83 FR 21310 - Northern States Power Company: Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Federal Register Volume 83, Issue 90 (May 9, 2018)
Federal Register Volume 83, Issue 90 (May 9, 2018)
| Page Range | 21310-21316 | |
| FR Document | 2018-09801 |
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 90 (Wednesday, May 9, 2018)] [Notices] [Pages 21310-21316] From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org] [FR Doc No: 2018-09801] ======================================================================= ----------------------------------------------------------------------- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION [Docket No. 50-263; NRC-2018-0090] Northern States Power Company: Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Exemption; issuance. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has issued an exemption for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, Docket No. 50- 263, in response to an April 6, 2017, request from Northern States Power Company. Specifically, the exemption is from the regulation that requires where redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions located within the same fire area outside of primary containment, one of the redundant trains remains free of fire damage by one of three methods of physical separation. DATES: The exemption was issued on May 1, 2018. ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID NRC-2018-0090 when contacting the NRC about the availability of information regarding this document. You may obtain publicly[dash]available information related to this document using any of the following methods:Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to http://www.regulations.gov and search for Docket ID NRC-2018-0090. Address questions about NRC dockets to Jennifer Borges; telephone: 301-287- 9127; email: [email protected]. For technical questions, contact the individual listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section of this document. NRC's Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS): You may obtain publicly-available documents online in the ADAMS Public Documents collection at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/adams.html. To begin the search, select ``ADAMS Public Documents'' and then select ``Begin Web-based ADAMS Search.'' For problems with ADAMS, please contact the NRC's Public Document Room (PDR) reference staff at 1-800-397-4209, 301-415-4737, or by email to [email protected]. The ADAMS accession number for each document referenced (if it is available in ADAMS) is provided the first time that it is mentioned in the attached exemption. In addition, for the convenience of the reader, the ADAMS accession numbers are provided in a table in the ``Availability of Documents'' section of the exemption. NRC's PDR: You may examine and purchase copies of public documents at the NRC's PDR, Room O1-F21, One White Flint North, 11555 Rockville Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Robert F. Kuntz, Office or Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-3733, email: [email protected]. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of the exemption is attached. Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 3rd day of May 2018. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Robert F. Kuntz, Senior Project Manager, Plant Licensing Branch III, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. Attachment--Exemption NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Docket No. 50-263 Northern States Power Company Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Exemption I. Background Northern States Power Company, doing business as Xcel Energy (the licensee), is the holder of Renewed Facility Operating License Number 50-263, which authorizes operation of the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant (Monticello). The license provides, among other things, that the facility is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC or the Commission) now or hereafter in effect. The facility consists of a boiling water reactor located in Wright County, Minnesota. II. Request/Action In its letter dated April 6, 2017 (Agencywide Documents Access and Management System (ADAMS) Accession No. ML17096A599), as supplemented by its letter dated November 20, 2017 (ADAMS Accession No. ML17324B361), the licensee requested an exemption from Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, which requires that where redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions are located within the same fire area outside of primary containment, that one of the redundant trains remains free of fire damage by either a 3-hour rated barrier; or 20 feet horizontal separation, no intervening combustibles, and detection and suppression system; or a 1-hour barrier, and detection and suppression systems. The licensee requested NRC approval for Monticello to use a method to maintain a hot shutdown train free of fire damage that is not one of the acceptable methods listed in 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. The licensee's exemption request is intended to justify why the proposed alternative, the use of a shorting switch, is acceptable in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.12, Specific Exemptions. The regulatory framework that applies to Monticello is contained in 10 CFR 50.48(b)(1) which requires that plants licensed before January 1, 1979, to meet Sections III.G, J, and O, of Appendix R to 10 CFR part 50. Monticello began commercial operations in 1971. Section III.G.2 of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, requires, that, ``where cables or equipment, including associated non-safety circuits that could prevent operation or cause maloperation due to hot shorts, open circuits, or shorts to ground, of redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions are located within the same fire area outside of primary containment, one of the following means of ensuring that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage shall be provided: a. Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating. Structural steel forming a part of or supporting such fire barriers shall be protected to provide fire resistance equivalent to that of the barrier; b. Separation of cables and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of redundant trains by a horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with no intervening combustible or fire hazards. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area; or c. Enclosure of cable and equipment and associated non-safety circuits of one redundant train in a fire barrier having a 1-hour fire rating. In addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire suppression system shall be installed in the fire area.'' In its April 29, 2014, triennial fire protection inspection report 05000263/2014008, (ADAMS Accession No. ML14119A216), the NRC staff identified two pairs of Drywell Spray (DWS) motor-operated valve (MOV) control cables that are not [[Page 21311]] protected in accordance with an acceptable option provided in 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. In 2012, the licensee installed a modification, called a shorting switch, to mitigate the lack of protection. The shorting switch modification had been approved for use at some plants that had adopted a risk-informed (RI), performance-based (PB) fire protection program (FPP) under 10 CFR 50.48(c)(4). Although Monticello had at one time expressed intent to adopt a 10 CFR 50.48(c)(4) FPP (ADAMS Accession No. ML053460342), Monticello later withdrew its letter of intent (ADAMS Accession No. ML102000433). The requirements at 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, require that hot shorts and open circuits be considered, and the licensee's analysis showed that the shorting switch modification could fail to meet its design purpose if certain hot shorts and open circuits were to occur due to fire damage. Therefore, on April 6, 2017, the licensee submitted an RI request for an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, to address postulated spurious actuations of the DWS MOVs that could occur in the event that an open circuit caused the shorting switch to fail to perform its function. III. Discussion Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the Commission may, upon application by any interested person or upon its own initiative, grant exemptions from the regulations when: (1) the exemptions are authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to public health or safety, and are consistent with the common defense and security; and (2) when special circumstances are present. The licensee requested an exemption from 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, claiming that the special circumstances of 10 CFR 50.12(a)(2)(ii), which states that, ``Application of the regulation in the particular circumstances would not serve the underlying purposed of the rule or is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule,'' apply. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, is to provide reasonable assurance of fire protection of safe shutdown capability by providing a means to ensure that one of the redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions is free of fire damage. The licensee's position is that the safety benefit, when measured using accepted probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) techniques, is ``virtually'' the same as if the plant had used one of the three separation options described in 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2.a, b, or c. The NRC staff's evaluation of the licensee's exemption request is provided below. 3.1 Deterministic Technical Evaluation The fire scenario, as described in the licensee's exemption request, is that there will be spurious operation of two normally closed DWS MOVs due to a fire. The cables are routed from the control room and may be subject to a fire in three other rooms. Two of the rooms are in Fire Area IX, the rooms (called fire zones) are Fire Zone 13C--Turbine Building East--Engineered Safeguards Feature Motor Control Center Area, and Fire Zone 19C--Turbine Building East--Pipe and Cable Tray Penetration Area. The third room is in Fire Area XII, Fire Zone 19B, Turbine Building East and Engineered Safeguards Features Motor Control Center Cable Tunnel. It is within these three rooms that the separation required by 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, is not provided. The scenario postulates that a fire in one of these areas could damage the control cables to the two DWS MOVs and cause the normally closed valves to spuriously open. If these valves were to open while the same division's residual heat removal (RHR) pump were operating, the scenario postulates that the RHR pumps would be damaged and safe shutdown capability would be impaired. 