11. All defense articles and services listed in this transmittal have been authorized for release and export to Romania. [FR Doc. 2017-22984 Filed 10-23-17; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 5001-06-P
![49194 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 204 / Tuesday, October 24, 2017 / Notices
training devices, classified software help it carry out international g. Mission Capability Areas:
(JMPS/MDLs), Engineering Technical commitments for transport, Surveillance/Data Management &
Assistance (ETA), Logistics Technical surveillance, and search and rescue Data/Air Vehicle Service Life
Assistance (LTA), Other Technical operations with the United States and h. Software Lab
Assistance (OTA), supply support, other allies. The proposed upgrades will i. USN Test Maintenance Cost
support equipment, and other related also provide Australia the resources 2. The spiral development case may
elements of logistics and program necessary to properly maintain its contain sensitive technology; however,
support. multi-mission helicopters. Australia defined requirements are not known at
(iv) Military Department: Navy (AT– will have no difficulty absorbing this this time and will be assessed on a case
P–GRS) equipment into its armed forces. by case basis.
(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: AT–P– The proposed sale of this equipment 3. A determination has been made
GXO, AT–P–SCF, AT–P–GTC and support will not alter the basic that Australia can provide substantially
(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, military balance in the region. the same degree of protection for the
Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None The principal contractor will be sensitive technology being released as
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Sikorsky, a Lockheed Martin Company, the U.S. Government. This sale is
Contained in the Defense Article or Stratford, CT and Lockheed Martin, necessary in furtherance of the U.S.
Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: Owego, NY. There are no offsets foreign policy and national security
See Attached Annex proposed in connection with this objectives outlined in the Policy
(viii) Date Report Delivered to potential sale. Justification.
Congress: August 30, 2017. Implementation of this proposed sale 4. All defense articles and services
* As defined in Section 47(6) of the will not require the assignment of any listed in this transmittal have been
Arms Export Control Act. additional U.S. Government or authorized for release and export to
contractor representatives to Australia. Australia.
POLICY JUSTIFICATION There will be no adverse impact on
[FR Doc. 2017–22980 Filed 10–23–17; 8:45 am]
Australia—Upgrade Program for (24) U.S. defense readiness as a result of this
BILLING CODE 5001–06–P
MH–60R Multi-Mission Helicopters proposed sale.
The Government of Australia has Transmittal No. 17–45
requested a follow-on case for a possible DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of
ten-year upgrade program for twenty- Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the
four (24) MH–60R Multi-Mission Office of the Secretary
Arms Export Control Act
Helicopters and associated training
Annex [Transmittal No. 17–36]
devices, spare and repair parts, support
and test equipment, engineering and Item No. vii Arms Sales Notification
technical services, U.S. Government and
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology: AGENCY: Defense Security Cooperation
contractor engineering, technical and
logistics support services, Engineering 1. The Commonwealth of Australia Agency, Department of Defense.
Change Proposals (ECPs), ECPs for requirement for spiral upgrades to the
twenty-four (24) Multi-Mission MH–60R ACTION: Arms sales notice.
training devices, classified software
(JMPS/MDLs), Engineering Technical Helicopters could include:
SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is
Assistance (ETA), Logistics Technical a. Mission Capability Areas: Surface publishing the unclassified text of an
Assistance (LTA), Other Technical Warfare/Surveillance/Flight arms sales notification.
Assistance (OTA), supply support, Management, Navigation &
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
support equipment, and other related Communication/Data Management &
Pamela Young, (703) 697–9107,
elements of logistics and program Fusion
pamela.a.young14.civ@mail.mil or
support. The total estimated program b. Mission Capability Areas: Anti- Kathy Valadez, (703) 697–9217,
cost is $360 million. Submarine Warfare/Flight kathy.a.valadez.civ@mail.mil; DSCA/
This sale will support the foreign Management, Navigation & DSA–RAN.
policy and national security of the Communication
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This
United States by helping to improve the c. Mission Capability Areas: Flight
Management, Navigation & 36(b)(1) arms sales notification is
security of a major non-NATO ally that
Communication/Data Management & published to fulfill the requirements of
continues to be an important force for
Fusion section 155 of Public Law 104–164
political stability and economic progress
d. Mission Capability Areas: Flight dated July 21, 1996. The following is a
in the Western Pacific. It is vital to the
Management, Navigation & copy of a letter to the Speaker of the
U.S. national interest to assist our ally
Communication/Data Management & House of Representatives, Transmittal
in developing and maintaining a strong
Fusion/Air Vehicle Service Life 17–36 with attached Policy Justification
and ready self-defense capability.
and Sensitivity of Technology.
The proposed upgrades to the MH– e. Mission Capability Areas for
60R helicopters will improve Australia’s Development: Kinematic Dated: October 18, 2017.
asabaliauskas on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with NOTICES
antisubmarine and surface warfare Performance/Airborne Survivability Aaron Siegel,
capability, provide an improved search f. Mission Capability Areas for Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison
and rescue capability, enhance its anti- Development: Obsolescence Officer, Department of Defense.
ship surveillance capability, and will Management BILLING CODE 5001–06–P
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![Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 204 / Tuesday, October 24, 2017 / Notices 49197
attack capability that is treaty compliant items of complete system procurements: instructions are unclassified but
(no un-exploded ordnance). It provides executable code, training manuals, user considered sensitive and not for general
a 24 hour, all weather, long range attack manuals, and system documentation release to foreign nationals, except that
capability against personnel, soft and such as external system architecture they will be provided with the system
lightly armored targets, and air defense diagrams, high level internal software when the system is procured through
targets. The GMLRS–AW uses the same architecture diagrams, the Version FMS.
motor, guidance and control systems Description Document, and the System 9. If a technologically advanced
fuze mechanisms, and proximity Administrator Manual as customized for adversary were to obtain knowledge of
sensors as the M31A1 GMLRS Unitary. each individual FMS customer. The
the specific hardware and software, the
The highest classification level for highest level of information that is
information could be used to develop
release of the GMLRS–AW is SECRET, necessarily disclosed during
countermeasures, which might reduce
based upon the software, sale or testing maintenance of these sanitized systems
weapon system effectiveness or be used
of the end item. The highest level of and applications is UNCLASSIFIED/
classification that must be disclosed for FOUO. The highest level of sensitive in the development of a system with
production, maintenance, or training is information that is necessarily disclosed similar or advanced capabilities.
