83 FR 19302 - Exelon Generation Company, LLC

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Federal Register Volume 83, Issue 85 (May 2, 2018)

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued a director's decision in response to a petition dated February 8, 2017, filed by Mr. Barry Quigley (the petitioner), requesting that the NRC take action with regard to Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon or the licensee). The petitioner's requests and the director's decision are included in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.

[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 85 (Wednesday, May 2, 2018)]
[Notices]
[Pages 19302-19304]
From the Federal Register Online  [www.thefederalregister.org]
[FR Doc No: 2018-09210]


=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. STN 50-454, STN 50-455, STN 50-456, and STN 50-457; NRC-
2018-0081]


Exelon Generation Company, LLC

AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Director's decision under 10 CFR 2.206; issuance.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued a 
director's decision in response to a petition dated February 8, 2017, 
filed by Mr. Barry Quigley (the petitioner), requesting that the NRC 
take action with regard to Exelon Generation Company, LLC (Exelon or 
the licensee). The petitioner's requests and the director's decision 
are included in the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION section of this document.

DATES: The director's decision was issued on April 24, 2018.

ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2018-0081 when contacting the 
NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You 
may obtain publicly[dash]available information related to this document 
using any of the following methods:
     Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2018-0081. Address 
questions about NRC dockets to Jennifer Borges; telephone: 301-287-
9127; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact 
the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of 
this document.
     NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System 
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the 
ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and 
then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, 
please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 
1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. The 
ADAMS accession number for each document referenced (if it is available 
in ADAMS) is provided the first time that it is mentioned in this 
document. In addition, for the convenience of the reader, the ADAMS 
accession numbers are provided in a table in the ``Availability of 
Documents'' section of this document.
     NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public 
documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 
Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Joel Wiebe, Office of Nuclear Reactor 
Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington DC 20555-
0001, telephone: 301-415-6606; e-mail: [email protected].

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the director's decision is 
attached.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 26th day of April, 2018.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
Joel S. Wiebe,
Senior Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch III, Division of 
Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.
Attachment--Director's Decision DD-18-01

