82 FR 60773 - In the Matter of All Operating Reactor Licensees

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Federal Register Volume 82, Issue 245 (December 22, 2017)

Page Range		60773-60774
FR Document		2017-27583

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued a director's decision in response to a petition dated February 19, 2016, filed by Roy Mathew, Sheila Ray, Swagata Som, Gurcharan Singh Matharu, Tania Martinez Navedo, Thomas Koshy, and Kenneth Miller (Petitioners), requesting that the NRC take enforcement- related action with regard to all operating nuclear power plants. The petitioner's requests and the director's decision are included in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.

Federal Register, Volume 82 Issue 245 (Friday, December 22, 2017)

[Federal Register Volume 82, Number 245 (Friday, December 22, 2017)]
[Notices]
[Pages 60773-60774]
From the Federal Register Online  [www.thefederalregister.org]
[FR Doc No: 2017-27583]


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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[NRC-2016-0061]


In the Matter of All Operating Reactor Licensees

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Director's decision under 10 CFR 2.206; issuance.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued a 
director's decision in response to a petition dated February 19, 2016, 
filed by Roy Mathew, Sheila Ray, Swagata Som, Gurcharan Singh Matharu, 
Tania Martinez Navedo, Thomas Koshy, and

[[Page 60774]]

Kenneth Miller (Petitioners), requesting that the NRC take enforcement-
related action with regard to all operating nuclear power plants. The 
petitioner's requests and the director's decision are included in the 
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.

DATES: The director's decision was issued on December 12, 2017.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2016-0061 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You 
may obtain publicly-available information related to this document 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Website: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2016-0061. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Carol Gallagher; telephone: 301-415-
3463; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact 
the individual(s) listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section 
of this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and 
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, 
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. The 
ADAMS accession number for each document referenced (if it is available 
in ADAMS) is provided the first time that it is mentioned in this 
document.
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tanya Mensah, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 
20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-3610, email: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Notice is hereby given that the Director, 
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, has issued a director's decision 
(ADAMS Accession No. ML17304A893) under Title 10 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (10 CFR) section 2.206 on a petition filed by the 
Petitioners on February 19, 2016 (ADAMS Accession No. ML16050A223).
    The Petitioners requested that the NRC take enforcement action 
against all operating nuclear power plants. Specifically, the 
Petitioners requested that the NRC either: (1) Issue orders to require 
immediate corrective actions including compensatory measures to address 
the operability of electric power systems in accordance with their 
plant technical specifications, and to implement plant modifications in 
accordance with current NRC regulatory requirements and staff guidance 
provided in the references within the 2.206 petition; or (2) issue 
orders to immediately shut down the nuclear power plants that are 
operating without addressing the significant design deficiency 
identified in NRC Bulletin 2012-01, ``Design Vulnerability in Electric 
Power System,'' dated July 27, 2012, (ADAMS Accession No. ML12074A115) 
since the licensees are not in compliance with their technical 
specifications (typically Section 3.8.1) related to onsite and offsite 
power systems.
    On February 24, 2016, the NRC's petition manager acknowledged 
receipt of the petition and offered the Petitioners an opportunity to 
address the Petition Review Board (PRB). The Petitioners declined an 
opportunity to address the PRB on the basis that the petition already 
contained all of the relevant facts to support the PRB's review.
    The NRC sent a copy of the proposed director's decision to the 
Petitioners and to the licensees for comment by letters dated September 
18, 2017 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML17156A197 and ML17156A214). The 
Petitioners and the licensees were provided the opportunity to provide 
comments on any part of the proposed director's decision that was 
considered to be erroneous or any issues in the petition that were not 
addressed. The Petitioners provided comments by letter dated October 
11, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17291A040), and the Nuclear Energy 
Institute (NEI) provided comments, on behalf of licensees, by letter 
dated October 16, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17291A846). No new 
information was provided. To enhance the clarity of the director's 
decision, the NRC staff revised the description of the NRC's accident 
sequence precursor (ASP) program provided in Section D of the 
director's decision, to differentiate between condition and event 
assessments. The comments from the Petitioners and NEI, along with the 
NRC staff's responses to the comments, are included as an attachment to 
the director's decision. The attachment identifies any updates to the 
director's decision, as a result of comments received from the 
Petitioners and NEI.
    The Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, has determined 
that the request(s) to issue orders to operating reactor licensees 
regarding an open phase condition be denied. The reasons for this 
decision are explained in the Director's Decision DD-17-04, pursuant to 
10 CFR 2.206.
    The NRC will file a copy of the director's decision with the 
Secretary of the Commission for the Commission's review in accordance 
with 10 CFR 2.206. As provided by this regulation, the director's 
decision will constitute the final action of the Commission 25 days 
after the date of the decision unless the Commission, on its own 
motion, institutes a review of the director's decision in that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 19th day of December 2017.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Tanya M. Mensah,
Senior Project Manager, ROP Oversight and Generic Communications 
Branch, Division of Inspection and Regional Support, Office of Nuclear 
Reactor Regulation.
[FR Doc. 2017-27583 Filed 12-21-17; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 7590-01-P