CONFIDENTIAL. by the sale of these sanitized systems 10. This sale is necessary in
4. The GPS PPS component of the and applications is UNCLASSIFIED/ furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy
HIMARS munitions (GMLRS Unitary, FOUO. The highest level of information and national security objectives
Alternative Warhead, and ATACMS that is necessarily disclosed to allow outlined in the enclosed Military Policy
Unitary) is also contained in the Fire system administration of these sanitized Justification. Moreover, the benefits to
Direction System, is classified SECRET, systems and applications be derived from this sale outweigh the
and is considered SENSITIVE. To that UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO. The highest potential damage that could result if the
end, no GPS PPS design information, level of information that is necessarily sensitive technology were revealed to
including GPS software algorithms, will disclosed in training of these sanitized unauthorized persons. A determination
be disclosed in the course of this sale to systems and applications is has been made that Romania can
country. Susceptibility of GMLRS to UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO. The highest provide the same degree of protection
diversion or exploitation is considered level of information that could be for the sensitive technology being
low risk. GMLRS employs an inertial revealed by reverse engineering or released as the U.S. Government.
navigational system that is aided by a testing of these systems is
Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing 11. All defense articles and services
UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO. Through
Module (SAASM) equipped GPS listed in this transmittal have been
scanning or testing these sanitized
receiver. To that end, this system authorized for release and export to
systems and applications, specific
requires encryption keys controlled by, Romania.
vulnerabilities could be disclosed, and
and issued by, the National Security will be treated at UNCLASSIFIED/ [FR Doc. 2017–22984 Filed 10–23–17; 8:45 am]
Agency. FOUO. The identification of these BILLING CODE 5001–06–P
5. AFATDS is a multi-service (U.S. vulnerabilities with U.S.-only systems is
Army and U.S. Marine Corps) CLASSIFIED, per Section 6.3.
automated, expert decision support Participants of the FMS process shall DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
system used for Command, Control, not make references to U.S.-only system
Communications and integration and maintenance, administration, or Office of the Secretary
synchronization of fires on ground technical details because they could be
targets during all phases of military considered SECRET. [Transmittal No. 17–28]
conflict. AFATDS provides the 7. Susceptibility of ATACMS Unitary
automated tools that significantly M57 FMS Variant, GMLRS M30A1 and Arms Sales Notification
augment the capability of fire support M31A1 to diversion or exploitation is
coordinators, fire support assets considered low risk. Components of the AGENCY: Defense Security Cooperation
commanders, and their respective staffs system are also considered highly Agency, Department of Defense.
at every echelon during the planning resistant to reverse engineering. Detailed
and execution of fire support on the ACTION: Arms sales notice.
knowledge of the technical capabilities
dynamic battlefields in support of the of the system could enable an enemy to
Maneuver Commander and his plans. tailor defenses and adjust tactics and SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is
6. The classification of the request for procedures to minimize the publishing the unclassified text of an
assistance and customized AFATDS effectiveness of the system. arms sales notification.
with sanitized and customized JMEM 8. Susceptibility of AFATDS to FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
and LMM, and/or with functionally diversion or exploitation is considered Pamela Young, (703) 697–9107,
compatible but UNCLASSIFIED low risk. Software of the system are also pamela.a.young14.civ@mail.mil or
modular substitutes for COMSEC, considered highly resistant to reverse Kathy Valadez, (703) 697–9217,
JMEM, and LMM capabilities, is engineering. Detailed knowledge of the kathy.a.valadez.civ@mail.mil; DSCA/
available for Foreign Military Sales technical capabilities of the system DSA–RAN.
(FMS) with the following restrictions could enable an enemy to tailor
asabaliauskas on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with NOTICES
and caveats. The software source code defenses and adjust tactics and SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This
and design specifications are procedures to minimize the 36(b)(1) arms sales notification is
UNCLASSIFIED but considered highly effectiveness of the system. Training published to fulfill the requirements of
sensitive and are not available for FMS. and user manuals are unclassified but section 155 of Public Law 104–164
The following items, while they are considered sensitive and not for general dated July 21, 1996. The following is a
unclassified they are not individually release to foreign nationals, except that copy of a letter to the Speaker of the
freely and openly releasable, however, they will be provided with the system House of Representatives, Transmittal
they can be offered for FMS as when the system is procured through 17–28 with attached Policy Justification
individually and specifically included foreign military sales. Installation and Sensitivity of Technology.
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Document Created: 2018-10-25 10:11:11
Document Modified: 2018-10-25 10:11:11
| Category | Regulatory Information | |
| Collection | Federal Register | |
| sudoc Class | AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106: | |
| Publisher | Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration | |
| Section | Notices | |
| Action | Arms sales notice. | |
| Contact | Pamela Young, (703) 697-9107, [email protected] or Kathy Valadez, (703) 697-9217, [email protected]; DSCA/DSA-RAN. | |
| FR Citation | 82 FR 49194 |
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