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION

In the Matter of Exelon Generation Company, LLC

Braidwood Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2

Docket Nos. STN 50[dash]456, 50[dash]457

License Nos. NPF[dash]72, NPF[dash]77

Byron Station, Unit Nos. 1 and 2

Docket Nos. STN 50[dash]454, 50[dash]455

License Nos. NPF[dash]37, NPF[dash]66

DIRECTOR'S DECISION UNDER 10 CFR 2.206

I. Introduction

    By e[dash]mail to Mr. Victor M. McCree, Executive Director for 
Operations, dated February 8, 2017 (Agencywide Documents Access and 
Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML17061A127), Mr. Barry 
Quigley filed a petition under Title 10, ``Energy,'' of the Code of 
Federal Regulations (10 CFR) 2.206, ``Requests for Action under this 
Subpart.'' Attachments to the petition are located at ADAMS 
Accession Nos. ML17061A126, ML17061A125, and ML17061A124. The 
petitioner requested that the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC or the Commission) take the following actions against Exelon 
Generation Company, LLC (Exelon), the licensee for Byron Station, 
Unit Nos. 1 and 2, and Braidwood Station, Units 1 and 2:
    1. Issue a violation under 10 CFR Part 50, ``Domestic Licensing 
of Production and Utilization Facilities,'' Appendix B, ``Quality 
Assurance Criteria for Nuclear Power Plants and Fuel Reprocessing 
Plants,'' Criterion III, ``Design Control,'' for deficiencies in the 
analysis of record (AOR) for the main steam isolation valve (MSIV) 
room pressurization following a high-energy line break (HELB).
    2. Issue a violation under 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion 
XVI, ``Corrective Action,'' for failure to update the AOR in a 
timely manner.
    3. Require Exelon to show that the consequences of the secondary 
missiles resulting from MSIV room pressurization do not have adverse 
consequences.
    4. Issue a Demand for Information under 10 CFR 2.204, ``Demand 
for Information,'' to compare and contrast the behavior of Exelon 
management as described in the petition with the NRC's policy 
statement on the attributes of a safety-conscious work environment 
(SCWE).
    5. Use Exelon's response to Item 4 above as a basis on which to 
determine whether to issue a ``chilling effects'' letter.
    As the basis for the request, the petitioner stated the 
following:
    1. (a)--Break enthalpies used in the MSIV room pressurization 
AOR are actually the thermodynamic internal energy of the steam, not 
the enthalpy. Because, in the range of interest, the internal energy 
is about 13 percent less than the enthalpy, the energy flow to the 
areas of concern is nonconservative.
    (b)--Steam flow from secondary piping is neglected.
    2. Corrective actions to resolve an issue in the AOR are long 
overdue (8 years) and improperly tracked.
    3. A proposed revision to the AOR shows that the MSIV room roof 
slabs will be ejected by the high pressures in the MSIV rooms 
becoming potential missiles.
    4. Management dismissed information in the updated final safety 
evaluation report (UFSAR) that supported the concerns about the AOR 
as ``excessive detail'' and directed personnel to remove the 
information. Management dismissed UFSAR internal inconsistency 
related to the ``Break Exclusion Zone'' without discussion or review 
and stated that the information supporting the concern could be 
deleted as an UFSAR cleanup item. Recently, there was an operability 
concern for which engineering management maintained a position of 
operability in the face of conflicting information. The information 
that engineering management relied on to support operability was 
demonstrably irrelevant.
    The petitioner met with the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation 
(NRR) Petition Review Board (PRB) on April 13, 2017, to clarify the 
basis for the petition. The NRC is treating the transcript of this 
meeting (ADAMS Accession No. ML17111A774) as a supplement to the 
petition. In its acknowledgement letter dated July 17, 2017 (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML17125A245), the NRC informed the petitioner that 
Items 1, 2, 4, and 5 were accepted for review under 10

[[Page 19303]]

CFR 2.206 and that the agency had referred the issues in the 
petition to NRR for appropriate action. This letter states that Item 
3 does not request enforcement action and, therefore, does not meet 
the criteria for acceptance for review under 10 CFR 2.206. However, 
the NRC informed the petitioner that the item is likely to be 
resolved when reviewing activities to address the AOR under Item 1.
    By letter dated July 26, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17166A362), 
the NRC requested that Exelon provide a voluntary response to the 
petition. By letter dated September 1, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML17255A824), Exelon provided its voluntary response.

