82 FR 49197 - Arms Sales Notification
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Office of the Secretary Federal Register Volume 82, Issue 204 (October 24, 2017)
Office of the Secretary
Federal Register Volume 82, Issue 204 (October 24, 2017)
| Page Range | 49197-49200 | |
| FR Document | 2017-22965 |
[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 204 (Tuesday, October 24, 2017)] [Notices] [Pages 49197-49200] From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org] [FR Doc No: 2017-22965] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE Office of the Secretary [Transmittal No. 17-28] Arms Sales Notification AGENCY: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Department of Defense. ACTION: Arms sales notice. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is publishing the unclassified text of an arms sales notification. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Pamela Young, (703) 697-9107, [email protected] or Kathy Valadez, (703) 697-9217, [email protected]; DSCA/DSA-RAN. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This 36(b)(1) arms sales notification is published to fulfill the requirements of section 155 of Public Law 104- 164 dated July 21, 1996. The following is a copy of a letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Transmittal 17-28 with attached Policy Justification and Sensitivity of Technology. [[Page 49198]] Dated: October 18, 2017. Aaron Siegel, Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense. BILLING CODE 5001-06-P [GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TN24OC17.002 BILLING CODE 5001-06-C [[Page 49199]] Transmittal No. 17-28 Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended (i) Prospective Purchaser: Saudi Arabia (ii) Total Estimated Value: Major Defense Equipment *............................... $ 9 billion Other................................................... $ 6 billion --------------- TOTAL................................................. $15 billion (iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase: Major Defense Equipment (MDE): Forty-four (44) Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Launchers Three hundred sixty (360) THAAD Interceptor Missiles Sixteen (16) THAAD Fire Control and Communications Mobile Tactical Station Group Seven (7) AN/TPY-2 THAAD Radars Non-MDE: Also included are THAAD Battery maintenance equipment, forty-three (43) prime movers (trucks), generators, electrical power units, trailers, communications equipment, tools, test and maintenance equipment, repair and return, system integration and checkout, spare/ repair parts, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel support services, facilities construction, studies, and other related elements of logistics and program support. (iv) Military Departments: Missile Defense Agency (XX-I-WIB, XX-I- WIC); Army (XX-B-TFP, XX-B-BDP, XX-B-ZAO, XX-B-DAH, XX-B-ZAQ, XX-B-OZY, XX-B-HFA); NSA (XX-M-AAG) (v) Prior Related Cases, if any: SR-I-WIA Basic, 2 February 2015; Amendment 1, 25 August 2016 (vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed to be Paid: None (vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached Annex (viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: October 6, 2017 *As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act. POLICY JUSTIFICATION Saudi Arabia--Terminal High Altitude Area Defense and Related Support Equipment and Services The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested a possible sale of forty-four (44) Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) launchers, three hundred sixty (360) THAAD Interceptor Missiles, sixteen (16) THAAD Fire Control and Communications Mobile Tactical Station Group, seven (7) AN/TPY-2 THAAD radars. Also included are THAAD Battery maintenance equipment, forty-three (43) prime movers (trucks), generators, electrical power units, trailers, communications equipment, tools, test and maintenance equipment, repair and return, system integration and checkout, spare/repair parts, publications and technical documentation, personnel training and training equipment, U.S. Government and contractor technical and logistics personnel support services, facilities construction, studies, and other related elements of logistics and program support. The estimated cost is $15 billion. This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by improving the security of a friendly country. This sale furthers U.S. national security and foreign policy interests, and supports the long-term security of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region in the face of Iranian and other regional threats. This potential sale will substantially increase Saudi Arabia's capability to defend itself against the growing ballistic missile threat in the region. THAAD's exo-atmospheric, hit-to-kill capability will add an upper-tier to Saudi Arabia's layered missile defense architecture and will support modernization of the Royal Saudi Air Defense Force (RSADF). Saudi Arabia will have no difficulty absorbing this equipment into its armed forces. The proposed sale of this equipment and support will not alter the basic military balance in the region. The principal contractors for the THAAD system are Lockheed Martin Space Systems Corporation, Dallas, TX, Camden, AR, Troy, AL and Huntsville, AL; and Raytheon Corporation, Andover, MA. There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale. Implementation of this proposed sale will require one hundred eleven (111) contractor representatives and eighteen (18) U.S. Government personnel in country for an extended period of time. There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale. Transmittal No. 17-28 Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act Annex