83 FR 23854 - Geomagnetic Disturbance Reliability Standard
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Federal Register Volume 83, Issue 100 (May 23, 2018)
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Federal Register Volume 83, Issue 100 (May 23, 2018)
| Page Range | 23854-23864 | |
| FR Document | 2018-11001 |
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 100 (Wednesday, May 23, 2018)] [Proposed Rules] [Pages 23854-23864] From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org] [FR Doc No: 2018-11001] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 18 CFR Part 40 [Docket No. RM18-8-000] Geomagnetic Disturbance Reliability Standard AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy. ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) proposes to approve Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 (Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events). The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), the Commission-certified Electric Reliability Organization, submitted proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 for Commission approval. Geomagnetic disturbance events (GMDs) occur when the sun ejects charged particles that interact with and cause changes in the earth's magnetic fields. Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 modifies currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 by requiring applicable entities to: Conduct supplemental GMD vulnerability assessments and thermal impact assessments; obtain geomagnetically induced current and magnetometer data; and meet certain deadlines for the development and completion of tasks in corrective action plans. In addition, the Commission proposes to direct NERC to develop and submit modifications to the Reliability Standard to require applicable entities to develop and implement corrective action plans to mitigate supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities. DATES: Comments are due July 23, 2018. ADDRESSES: Comments, identified by docket number, may be filed electronically at http://www.ferc.gov in acceptable native applications and print-to-PDF, but not in scanned or picture format. For those unable to file electronically, comments may be filed by mail or hand- delivery to: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Secretary of the Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426. The Comment Procedures Section of this document contains more detailed filing procedures. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Justin Kelly (Technical Information), Office of Electric Reliability, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426, Telephone: (301) 665-1394, Justin.Kelly@ferc.gov. Matthew Vlissides (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426, Telephone: (202) 502-8408, Matthew.Vlissides@ferc.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 1. Pursuant to section 215 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), the Commission proposes to approve Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 (Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events).\1\ The Commission also proposes to approve the associated violation risk factors and violation severity levels, implementation plan, and effective date for proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), the Commission-certified Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), submitted proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 for approval in response to a Commission directive in Order No. 830.\2\ Geomagnetic disturbance events (GMDs) occur when the sun ejects charged particles that interact with and cause changes in the earth's magnetic fields. This interaction can cause geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) to flow in an electric power system and, depending on various factors affecting the intensity of the current, can result in a risk of voltage instability or voltage collapse, as well as equipment loss or failure. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ 16 U.S.C. 824o (2012). \2\ Reliability Standard for Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events, Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 (2016), reh'g denied, 158 FERC ] 61,041 (2017). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 modifies currently- effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 (Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events) by requiring applicable entities to: (1) Conduct supplemental GMD vulnerability assessments and thermal impact assessments; (2) obtain GIC and magnetometer data; and (3) meet certain deadlines for the development and completion of tasks in corrective action plans. 3. The Commission proposes to approve proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 as it largely addresses (with one exception discussed below) the directives in Order No. 830 to modify currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1: (1) To revise the benchmark GMD event definition, as it pertains to the required GMD Vulnerability Assessments and transformer thermal impact assessments, so that the definition is not based solely on spatially-averaged data; (2) to require the collection of necessary GIC monitoring and magnetometer data; and (3) to include a one-year deadline for the completion of corrective action plans and two- and four-year deadlines to complete mitigation actions involving non-hardware and hardware mitigation, respectively. 4. While proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 addresses the first directive in Order No. 830 by requiring applicable entities to conduct supplemental GMD vulnerability and thermal impact assessments, which do not rely solely upon on spatially-averaged data, the proposed Reliability Standard does not require applicable entities to mitigate vulnerabilities identified pursuant to such a supplemental assessment.\3\ NERC's proposal to modify the benchmark, but then allow entities the discretion to take corrective action based solely on the results of the spatially-averaged data while taking under advisement (``an evaluation of possible actions'') the results of the supplemental assessment, does not satisfy the clear intent of the Commission's directive. Moreover, Order No. 830 reiterated the directive in Order No. 779 that NERC develop a second stage GMD Reliability Standard requiring GMD vulnerability [[Page 23855]] assessments and that ``owners and operators [ ] develop and implement a plan to protect against instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures of the Bulk-Power System.''\4\ Accordingly, as discussed below, the Commission proposes to direct that NERC, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, develop and submit modifications to the Reliability Standard to require applicable entities to develop and implement corrective action plans to mitigate vulnerabilities revealed by conducting supplemental GMD vulnerability assessments.\5\ The Commission proposes to direct NERC to submit the modified Reliability Standard for approval within 12 months from the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ See Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 44 (directing NERC to ``develop revisions to the benchmark GMD event definition so that the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude component is not based solely on spatially-averaged data''). \4\ Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 7. \5\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(5). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5. In addition, while proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 imposes deadlines for the preparation and completion of tasks in corrective action plans, Requirement R7.4 of the proposed Reliability Standard also permits applicable entities to exceed deadlines for completing corrective action plan tasks when ``situations beyond the control of the responsible entity [arise].'' As discussed below, the Commission seeks comment on two options that it is considering regarding proposed Requirement R7.4. Under the first option, the Commission would, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, direct NERC to modify the Reliability Standard to bring the proposed standard into alignment with the Commission's direction in Order No. 830, through a process whereby NERC considers extensions on a case-by-case basis informed by proposed Requirement R7.4.\6\ Under the second option, the Commission would approve proposed Requirement R7.4. Under both options, the Commission would direct NERC to prepare and submit a report regarding how often and why applicable entities are exceeding corrective action plan deadlines following implementation of the proposed Reliability Standard. Under such a directive, NERC would submit the report within 12 months from the date on which applicable entities must comply with the last requirement of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.\7\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 102. \7\ NERC's proposed implementation plan provides that, depending on the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, applicable entities will be required to comply with the requirements of the proposed Reliability Standard on a staggered schedule. For example, if proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 becomes effective before January 1, 2021, the last requirement applicable entities will be required to comply with is Requirement R7 54 months following the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. If proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 becomes effective after January 1, 2021, the last requirement applicable entities will be required to comply with is Requirement R8 72 months following the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- I. Background A. Section 215 and Mandatory Reliability Standards 6. Section 215 of the FPA requires the Commission to certify an ERO to develop mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards, subject to Commission review and approval. Once approved, the Reliability Standards may be enforced in the United States by the ERO, subject to Commission oversight, or by the Commission independently.\8\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(e). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B. GMD Primer 7. GMD events occur when the sun ejects charged particles that interact and cause changes in the earth's magnetic fields.\9\ Once a solar particle is ejected, it can take between 17 to 96 hours (depending on its energy level) to reach earth.\10\ A geoelectric field is the electric potential (measured in volts per kilometer (V/km)) on the earth's surface and is directly related to the rate of change of the magnetic fields.\11\ The geoelectric field has an amplitude and direction and acts as a voltage source that can cause GICs to flow on long conductors, such as transmission lines.\12\ The magnitude of the geoelectric field amplitude is impacted by local factors such as geomagnetic latitude and local earth conductivity.\13\ Geomagnetic latitude is the proximity to earth's magnetic north and south poles, as opposed to earth's geographic poles.\14\ Local earth conductivity is the ability of the earth's crust to conduct electricity at a certain location to depths of hundreds of kilometers down to the earth's mantle. Local earth conductivity impacts the magnitude (i.e., severity) of the geoelectric fields that are formed during a GMD event by, all else being equal, a lower earth conductivity resulting in higher geoelectric fields.\15\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \9\ See NERC, 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk Power System at i-ii (February 2012), http://www.nerc.com/files/2012GMD.pdf. \10\ Id. at ii. \11\ Id. \12\ Id. \13\ NERC, Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description, Docket No. 15-11-000, at 4 (filed June 28, 2016) (2016 NERC White Paper). \14\ Id. \15\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 8. GICs can flow in an electric power system with varying intensity depending on the various factors discussed above. As explained in the Background section of the proposed Reliability Standard, ``[d]uring a GMD event, geomagnetically[hyphen]induced currents (GIC) may cause transformer hot[hyphen]spot heating or damage, loss of Reactive Power sources, increased Reactive Power demand, and Misoperation(s), the combination of which may result in voltage collapse and blackout.'' C. Currently-Effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 and Order No. 830 1. Currently-Effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 9. Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 consists of seven requirements and applies to planning coordinators, transmission planners, transmission owners and generation owners who own or whose planning coordinator area or transmission planning area includes a power transformer with a high side, wye-grounded winding connected at 200 kV or higher. 10. Requirement R1 requires planning coordinators and transmission planners (i.e., ``responsible entities'') to determine the individual and joint responsibilities in the planning coordinator's planning area for maintaining models and performing studies needed to complete the GMD vulnerability assessment required in Requirement R4. Requirement R2 requires responsible entities to maintain system models and GIC system models needed to complete the GMD vulnerability assessment required in Requirement R4. Requirement R3 requires each responsible entity to have criteria for acceptable system steady state voltage performance for its system during the GMD conditions described in Attachment 1 of Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. Requirement R4 requires responsible entities to conduct a GMD vulnerability assessment every 60 months using the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1. Requirement R5 requires responsible entities to provide GIC flow information, based on the benchmark GMD event definition, to be used in the transformer thermal impact assessments required in Requirement R6, to each transmission owner and generator owner that owns an applicable transformer within the applicable planning area. Requirement R6 requires transmission owners and generator owners to conduct thermal impact assessments on solely and jointly owned applicable transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5 is 75 amps per phase (A/phase) or greater. Requirement R7 requires responsible entities to develop [[Page 23856]] corrective action plans if the GMD vulnerability assessment concludes that the system does not meet the performance requirements in Table 1 of Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. 11. Calculation of the benchmark GMD event, against which applicable entities must assess their facilities, is fundamental to compliance with Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Requirement R3 states that ``[e]ach responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System during the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1.'' Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Attachment 1 states that the benchmark GMD event is composed of four elements: (1) A reference peak geoelectric field amplitude of 8 V/km derived from statistical analysis of historical magnetometer data; (2) a scaling factor to account for local geomagnetic latitude; (3) a scaling factor to account for local earth conductivity; and (4) a reference geomagnetic field time series or wave shape to facilitate time-domain analysis of GMD impact on equipment. The product of the first three elements is referred to as the regional peak geoelectric field amplitude. The benchmark GMD event defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows for a GMD vulnerability assessment, which is required in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1.\16\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \16\ See Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Requirements R4 and R5. Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 does not set a threshold amount of GIC flow that would constitute a vulnerable transformer. However, if a transformer is calculated to experience a maximum effective GIC flow during a benchmark GMD event of a least 75 A/phase, a thermal impact assessment of that transformer is required. See Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Requirement R6. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 12. For the purpose of determining a benchmark event that specifies what severity GMD events a responsible entity must assess for potential impacts on the Bulk-Power System, NERC determined that a 1-in-100 year GMD event would cause an 8 V/km reference peak geoelectric field amplitude at 60 degree north geomagnetic latitude using Qu[eacute]bec's earth conductivity.\17\ Scaling factors (i.e., multiplying values) are applied to this reference peak geoelectric field amplitude to adjust the 8 V/km value for different geomagnetic latitudes (scaling factors between 0.1 and 1.0) and earth conductivities (scaling factors between 0.21 and 1.17). NERC identified a reference geomagnetic field time series from an Ottawa, Ontario magnetic observatory during a 1989 GMD storm affecting Qu[eacute]bec. NERC used this to estimate a time series (i.e., 10-second values over a period of days) of the geoelectric field that is representative of what is expected to occur at 60 degree geomagnetic latitude during a 1-in-100 year GMD event. Such a time series is used in some methods of calculating the vulnerability of a transformer to damage from heating caused by GIC. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \17\ NERC used Qu[eacute]bec as the location for the reference peak 1-in-100 year GMD event because of its proximity to 60 degree geomagnetic latitude and its well understood earth model. By creating scaling factors, each entity can scale this reference peak geoelectric field and geoelectric field time series values to match its own expected field conditions. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13. NERC used field measurements taken from the International Monitor for Auroral Geomagnetic Effects (IMAGE) magnetometer chain, which consists of 39 magnetometer stations in Northern Europe, for the period 1993-2013 to calculate the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude. As described in the 2016 NERC White Paper, to arrive at a reference peak geoelectric field amplitude of 8 V/km, NERC ``spatially averaged'' four different station groups each spanning a square area of approximately 500 km (roughly 310 miles) in width.\18\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \18\ ``Spatial Averaging'' refers to the averaging of magnetometer readings over a geographic area. The standard drafting team averaged several (but not all) geomagnetic field readings taken by magnetometers located within square geographical areas of 500 km per side. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. Order No. 830 14. On January 21, 2015, NERC submitted for Commission approval Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 in response to a directive in Order No. 779, which directed NERC to develop one or more Reliability Standards to address the effects of GMD events on the electric grid.\19\ In Order No. 830, the Commission approved Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, concluding that Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 addressed the Commission's directive by requiring applicable Bulk-Power System owners and operators to conduct, on a recurring five-year cycle, initial and ongoing vulnerability assessments regarding the potential impact of a benchmark GMD event on the Bulk-Power System as a whole and on Bulk- Power System components. In addition, the Commission determined that Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 requires applicable entities to develop and implement corrective action plans to mitigate vulnerabilities identified through those recurring vulnerability assessments and that potential mitigation strategies identified in Reliability Standard TPL- 007-1 include, but are not limited to, the installation, modification or removal of transmission and generation facilities and associated equipment. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \19\ Reliability Standards for Geomagnetic Disturbances, Order No. 779, 143 FERC ] 61,147, reh'g denied, 144 FERC ] 61,113 (2013). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15. In Order No. 830, the Commission also determined that Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 should be modified. Specifically, Order No. 830 directed NERC to develop and submit modifications to Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 concerning: (1) The calculation of the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude component of the benchmark GMD event definition; (2) the collection and public availability of necessary GIC monitoring and magnetometer data; and (3) deadlines for completing corrective action plans and the mitigation measures called for in corrective action plans. Order No. 830 directed NERC to develop and submit these revisions for Commission approval within 18 months of the effective date of Order No. 830. 16. With respect to the calculation of the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude component of the benchmark GMD event definition, Order No. 830 expressed concern with relying solely on spatial averaging in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 because ``the use of spatial averaging in this context is new, and thus there is a dearth of information or research regarding its application or appropriate scale.'' \20\ While Order No. 830 directed that the peak geoelectric field amplitude should not be based solely on spatially-averaged data, the Commission indicated that this ``directive should not be construed to prohibit the use of spatial averaging in some capacity, particularly if more research results in a better understanding of how spatial averaging can be used to reflect actual GMD events.'' \21\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \20\ Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 45. \21\ Id. P 46. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- D. NERC Petition and Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 17. NERC states that proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 enhances currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 by addressing reliability risks posed by GMDs more effectively and implementing the directives in Order No. 830.\22\ NERC asserts that proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 reflects the latest [[Page 23857]] in GMD understanding and provides a technically sound and flexible approach to addressing the concerns discussed in Order No. 830. NERC contends that the proposed modifications enhance reliability by expanding GMD vulnerability assessments to include severe, localized impacts and by implementing deadlines and processes to maintain accountability in the development, completion, and revision of corrective action plans developed to address identified vulnerabilities. Further, NERC states that the proposed modifications improve the availability of GMD monitoring data that may be used to inform GMD vulnerability assessments. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \22\ Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 is not attached to this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR). Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 is available on the Commission's eLibrary document retrieval system in Docket No. RM18-8-000 and on the NERC website, www.nerc.com. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 18. Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 modifies currently- effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 by requiring applicable entities to: (1) Conduct supplemental GMD vulnerability and transformer thermal impact assessments in addition to the existing benchmark GMD vulnerability and transformer thermal impact assessments required in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1; (2) collect data from GIC monitors and magnetometers as necessary to enable model validation and situational awareness; and (3) develop necessary corrective action plans within one year from the completion of the benchmark GMD vulnerability assessment, include a two-year deadline for the implementation of non-hardware mitigation, and include a four-year deadline to complete hardware mitigation.\23\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \23\ Unless otherwise indicated, the requirements of proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 are substantively the same as the requirements in currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 contains conforming and other non-substantive modifications that are not addressed in this NOPR. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 19. In particular, proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 modifies Requirements R1 (identification of responsibilities) and R2 (system and GIC system models) to extend the existing requirements pertaining to benchmark GMD assessments to the proposed supplemental GMD assessments. Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 adds the newly mandated supplemental GMD vulnerability and transformer thermal impact assessments in new Requirements R8 (supplemental GMD vulnerability assessment), R9 (GIC flow information needed for supplemental GMD thermal impact assessments) and R10 (supplemental GMD thermal impact assessments). The supplemental GMD event definition contains a higher, non-spatially-averaged reference peak geoelectric field amplitude component than the benchmark GMD event definition (12 V/km versus 8 V/ km). These three new requirements largely mirror existing Requirements R4, R5, and R6 that currently apply, and would continue to apply, only to benchmark GMD vulnerability and transformer thermal impact assessments.\24\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \24\ An exception is the qualifying threshold for transformers required to undergo thermal impact assessments: For the supplemental GMD assessment the qualifying threshold for transformers is a maximum effective GIC value of 85 A/phase while the threshold for benchmark GMD event assessments is 75 A/phase. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 20. In addition, proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 includes two other new requirements, Requirements R11 and R12, that require applicable entities to gather GIC monitored data (Requirement R11) and magnetometer data (Requirement R12). 21. Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 modifies existing Requirement R7 (corrective action plans) to create a one-year deadline for the development of corrective action plans and two and four-year deadlines to complete actions involving non-hardware and hardware mitigation, respectively, for vulnerabilities identified in the benchmark GMD assessment. The proposed modifications to Requirement R7 include a provision allowing for extension of deadlines if ``situations beyond the control of the responsible entity determined in Requirement R1 prevent implementation of the [corrective action plan] within the timetable for implementation.'' II. Discussion 22. Pursuant to section 215(d) of the FPA, the Commission proposes to approve Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 as just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest. Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 addresses the directives in Order No. 830 to modify currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL- 007-1: (1) To revise the benchmark GMD event definition, as it pertains to the required GMD Vulnerability Assessments and transformer thermal impact assessments, so that the definition is not based solely on spatially-averaged data; (2) to require the collection of necessary GIC monitoring and magnetometer data; and (3) to include a one-year deadline for the completion of corrective action plans and two and four-year deadlines to complete mitigation actions involving non- hardware and hardware mitigation, respectively.\25\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \25\ NERC states that it will address the directive in Order No. 830 on public dissemination of GIC monitoring and magnetometer data through a forthcoming NERC data request to applicable entities pursuant to Section 1600 of the NERC Rules of Procedure rather than through a Reliability Standard requirement. On February 7, 2018, NERC released a draft data request for a 45-day comment period. After reviewing the comments, NERC indicates that it intends to seek authorization from the NERC Board of Trustees to issue the data request in August 2018. NERC Petition at 27. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 23. Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 complies with the directives in Order No. 830 by requiring, in addition to the benchmark GMD event vulnerability and thermal impact assessments, supplemental GMD vulnerability and thermal impact assessments. The supplemental GMD event definition in proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 contains a non-spatially-averaged reference peak geoelectric field amplitude component of 12 V/km, in contrast to the 8 V/km figure in the spatially-averaged benchmark GMD event definition. As NERC explains in its petition, the supplemental GMD event will be used to ``represent conditions associated with localized enhancement of the geomagnetic field during a severe GMD event for use in assessing GMD impacts.'' \26\ Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 therefore addresses the Commission's directive to modify currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 so that the benchmark GMD event does not rely solely on spatially-averaged data to calculate the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \26\ NERC Petition at 12. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 24. While proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 addresses the first directive in Order No. 830 by requiring applicable entities to conduct supplemental GMD vulnerability and thermal impact assessments, the proposed Reliability Standard does not require applicable entities to mitigate such vulnerabilities. Instead, proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, Requirement R8.3 only requires applicable entities to make ``an evaluation of possible actions designed to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the consequences and adverse impacts of the event(s)'' if a supplemental GMD event is assessed to result in Cascading.