Federal Register / Vol. 82, No. 245 / Friday, December 22, 2017 / Notices 60773

of a radiological emergency, to establish design-basis accident that will result in an taken by State and local government agencies
plume exposure and ingestion pathway offsite radiological release exceeding the EPA using a CEMP approach in the unlikely event
emergency planning zones for nuclear power early phase PAGs at the exclusion area of a radiological emergency at the FCS
plants, and to ensure that licensees maintain boundary. In the unlikely event of a beyond- facility. Since the underlying purposes of the
effective offsite and onsite radiological design-basis accident affecting the SFP that rules, as exempted, would continue to be
emergency plans. The standards and results in a complete loss of heat removal via achieved, even with the elimination of the
requirements in these regulations were all modes of heat transfer, there will be well requirements under 10 CFR part 50 to
developed by considering the risks associated over 10 hours available before an offsite maintain formal offsite radiological
with operation of a power reactor at its release might occur and, therefore, at least 10 emergency plans and reduction in the scope
licensed full-power level. These risks include hours to initiate appropriate mitigating of the onsite emergency planning activities at
the potential for a reactor accident with actions to restore a means of heat removal to FCS, the special circumstances required by
offsite radiological dose consequences. the spent fuel. If a radiological release were 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii) exist.
As discussed previously in Section III, projected to occur under this unlikely
scenario, a minimum of 10 hours is E. Environmental Considerations
because FCS is permanently shut down and
defueled, there is no longer a risk of a considered sufficient time for offsite In accordance with 10 CFR 51.31(a), the
significant offsite radiological release from a authorities to implement protective actions Commission has determined that the granting
design-basis accident exceeding EPA early using a CEMP approach to protect the health of this exemption will not have a significant
phase PAG at the exclusion area boundary and safety of the public. effect on the quality of the human
and the risk of a significant offsite Exemptions from the offsite EP environment as discussed in the NRC staff’s
radiological release from a beyond-design- requirements in 10 CFR part 50 have Finding of No Significant Impact and
basis accident is greatly reduced when previously been approved by the NRC when associated Environmental Assessment
compared to an operating power reactor. The the site-specific analyses show that at least published November 27, 2017 (82 FR 56060).
NRC staff has confirmed the reduced risks at 10 hours is available following a loss of SFP IV. Conclusions
FCS by comparing the generic risk coolant inventory accident with no air
assumptions in the analyses in NUREG–1738 cooling (or other methods of removing decay Accordingly, the Commission has
to site-specific conditions at FCS and heat) until cladding of the hottest fuel determined, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12(a), that
determined that the risk values in NUREG– assembly reaches the zirconium rapid OPPD’s request for exemptions from certain
1738 bound the risks presented by FCS. As oxidation temperature. The NRC staff EP requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR
indicated by the results of the research concluded in its previously granted 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E,
conducted for NUREG–1738 and more exemptions, as it does with the OPPD Section IV, and as summarized in Table 1 of
recently, for NUREG–2161, ‘‘Consequence requested EP exemptions, that if a minimum the exemption dated December 11, 2017, are
Study of a Beyond-Design-Basis Earthquake of 10 hours is available to initiate mitigative authorized by law, will not present an undue
Affecting the Spent Fuel Pool for a U.S. Mark actions consistent with plant conditions, or risk to the public health and safety, and are
I Boiling Water Reactor’’ (ADAMS Accession if needed, for offsite authorities to implement consistent with the common defense and
No. ML14255A365), while other protective actions using a CEMP approach, security. Also, special circumstances are
consequences can be extensive, accidents then formal offsite radiological emergency present. Therefore, the Commission hereby
from SFPs with significant decay time have plans, required under 10 CFR part 50, are not grants OPPD’s exemptions from certain EP
little potential to cause offsite early fatalities, necessary at permanently shutdown and requirements of 10 CFR 50.47(b), 10 CFR