Item No. vii (vii) Sensitivity of Technology: 1. The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense System (THAAD) Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) System contains classified CONFIDENTIAL/SECRET components and critical/sensitive technology. The THAAD Fire Unit is a ground-based, forward deployable terminal missile defense system that represents significant technological advances. The THAAD system continues to hold a technology lead over other terminal ballistic missile systems. THAAD is the first weapon system with both endo- and exo- atmospheric capability developed specifically to defend against ballistic missiles. The higher altitude and theater-wide protection offered by THAAD provides more protection of larger areas than lower- tier systems alone. THAAD is designed to defend against short, medium, and intermediate range ballistic missiles. The THAAD system consists of four major components: Fire Control/Communications, Radar, Launchers, and Interceptor Missiles. 2. The THAAD BMD System contains sensitive/critical technology, primarily in the area of defense and production know-how and primarily inherent in the design, development and/or manufacturing data related to certain critical components. Information on operational effectiveness with respect to countermeasures and counter- countermeasures, low observable technologies, select software documentation and test data are classified up to and including SECRET. 3. The THAAD BMD System contains Controlled Cryptographic Items (CCI) that are used for both system internal links and for external communications. These items consist of key loading devices, network encryptors, secure telephones, voice radios, tactical data radios, and mission data radios. Specific CCI used for the Saudi Arabia case will be determined through the COMSEC Release Request (CRR) process, initiated through USCENTCOM once an interoperability requirement has been established. NSA will identify releasable items, in parallel with staffing and validation of the CRR by the Joint Staff. The Committee for National Security Systems (CNSS) reviews and provides final approval of the items and quantities. 4. AN/VRC-90, AN/VRC-91, AN/VRC-92 are different configurations of [[Page 49200]] the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) family. SINCGARS is a tactical radio providing secure jam-resistant voice and data communications of command, control, targeting, and technical information for the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system. The spread-spectrum frequency hopping Electronic Counter-Counter Measures (ECCM) technology resident in the radio is sensitive but UNCLASSIFIED. While sensitive, the frequency-hopping algorithms used to generate the ECCM waveform are unique to the country of ownership and cannot be manipulated by potential adversaries for use or interference with other countries possessing SINCGARS technology. Should a potential adversary come into possession of one of these radios, they would have the potential to intercept operational command, control, and targeting information. This potential problem is mitigated by the fact that the customer can secure information passed over the radio network using a commercial grade security capability equivalent to an Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) 256-bit encryption system whose keys are controlled by the customer country. 5. As with the SINCGARS family of radios, the AN/PRC-117 is a tactical radio providing ECCM jam-resistant secure communications for exchange of command, control, and targeting information within the THAAD system tactical radio network. ECCM capabilities are sensitive but UNCLASSIFIED and algorithms for these jam-resistant waveforms are unique to the customer country. Unlike the SINCGARS radios, the AN/PRC- 117 uses Type 1 encryption. When loaded with U.S. crypto keys, the system is then CLASSIFIED up to SECRET. Should a potential adversary come into possession of one of these radios, the customer country can quickly remotely rekey remaining radios, preventing potential adversaries from understanding received command, control, and targeting information. 6. The Defense Advanced Global Positioning System (GPS) Receiver (DAGR) is a handheld GPS location device with map background displaying the user's location. Unlike commercial grade GPS receivers capable of receiving Standard Positioning Signals (SPS) from GPS satellites, the DAGR is capable of receiving Precise Positioning Signals (PPS). PPS satellite signals provide significantly more accurate location data than do SPS signals. This capability within DAGRs is possible due to the Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM). The SAASM is an encrypted device permitting both receipt of PPS signals and the benefit of preventing potential adversaries from spoofing the system to display incorrect location information. The SAASM capability within the DAGR is sensitive but UNCLASSIFIED. The SAASM capabilities are sensitive due to the system's ability to access restricted PPS GPS satellite signals and to prevent spoofing. While sensitive, the ability of potential adversaries to exploit the system is limited. 7. The same SAASM capabilities resident in the DAGR are also resident in the THAAD GPS timing system. The THAAD system requires highly precise timing hacks in order accurately track and engage targets. The PPS signals generated by GPS satellites provide this precise timing information. The SAASM device resident in the timing system permits receipt of this precise PPS timing data. The SAASM is an encrypted device permitting both receipt of PPS signals and the benefit of preventing potential adversaries from spoofing the system to display incorrect data. The SAASM capability within the timing system is sensitive but UNCLASSIFIED. 8. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain knowledge of specific hardware, the information could be used to develop countermeasures which might reduce weapons system effectiveness or be used in the development of a system with similar or advanced capabilities. 9. A determination has been made that Saudi Arabia can provide substantially the same degree of protection for sensitive technology being released as the U.S. Government. This proposed sustainment program is necessary to the furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives outlined in the policy justification. 10. All defense articles and services listed on this transmittal are authorized for release and export to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. [FR Doc. 2017-22965 Filed 10-23-17; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 5001-06-P
![Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 204 / Tuesday, October 24, 2017 / Notices 49197
attack capability that is treaty compliant items of complete system procurements: instructions are unclassified but
(no un-exploded ordnance). It provides executable code, training manuals, user considered sensitive and not for general
a 24 hour, all weather, long range attack manuals, and system documentation release to foreign nationals, except that
capability against personnel, soft and such as external system architecture they will be provided with the system
lightly armored targets, and air defense diagrams, high level internal software when the system is procured through
targets. The GMLRS–AW uses the same architecture diagrams, the Version FMS.
motor, guidance and control systems Description Document, and the System 9. If a technologically advanced
fuze mechanisms, and proximity Administrator Manual as customized for adversary were to obtain knowledge of
sensors as the M31A1 GMLRS Unitary. each individual FMS customer. The
the specific hardware and software, the
The highest classification level for highest level of information that is
information could be used to develop
release of the GMLRS–AW is SECRET, necessarily disclosed during
countermeasures, which might reduce
based upon the software, sale or testing maintenance of these sanitized systems
weapon system effectiveness or be used
of the end item. The highest level of and applications is UNCLASSIFIED/
classification that must be disclosed for FOUO. The highest level of sensitive in the development of a system with
production, maintenance, or training is information that is necessarily disclosed similar or advanced capabilities.
CONFIDENTIAL. by the sale of these sanitized systems 10. This sale is necessary in
4. The GPS PPS component of the and applications is UNCLASSIFIED/ furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy
HIMARS munitions (GMLRS Unitary, FOUO. The highest level of information and national security objectives
Alternative Warhead, and ATACMS that is necessarily disclosed to allow outlined in the enclosed Military Policy
Unitary) is also contained in the Fire system administration of these sanitized Justification. Moreover, the benefits to
Direction System, is classified SECRET, systems and applications be derived from this sale outweigh the
and is considered SENSITIVE. To that UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO. The highest potential damage that could result if the
end, no GPS PPS design information, level of information that is necessarily sensitive technology were revealed to
including GPS software algorithms, will disclosed in training of these sanitized unauthorized persons. A determination
be disclosed in the course of this sale to systems and applications is has been made that Romania can
country. Susceptibility of GMLRS to UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO. The highest provide the same degree of protection
diversion or exploitation is considered level of information that could be for the sensitive technology being
low risk. GMLRS employs an inertial revealed by reverse engineering or released as the U.S. Government.
navigational system that is aided by a testing of these systems is
Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing 11. All defense articles and services
UNCLASSIFIED/FOUO. Through
Module (SAASM) equipped GPS listed in this transmittal have been
scanning or testing these sanitized
receiver. To that end, this system authorized for release and export to
systems and applications, specific
requires encryption keys controlled by, Romania.
vulnerabilities could be disclosed, and
and issued by, the National Security will be treated at UNCLASSIFIED/ [FR Doc. 2017–22984 Filed 10–23–17; 8:45 am]
Agency. FOUO. The identification of these BILLING CODE 5001–06–P
5. AFATDS is a multi-service (U.S. vulnerabilities with U.S.-only systems is
Army and U.S. Marine Corps) CLASSIFIED, per Section 6.3.
automated, expert decision support Participants of the FMS process shall DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
system used for Command, Control, not make references to U.S.-only system
Communications and integration and maintenance, administration, or Office of the Secretary
synchronization of fires on ground technical details because they could be
targets during all phases of military considered SECRET. [Transmittal No. 17–28]
conflict. AFATDS provides the 7. Susceptibility of ATACMS Unitary
automated tools that significantly M57 FMS Variant, GMLRS M30A1 and Arms Sales Notification
augment the capability of fire support M31A1 to diversion or exploitation is
coordinators, fire support assets considered low risk. Components of the AGENCY: Defense Security Cooperation
commanders, and their respective staffs system are also considered highly Agency, Department of Defense.