3.1.1 Explanation of Postulated Scenario and Shorting Switch Modification The NRC staff evaluated the licensee's analysis of how the protection provided by the shorting switch compares to the 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 requirement that one train be free of fire damage by comparing the installed shorting switch configuration to the configuration required by the regulation. This section includes a discussion of how the installed shorting switch works to prevent a spurious opening of the DWS MOVs. To reduce the likelihood of a spurious actuation, the licensee installed a shorting switch on one of the valves in series. There are two trains of DWS. A shorting switch is installed on MOV MO-2020 (Division I), and installed on MOV MO-2021 (Division II). The other valves in series, MOVs MO-2022 (Division I) and MO-2023 (Division II), are not equipped with a shorting switch, and therefore may be subject to an energized cable fault that could cause a spurious opening of those valves. Figure 1 of the licensee's exemption request includes a one-line diagram of the system. When the control room switch is in the closed position, the shorting switch creates an electrical circuit that provides a low impedance path bypassing the valve's ``open'' coil. If an energized cable fault or hot short were to occur that would energize the ``open'' coil, this low impedance path would divert enough current away from the ``open'' coil through the shorting switch electrical circuit to prevent the ``open'' coil from actuating. When the control room switch is set to the open position, this low impedance path is removed from the circuit and the valve can be opened normally. The shorting switch only functions to prevent spurious actuation of the valve in the event of an energized cable fault. A simplified shorting switch circuit is shown in Figure 2 of the licensee's exemption request. The fire scenario of concern would involve three fire-induced failures. First, an energized cable fault or hot short would need to occur on control circuitry for the DWS MOV that does not have a shorting switch installed, for example MO-2022. Second, the fire would need to cause a cable to become severed, also called an open circuit, on one of the conductors for the shorting switch protected valves, such as MO-2020. Third, the fire would have to cause that same severed cable to MO-2020 to be exposed to an energized cable fault or hot short. Essentially the severed cable would remove the shorting switch from the circuit, thereby, defeating the design capability of the shorting switch. Similarly, the pair of valves MO[dash]2021 and MO-2023 would be vulnerable to the same potential failure mode. Note that both valves in a pair, MO-2020 and MO-2022 or MO-2021 and MO-2023, would need to be impacted to remove the shorting switch from the circuit. A hot short from one cable in the first pair and one cable in the second pair would not create a condition where the RHR pumps could be damaged. 3.2 Risk-Informed Technical Evaluation The licensee's exemption request includes a risk assessment of the proposed plant change. The use of risk information in a 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, exemption request is in accordance with Regulatory Position 1.8 of Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.189, ``Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants,'' Revision 2, dated October 2009 (ADAMS Accession No. ML092580550), which says that RI/PB methodologies may be used to evaluate the acceptability of FPP changes; however, for this approach, the licensee should use methodologies and acceptance criteria that the NRC has reviewed and approved. RG 1.174, ``An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis,'' Revision 2, (ADAMS Accession No. ML100910006), includes guidance for RI changes to a plant's current licensing bases. Accordingly, the NRC staff reviewed the licensee's exemption request using the review methodology and criteria contained in RG 1.174, Revision 2, which includes the following elements: Defining the proposed change, Performing an engineering analysis, including an evaluation that the proposed change is consistent with the defense- in-depth (DID) philosophy and the principle that sufficient safety margins are maintained, Assessing the technical adequacy of the PRA analysis, the methods used to determine the risk impact of the proposed change, and the results of the risk impact assessment, Defining the implementation and monitoring program to ensure that no unexpected adverse safety degradation occurs due to the proposed change, and Confirming that an integrated approach was used to evaluate the proposed change. 3.2.1 Proposed Change to the Appendix R Program Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the licensee requested an exemption from 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 requirements with respect to the protection of the control circuitry for the DWS MOVs. In lieu of meeting the protection requirements of Section III.G.2, the licensee has installed a shorting switch modification on the control circuitry for one MOV in each division of the DWS system to reduce the risk impact of a fire-induced multiple spurious operation (MSO) that fails both MOVs. A detailed [[Page 21312]] description of the modification is provided in Enclosure 1, Section 3.1, of the licensee's exemption request. 3.2.2 Engineering Analysis Regulatory Position 2.1 of RG 1.174, Revision 2, indicates that, for RI changes to the plant licensing basis, the licensee should evaluate the proposed change to determine whether it is consistent with the DID philosophy and the principle that sufficient safety margins are maintained. Fire Protection DID Regulatory Position 2.1.1 of RG 1.174, Revision 2, provides guidance on maintaining the philosophy of nuclear safety DID and identifies several elements to consider in this evaluation. DID involves prevention, protection, and mitigation. With respect to nuclear power plant FPPs, the regulations in 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section II.A state that the FPP shall extend the concept of DID to fire protection in fire areas important to safety with the following objectives: to prevent fires from starting; to detect rapidly, control, and extinguish promptly those fires that do occur; and to provide protection for structures, systems and components important to safety so that a fire that is not promptly extinguished by the fire suppression activities will not prevent the safe shutdown of the plant. An engineering analysis that evaluates the impact of a proposed change to an Appendix R FPP on the balance among these FPP DID elements is deemed by the NRC staff to satisfy the RG 1.174 guidance. Enclosure 1, Section 3.2, of the exemption request provides the licensee's evaluation of the FPP DID elements. Fire protection DID elements consist of administrative controls such as plant procedures to limit combustible materials or control hot work activities, plant design features, fire protection inspections, installed fire detection and suppression systems, and passive fire protection features such as fire barriers. The licensee's position is that the use of a shorting switch meets the underlying purpose of the rule by providing equivalent protection to one of the separation methods of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. The licensee chose to install the shorting switch in lieu of possibly separating the cables for the valves in series (MO-2021 from MO-2023, and MO-2020 from MO-2022) into separate areas. The following sections discuss the fire protection DID elements of preventing fires, suppressing fires that do occur, and protecting safe shutdown. Fire Protection DID Element 1--Preventing Fires The licensee indicated that each of the three rooms has administratively controlled restrictions on combustibles. The licensee described that of the three zones, only Fire Area IX, Fire Zone 13C, has significant fixed ignition sources, which are motor control centers. The NRC staff finds that this exemption does not degrade the preventing fires DID element, because the proposed change does not introduce additional combustibles or ignition sources at such a level that necessitates additional controls be put in place to prevent fires from starting. Fire Protection DID Element 2--Detecting and Extinguishing Fires The licensee indicated that all three of the rooms addressed in this exemption are equipped with full area ionization smoke detection systems. Only Fire Area IX, Fire Zone 13C, has significant fixed ignition sources and it is equipped with an automatic water based suppression system which the licensee indicates is based on the significance of the fire hazards contained within that room. The smoke detection system annunciates to the control room which results in response of the fire brigade. Each of the three rooms included in this exemption has fire hose stations and fire extinguishers in the rooms or in adjacent rooms. Fire Area IX, Fire Zone 13C, and Fire Area XII, Fire Zone 19B, are 900 square feet, are considered large rooms, and have extinguishers and hose stations within the rooms. Fire Area IX, Fire Zone 19C, does not have a fire hose station or extinguisher in the room. Because Fire Area IX, Fire Zone 19C, has a small floor area of 204 square feet, the NRC staff concludes that it is reasonable that extinguishers and fire hoses could be brought from adjoining areas. The NRC staff also concludes that this exemption does not degrade the detecting and extinguishing fires DID element, because the installation of the switches (1) does not impact the ability of the installed detection and suppression systems to detect and extinguish a fire, and (2) does not impact the fire brigades ability to manually extinguish a fire using the installed extinguishers and fire hose stations. Fire Protection DID Element 3--Safe Shutdown The NRC staff determined that the safe shutdown element of fire protection DID is impacted by this exemption request. The licensee proposes to install an engineered feature called a shorting switch, in lieu of the protection required by 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. Compliance with the regulation by use of a barrier, or separation with fire detection and suppression, protects against possible failure modes, but the shorting switch modification results in a possible failure mode involving hot shorts and open circuits. 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, specifically states that a plant licensed before January 1, 1979, must address these failure modes (i.e., ``maloperation due to hot shorts [and] open circuits''). Although the licensee has chosen to use a RI analysis to compare compliance with the regulation and the proposed alternative using a shorting switch, the following deterministic features are in place, in addition to the fire prevention, fire detection, and fire suppression that are discussed above. A fire would have to occur in one of the three subject areas and damage the cables to two of the MOVs. One MOV cable would have to be subjected to an energized fault or hot short, and the second MOV cable would have to be subjected to both a hot short and a severed cable also called an open circuit. For the combination of cable faults to damage the RHR pumps, the pumps would have to be running at the time of the cable faults. Although possible in an actual plant event, the licensee did not assume in its evaluation that plant operators would turn off the pumps before they became damaged. The NRC staff considers this assumption to be conservative because the licensee indicated that operators would initiate a controlled shutdown to preclude equipment failures. Additionally, the NRC staff determined that hot shorts would have to be of sufficient duration to open the MOVs enough to result in a flow that would cause RHR pump failure due to runout and that typically, hot shorts are of a very short duration. These aspects of the scenario, the likelihood of cable faults, the assumption that the RHR pumps are operating, and the possible operator actions and timing related to mitigating the potentially damaging configuration were not explicitly credited in the analysis. The NRC staff has determined that the DID discussion regarding prevention, protection, and mitigation satisfies the RG 1.174 guidance for a DID analysis because it discussed multiple means to accomplish safety functions in accordance with the guidance provided in Regulatory Position 2.1.1 of RG 1.174. Safety Margins In Enclosure 1, Section 3.4.3, of the exemption request, the licensee provided its assessment of how sufficient safety margins are maintained. The licensee explained that the design and installation of the shorting switches was completed using applicable codes and standards and that the Monticello safety analyses were not impacted by the installation of the switches or the exemption request. In its letter dated November 20, 2017, in response to the NRC's October 18, 2017, request for additional information (RAI) (ADAMS Accession No. ML17293A091), the licensee indicated that sufficient safety margins are demonstrated by the design, operation, and performance monitoring of the shorting switches. The