\27\ As discussed below, NERC's proposal differs significantly from Order No. 830 because the intent of the directive was not only to identify vulnerabilities arising from localized [[Page 23858]] GMD events but also to mitigate such vulnerabilities. Moreover, Order No. 830 reiterated the directive in Order No. 779 that NERC develop a second stage GMD Reliability Standard requiring GMD vulnerability assessments and that ``owners and operators [ ] develop and implement a plan to protect against instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures of the Bulk-Power System.'' \28\ Accordingly, the Commission proposes to direct NERC, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, to develop and submit modifications to the Reliability Standard to require applicable entities to develop and implement corrective action plans to mitigate supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities. The Commission proposes to direct NERC to submit the modified Reliability Standard for approval within 12 months from the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \27\ The NERC Glossary defines Cascading as ``uncontrolled successive loss of System Elements triggered by an incident at any location . . . [c]ascading results in widespread electric service interruption that cannot be restrained from sequentially spreading beyond an area predetermined by studies.'' Glossary of Terms Used in NERC Reliability Standards (January 31, 2018). \28\ Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 7. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 25. In addition, as discussed below, the Commission seeks comment on the need for Requirement R7.4 of proposed Reliability Standard TPL- 007-2, which allows applicable entities to extend corrective action plan implementation deadlines, as compared to a process whereby NERC considers extensions on a case-by-case basis, as suggested in Order No. 830.\29\ After reviewing the comments, the Commission may approve the requirement but direct NERC to prepare and submit a report concerning the use of corrective action plan deadline extensions as allowed under proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, Requirement R7.4. Under such a directive, NERC would submit the report within 12 months from the date on which applicable entities must comply with the last requirement of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. Alternatively, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, the Commission may direct NERC to modify the Reliability Standard to remove Requirement R7.4. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \29\ Id. P 102. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- A. Corrective Action Plan for Supplemental GMD Event Vulnerabilities NERC Petition 26. In requiring applicable entities to assess their vulnerabilities to a supplemental GMD event, NERC states that geomagnetic fields during severe GMD events can be spatially non[hyphen]uniform with higher and lower strengths across a geographic region. NERC explains that the supplemental GMD event was derived using individual station measurements rather than spatially-averaged measurements, and thus includes localized enhancement of field strength above the average value found in the benchmark GMD event. NERC contends that the supplemental GMD event thus addresses the directive in Order No. 830 to revise Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 to account for the effects of localized peaks that could potentially affect reliable operations. 27. NERC maintains that the benchmark GMD event and supplemental GMD event are similar in structure but the supplemental GMD event contains differences to account for localized impacts. NERC explains that, like the benchmark GMD event, the supplemental GMD event defines the geomagnetic and geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows for use in a GMD vulnerability assessment and is composed of four elements: (1) Reference peak geoelectric field amplitude of 12 V/km derived from statistical analysis of historical magnetometer data; (2) scaling factors to account for local geomagnetic latitude; (3) scaling factors to account for local earth conductivity; and (4) a locally- enhanced reference geomagnetic field time series or waveform to facilitate time-domain analysis of GMD impact on equipment. 28. NERC states that the higher reference peak geoelectric field amplitude (12 V/km compared to 8 V/km used in the benchmark GMD event) and local enhancements to the geomagnetic field time series or waveform are distinguishing characteristics of the supplemental GMD event and are intended to represent conditions associated with localized enhancement of the geomagnetic field during a severe GMD event for use in assessing GMD impacts.\30\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \30\ NERC states that the supplemental GMD event waveform is more severe than the benchmark GMD event waveform because it includes a five-minute duration enhanced peak up to 12 V/km for the reference earth model and 60 degree geomagnetic latitude. NERC Petition at 13. NERC explains that this synthetic enhancement represents the observed localized, rapid magnetic field variation periods associated with ionospheric sources during some severe GMD events. Id. NERC observes that such GMD conditions could result in increased transformer heating for short durations during a severe GMD event due to increased GIC flows. Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 29. In developing the supplemental GMD event, NERC indicates that the standard drafting team ensured that the peak geoelectric field does not rely on spatial averaging of geomagnetic field data. NERC states that, like the value in the existing benchmark GMD event, the supplemental GMD event peak geoelectric field is a 1-in-100 year extreme value determined using statistical analysis of historical geomagnetic field data. NERC explains that the fundamental difference in the supplemental GMD event amplitude is that it is based on geomagnetic field observations taken at individual observation stations (i.e., localized measurements), instead of the spatially-averaged geoelectric fields used in the benchmark GMD event. NERC states that the result of the extreme value analysis shows that the supplemental GMD event peak of 12 V/km is above the upper limit of the 95 percent confidence interval for a 100[hyphen]year interval, while the same confidence interval with spatially-averaged data (i.e., the benchmark GMD event) is 8 V/km. 30. NERC indicates that the corrective action plans mandated in Requirement R7 continue to apply only if an entity has identified system performance issues through the benchmark GMD vulnerability assessments. NERC explains that mitigation for assessed supplemental GMD vulnerabilities are addressed in proposed Requirement R8.3, which states that if a responsible entity concludes that there would be ``Cascading'' caused by the supplemental GMD event, the entity shall conduct an analysis of possible actions to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the impacts of the event.\31\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \31\ NERC Petition at 23. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 31. NERC states that the standard drafting team determined that requiring corrective action plans in response to assessed supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities would not be appropriate at this time because the supplemental GMD event definition uses a small number of observed localized enhanced geoelectric field events that provide only general insight into the geographic size of localized events during severe solar storms.\32\ NERC also contends that currently available modeling tools do not provide entities with capabilities to model localized enhancements within a severe GMD event realistically.\33\ As a result, NERC claims that applicable entities may need to employ conservative approaches when performing the supplemental GMD vulnerability assessment, such as applying the localized peak geoelectric field over an entire planning area.\34\ NERC states that, for these reasons, ``requiring mandatory mitigation may not provide effective reliability benefit [[Page 23859]] or use resources optimally.'' \35\ NERC contends that the approach used in proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 for the supplemental GMD event provides entities with flexibility to consider and select mitigation actions based on their circumstances and is similar to the approach used in Reliability Standard TPL-001-4, Requirement R3.5 for extreme events.\36\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \32\ Id. \33\ Id. \34\ Id. at 24. \35\ Id. \36\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Commission Proposal 32. NERC's proposal not to require corrective action plans for supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities differs significantly from Order No. 830 because the intent and clear meaning of the directive was not only to identify vulnerabilities arising from localized GMD events but also to mitigate such vulnerabilities. Order No. 830 reiterated the directive in Order No. 779 that NERC develop a second stage GMD Reliability Standard requiring GMD vulnerability assessments and that ``owners and operators [ ] develop and implement a plan to protect against instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures of the Bulk-Power System.'' \37\ By contrast, proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 allows supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities to potentially go unmitigated even, for example, if an applicable entity assesses that the supplemental GMD event causes Cascading.\38\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \37\ Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 7. \38\ Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, Requirement R8.3 (``If the analysis concludes there is Cascading caused by the supplemental GMD event described in Attachment 1, an evaluation of possible actions designed to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the consequences and adverse impacts of the event(s) shall be conducted.''