at every echelon during the planning resistant to reverse engineering. Detailed
and execution of fire support on the ACTION: Arms sales notice.
knowledge of the technical capabilities
dynamic battlefields in support of the of the system could enable an enemy to
Maneuver Commander and his plans. tailor defenses and adjust tactics and SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is
6. The classification of the request for procedures to minimize the publishing the unclassified text of an
assistance and customized AFATDS effectiveness of the system. arms sales notification.
with sanitized and customized JMEM 8. Susceptibility of AFATDS to FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
and LMM, and/or with functionally diversion or exploitation is considered Pamela Young, (703) 697–9107,
compatible but UNCLASSIFIED low risk. Software of the system are also pamela.a.young14.civ@mail.mil or
modular substitutes for COMSEC, considered highly resistant to reverse Kathy Valadez, (703) 697–9217,
JMEM, and LMM capabilities, is engineering. Detailed knowledge of the kathy.a.valadez.civ@mail.mil; DSCA/
available for Foreign Military Sales technical capabilities of the system DSA–RAN.
(FMS) with the following restrictions could enable an enemy to tailor
asabaliauskas on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with NOTICES
and caveats. The software source code defenses and adjust tactics and SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This
and design specifications are procedures to minimize the 36(b)(1) arms sales notification is
UNCLASSIFIED but considered highly effectiveness of the system. Training published to fulfill the requirements of
sensitive and are not available for FMS. and user manuals are unclassified but section 155 of Public Law 104–164
The following items, while they are considered sensitive and not for general dated July 21, 1996. The following is a
unclassified they are not individually release to foreign nationals, except that copy of a letter to the Speaker of the
freely and openly releasable, however, they will be provided with the system House of Representatives, Transmittal
they can be offered for FMS as when the system is procured through 17–28 with attached Policy Justification
individually and specifically included foreign military sales. Installation and Sensitivity of Technology.
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![49200 Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 204 / Tuesday, October 24, 2017 / Notices
the Single Channel Ground and encrypted device permitting both SUMMARY: The Department of Defense is
Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) receipt of PPS signals and the benefit of publishing this notice to encourage
family. SINCGARS is a tactical radio preventing potential adversaries from feedback for the Section 809 Advisory
providing secure jam-resistant voice and spoofing the system to display incorrect Panel on Streamlining and Codifying
data communications of command, location information. The SAASM Acquisition Regulations (hereafter ‘‘the
control, targeting, and technical capability within the DAGR is sensitive Panel’’). The Panel meets on a monthly
information for the Terminal High but UNCLASSIFIED. The SAASM basis and will provide a final report to
Altitude Air Defense (THAAD) system. capabilities are sensitive due to the the Secretary of Defense and Congress in
The spread-spectrum frequency hopping system’s ability to access restricted PPS 2019. The agendas, meeting times, and
Electronic Counter-Counter Measures GPS satellite signals and to prevent contact information are posted on the
(ECCM) technology resident in the radio spoofing. While sensitive, the ability of Panel Web site: http://
is sensitive but UNCLASSIFIED. While potential adversaries to exploit the www.section809panel.org. Public
sensitive, the frequency-hopping system is limited. feedback can be submitted in the
algorithms used to generate the ECCM 7. The same SAASM capabilities ‘‘Contact Us’’ section of the Web site as
waveform are unique to the country of resident in the DAGR are also resident either general comments or specific
ownership and cannot be manipulated in the THAAD GPS timing system. The recommendations.
by potential adversaries for use or THAAD system requires highly precise FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
interference with other countries timing hacks in order accurately track Shayne L. Martin, Section 809 Panel,
possessing SINCGARS technology. and engage targets. The PPS signals
Should a potential adversary come into 1400 Key Blvd., Suite 210, Arlington,
generated by GPS satellites provide this VA 22209, email: shayne.martin@
possession of one of these radios, they precise timing information. The SAASM
would have the potential to intercept dau.mil, phone: 703–571–2989.