licensee indicated that the RHR system currently meets all applicable codes and standards (with the exception of the stated 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 noncompliance), and also stated that granting the exemption will not affect Monticello's ability to demonstrate consistency with all applicable codes and standards. In its November 20, 2017, letter, the licensee also summarized some of the PRA bases for ensuring sufficient safety margins. The summarized bases included maintaining a FPP that meets regulatory requirements, using a fire PRA (FPRA) that was developed in accordance with NUREG/CR-6850, ``Fire PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power Facilities,'' having had formal industry peer reviews of internal events PRAs (IEPRAs) and FPRAs, and using verified and validated fire models. The NRC staff concludes that the licensee's safety margins assessment is acceptable because it demonstrated that codes and standards or their alternatives approved by the NRC are met, and that the safety analysis acceptance criteria described in the licensing basis are met. [[Page 21313]] 3.2.3 PRA The licensee performed a risk impact assessment for installation of the shorting switches rather than physically separating the control circuitry for the DWS MOVs in accordance with the 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, separation requirements. For the assessment, the risk was evaluated by estimating the change in risk between an Appendix R-compliant configuration and the as-installed and as- operated configuration of the shorting switches. The risk assessment was provided in Enclosure 1, Section 3.3, of the licensee's exemption request. Technical Adequacy of the PRA The licensee used Revision 4.0 of the Monticello FPRA model to perform the risk impact assessment. For the development of the FPRA, the licensee modified its IEPRA model to capture the effects of fire. Therefore, the NRC staff evaluated both the IEPRA and FPRA quality information provided by the licensee in the exemption request to determine whether the plant-specific PRA used in the risk impact assessment includes sufficient scope, level of detail, and technical adequacy for this assessment. Consistent with the information provided in NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2007[dash]06, ``Regulatory Guide 1.200 Implementation,'' March 22, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. ML070650428), the NRC staff uses RG 1.200, ``An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities,'' Revision 2 (ADAMS Accession No. ML090410014). The licensee stated that a full-scope peer review was performed in April 2013, for the IEPRA model (Revision 3.2). The peer review was performed using Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 05-04, Revision 2, ``Process for Performing Internal Events PRA Peer Reviews Using the ASME/ANS [American Society of Mechanical Engineers/American Nuclear Society] PRA Standard'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML083430462), as clarified by RG 1.200, Revision 2. The PRA standard provides supporting requirements for the PRA against capability categories (CC) CC-I, CC-II, or CC-Ill. The peer review resulted in identification of PRA standard supporting requirements that did not meet CC-II, or that were met and had related findings (Reference: Evaluation of Risk Significance of Permanent Integrated Leak Rate Testing Extension--ML16047A273). In Enclosure 2 of the exemption request, the licensee provided the peer review finding-level facts and observations (F&Os) against the PRA standard supporting requirements and the licensee's resolution to each of the F&Os. The licensee stated that all of the finding-level F&Os have been resolved and that none were determined to affect the exemption request. The licensee stated that a full-scope peer review of the FPRA model (Revision 1a) was performed in March 2015, using NEI 07-12, Revision 1, ``Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (FPRA) Peer Review Process Guidelines,'' June 2010 (ADAMS Accession No. ML102230070), and RG 1.200, Revision 2. The peer review resulted in identification of PRA standard supporting requirements that did not meet CC-II, or CC-III for one supporting requirement (Reference: Monticello ILRT license amendment--ML16047A273). In Enclosure 3 of the exemption request, the licensee provided the peer review finding-level F&Os against the PRA standard supporting requirements and its resolution to each of the F&Os. The licensee stated that all of the finding- level F&Os have been resolved and that none were determined to affect the exemption request. The licensee stated that a focused-scope peer review of Revision 4.0 of the FPRA model was performed in December 2016, of a subset of high-level requirements impacted by the use of enhanced fire modeling methods that were implemented subsequent to the March 2015, peer review. The licensee provided the two peer review finding-level F&Os from this focused-scope peer review in Enclosure 4 of the exemption request. The licensee stated that the two finding-level F&Os have been resolved and that neither was determined to affect the exemption request. The licensee also stated that the PRA used in the risk impact assessment represents the current as-installed and as-operated configuration of Monticello. The NRC staff reviewed the exemption request to determine the technical adequacy of the Monticello IEPRA and FPRA models used for this exemption request. The licensee stated that it evaluated its PRA against Revision 2 of RG 1.200 and the ASME/ANS PRA standard. The licensee stated that it had resolved all peer review and focused-scope peer review finding-level F&Os and concluded that they had no impact on the exemption request. Based on the information provided by the licensee, the NRC staff found that the licensee's PRA represents the current as-installed and as-operated plant, and the margin between the reported risk values and the guidance recommended values is acceptable. The NRC staff concludes that the IEPRA is adequate and can be used to support the FPRA because the licensee demonstrated that the resolution of the F&Os did not affect the technical adequacy of the licensee's PRA analysis submitted to support the licensee's risk evaluation of the proposed exemption request. The NRC staff concludes that the IEPRA is adequate and can be used to support the FPRA because the licensee demonstrated that the resolution of the F&Os support the technical adequacy of the licensee's PRA analysis submitted for the licensee's risk evaluation of the proposed exemption request. The NRC staff also concludes that the FPRA is of sufficient technical adequacy and that its quantitative results can be used to demonstrate that the change in risk due to the lack of physical separation between the DWS division meets the acceptance guidelines in RG 1.174 because the licensee demonstrated that the resolution of the relevant F&Os supports the determination that the quantitative results are adequate and have no significant impact on the FPRA. For several F&Os, the NRC staff determined that the resolutions could impact the delta risk results reported in the exemption request, but that their resolution is unlikely to change the delta risk results reported by the licensee in the exemption request enough to increase the delta core damage frequency (CDF) and the delta large early release frequency (LERF) by an amount necessary to exceed the RG 1.174 risk guidelines for very small changes. Based on the above, NRC staff concludes that the FPRA model is of sufficient technical adequacy to support the risk impact assessment of the proposed change. Risk Impact Assessment The licensee stated that the evaluation of the risk for the proposed change was done using Revision 4.0 of the Monticello FPRA model to estimate the change in risk between an Appendix R-compliant configuration and the as-installed and as-operated configuration of the shorting switches. In Enclosure 1, Section 3.3.3, of the exemption request, the licensee described how it developed the risk of the as-installed and as-operated configuration of the plant with shorting switches installed. For this plant configuration, the licensee modified the FPRA model to include new basic events to fail the DWS MOVs due to fire-induced MSOs (referred to as the ``variant model''). The model modification included identifying the cables that could cause a DWS MOV MSO, identifying the plant locations (fire zones) where these cables are located in the plant, and linking these cables to specific fire scenarios modeled in the FPRA. The exemption request also described the revised fault tree logic that incorporated the new basic events. Each of the two DWS trains includes two-normally-closed in- series MOVs that could fail open due to a fire-induced MSO and result in core damage. Each in-series pair of DWS MOVs were added together in the fault tree and assigned a hot short probability. The MOVs without a shorting switch have a hot short probability of 0.39, which is taken from Volume 2 of NUREG/CR-7150, ``Joint Assessment of Cable Damage and Quantification of Effects from Fire (JACQUE-FIRE)'' (ADAMS Accession No. ML14141A129). The MOVs with a shorting switch are assumed to have a failure probability of 1.0E-03, which is the assumed failure probability of the shorting switch. In enclosure 1, section 3.3.5 of the exemption request, the licensee justified its use of the 1.0E-03 failure probability by explaining that it was found acceptable by the NRC staff in the safety evaluations related to National Fire Protection Association 805 license amendment requests by other licensees (see ADAMS Accession Nos. ML15212A796 and ML16223A481). The licensee stated that the control circuitry configuration for the shorting switch application at these plants is substantially similar to that for the Monticello DWS MOVs. The NRC staff finds that the use of a hot short probability of 0.39 is acceptable because it is the most bounding of the MOV hot short probabilities for grounded and ungrounded alternate current control circuits as described in Table 8-1 of NUREG/CR-7150, Volume 2. The NRC staff also finds that the licensee's use of the 1.0E-3 failure probability for the shorting switches is acceptable because the conditions that would [[Page 21314]] have to occur to fail a shorting switch are considered extremely unlikely. The exemption request further explained that the flow diversion created by the failure of just one train of DWS MOVs (i.e., spurious opening of both in-series MOVs) was assumed to result in damage of the RHR pumps because activation of the Drywell Sprays would result in lowering the drywell pressure. This in turn could result in the potential loss of containment accident pressure, which leads to a loss of net positive suction head and which, in turn, would fail the RHR pumps. All RHR pumps are potentially damaged because the RHR removal cross[dash]tie valves are normally kept open. The failure of the RHR pumps and loss of net positive suction head result in failure of all associated functions modeled in the PRA (except DWS), specifically: Shutdown cooling, Low pressure coolant injection (LPCI), Torus cooling (which fails high pressure coolant injection and reactor coolant isolation cooling when suction is from the torus), Core spray, Alternate injection with condensate service water, the fire protection system, or RHR service water, and Primary containment. Because of the failure of RHR pumps, the torus sprays would also fail, which is not modeled in the PRA. In Enclosure 1, Section 3.3.2, of the exemption request, the licensee described how it developed the risk of the Appendix R- compliant configuration. For this plant configuration, the licensee revised the FPRA model to assume the DWS MOVs do not fail due to a fire-induced MSO (referred to as the ``compliant model''). The licensee explained that its assumption is conservative because it assumes a failure probability of zero for the DWS MOVs due to a fire[dash]induced MSO. The NRC staff concludes