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 33. Moreover, in Order No. 830, the Commission directed NERC to ``develop revisions to the benchmark GMD event definition so that the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude component is not based solely on spatially-averaged data.'' \39\ NERC's proposal to modify the benchmark, but then allow applicable entities the discretion to take corrective action based solely on the results of the spatially-averaged benchmark analysis while taking under advisement (``an evaluation of possible actions'') the results of the supplemental assessment, does not satisfy the clear intent of the Commission's directive. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \39\ Id. at 44. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 34. Further, we are not persuaded by NERC's reasoning that: (1) Existing technical limitations, specifically the limited number of observations used to define the supplemental GMD event and the availability of modeling tools to assist entities in assessing vulnerabilities, make requiring mitigation premature at this time; and (2) requiring only an evaluation of possible actions for supplemental GMD events that result in Cascading is similar to the treatment of extreme events in Reliability Standard TPL-001-4 (Transmission System Planning Performance Requirements). 35. We believe, based on the information before us, that it is reasonable to require applicable entities to mitigate supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities because, as NERC contends, the supplemental GMD event ``provides a technically justified method of assessing vulnerabilities to the localized peak effects of severe GMD events.'' \40\ While the supplemental GMD event possesses characteristics that differentiate it from the benchmark GMD event (i.e., geographic area, peak amplitude, duration, and geoelectric field waveform), both events were developed by the standard drafting team using a common framework. The standard drafting team determined the peak amplitude of the supplemental GMD event using generalized extreme value statistical analysis methods, as it did for the benchmark GMD event, and found a consistent result of 12 V/km with a 95 percent confidence interval. Generalized extreme value analysis is well-supported in the technical literature and, in approving the benchmark GMD event, was previously accepted in Order No. 830. The basic waveform used for the supplemental GMD event is the same waveform used in the benchmark GMD event.\41\ Similar to the methodology for determining peak amplitude, the benchmark GMD event waveform was previously considered appropriate in Order No. 830. While the supplemental GMD event waveform includes a ``five-minute duration enhanced peak up to 12 V/km,'' NERC does not suggest that the duration of the enhanced peak is unrepresentative of the behavior of localized enhancements. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \40\ NERC Petition at 13. \41\ Id. (``Both the benchmark and supplemental GMD event waveforms are based on 10-second sampling interval magnetic field data from the Ottawa observatory recorded during the March 13-14, 1989 GMD event.''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 36. NERC contends that the low number of real-world observations on which the supplemental GMD event is based calls into question the accuracy of its geographic size.\42\ However, any uncertainty regarding the size of the geographic footprint of the supplemental GMD event could be addressed by applicable entities through sensitivity analysis and other methods within the planning studies. The proposed Reliability Standard does not prescribe how applicable entities must perform such studies; so applicable entities may incorporate this uncertainty into their studies. Indeed, Attachment 1 (Calculating Geoelectric Fields for the Benchmark and Supplemental GMD Events) of proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 states that ``Planners have flexibility to determine how to apply the localized peak geoelectric field over the planning area in performing GIC calculations.'' \43\ Attachment 1 provides that an applicable entity may apply the supplemental GMD event definition over the entire planning area; apply some combination of the benchmark GMD event and supplemental GMD event over portions of a planning area; or use ``[o]ther methods to adjust the benchmark GMD event analysis to account for the localized geoelectric field enhancement of the supplemental GMD event.'' \44\ The flexibility afforded to applicable entities by proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 to determine the geographic size of the supplemental GMD event, in our view, addresses NERC's concern. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \42\ Id. at 23 (``[the] small number of observed localized enhanced geoelectric field events . . . provide only general insight into the geographic size of localized events during severe solar storms''). \43\ Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, Attachment 1, Applying the Localized Peak Geoelectric Field in the Supplemental GMD Event. \44\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 37. The Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description appended to NERC's petition further supports the supplemental GMD event definition by stating that ``[b]ased on the above analysis and the previous work associated with the benchmark GMD event, it is reasonable to incorporate a second (or supplemental) assessment into TPL[hyphen]007[hyphen]2 to account for the potential impact of a local enhancement in both the network analysis and the transformer thermal assessment(s).'' \45\ The Supplemental GMD Event White Paper also states that ``[g]iven the current state of knowledge regarding the spatial extent of a local geomagnetic field enhancements, upper geographic boundaries, such as the values used in the approaches above, are reasonable but are not definitive.'' \46\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \45\ NERC Petition, Exhibit I (Supplemental Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description) at 12 (Supplemental GMD Event White Paper). \46\ Id. at 13. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 38. With respect to NERC's contention regarding the unavailability of modeling tools, we are not persuaded. We understand that there are commercially available tools that could allow for [[Page 23860]] modeling of supplemental GMD events.\47\ In addition to these modeling tools, other methods could be used within the framework of the Reliability Standard to study planning areas (e.g., superposition or sensitivity studies) in conjunction with other power system modeling tools. However, we will consider any comments that substantiate NERC's position. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \47\ See, e.g., Siemens Power Technologies International, GIC Module to Analyze Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Grid, Features Summary, http://w3.usa.siemens.com/smartgrid/us/en/transmission-grid/products/grid-analysis-tools/transmission-system-planning/Documents/PTI_FF_EN_SWPE_GIC_1412.pdf; PowerWorld, Simulator, Geomagnetically Induced Current (GIC), https://www.powerworld.com/products/simulator/add-ons-2/simulator-gic. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 39. In addition, the Commission recognized in Order No. 830 that an improved understanding of GMDs is necessary and directed NERC to conduct certain GMD-related research. The GMD research directed in Order No. 830 is meant to address technical limitations regarding GMD mitigation, among other areas. In the preliminary GMD research work plan submitted by NERC on May 30, 2017, NERC stated that the Commission in Order No. 830 ``noted its concern that a spatially-averaged benchmark may not adequately account for localized peak geoelectric fields that could potentially affect reliable operations.'' \48\ In response, NERC indicated that it will conduct ``(i) research [Task 1 of the GMD research work plan] to improve understanding of the characteristics and spatial scales of localized geoelectric field enhancements caused by severe GMD events; and (ii) research to determine the impacts of spatial averaging assumptions on [Bulk-Power System] reliability.'' \49\ NERC estimated that Task 1, which includes the development of better models, will require approximately 24-36 months to complete from start of work. Such GMD research on localized events should inform the standard development process and aid applicable entities when implementing a modified Reliability Standard.\50\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \48\ NERC, Geomagnetic Disturbance Research Work Plan of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, Docket No. RM15-11- 002, at 8 (filed May 30, 2017). \49\ Id. \50\ On April 19, 2018, NERC submitted a revised GMD Work Plan that is currently pending before the Commission. NERC, Revised Geomagnetic Disturbance Research Work Plan of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation, Docket No. 15-11-003 (filed April 19, 2018). The revised GMD Work Plan provides additional detail to the previous version. NERC now estimates that Task 1 deliverables will be completed in 2019. Id., Attachment 1 (Order No. 830 GMD Research Work Plan (April 2018)) at 7. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 40. We are also not persuaded by NERC's reliance on Reliability Standard TPL-001-4 to justify only requiring an evaluation of possible actions for supplemental GMD events that result in Cascading in light of the directive in Order No. 830. In Order No. 830, the Commission directed NERC to modify the proposed Reliability Standard to assess and address the risks posed by enhanced localized GMD events to the Bulk- Power System. In contrast, in approving Reliability Standard TPL-001-4, the Commission did not direct NERC to further modify the Reliability Standard to address the risks posed by extreme events. Accordingly, the treatment of extreme events under Reliability Standard TPL-001-4 does not support the notion here that applicable entities should, as NERC suggests, have the ``the flexibility to . . . consider mitigation.'' \51\ However, as with the mitigation of benchmark GMD event vulnerabilities, we agree with NERC that any required mitigation of supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities should be flexible in terms of how applicable entities choose to mitigate such vulnerabilities. NERC's petition already stresses that proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 affords flexibility as to how applicable entities apply the supplemental GMD event to their planning areas.