device resident in the timing system
operational command, control, and SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Section
permits receipt of this precise PPS
targeting information. This potential 809 of the National Defense
timing data. The SAASM is an
problem is mitigated by the fact that the Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016
encrypted device permitting both
customer can secure information passed (Pub. L. 114–92) required the Secretary
receipt of PPS signals and the benefit of
over the radio network using a of Defense to establish ‘‘an advisory
preventing potential adversaries from
commercial grade security capability panel on streamlining acquisition
spoofing the system to display incorrect
equivalent to an Advanced Encryption regulations.’’ The Panel was seated on
data. The SAASM capability within the
Standard (AES) 256-bit encryption August 12, 2016. By Statute, the Panel
timing system is sensitive but
system whose keys are controlled by the is exempt from the Federal Advisory
UNCLASSIFIED.
customer country. Committee Act (5 U.S.C. Appendix).
8. If a technologically advanced
5. As with the SINCGARS family of Public information, including
adversary were to obtain knowledge of
radios, the AN/PRC–117 is a tactical opportunities for input, is posted and
specific hardware, the information
radio providing ECCM jam-resistant periodically updated at http://
could be used to develop
secure communications for exchange of www.section809panel.org.
countermeasures which might reduce
command, control, and targeting Dated: October 18, 2017.
weapons system effectiveness or be used
information within the THAAD system Aaron Siegel,
in the development of a system with
tactical radio network. ECCM
similar or advanced capabilities. Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison
capabilities are sensitive but Officer, Department of Defense.
9. A determination has been made
UNCLASSIFIED and algorithms for
these jam-resistant waveforms are that Saudi Arabia can provide [FR Doc. 2017–22987 Filed 10–23–17; 8:45 am]
unique to the customer country. Unlike substantially the same degree of BILLING CODE 5001–06–P
the SINCGARS radios, the AN/PRC–117 protection for sensitive technology
uses Type 1 encryption. When loaded being released as the U.S. Government.
This proposed sustainment program is DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
with U.S. crypto keys, the system is
then CLASSIFIED up to SECRET. necessary to the furtherance of the U.S.
foreign policy and national security Department of the Navy
Should a potential adversary come into
possession of one of these radios, the objectives outlined in the policy
Notice of Performance Review Board
customer country can quickly remotely justification.
Membership
rekey remaining radios, preventing 10. All defense articles and services
potential adversaries from listed on this transmittal are authorized AGENCY: Department of the Navy, DoD.
understanding received command, for release and export to the Kingdom of ACTION: Notice.
control, and targeting information. Saudi Arabia.
6. The Defense Advanced Global [FR Doc. 2017–22965 Filed 10–23–17; 8:45 am] SUMMARY: The purpose of the PRBs is to
Positioning System (GPS) Receiver BILLING CODE 5001–06–P
provide fair and impartial review of the
(DAGR) is a handheld GPS location annual SES performance appraisal
device with map background displaying prepared by the senior executive’s
the user’s location. Unlike commercial DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE immediate and second level supervisor;
grade GPS receivers capable of receiving to make recommendations to appointing
Office of the Secretary officials regarding acceptance or
asabaliauskas on DSKBBXCHB2PROD with NOTICES
Standard Positioning Signals (SPS) from
GPS satellites, the DAGR is capable of modification of the performance rating;
receiving Precise Positioning Signals Advisory Panel on Streamlining and and to make recommendations for
(PPS). PPS satellite signals provide Codifying Acquisition Regulations performance bonuses and basic pay
significantly more accurate location data AGENCY: Office of the Under Secretary of increases. Composition of the specific
than do SPS signals. This capability Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and PRBs will be determined on an ad hoc
within DAGRs is possible due to the Logistics), DoD. basis from among the individuals listed
Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing below:
ACTION: Notice of Advisory Panel.
Module (SAASM). The SAASM is an Mr. Mark Andress
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Document Created: 2018-10-25 10:09:55
Document Modified: 2018-10-25 10:09:55
| Category | Regulatory Information | |
| Collection | Federal Register | |
| sudoc Class | AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106: | |
| Publisher | Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration | |
| Section | Notices | |
| Action | Arms sales notice. | |
| Contact | Pamela Young, (703) 697-9107, [email protected] or Kathy Valadez, (703) 697-9217, [email protected]; DSCA/DSA-RAN. | |
| FR Citation | 82 FR 49197 |
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