that this assumption is conservative because, although unlikely, there is a greater-than- zero probability of a large enough fire that could defeat the Appendix R protection requirements and produce a MSO that would fail the MOVs. In Enclosure 1, Section 3.3.4, of the exemption request, the license explained that it calculated the change in risk for the proposed change by subtracting the calculated risk (CDF) and LERF) for the compliant model from the calculated risk for the variant model. Furthermore, in Enclosure 1, Section 3.3.5, of the exemption request, the licensee identified several conservatisms in the PRA model that would overestimate the calculated change in risk. These conservatisms include: the assumption that all postulated control room fires fail the shorting switches, assumption that the RHR pumps are running at the time of the MSO event, and the assumption that the loss of containment accident pressure and net positive suction head is instantaneous with the MSO event. The NRC staff finds that these conservatisms make the model overestimate the calculated change in risk because not all control room fires fail the shorting switches, because the RHR pumps may not be running at the time of the MSO event, and because loss of containment accident pressure and net positive suction head may not be instantaneous with the MSO event. Based on the licensee's description of the fault tree modeling of the MSO event in the compliant and variant models, the NRC staff concludes that the hot short probability and shorting switch failure probability are acceptable, and that the calculated change in risk is likely conservative. The NRC staff further concludes that the licensee's method for calculating the change in risk is acceptable. PRA Results and Comparison with Risk Guidelines In Enclosure 1, Section 3.3.4, of the exemption request, the licensee reported the results of its risk impact assessment. The licensee reported the calculated change in risk (variant model risk minus compliant model risk) for the proposed plant change to be 1.8E-08 per year for CDF and 1.4E-08 per year for LERF, which are below the RG 1.174, Revision 2, risk guidelines for a ``very small'' change. Based on its review of the risk impact assessment results, and the margin between the reported risk values and the risk guidelines, the NRC staff concludes that the increase in CDF and LERF from the proposed change is very small per the definition in RG 1.174, Revision 2. Also, while the licensee did not provide the total plant risk from all hazards, the NRC staff finds this acceptable and consistent with RG 1.174, Revision 2, because there is no indication that the total CDF and LERF is considerably higher than 1.0E-04 and 1.0E-05 per reactor year, respectively. 3.2.4 Implementation and Monitoring In Enclosure 1, Section 3.4.5, of the exemption request, the licensee described the implementation and the monitoring program for the shorting switches and the DWS MOVs. The licensee explained that the shorting switches were installed in 2012 and that post- maintenance testing was conducted to ensure that the switches were installed in accordance with the approved design and that the MOVs continued to operate as expected. The DWS MOVs will continue to be regularly exercised in accordance with the Monticello MOV program, which has been accepted by the NRC staff, as providing an acceptable level of quality and safety, and are monitored under the Monticello Maintenance Rule Program. In its November 20, 2017, letter, the licensee indicated that Monticello will generate a preventive maintenance task for the shorting switches to ensure acceptable resistance, and that this task will be completed within 180 days of the date of the exemption is issued. The licensee will introduce performance monitoring of the shorting switches into the Monticello, Appendix R, program, with the objective to ensure the shorting switches provide a low impedance path to ground in the event of a fire-induced hot short. The program will include acceptance criteria, which if exceeded, will cause the licensee to enter the issue into its corrective action program. The NRC staff concludes that the proposed monitoring program for the shorting switches meets the guidelines of RG 1.174, Revision 2, and that RI applications include performance monitoring and feedback provisions. 3.2.5 Integrated Decision-making As described in the previous sections, the licensee's exemption request and responses to NRC staff RAIs provided an integrated approach to evaluating the proposed change. Specifically, the licensee's assessment of the proposed change included: Performing a traditional engineering analysis, including an evaluation that the proposed change is consistent with the DID philosophy and the principle that sufficient safety margins are maintained, Assessing the technical adequacy of the PRA analysis, evaluating the risk impact of the proposed change, and comparing the results of the risk impact assessment to the RG 1.174, Revision 2, risk guidelines, and Defining the implementation of the proposed change and of a monitoring program to ensure that no unexpected adverse safety degradation occurs due to the proposed change. Based on the NRC staff's review of each of these elements of the licensee's exemption request, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's evaluations are acceptable and in accordance with RG 1.174, Revision 2, and that the risk increase of the proposed change meets the RG 1.174, Revision 2, risk guidelines for a ``very small'' change. Based on this, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's integrated evaluation of the proposed change is acceptable. 3.3 Technical Evaluation Conclusion Based on its review of the information provided by the licensee, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's request to credit a shorting switch does not create any new accident precursors because the plant's operation remains the same in that fire protection for structures, systems, and components important to safe shutdown continues to be provided, and fire damage continues to be limited so that one of the redundant trains is free of fire. The NRC staff also concludes that the licensee's evaluations are acceptable and in accordance with RG 1.174, Revision 2, and that the risk increase of the proposed change meets the RG 1.174, Revision 2, risk guidelines for a ``very small'' change. Based on this, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's integrated evaluation of the proposed change is acceptable. 3.4 Authorized by Law The exemption would allow the licensee to rely on the installed shorting switch and other fire protection DID features instead of providing separation in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. As stated above, 10 CFR 50.12 allows the NRC to grant exemptions from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50. The NRC staff has determined, as described in Section 3.7 below, that special circumstances exist to grant the proposed exemption and that granting of the licensee's proposed exemption will not result in a violation of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, or [[Page 21315]] the Commission's regulations. Therefore, the exemption is authorized by law. 3.5 No Undue Risk to Public Health and Safety The underlying purposes of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, is to provide reasonable assurance of fire protection safe shutdown capability. As discussed in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 above, the NRC staff found that the crediting of a shorting switch permitted by the proposed exemption does not create any new accident precursors or degrade detection systems because the plant's operation remains the same and the installed shorting switch provides an acceptable level of protection as compared to that provided by compliance with the regulation. Because no new accident precursors are created by the proposed exemption, which would allow the licensee to use, or take credit using a risk-informed approach, for an installed shorting switch to ensure that one redundant train is free of fire damage, the probability of postulated accidents is not significantly increased, and reasonable assurance of fire protection of safe shutdown capability is maintained. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that the consequences of postulated accidents are not significantly increased, and there is no undue risk to public health and safety. 3.6 Consistent with Common Defense and Security The proposed exemption would allow the licensee to rely on the installed shorting switch instead of providing separation required by 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. The NRC staff concludes that this change to the plant design has no relation to security issues, therefore, the common defense and security is not impacted by this exemption. 3.7 Special Circumstances Special circumstances, in accordance with 10 CFR 50.12, are present whenever an application of the regulation in the particular circumstances is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. The underlying purpose of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, is to provide reasonable assurance of fire protection of safe shutdown capability by providing a means to ensure that one of the redundant trains of systems necessary to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions is free of fire damage. The technical evaluation above demonstrates that the shorting switch and DID features provide reasonable assurance that the underlying purpose of the rule is met because the licensee demonstrated that the installed shorting switch provides an acceptable level of protection that is similar to that provided by compliance with the regulation. The licensee performed a deterministic engineering analysis and demonstrated that the proposed change is consistent with the DID philosophy and maintains sufficient safety margins. The licensee also assessed the technical adequacy of the PRA analysis and evaluated the risk impact of the proposed change and compared the results to the RG 1.174, Revision 2, risk guidelines, and also defined the implementation of the proposed change and of a monitoring program to ensure that no unexpected adverse safety degradation occurs due to the proposed change. Therefore, the NRC staff concludes that since the underlying purpose of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2 (i.e., ensuring one of the redundant trains of Drywell Spray is free of fire damage), is achieved, the special circumstances required by 10 CFR 50.12 for the granting of an exemption from 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, exist. IV. Environmental Considerations. The NRC staff determined that the issuance of the requested exemption meets the provisions of categorical exclusion 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9) because the exemption is from a requirement, with respect to the installation or use of a facility component located within the restricted area, as defined in 10 CFR part 20 and the issuance of the exemption involves: (i) No significant hazards consideration; (ii) no significant change in the types or significant increase in the amounts of any effluents that may be released offsite; and (iii) no significant increase in individual or cumulative occupational radiation exposure. Therefore, in accordance with 10 CFR 51.22(b), no environmental impact statement or environmental assessment need be prepared in connection with the NRC's issuance of this exemption. The basis for the NRC staff's determination is provided in the following evaluation of the requirements in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9)(i)-(iii). Requirements in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9)(i) The NRC staff evaluated whether the exemption involves no significant hazards consideration by using the standards in 10 CFR 50.92(c), as presented below: 1. Does the requested exemption involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated? No. The proposed