II. Discussion

    1. Issue a violation under 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion 
III, for deficiencies in the AOR for the MSIV room pressurization 
following an HELB.
    The petitioner's basis and the licensee's September 1, 2017, 
voluntary response letter both identify errors in calculation 3C8-
0282-001, Revision 3. The licensee stated in its voluntary response 
letter that calculation 3C8-0282-001 is the design-basis analysis 
for the structural design of the MSIV house and the main steam 
tunnel. The regulation under 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion 
III, ``Design Control,'' requires, in part, that the licensee 
provide for verifying or checking the adequacy of design, such as by 
the performance of design reviews, by the use of alternate or 
simplified calculational methods, or by the performance of a 
suitable testing program. The NRC Region III staff conducted 
inspections at the Byron and Braidwood Stations between October 30 
and November 16, 2017. The inspectors identified that as of October 
22, 1996, and continuing through the date of the NRC inspections, 
the licensee failed to verify that Design Analysis 3C8-0282-001, 
Revision 3, which was the AOR addressing a postulated HELB in the 
safety-related main steam safety valve (MSSV) rooms [the petitioner 
and the licensee used the label MSIV house or room], would not cause 
a structural failure since it failed to apply worst-case 
environmental loading. The NRC Inspection Reports 05000454/455-2017-
010 for Byron Station and 05000456/457-2017-008 for Braidwood 
Station, dated December 15, 2017 (ADAMS Accession Nos. ML17349A917 
and ML17349A894, respectively), each identify a non-cited violation 
(NCV) of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, ``Design 
Control.''
    2. Issue a violation under 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion 
XVI, for failure to update the AOR in a timely manner.
    The petitioner's basis states that although the errors regarding 
the wrong break enthalpies in calculation 3C8-0282-001, Revision 3, 
were documented on June 30, 2008, in Issue Report 792213, ``MSLB 
Calc[ulation] Energy Release Error,'' the analysis still contains 
the nonconservative break enthalpies 8 years later. Exelon's 
voluntary response letter agrees that Issue Report 792213 for Byron 
Station and the related Issue Report 792215 for Braidwood Station 
were documented on June 30, 2008. Exelon's voluntary response letter 
shows that it issued a contract with a vendor to revise calculation 
3C8-0282-001, Revision 3, in February 2013; 5 years after 
identification of the error. In November 2013, the vendor provided a 
draft copy of a revision to calculation 3C8-0282-001 to Exelon for 
review. Currently, Exelon still has the analysis and proposed plant 
modifications under review to correct the analysis.
    The regulation under 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, 
``Corrective Action,'' requires, in part, that measures shall be 
established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as 
non-conformances, are promptly identified and corrected. The NRC 
Region III staff conducted inspections at the Byron and Braidwood 
Stations between October 30 and November 16, 2017. The inspectors 
identified that as of the dates of NRC inspections at Byron and 
Braidwood Stations, the licensee failed to promptly correct errors 
in Design Analysis 3C8[dash]0282[dash]001, Revision 3, for a main 
steam line break in the safety-related MSSV rooms [the petitioner 
and the licensee used the label MSIV house or room] and steam 
tunnels that were identified on June 30, 2008. The NRC Inspection 
Reports 05000454/455-2017-010 for Byron Station and 05000456/457-
2017-008 for Braidwood Station, dated December 15, 2017, each 
identify a NCV of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, 
``Corrective Action.''
    3. Require Exelon to show that the consequences of the secondary 
missiles resulting from MSIV room pressurization do not have adverse 
consequences.
    The July 17, 2017, acknowledgement letter informed the 
petitioner that this item did not meet the criteria for review under 
10 CFR 2.206 because it does not request enforcement action, as 
specified in Management Directive 8.11, ``Review Process for 10 CFR 
2.206 Petitions'' (MD 8.11). However, the licensee and NRC have 
taken action that addresses the issue raised by the petitioner. In 
September 2017, the licensee initiated operability evaluations 
(Operability Evaluation 17-002, Revision 0, for Braidwood Station 
and Operability Evaluation 17-001, Revision 0, for Byron Station) to 
address the consequences of secondary missiles from the MSIV room 
pressurization and has determined that no equipment safety functions 
are affected by potential missiles. During inspections conducted at 
Byron Station (Inspection Reports 05000454/455-2017-003 (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML17306A639) and 05000454/455-2017-010) and Braidwood 
Station (Inspection Reports 05000456/457-2017-003 (ADAMS Accession 
No. ML17306A664) and 05000456/457-2017-008), the NRC reviewed the 
licensee's revisions to the applicable operability evaluations and 
did not identify any concerns, but did identify NCVs of 10 CFR part 
50, Appendix B, Criterion III, ``Design Control,'' for the failure 
to identify design deficiencies involving secondary missiles from 
the MSSV room pressurization and NCVs of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix B, 
Criterion XVI, ``Corrective Action,'' for the failure to correct the 
design deficiencies.
    4. Issue a ``Demand for Information'' under 10 CFR 2.204, to 
compare and contrast the behavior of Exelon management as described 
in the petition with the NRC's policy statement on the attributes of 
an SCWE.
    As described in the NRC Enforcement Manual (ADAMS Accession No. 
ML102630150), a demand for information (DFI) is a formal request 
made to a licensee or applicant to obtain information for the NRC 
staff to determine whether an Order should be issued to modify, 
suspend, or revoke the license, or whether to take other enforcement 
action. The PRB determined that issuance of a DFI in this 
circumstance was not necessary to evaluate the SCWE concerns 
expressed in the petition. Consistent with MD 8.11, the NRC's letter 
dated July 26, 2017, requested that Exelon provide a voluntary 
response to the concerns raised in the petition. Exelon's September 
1, 2017, response, in part, provided the results of its evaluation 
of the SCWE at Byron Station. Exelon's evaluation included 
interviews with Braidwood Station personnel that were involved with 
the activities that the petitioner described in the petition. The 
evaluation concluded that the actions taken and behaviors 
demonstrated by Exelon management in response to the issues and 
activities cited in the petition dated February 8, 2017, demonstrate 
a healthy SCWE.
    The NRC conducted an inspection at Byron Station that ended on 
August 25, 2017 (Inspection Report 05000454/455-2017-007 (ADAMS 
Accession No. ML17276B174) that, in part, assessed the licensee's 
SCWE at Byron Station. Information obtained from interviews and 
focus groups (including with engineering personnel) indicated that 
an environment was established where licensee personnel felt free to 
raise nuclear safety issues without fear of retaliation. Licensee 
personnel were generally aware of and familiar with the corrective 
action program (CAP) and other processes, including the Employee 
Concerns Program (ECP) and the NRC's allegation process, through 
which concerns could be raised. In addition, a review of the types 
of issues in the ECP indicated that the licensee's staff members 
were appropriately using the CAP and ECP to identify issues. The 
inspection did not identify any examples where there was retaliation 
for raising nuclear safety issues. Documents regarding surveys and 
monitoring of the safety culture and SCWE generally supported the 
conclusions from the interviews. The inspection did not identify any 
chilling effect or impediment to the establishment of an SCWE at 
Byron Station.
    5. Use Exelon's response to Item 4 above as a basis on which to 
determine whether to issue a ``chilling effects'' letter.
    A chilling effect letter is a regulatory tool identified in the 
NRC Allegations Manual (ADAMS Accession No. ML17003A227) that the 
NRC uses to ensure that licensees are taking appropriate actions to 
foster a workplace environment that encourages employees to raise 
safety concerns and to feel free to do so without fear of 
retaliation, referred to as an SCWE. A chilling effect letter may be 
appropriate when there are indications of a chilled work 
environment, but no discrimination concern has been substantiated. 
Neither Exelon's voluntary response nor NRC's inspection at Byron 
Station, as discussed in Item 4, identified