even if the formal offsite radiological EP defueled facilities. 50.47(c)(2), and 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E,
requirements were relaxed. The licensee’s Additionally, FCS committed to Section IV, as discussed and evaluated in
analysis of a beyond-design-basis accident maintaining SFP makeup strategies in its detail in the staff’s safety evaluation dated
involving a complete loss of SFP water letter to the NRC dated December 16, 2016 December 11, 2017. The exemptions are
inventory, based on an adiabatic heatup (ADAMS Accession No. ML16356A578). The effective as of April 7, 2018.
analysis of the limiting fuel assembly for multiple strategies for providing makeup to Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 11th day
decay heat, shows that within 530 days (1 the SFP include: using existing plant systems of December, 2017.
year, 165 days) after shutdown, the time for for inventory makeup; an internal strategy For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
the limiting fuel assembly to reach 900 °C is that relies on the fire protection system with
10 hours after the assemblies have been redundant pumps (one diesel-driven and Kathryn M. Brock,
uncovered assuming a loss of air cooling. electric motor-driven); and onsite diesel fire Acting Director, Division of Operating
The only analyzed beyond-design-basis truck that can take suction from the Missouri Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor
accident scenario that progresses to a River. These strategies will continue to be Regulation.
condition where a significant offsite release required as license condition 3.G, [FR Doc. 2017–27590 Filed 12–21–17; 8:45 am]
might occur, involves the very unlikely event ‘‘Mitigation Strategy License Condition.’’ BILLING CODE 7590–01–P
where the SFP drains in such a way that all Considering the very low probability of
modes of cooling or heat transfer are assumed beyond-design-basis accidents affecting the
to be unavailable, which is referred to as an SFP, these diverse strategies provide multiple
adiabatic heatup of the spent fuel. The methods to obtain additional makeup or
NUCLEAR REGULATORY
licensee’s analysis of this beyond-design- spray to the SFP before the onset of any COMMISSION
basis accident shows that within 530 days (1 postulated offsite radiological release. [NRC–2016–0061]
year, 165 days) after shutdown, more than 10 For all the reasons stated above, the NRC
hours would be available between the time staff finds that the licensee’s requested In the Matter of All Operating Reactor
the fuel is initially uncovered (at which time exemptions to meet the underlying purpose Licensees
adiabatic heatup is conservatively assumed of all of the standards in 10 CFR 50.47(b),
to begin), until the fuel cladding reaches a and requirements in 10 CFR 50.47(c)(2) and AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory
temperature of 1652 degrees Fahrenheit (900 10 CFR part 50, Appendix E, acceptably Commission.
°C), which is the temperature associated with satisfy the special circumstances in 10 CFR ACTION: Director’s decision under 10
rapid cladding oxidation and the potential 50.12(a)(2)(ii) in view of the greatly reduced
for a significant radiological release. This risk of offsite radiological consequences
CFR 2.206; issuance.
sradovich on DSK3GMQ082PROD with NOTICES

analysis conservatively does not include the associated with the permanently shutdown SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
period of time from the initiating event and defueled state of the FCS facility.
Commission (NRC) has issued a
causing a loss of SFP water inventory until The NRC staff has concluded that the
all cooling means are lost. exemptions being granted by this action will director’s decision in response to a
The NRC staff has verified OPPD’s analyses maintain an acceptable level of emergency petition dated February 19, 2016, filed
and its calculations. The analyses provide preparedness at FCS and, if needed, that by Roy Mathew, Sheila Ray, Swagata
reasonable assurance that in granting the there is reasonable assurance that adequate Som, Gurcharan Singh Matharu, Tania
requested exemptions to OPPD, there is no offsite protective measures can and will be Martinez Navedo, Thomas Koshy, and

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Document Created: 2017-12-22 00:34:05
Document Modified: 2017-12-22 00:34:05

Category		Regulatory Information
Collection		Federal Register
sudoc Class		AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106:
Publisher		Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration
Section		Notices
Action		Director's decision under 10 CFR 2.206; issuance.
Dates		The director's decision was issued on December 12, 2017.
Contact		Tanya Mensah, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-3610, email: [email protected]
FR Citation		82 FR 60773