exemption would allow the licensee to rely on the installed shorting switch instead of providing physical separation in accordance with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, III.G.2 to protect structures, systems or components important to safe shutdown of the plant in the event of a fire. The licensee performed a risk impact assessment for installation of the shorting switches rather than physically separating the control circuitry in accordance with the 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, III.G.2 separation requirements. For the assessment, the risk was evaluated by estimating the change in fire risk between an Appendix R-compliant configuration and the as- installed and as-operated configuration of the shorting switches. Based on its review of the licensee's exemption request, the NRC staff concludes that the licensee's evaluations are acceptable and in accordance with Regulatory Guide (RG) 1.174, ``An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis,'' Revision 2, and that the risk increase of the proposed change meets the RG 1.174, Revision 2, risk guidelines for a ``very small'' change. The installation of the shorting switch does not alter plant operation or affect fire detection capability because fire protection for structures, systems, and components important to safe shutdown continues to be provided, and fire damage continues to be limited so that one of the redundant trains is free of fire damage and, therefore, would not alter the consequences of any accident previously evaluated. Therefore, the exemption does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated. 2. Does the requested exemption create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated? No. The underlying purposes of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, III.G.2 is to provide reasonable assurance of fire protection safe shutdown capability. The exemptions' crediting of a shorting switch and defense in depth measures does not create any new accident precursors because the plant's operation and fire detection capability remains the same. Therefore, the exemption does not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated. 3. Does the requested exemption involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety? No. The installation of the shorting switch and reliance on defense in depth measures does not alter plant operation and does not impact any safety margins because codes and standards or their alternatives approved by the NRC are met, and the safety analysis acceptance criteria described in the licensing basis are met. Therefore, the exemption does not involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. Based on the evaluation above, the NRC staff has determined that the proposed exemption involves no significant hazards consideration. Therefore, the requirements of 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9)(i) are met. Requirements in 10 CFR 51.22(c)(9)(ii) and (iii) The proposed exemption would allow the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant to maintain a hot shutdown train of Drywell Spray free of fire damage by using a method that is different from one of the acceptable methods listed in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. Specifically, In lieu of meeting these protection requirements, the licensee has installed a shorting switch modification on the control circuitry for one motor-operated valve (MOV) in each division of the Drywell Spray system to reduce the risk impact of a fire-induced multiple spurious operation that fails both MOVs. In addition, the licensee will rely on fire protection DID features such as administrative controls, plant design features, fire protection inspections, installed fire detection and suppression systems, and passive fire protection features. The exemption does not modify plant operation because fire protection for structures, systems, and components important to safe shutdown continues to be provided, and fire damage continues to be limited so that one of the redundant trains of Drywell Spray is free of fire damage. Thus the exemption does [[Page 21316]] not result in a significant change in the types or amount of effluents that may be released and does not result in any additional occupational exposure. Therefore, the requirements of 10 CFR51.22(c)(9)(ii) and (iii) are met. V. Conclusions. Accordingly, the Commission has determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the exemption is authorized by law, will not present an undue risk to the public health and safety, and is consistent with the common defense and security. Also, special circumstances are present in that application of the regulation is not necessary to achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. Therefore, the Commission hereby grants Northern States Power Company, doing business as Xcel Energy, an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, for Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant, to allow the use of a shorting switch to ensure that one redundant train of Drywell Spray is free of fire damage to achieve and maintain hot shutdown conditions in the event of a fire. VI. Availability of Documents. The documents identified in the following table are available in ADAMS. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Document ADAMS Accession No. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Risk-Informed Request for Exemption from ML17096A599 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, III.G.2 Requirements for Multiple Spurious Operations of Drywell Spray Motor- Operated Valves. Request for additional information RE: ML17293A091 Monticello Request for Exemption from Appendix R Requirements (CAC NO. MF9586; EPID L-2017-LLE-00012). Response to Request for Additional ML17324B361 Information regarding Risk-Informed Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, III.G.2 Requirements for Multiple Spurious Operations of Drywell Spray Motor-Operated Valves (CAC No. MF9586). Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant ML14119A216 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000263/2014008. Letter of Intent to Transition to 10 CFR ML053460342 50.48(c)--National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805. ``Performance-based Standards for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants.'' 2001 Edition. Notice of Withdrawal of Letter of Intent ML102000433 to Transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c)''. NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2007-06 ML070650428 Regulatory Guide 1.200 Implementation. NEI 05-04, Rev. 2 Process for Performing ML083430462 Internal Events PRA Peer Reviews Using the ASME/ANS PRA Standard. NEI 07-12 [REV 1] Fire Probabilistic ML102230070 Risk Assessment (FPRA) Peer Review Process Guidelines. NUREG/CR-7150, Vol. 2 Joint Assessment ML14141A129 of Cable Damage and Quantification of Effects from Fire (JACQUE-FIRE). Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, ML15212A796 And 3--Issuance of Amendments Regarding Transition to a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) (CAC NOS. MF1185, MF1186, AND MF1187). Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1--Issuance ML16223A481 of Amendment Regarding Transition to a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire Protection Program in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) (CAC NO. MF3419). Regulatory Guide 1.189 ``Fire Protection ML092580550 for Nuclear Power Plants,'' Revision 2. Regulatory Guide 1.174 ``An Approach for ML100910006 Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant- Specific Changes to the Licensing Basis,'' Revision 2. Regulatory Guide 1.200 ``An Approach for ML090410014 Determining the Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for Risk-Informed Activities,'' Revision 2. Monticello Nuclear Generating Station: ML16047A273 Evaluation of Risk Significance of Permanent Integrated Leak Rate Test Extension. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 1st day of May 2018. For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Gregory F. Suber, Acting Director, Division of Operating Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation. [FR Doc. 2018-09801 Filed 5-8-18; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 7590-01-P
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exclusive patent license to Vigilant technical questions, contact the The facility consists of a boiling water
Aerospace Systems, Inc. The document individual listed in the FOR FURTHER reactor located in Wright County, Minnesota.
contained an incorrect phone number. INFORMATION CONTACT section of this II. Request/Action
DATES: The correction is valid May 9, document. In its letter dated April 6, 2017
2018. • NRC’s Agencywide Documents (Agencywide Documents Access and
Access and Management System Management System (ADAMS) Accession
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
(ADAMS): You may obtain publicly- No. ML17096A599), as supplemented by its
Correction available documents online in the letter dated November 20, 2017 (ADAMS
ADAMS Public Documents collection at Accession No. ML17324B361), the licensee
In the Federal Register of May 1, requested an exemption from Title 10 of the
2018, in FR Doc. 18–09183, on page http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
adams.html. To begin the search, select Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR), Part
19116, in the first column, correct the 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2, which
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT
‘‘ADAMS Public Documents’’ and then
requires that where redundant trains of
caption to read: select ‘‘Begin Web-based ADAMS systems necessary to achieve and maintain
Search.’’ For problems with ADAMS, hot shutdown conditions are located within
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:
please contact the NRC’s Public the same fire area outside of primary
Mark Homer, Patent Counsel, NASA
Document Room (PDR) reference staff at containment, that one of the redundant trains
Management Office of Chief Counsel, Jet
1–800–397–4209, 301–415–4737, or by remains free of fire damage by either a 3-hour
Propulsion Laboratory, 4800 Oak Grove rated barrier; or 20 feet horizontal separation,
email to pdr.resource@nrc.gov. The
Drive, M/S 180–800C Pasadena, CA no intervening combustibles, and detection
ADAMS accession number for each
91109. Phone (818) 354–7770. Facsimile and suppression system; or a 1-hour barrier,
document referenced (if it is available in
(818) 393–2607. and detection and suppression systems. The
ADAMS) is provided the first time that
licensee requested NRC approval for
Deborah F. Bloxon, it is mentioned in the attached Monticello to use a method to maintain a hot
Federal Liaison Officer. exemption. In addition, for the shutdown train free of fire damage that is not
[FR Doc. 2018–09790 Filed 5–8–18; 8:45 am] convenience of the reader, the ADAMS one of the acceptable methods listed in 10
BILLING CODE 7510–13–P
accession numbers are provided in a CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2. The
table in the ‘‘Availability of Documents’’ licensee’s exemption request is intended to
section of the exemption. justify why the proposed alternative, the use
• NRC’s PDR: You may examine and of a shorting switch, is acceptable in
NUCLEAR REGULATORY accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR
purchase copies of public documents at
COMMISSION 50.12, Specific Exemptions.
the NRC’s PDR, Room O1–F21, One
The regulatory framework that applies to
[Docket No. 50–263; NRC–2018–0090] White Flint North, 11555 Rockville
Monticello is contained in 10 CFR 50.48(b)(1)
Pike, Rockville, Maryland 20852. which requires that plants licensed before
Northern States Power Company: FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: January 1, 1979, to meet Sections III.G, J, and
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Robert F. Kuntz, Office or Nuclear O, of Appendix R to 10 CFR part 50.
AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Monticello began commercial operations in
Commission. Regulatory Commission, Washington, 1971. Section III.G.2 of 10 CFR part 50,
DC 20555–0001; telephone: 301–415– Appendix R, requires, that, ‘‘where cables or
ACTION: Exemption; issuance. equipment, including associated non-safety
3733, email: Robert.Kuntz@nrc.gov.
circuits that could prevent operation or cause
SUMMARY: The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The text of maloperation due to hot shorts, open circuits,
Commission (NRC) has issued an the exemption is attached. or shorts to ground, of redundant trains of
exemption for the Monticello Nuclear Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 3rd day systems necessary to achieve and maintain
Generating Plant, Docket No. 50–263, in of May 2018. hot shutdown conditions are located within
response to an April 6, 2017, request For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. the same fire area outside of primary
from Northern States Power Company. containment, one of the following means of
Robert F. Kuntz, ensuring that one of the redundant trains is
Specifically, the exemption is from the
Senior Project Manager, Plant Licensing free of fire damage shall be provided: a.
regulation that requires where
Branch III, Division of Operating Reactor Separation of cables and equipment and
redundant trains of systems necessary to Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor associated non-safety circuits of redundant
achieve and maintain hot shutdown Regulation. trains by a fire barrier having a 3-hour rating.
conditions located within the same fire Structural steel forming a part of or
area outside of primary containment, Attachment—Exemption
supporting such fire barriers shall be
one of the redundant trains remains free NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION protected to provide fire resistance
of fire damage by one of three methods Docket No. 50–263
equivalent to that of the barrier; b. Separation
of physical separation. of cables and equipment and associated non-
DATES: The exemption was issued on Northern States Power Company safety circuits of redundant trains by a
horizontal distance of more than 20 feet with
May 1, 2018. Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant no intervening combustible or fire hazards. In
ADDRESSES: Please refer to Docket ID Exemption addition, fire detectors and an automatic fire
NRC–2018–0090 when contacting the suppression system shall be installed in the
NRC about the availability of I. Background fire area; or c. Enclosure of cable and
information regarding this document. Northern States Power Company, doing equipment and associated non-safety circuits
You may obtain publicly-available business as Xcel Energy (the licensee), is the of one redundant train in a fire barrier having
information related to this document holder of Renewed Facility Operating a 1-hour fire rating. In addition, fire detectors
amozie on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES
using any of the following methods: License Number 50–263, which authorizes and an automatic fire suppression system
operation of the Monticello Nuclear shall be installed in the fire area.’’
• Federal Rulemaking Web Site: Go to
Generating Plant (Monticello). The license In its April 29, 2014, triennial fire
http://www.regulations.gov and search provides, among other things, that the facility protection inspection report 05000263/
for Docket ID NRC–2018–0090. Address is subject to all rules, regulations, and orders 2014008, (ADAMS Accession No.
questions about NRC dockets to Jennifer of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission ML14119A216), the NRC staff identified two
Borges; telephone: 301–287–9127; (NRC or the Commission) now or hereafter in pairs of Drywell Spray (DWS) motor-operated
email: Jennifer.Borges@nrc.gov. For effect. valve (MOV) control cables that are not
VerDate Sep<11>2014 17:39 May 08, 2018 Jkt 244001 PO 00000 Frm 00054 Fmt 4703 Sfmt 4703 E:\FR\FM\09MYN1.SGM 09MYN1](https://thefederalregister.org/doc/83_FR_21400/page/1.svg)
![21312 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 90 / Wednesday, May 9, 2018 / Notices
description of the modification is provided in combustibles or ignition sources at such a the RHR pumps, the pumps would have to
Enclosure 1, Section 3.1, of the licensee’s level that necessitates additional controls be be running at the time of the cable faults.
exemption request. put in place to prevent fires from starting. Although possible in an actual plant event,
Fire Protection DID Element 2—Detecting the licensee did not assume in its evaluation
3.2.2 Engineering Analysis
and Extinguishing Fires that plant operators would turn off the
Regulatory Position 2.1 of RG 1.174, pumps before they became damaged. The
Revision 2, indicates that, for RI changes to The licensee indicated that all three of the NRC staff considers this assumption to be
the plant licensing basis, the licensee should rooms addressed in this exemption are conservative because the licensee indicated
evaluate the proposed change to determine equipped with full area ionization smoke
that operators would initiate a controlled
whether it is consistent with the DID detection systems. Only Fire Area IX, Fire
shutdown to preclude equipment failures.
philosophy and the principle that sufficient Zone 13C, has significant fixed ignition
Additionally, the NRC staff determined
safety margins are maintained. sources and it is equipped with an automatic
that hot shorts would have to be of sufficient
water based suppression system which the
Fire Protection DID duration to open the MOVs enough to result
licensee indicates is based on the
Regulatory Position 2.1.1 of RG 1.174, significance of the fire hazards contained in a flow that would cause RHR pump failure
Revision 2, provides guidance on within that room. The smoke detection due to runout and that typically, hot shorts
maintaining the philosophy of nuclear safety system annunciates to the control room are of a very short duration.
DID and identifies several elements to which results in response of the fire brigade. These aspects of the scenario, the
consider in this evaluation. DID involves Each of the three rooms included in this likelihood of cable faults, the assumption
prevention, protection, and mitigation. With exemption has fire hose stations and fire that the RHR pumps are operating, and the
respect to nuclear power plant FPPs, the extinguishers in the rooms or in adjacent possible operator actions and timing related
regulations in 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, rooms. Fire Area IX, Fire Zone 13C, and Fire to mitigating the potentially damaging
Section II.A state that the FPP shall extend Area XII, Fire Zone 19B, are 900 square feet, configuration were not explicitly credited in
the concept of DID to fire protection in fire are considered large rooms, and have the analysis. The NRC staff has determined
areas important to safety with the following extinguishers and hose stations within the that the DID discussion regarding prevention,
objectives: rooms. Fire Area IX, Fire Zone 19C, does not protection, and mitigation satisfies the RG
• to prevent fires from starting; have a fire hose station or extinguisher in the 1.174 guidance for a DID analysis because it
• to detect rapidly, control, and extinguish room. Because Fire Area IX, Fire Zone 19C, discussed multiple means to accomplish
promptly those fires that do occur; and has a small floor area of 204 square feet, the safety functions in accordance with the
• to provide protection for structures, NRC staff concludes that it is reasonable that guidance provided in Regulatory Position
systems and components important to safety extinguishers and fire hoses could be brought 2.1.1 of RG 1.174.
so that a fire that is not promptly from adjoining areas. The NRC staff also Safety Margins
extinguished by the fire suppression concludes that this exemption does not In Enclosure 1, Section 3.4.3, of the
activities will not prevent the safe shutdown degrade the detecting and extinguishing fires exemption request, the licensee provided its
of the plant. DID element, because the installation of the
An engineering analysis that evaluates the assessment of how sufficient safety margins
switches (1) does not impact the ability of the
impact of a proposed change to an Appendix are maintained. The licensee explained that
installed detection and suppression systems
R FPP on the balance among these FPP DID the design and installation of the shorting
to detect and extinguish a fire, and (2) does
elements is deemed by the NRC staff to switches was completed using applicable
not impact the fire brigades ability to
satisfy the RG 1.174 guidance. Enclosure 1, codes and standards and that the Monticello
manually extinguish a fire using the installed
Section 3.2, of the exemption request safety analyses were not impacted by the
extinguishers and fire hose stations.
provides the licensee’s evaluation of the FPP installation of the switches or the exemption
Fire Protection DID Element 3—Safe request. In its letter dated November 20,
DID elements. Fire protection DID elements Shutdown
consist of administrative controls such as 2017, in response to the NRC’s October 18,
plant procedures to limit combustible The NRC staff determined that the safe 2017, request for additional information
materials or control hot work activities, plant shutdown element of fire protection DID is (RAI) (ADAMS Accession No.