[[Page 19304]]

evidence of a chilled environment at the Byron Station.

III. Conclusion

    The NRC staff conducted inspections at the Byron Station and 
Braidwood Station that assessed the licensee's compliance with the 
regulations under 10 CFR part 50, Appendix B, Criterion III, 
``Design Control,'' and Criterion XVI, ``Corrective Action,'' 
related to the adequacy of the AOR for the structural design of the 
MSIV house and the main steam tunnel, and took enforcement action as 
outlined in the inspection reports identified above. The NRC staff 
requested that the licensee evaluate the SCWE concerns expressed in 
the petition, and conducted an inspection that assessed the 
licensee's SCWE at Byron Station. Based on the licensee's voluntary 
response and the results of the inspection, the NRC staff did not 
identify challenges to the licensee's SCWE or evidence of a chilled 
environment at the Byron Station and, therefore, determined that 
issuance of a chilling effect letter was not warranted. Because 
these actions address the underlying concerns raised in requests 1, 
2, 4, and 5 of the petition, the petition is granted in part.
    As provided in 10 CFR 2.206(c), a copy of this director's 
decision will be filed with the Secretary of the Commission for 
review. As provided by this regulation, the decision will constitute 
the final action of the Commission 25 days after the date of the 
decision unless the Commission, on its own motion, institutes a 
review of the decision within that time.

    Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 24th day of April, 2018.

    For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Brian E. Holian,

Acting Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 2018-09210 Filed 5-1-18; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 7590-01-P