design features, fire protection inspections, impacted by this exemption request. The ML17293A091), the licensee indicated that
installed fire detection and suppression licensee proposes to install an engineered sufficient safety margins are demonstrated by
systems, and passive fire protection features feature called a shorting switch, in lieu of the the design, operation, and performance
such as fire barriers. protection required by 10 CFR part 50, monitoring of the shorting switches. The
The licensee’s position is that the use of a Appendix R, Section III.G.2. Compliance licensee indicated that the RHR system
shorting switch meets the underlying with the regulation by use of a barrier, or currently meets all applicable codes and
purpose of the rule by providing equivalent separation with fire detection and standards (with the exception of the stated 10
protection to one of the separation methods suppression, protects against possible failure CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section III.G.2
of 10 CFR part 50, Appendix R, Section modes, but the shorting switch modification noncompliance), and also stated that granting
III.G.2. The licensee chose to install the results in a possible failure mode involving the exemption will not affect Monticello’s
shorting switch in lieu of possibly separating hot shorts and open circuits. 10 CFR part 50, ability to demonstrate consistency with all
the cables for the valves in series (MO–2021 Appendix R, Section III.G.2, specifically applicable codes and standards.
from MO–2023, and MO–2020 from MO– states that a plant licensed before January 1, In its November 20, 2017, letter, the
2022) into separate areas. The following 1979, must address these failure modes (i.e., licensee also summarized some of the PRA
sections discuss the fire protection DID ‘‘maloperation due to hot shorts [and] open bases for ensuring sufficient safety margins.
elements of preventing fires, suppressing circuits’’). The summarized bases included maintaining
fires that do occur, and protecting safe Although the licensee has chosen to use a a FPP that meets regulatory requirements,
shutdown. RI analysis to compare compliance with the using a fire PRA (FPRA) that was developed
regulation and the proposed alternative using in accordance with NUREG/CR–6850, ‘‘Fire
Fire Protection DID Element 1—Preventing a shorting switch, the following deterministic PRA Methodology for Nuclear Power
Fires features are in place, in addition to the fire Facilities,’’ having had formal industry peer
The licensee indicated that each of the prevention, fire detection, and fire reviews of internal events PRAs (IEPRAs) and
three rooms has administratively controlled suppression that are discussed above. FPRAs, and using verified and validated fire
amozie on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES
restrictions on combustibles. The licensee A fire would have to occur in one of the models.
described that of the three zones, only Fire three subject areas and damage the cables to The NRC staff concludes that the licensee’s
Area IX, Fire Zone 13C, has significant fixed two of the MOVs. One MOV cable would safety margins assessment is acceptable
ignition sources, which are motor control have to be subjected to an energized fault or because it demonstrated that codes and
centers. The NRC staff finds that this hot short, and the second MOV cable would standards or their alternatives approved by
exemption does not degrade the preventing have to be subjected to both a hot short and the NRC are met, and that the safety analysis
fires DID element, because the proposed a severed cable also called an open circuit. acceptance criteria described in the licensing
change does not introduce additional For the combination of cable faults to damage basis are met.
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![Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 90 / Wednesday, May 9, 2018 / Notices 21313
3.2.3 PRA supporting requirement (Reference: the exemption request enough to increase the
The licensee performed a risk impact Monticello ILRT license amendment— delta core damage frequency (CDF) and the
assessment for installation of the shorting ML16047A273). In Enclosure 3 of the delta large early release frequency (LERF) by
switches rather than physically separating exemption request, the licensee provided the an amount necessary to exceed the RG 1.174
the control circuitry for the DWS MOVs in peer review finding-level F&Os against the risk guidelines for very small changes.
accordance with the 10 CFR part 50, PRA standard supporting requirements and Based on the above, NRC staff concludes
Appendix R, separation requirements. For its resolution to each of the F&Os. The that the FPRA model is of sufficient technical
the assessment, the risk was evaluated by licensee stated that all of the finding-level adequacy to support the risk impact
estimating the change in risk between an F&Os have been resolved and that none were assessment of the proposed change.
Appendix R-compliant configuration and the determined to affect the exemption request.
The licensee stated that a focused-scope Risk Impact Assessment
as-installed and as-operated configuration of
the shorting switches. The risk assessment peer review of Revision 4.0 of the FPRA The licensee stated that the evaluation of
was provided in Enclosure 1, Section 3.3, of model was performed in December 2016, of the risk for the proposed change was done
the licensee’s exemption request. a subset of high-level requirements impacted using Revision 4.0 of the Monticello FPRA
by the use of enhanced fire modeling model to estimate the change in risk between
Technical Adequacy of the PRA methods that were implemented subsequent an Appendix R-compliant configuration and
The licensee used Revision 4.0 of the to the March 2015, peer review. The licensee the as-installed and as-operated configuration
Monticello FPRA model to perform the risk provided the two peer review finding-level of the shorting switches.
impact assessment. For the development of F&Os from this focused-scope peer review in In Enclosure 1, Section 3.3.3, of the
the FPRA, the licensee modified its IEPRA Enclosure 4 of the exemption request. The exemption request, the licensee described
model to capture the effects of fire. Therefore, licensee stated that the two finding-level how it developed the risk of the as-installed
the NRC staff evaluated both the IEPRA and F&Os have been resolved and that neither and as-operated configuration of the plant
FPRA quality information provided by the was determined to affect the exemption with shorting switches installed. For this
licensee in the exemption request to request. The licensee also stated that the PRA plant configuration, the licensee modified the
determine whether the plant-specific PRA used in the risk impact assessment represents FPRA model to include new basic events to
used in the risk impact assessment includes the current as-installed and as-operated fail the DWS MOVs due to fire-induced
sufficient scope, level of detail, and technical configuration of Monticello. MSOs (referred to as the ‘‘variant model’’).
adequacy for this assessment. The NRC staff reviewed the exemption
The model modification included identifying
Consistent with the information provided request to determine the technical adequacy
the cables that could cause a DWS MOV
in NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2007-06, of the Monticello IEPRA and FPRA models
MSO, identifying the plant locations (fire
‘‘Regulatory Guide 1.200 Implementation,’’ used for this exemption request. The licensee
zones) where these cables are located in the
March 22, 2007 (ADAMS Accession No. stated that it evaluated its PRA against
plant, and linking these cables to specific fire
ML070650428), the NRC staff uses RG 1.200, Revision 2 of RG 1.200 and the ASME/ANS
scenarios modeled in the FPRA. The
‘‘An Approach for Determining the Technical PRA standard. The licensee stated that it had
exemption request also described the revised
Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment resolved all peer review and focused-scope
fault tree logic that incorporated the new
Results for Risk-Informed Activities,’’ peer review finding-level F&Os and
concluded that they had no impact on the basic events.
Revision 2 (ADAMS Accession No.
ML090410014). exemption request. Based on the information Each of the two DWS trains includes two-
The licensee stated that a full-scope peer provided by the licensee, the NRC staff found normally-closed in-series MOVs that could
review was performed in April 2013, for the that the licensee’s PRA represents the current fail open due to a fire-induced MSO and
IEPRA model (Revision 3.2). The peer review as-installed and as-operated plant, and the result in core damage. Each in-series pair of
was performed using Nuclear Energy margin between the reported risk values and DWS MOVs were added together in the fault
Institute (NEI) 05–04, Revision 2, ‘‘Process the guidance recommended values is tree and assigned a hot short probability. The
for Performing Internal Events PRA Peer acceptable. MOVs without a shorting switch have a hot
Reviews Using the ASME/ANS [American The NRC staff concludes that the IEPRA is short probability of 0.39, which is taken from
Society of Mechanical Engineers/American adequate and can be used to support the Volume 2 of NUREG/CR–7150, ‘‘Joint
Nuclear Society] PRA Standard’’ (ADAMS FPRA because the licensee demonstrated that Assessment of Cable Damage and
Accession No. ML083430462), as clarified by the resolution of the F&Os did not affect the Quantification of Effects from Fire (JACQUE–
RG 1.200, Revision 2. The PRA standard technical adequacy of the licensee’s PRA FIRE)’’ (ADAMS Accession No.
provides supporting requirements for the analysis submitted to support the licensee’s ML14141A129). The MOVs with a shorting
PRA against capability categories (CC) CC–I, risk evaluation of the proposed exemption switch are assumed to have a failure
CC–II, or CC-Ill. The peer review resulted in request. probability of 1.0E–03, which is the assumed
identification of PRA standard supporting The NRC staff concludes that the IEPRA is failure probability of the shorting switch. In
requirements that did not meet CC–II, or that adequate and can be used to support the enclosure 1, section 3.3.5 of the exemption
were met and had related findings FPRA because the licensee demonstrated that request, the licensee justified its use of the
(Reference: Evaluation of Risk Significance of the resolution of the F&Os support the 1.0E–03 failure probability by explaining that
Permanent Integrated Leak Rate Testing technical adequacy of the licensee’s PRA it was found acceptable by the NRC staff in
Extension—ML16047A273). In Enclosure 2 of analysis submitted for the licensee’s risk the safety evaluations related to National Fire
the exemption request, the licensee provided evaluation of the proposed exemption Protection Association 805 license
the peer review finding-level facts and request. amendment requests by other licensees (see
observations (F&Os) against the PRA The NRC staff also concludes that the ADAMS Accession Nos. ML15212A796 and
standard supporting requirements and the FPRA is of sufficient technical adequacy and ML16223A481). The licensee stated that the
licensee’s resolution to each of the F&Os. The that its quantitative results can be used to control circuitry configuration for the
licensee stated that all of the finding-level demonstrate that the change in risk due to shorting switch application at these plants is
F&Os have been resolved and that none were the lack of physical separation between the substantially similar to that for the
determined to affect the exemption request. DWS division meets the acceptance Monticello DWS MOVs.
The licensee stated that a full-scope peer guidelines in RG 1.174 because the licensee The NRC staff finds that the use of a hot
review of the FPRA model (Revision 1a) was demonstrated that the resolution of the short probability of 0.39 is acceptable
amozie on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES
performed in March 2015, using NEI 07–12, relevant F&Os supports the determination because it is the most bounding of the MOV
Revision 1, ‘‘Fire Probabilistic Risk that the quantitative results are adequate and hot short probabilities for grounded and
Assessment (FPRA) Peer Review Process have no significant impact on the FPRA. For ungrounded alternate current control circuits
Guidelines,’’ June 2010 (ADAMS Accession several F&Os, the NRC staff determined that as described in Table 8–1 of NUREG/CR–
No. ML102230070), and RG 1.200, Revision the resolutions could impact the delta risk 7150, Volume 2. The NRC staff also finds that
2. The peer review resulted in identification results reported in the exemption request, but the licensee’s use of the 1.0E–3 failure
of PRA standard supporting requirements that their resolution is unlikely to change the probability for the shorting switches is
that did not meet CC–II, or CC–III for one delta risk results reported by the licensee in acceptable because the conditions that would
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![21316 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 90 / Wednesday, May 9, 2018 / Notices
not result in a significant change in the types present an undue risk to the public health Generating Plant, to allow the use of a
or amount of effluents that may be released and safety, and is consistent with the shorting switch to ensure that one redundant
and does not result in any additional common defense and security. Also, special train of Drywell Spray is free of fire damage
occupational exposure. Therefore, the circumstances are present in that application to achieve and maintain hot shutdown
requirements of 10 CFR51.22(c)(9)(ii) and (iii) of the regulation is not necessary to achieve conditions in the event of a fire.
are met. the underlying purpose of the rule.
Therefore, the Commission hereby grants VI. Availability of Documents.
V. Conclusions. Northern States Power Company, doing
Accordingly, the Commission has business as Xcel Energy, an exemption from The documents identified in the following
determined that, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.12, the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, table are available in ADAMS.
the exemption is authorized by law, will not Section III.G.2, for Monticello Nuclear
ADAMS
Document Accession
No.
Risk-Informed Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 50, Appendix R, III.G.2 Requirements for Multiple Spurious Operations of ML17096A599
Drywell Spray Motor-Operated Valves.
Request for additional information RE: Monticello Request for Exemption from Appendix R Requirements (CAC NO. MF9586; ML17293A091
EPID L–2017–LLE–00012).
Response to Request for Additional Information regarding Risk-Informed Request for Exemption from 10 CFR 50, Appendix ML17324B361
R, III.G.2 Requirements for Multiple Spurious Operations of Drywell Spray Motor-Operated Valves (CAC No. MF9586).
Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant Triennial Fire Protection Inspection Report 05000263/2014008 .......................................... ML14119A216
Letter of Intent to Transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c)—National Fire Protection Association Standard NFPA 805. ‘‘Performance- ML053460342
based Standards for Fire Protection for Light Water Reactor Electric Generating Plants.’’ 2001 Edition.
Notice of Withdrawal of Letter of Intent to Transition to 10 CFR 50.48(c)’’ .................................................................................... ML102000433
NRC Regulatory Issue Summary 2007–06 Regulatory Guide 1.200 Implementation ..................................................................... ML070650428
NEI 05–04, Rev. 2 Process for Performing Internal Events PRA Peer Reviews Using the ASME/ANS PRA Standard ............... ML083430462
NEI 07–12 [REV 1] Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment (FPRA) Peer Review Process Guidelines ............................................... ML102230070
NUREG/CR–7150, Vol. 2 Joint Assessment of Cable Damage and Quantification of Effects from Fire (JACQUE–FIRE) ........... ML14141A129
Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant, Units 1, 2, And 3—Issuance of Amendments Regarding Transition to a Risk-Informed, Perform- ML15212A796
ance-Based Fire Protection Program in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) (CAC NOS. MF1185, MF1186, AND MF1187).
Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1—Issuance of Amendment Regarding Transition to a Risk-Informed, Performance-Based Fire ML16223A481
Protection Program in Accordance with 10 CFR 50.48(c) (CAC NO. MF3419).
Regulatory Guide 1.189 ‘‘Fire Protection for Nuclear Power Plants,’’ Revision 2 ........................................................................... ML092580550
Regulatory Guide 1.174 ‘‘An Approach for Using Probabilistic Risk Assessment in Risk-Informed Decisions on Plant-Specific ML100910006
Changes to the Licensing Basis,’’ Revision 2.
Regulatory Guide 1.200 ‘‘An Approach for Determining the Technical Adequacy of Probabilistic Risk Assessment Results for ML090410014
Risk-Informed Activities,’’ Revision 2.
Monticello Nuclear Generating Station: Evaluation of Risk Significance of Permanent Integrated Leak Rate Test Extension ..... ML16047A273
Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 1st day notice is hereby given that on May 2, Cboe Exchange, Inc. Rules
of May 2018. 2018, Cboe Exchange, Inc. (the * * * * *
For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. ‘‘Exchange’’ or ‘‘Cboe Options’’) filed Rule 24.9. Terms of Index Option Contracts
Gregory F. Suber, with the Securities and Exchange
(a)–(d) (No change).
Acting Director, Division of Operating Commission (the ‘‘Commission’’) the (e) Nonstandard Expirations Pilot Program
Reactor Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor proposed rule change as described in (1)–(2) (No change).
Regulation. Items I and II below, which Items have (3) Duration of Nonstandard Expirations
[FR Doc. 2018–09801 Filed 5–8–18; 8:45 am] been prepared by the Exchange. The Pilot Program. The Nonstandard Expirations
BILLING CODE 7590–01–P Exchange filed the proposal as a ‘‘non- Pilot Program shall be through [May
controversial’’ proposed rule change 3]November 5, 2018.
pursuant to Section 19(b)(3)(A)(iii) of (4) (No change).
the Act 3 and Rule 19b–4(f)(6) . . . Interpretations and Policies:
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE .01–.14 (No change).
thereunder.4 The Commission is
COMMISSION * * * * *
publishing this notice to solicit
[Release No. 34–83165; File No. SR–CBOE– comments on the proposed rule change The text of the proposed rule change
2018–038] from interested persons. is also available on the Exchange’s
I. Self-Regulatory Organization’s website (http://www.cboe.com/
Self-Regulatory Organizations; Cboe
Statement of the Terms of Substance of AboutCBOE/
Exchange, Inc.; Notice of Filing and
the Proposed Rule Change CBOELegalRegulatoryHome.aspx), at
Immediate Effectiveness of a Proposed
the Exchange’s Office of the Secretary,
Rule Change To Renew the
The Exchange proposes to renew an and at the Commission’s Public
Nonstandard Expirations Pilot
existing pilot program until November Reference Room.
Program
5, 2018.
II. Self-Regulatory Organization’s
amozie on DSK3GDR082PROD with NOTICES
May 3, 2018.
(additions are italicized; deletions are Statement of the Purpose of, and
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the [bracketed]) Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the Change
‘‘Act’’),1 and Rule 19b–4 thereunder,2 * * * * *
In its filing with the Commission, the
1 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1). 3 15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(3)(A)(iii). Exchange included statements
2 17 CFR 240.19b–4. 4 17 CFR 240.19b–4(f)(6). concerning the purpose of and basis for
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Document Created: 2018-05-09 03:18:09
Document Modified: 2018-05-09 03:18:09
| Category | Regulatory Information | |
| Collection | Federal Register | |
| sudoc Class | AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106: | |
| Publisher | Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration | |
| Section | Notices | |
| Action | Exemption; issuance. | |
| Dates | The exemption was issued on May 1, 2018. | |
| Contact | Robert F. Kuntz, Office or Nuclear Reactor Regulation, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555-0001; telephone: 301-415-3733, email: [email protected] | |
| FR Citation | 83 FR 21310 |
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