\52\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \51\ NERC Petition at 24 (emphasis added). \52\ NERC Petition, Exhibit I at 13 (``Proposed TPL[hyphen]007[hyphen]2 provides flexibility for planners to determine how to apply the supplemental GMD event to the planning area.''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 41. Accordingly, the Commission proposes to direct NERC, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, to develop and submit modifications to the Reliability Standard to require applicable entities to develop and implement corrective action plans to mitigate supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities. The Commission proposes to direct NERC to submit the modified Reliability Standard for approval within 12 months from the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. The Commission seeks comments from NERC and other interested entities on this proposal. B. Corrective Action Plan Deadline Extensions NERC Petition 42. NERC states that proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, Requirement R7.2 requires responsible entities to develop a corrective action plan within one year of the benchmark GMD vulnerability assessment, if the entity concludes that its System does not meet the performance requirements for the steady state planning benchmark GMD event. NERC indicates that under Requirement R7.3, the corrective action plan shall include a timeline that specifies the completion of non-hardware and hardware mitigation within two and four years of development of the corrective action plan, respectively. 43. NERC maintains that proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 also recognizes that there may be circumstances outside of a responsible entity's control that could prevent the completion of a mitigation activity within the specified timetable. NERC cites as examples delays due to regulatory or legal processes, such as permitting; delays from stakeholder processes required by tariffs; delays resulting from equipment lead times; or delays resulting from the inability to acquire necessary right-of-way. NERC explains that in such circumstances, a responsible entity may maintain compliance by revising its corrective action plan in accordance with Requirement R7.4. NERC states that under Requirement R7.4, the responsible entity shall revise its corrective action plan if events beyond its control prevent implementation within the original timetable. NERC explains that in the revised corrective action plan, the responsible entity must provide justification for its revised timetable by documenting: (1) The circumstances causing the delay; (2) description of the original corrective action plan and any changes; and (3) revisions to selected actions, including the use of any operating procedures if applicable, along with an updated timetable for completion. NERC states that the revised corrective action plan shall be updated at least annually and the responsible entity must then provide its revised corrective action plan to recipients of the original corrective action plan (i.e., reliability coordinator, adjacent planning coordinator(s), adjacent transmission planner(s), functional entities referenced in the corrective action plan, and any functional entity that submits a written request and has a reliability related need for the information). 44. NERC contends that this proposal is consistent with other Commission-approved Reliability Standards. NERC cites Reliability Standard FAC-003-4, Requirement R7 and asserts that it provides that an entity may modify its annual vegetation work plan in light of circumstances beyond the entity's control, such as a natural disaster or other circumstance. NERC also cites Reliability Standard PRC-004- 5(i), Requirement R5 and contends that under that Reliability Standard a responsible entity that owns a protection system component that caused a misoperation shall either [[Page 23861]] develop a corrective action plan or explain in a declaration why corrective actions are beyond the entity's control or would not improve reliability. Commission Proposal 45. Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 satisfies Order No. 830 by incorporating the deadlines set out by the Commission for the development and implementation of corrective action plans. However, Requirement R7.4 of the proposed Reliability Standard differs from Order No. 830 by allowing applicable entities to ``revise'' or ``update'' corrective action plans to extend deadlines. This provision contrasts with the Commission's guidance in Order No. 830 that ``NERC should consider extensions of time on a case-by-case basis.'' \53\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \53\ Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 102. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 46. NERC contends that the proposed Reliability Standard ``would implement the Commission directed deadlines for Corrective Action Plans and mitigation, along with a process to maintain accountability and communication with affected entities when circumstances beyond a responsible entity's control affect the entity's ability to complete implementation within the original deadlines.'' \54\ Given the complexities and potential novelty of steps applicable entities may take to mitigate the risks of GMDs, we agree with NERC that there should be a mechanism for allowing extensions of corrective action plan implementation deadlines. However, we would like to avoid unnecessary delay in implementing protection against GMD threats. Moreover, we are not persuaded that the proposal is supported by the precedent cited by NERC because the Reliability Standards NERC cites are distinguishable. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \54\ NERC Petition at 22. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 47. NERC maintains that provisions similar to Requirement R7.4 are found in two Reliability Standards. NERC states that Reliability Standard FAC-003-4, Requirement R7, allows a registered entity to modify its annual vegetation work plan in light of circumstances beyond the entity's control. While Reliability Standard FAC-003-4, Requirement R7 permits modifications to annual vegetation work plans, the modifications cannot result in a registered entity's failure to avoid the damage contemplated by Requirement R7--vegetation encroachment: ``Modifications to the work plan in response to changing conditions or to findings from vegetation inspections may be made (provided they do not allow encroachment of vegetation into the [minimum vegetation clearance distance]) and must be documented.'' In contrast, proposed Requirement R7.4 could enable applicable entities to delay mitigation that would avoid the damage of known GMD vulnerabilities. Accordingly, the extensions of time permitted by Reliability Standard FAC-003-4, because they may not result in the damage contemplated by the Reliability Standard, are not comparable, as NERC asserts, to failure to mitigate an existing GMD vulnerability in a timely manner. 48. NERC also compares the corrective action plan provision in proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 with Reliability Standard PRC- 004-5(i), Requirement R5, which allows ``a responsible entity that owns a Protection System component that caused a Misoperation . . . [to] either develop a Corrective Action Plan or explain in a declaration why corrective actions are beyond the entity's control or would not improve reliability.'' We are not persuaded that NERC's proposal to allow self- declared extensions of time in Requirement R7.4 is supported by the quoted language in Reliability Standard PRC-004-5(i), Requirement R5 because Requirement R5 does not allow for extensions of time. Rather, Requirement R5 permits the registered entity to declare that it cannot carry out corrective actions (e.g., because the misoperation occurred on facilities it does not own or control) or because the corrective action would not improve Bulk-Power System reliability. Moreover, the Guidelines and Technical Basis document accompanying Reliability Standard PRC-004-5(i) concludes by stating that a ``declaration that no further corrective actions will be taken is expected to be used sparingly.'' 49. Given these concerns, the Commission is considering two options in response to Requirement R7.4 of the proposed Reliability Standard. The Commission seeks comment from NERC and other interested entities on each of these proposals. 50. Under the first option, the Commission would, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, direct NERC to modify the proposed Reliability Standard to comport with Order No. 830, by requiring that NERC and the Regional Entities, as appropriate, consider requests for extension of time on a case-by-case basis.\55\ Under this option, responsible entities seeking an extension would submit the information required by proposed Requirement R7.4 to NERC and the Regional Entities for their consideration of the request. The Commission would also direct NERC to prepare and submit a report addressing the disposition of any such requests, as well as information regarding how often and why applicable entities are exceeding corrective action plan deadlines following implementation of the proposed Reliability Standard.\56\ Under such a directive, NERC would submit the report within 12 months from the date on which applicable entities must comply with the last requirement of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. Following receipt of the report, the Commission would determine whether further action is necessary. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \55\ Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 102. \56\ Under proposed Requirement R7.4, when an applicable entity extends a corrective action plan deadline, it must revise the corrective action plan to explain the ``[c]ircumstances causing the delay for fully or partially implementing the selected actions.'' NERC could use this information to populate the proposed report. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 51. Under the second option, the Commission would approve proposed Requirement R7.4 but also direct NERC to prepare and submit a report regarding how often and why applicable entities are exceeding corrective action plan deadlines following implementation of the proposed Reliability Standard. Under such a directive, NERC would submit the report within 12 months from the date on which applicable entities must comply with the last requirement of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. Following receipt of the report, the Commission would determine whether further action is necessary. III. Information Collection Statement 52. The collection of information contained in this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is subject to review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under section 3507(d) of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.\57\ OMB's regulations require review and approval of certain information collection requirements imposed by agency rules.\58\ Upon approval of a collection of information, OMB will assign an OMB control number and an expiration date. Respondents subject to the information collection requirements of a rule will not be penalized for failing to respond to the collection of information unless the collection of information displays a valid OMB control number. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \57\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d) (2012). \58\ 5 CFR part 1320 (2017). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 53. We solicit comments on the Commission's need for this information, whether the information will have practical utility, the accuracy of the burden estimates, ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the [[Page 23862]] information to be collected or retained, and any suggested methods for minimizing respondents' burden, including the use of automated information techniques. Specifically, the Commission asks that any revised burden or cost estimates submitted by commenters be supported by sufficient detail to understand how the estimates are generated. 54. The Commission proposes to approve proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, which would replace currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. When compared to Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 maintains the current information collection requirements, modifies existing Requirement R7 and adds new requirements in Requirements R8 through R12. 55. Proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 includes new corrective action plan development and implementation deadlines in Requirement R7, new supplemental GMD vulnerability and transformer thermal impact assessments in Requirements R8 through R10, and requirements for applicable entities to gather magnetometer and GIC monitored data in Requirements R11 and R12. Deadlines in Requirement R7 for the development and implementation of corrective action plans would only change the timeline of such documentation and are not expected to revise the burden to applicable entities. The burden estimates for new Requirements R8 through R10 are expected to be similar to the burden estimates for Requirements R4 through R6 in currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 due to the closely-mirrored requirements.\59\ The Commission expects that only 25 percent or fewer of transmission owners and generator owners would have to complete a supplemental transformer thermal impact assessment per Requirement R10. Requirements R11 and R12 require applicable entities to have a process to collect GIC and magnetometer data from meters in planning coordinator planning areas. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \59\ NERC Petition at 15-17. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Public Reporting Burden: The burden and cost estimates below are based on the changes to the reporting and recordkeeping burden imposed by proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. Our estimates for the number of respondents are based on the NERC Compliance Registry as of 3/9/2018, which indicates there are 183 entities registered as transmission planner (TP), 65 planning coordinators (PC), 330 transmission owners (TO), 944 generator owners (GO) within the United States. However, due to significant overlap, the total number of unique affected entities (i.e., entities registered as a transmission planner, planning coordinator, transmission owner or generator owner, or some combination of these functional entities) is 1,130 entities. This includes 188 entities that are registered as a transmission planner or planning coordinator (applicability for Requirements R7 to R9 and R11 to R12), and 1,119 entities registered as a transmission or generation owner (applicability for Requirement R10). Given the assumption above, there is an expectation that at most only 25 percent of the 1,119 entities (or 280 entities) will have to complete compliance activities for Requirement R10. The estimated burden and cost are as follow.\60\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \60\ Hourly costs are based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) figures for May 2017 (Sector 22, Utilities) for wages (https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics2_22.htm) and benefits for December 2017 (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.nr0.htm). We estimate that an Electrical Engineer (NAICS code 17-2071) would perform the functions associated with reporting requirements, at an average hourly cost (for wages and benefits) of $66.90. The functions associated with recordkeeping requirements, we estimate, would be performed by a File Clerk (NAICS code 43-4071) at an average hourly cost of $32.04 for wages and benefits. The estimated burden and cost are in addition to the burden and cost that are associated with the existing requirements in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 (and in the current OMB-approved inventory), which would continue under proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. FERC-725N, Changes Proposed in NOPR in Docket No. RM18-8 61 62 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Total annual Number and type of Annual number of Total number of Average burden burden hours and Cost per Requirement (R) respondents responses per responses hours and cost per total annual cost respondent ($) respondent response (rounded) (1)............... (2)............... (1) x (2) = (3)... (4)............... (3) x (4) = (5)... (5) / (1) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- R1 through R6................... No change......... No change......... No change......... No change......... No change......... No change. R7.............................. 188............... 1/5 (once for 37.6.............. Rep. 5 hrs., Rep. 188 Rep. 1 hr., $66.9; (PC and TP)....... every five year $334.5; RK 5 hrs.,$12,577; RK RK 1 hr., $32.04. study). hrs., $160.2. 188 hrs., $6,023. R8.............................. 188............... 1/5 (once for 37.6.............. Rep., 27 hrs., Rep. 1,015 hrs., Rep., 5.4 hrs., (PC and TP)....... every five year $1,806.30;RK, 21 $67,917; RK 790 $361.26; RK 4.2 study). hrs., $672.84. hrs., $25,299. hrs., $134.57. R9.............................. 188............... 1/5 (once for 37.6.............. Rep. 9 hrs., Rep. 338 hrs.; Rep. 1.8 hrs., (PC and TP)....... every five year $602.10. $22,639 RK 263 $120.42; RK 1.4 study). RK 7 hrs., $224.28 hrs., $8,432. hrs., $44.85. R10............................. 280............... 1/5 (once for 56................ Rep. 22 hrs., Rep. 1,232 hrs., Rep. ;4.4 hrs., (25% of 1,119).... every five year $1,471.8;. $82,421; RK 1,008 $294.36; RK 3.6 (GO and TO)....... study). RK 18 hrs. $576.72 hrs., $32,296. hrs., $115.34. R11............................. 188............... 1 (on-going 188............... Rep. 10 hrs., Rep. 1,880 hrs., Rep. 10 hrs., (PC and TP)....... reporting). $669;. $125,772; RK $669; RK 10 hrs., RK. 10 hrs., 1,880 hrs., $320.40. $320.40. $60,235. R12............................. 188............... 1 (on-going 188............... Rep. 10 hrs., $669 Rep. 1,880 hrs. Rep. 10 hrs., (PC and TP)....... reporting). RK. hrs 320.4..... $125,772; RK $669; RK 10 hrs., 1,880 hrs., $320.40. $60,235. ----------------------------------------------------------- [[Page 23863]] Total Additional Hrs. and .................. .................. .................. .................. Rep., 6,533....... .................. Cost (rounded), due to NOPR hrs., $437,057; RK in RM18-8. 6,009. hrs., $192,528.... -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Title: FERC-725N, Mandatory Reliability Standards: TPL Reliability Standards. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \61\ Rep. = reporting requirements; RK = recordkeeping requirements. \62\ For each Reliability Standard, the Measure shows the acceptable evidence (Reporting Requirement) for the associated Requirement (R numbers), and the Compliance section details the related Recordkeeping Requirement. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Action: Proposed revisions to an existing collection of information. OMB Control No: 1902-0264. Respondents: Business or other for profit, and not for profit institutions. Frequency of Responses: \63\ Every five years (for Requirement R7- R10), annually (for Requirement R11 and R12). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \63\ The frequency of Requirements R1 through R6 in proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 is unchanged from the existing requirements in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Necessity of the Information: Proposed Reliability Standard TPL- 007-2, if adopted, would implement the Congressional mandate of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to develop mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards to better ensure the reliability of the nation's Bulk-Power System. Specifically, these requirements address the threat posed by GMD events to the Bulk-Power System and conform to the Commission's directives to modify Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 as directed in Order No. 830. Internal review: The Commission has reviewed proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, and made a determination that its action is necessary to implement section 215 of the FPA. The Commission has assured itself, by means of its internal review, that there is specific, objective support for the burden estimates associated with the information requirements. 56. Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting requirements by contacting the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Office of the Executive Director, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426 [Attention: Ellen Brown, email: DataClearance@ferc.gov, phone: (202) 502-8663, fax: (202) 273-0873]. Comments concerning the proposed collection of information and the associated burden estimate should be sent to the Commission in this docket and may also be sent to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, 725 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20503 [Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission]. Due to security concerns, comments should be sent electronically to the following email address: oira_submission@omb.eop.gov. Comments submitted to OMB should refer to FERC-725N and OMB Control No. 1902-0264. IV. Environmental Analysis 57. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may have a significant adverse effect on the human environment.\64\ The Commission has categorically excluded certain actions from this requirement as not having a significant effect on the human environment. Included in the exclusion are rules that are clarifying, corrective, or procedural or that do not substantially change the effect of the regulations being amended.\65\ The actions proposed here fall within this categorical exclusion in the Commission's regulations. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \64\ Regulations Implementing the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Order No. 486, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 30,783 (1987). \65\ 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii) (2017). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- V. Regulatory Flexibility Act 58. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) \66\ generally requires a description and analysis of proposed rules that will have significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The definition of small business is provided by the Small Business Administration (SBA) at 13 CFR 121.201. The threshold for a small utility (using SBA's sub-sector 221) is based on the number of employees for a concern and its affiliates. As discussed above, proposed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 would apply to a total of 1,130 unique planning coordinators, transmission planners, transmission owners, and generation owners.\67\ A small utility (and its affiliates) is defined as having no more than the following number of employees: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \66\ 5 U.S.C. 601-12 (2012). \67\ In the NERC Registry, there are approximately 65 PCs, 188 TPs, 944 GOs, and 330 TOs (in the United States), which will be affected by this NOPR. Because some entities serve in more than one role, these figures involve some double counting. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------For planning coordinators, transmission planners, and transmission owners (NAICS code 221121, Electric Bulk Power Transmission and Control), a maximum of 500 employees for generator owners, a maximum of 750 employees.\68\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \68\ The maximum number of employees for a generator owner (and its affiliates) to be ``small'' varies from 250 to 750 employees, depending on the type of generation (e.g., hydroelectric, nuclear, fossil fuel, wind). For this analysis, we use the most conservative threshold of 750 employees. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 59. The total cost to all entities (large and small) is $629,585 annually (or an average of $1,345.27 for each of the estimated 468 entities affected annually). For the estimated 280 generator owners and transmission owners affected annually, the average cost would be $409.70 per year. For the estimated 188 planning coordinators and transmission planners, the estimated average annual cost would be $2,738.84. The estimated annual cost to each affected entity varies from $409.70 to $2,738.84 and is not considered significant. 60. Accordingly, the Commission certifies that the proposals contained in this NOPR will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The Commission seeks comment on this certification. [[Page 23864]] VI. Comment Procedures 61. The Commission invites interested persons to submit comments on the matters and issues proposed in this notice to be adopted, including any related matters or alternative proposals that commenters may wish to discuss. Comments are due July 23, 2018. Comments must refer to Docket No. RM18-8-000, and must include the commenter's name, the organization they represent, if applicable, and their address in their comments. 62. The Commission encourages comments to be filed electronically via the eFiling link on the Commission's website at http://www.ferc.gov. The Commission accepts most standard word processing formats. Documents created electronically using word processing software should be filed in native applications or print-to-PDF format and not in a scanned format. Commenters filing electronically do not need to make a paper filing. 63. Commenters that are not able to file comments electronically must send an original of their comments to: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Secretary of the Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426. 64. All comments will be placed in the Commission's public files and may be viewed, printed, or downloaded remotely as described in the Document Availability section below. Commenters on this proposal are not required to serve copies of their comments on other commenters. VII. Document Availability 65. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the internet through the Commission's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov) and in the Commission's Public Reference Room during normal business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street NE, Room 2A, Washington DC 20426. 66. From the Commission's Home Page on the internet, this information is available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is available on eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing, printing, and/or downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type the docket number, excluding the last three digits of this document in the docket number field. 67. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the Commission's website during normal business hours from the Commission's Online Support at 202-502-6652 (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or email at ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the Public Reference Room at 202-502- 8371, TTY 202-502-8659. Email the Public Reference Room at public.referenceroom@ferc.gov. By direction of the Commission. Issued: May 17, 2018. Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr., Deputy Secretary. [FR Doc. 2018-11001 Filed 5-22-18; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
![23854 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 100 / Wednesday, May 23, 2018 / Proposed Rules
project vicinity, and on any project Reliability Standard to require a risk of voltage instability or voltage
website, the approved recreation plan, applicable entities to develop and collapse, as well as equipment loss or
any recreation-related reports approved implement corrective action plans to failure.
by the Commission, and the entire mitigate supplemental GMD event 2. Proposed Reliability Standard TPL–
license instrument, properly indexed for vulnerabilities. 007–2 modifies currently-effective
easy reference to the license conditions Reliability Standard TPL–007–1
DATES: Comments are due July 23, 2018.
designated for publications in § 8.1. (Transmission System Planned
ADDRESSES: Comments, identified by Performance for Geomagnetic
§ 8.11 [Removed] docket number, may be filed Disturbance Events) by requiring
■ 4. Remove § 8.11. electronically at http://www.ferc.gov in applicable entities to: (1) Conduct
acceptable native applications and supplemental GMD vulnerability
PART 141—STATEMENTS AND print-to-PDF, but not in scanned or assessments and thermal impact
REPORTS (SCHEDULES) picture format. For those unable to file assessments; (2) obtain GIC and
electronically, comments may be filed magnetometer data; and (3) meet certain
■ 5. The authority citation for part 141
by mail or hand-delivery to: Federal deadlines for the development and
continues to read as follows:
Energy Regulatory Commission, completion of tasks in corrective action
Authority: 15 U.S.C. 79; 15 U.S.C. 717– Secretary of the Commission, 888 First plans.
717z; 16 U.S.C. 791a–828c, 2601–2645; 31 Street NE, Washington, DC 20426. The 3. The Commission proposes to
U.S.C. 9701; 42 U.S.C. 7101–7352. Comment Procedures Section of this approve proposed Reliability Standard
§ 141.14 [Removed] document contains more detailed filing TPL–007–2 as it largely addresses (with
■ 6. Remove 141.14.
procedures. one exception discussed below) the
[FR Doc. 2018–11002 Filed 5–22–18; 8:45 am] FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: directives in Order No. 830 to modify
BILLING CODE 6717–01–P Justin Kelly (Technical Information), currently-effective Reliability Standard
Office of Electric Reliability, Federal TPL–007–1: (1) To revise the benchmark
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 GMD event definition, as it pertains to
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY First Street NE, Washington, DC the required GMD Vulnerability
20426, Telephone: (301) 665–1394, Assessments and transformer thermal
Federal Energy Regulatory Justin.Kelly@ferc.gov. impact assessments, so that the
Commission Matthew Vlissides (Legal Information), definition is not based solely on
Office of the General Counsel, Federal spatially-averaged data; (2) to require
18 CFR Part 40 Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 the collection of necessary GIC
First Street NE, Washington, DC monitoring and magnetometer data; and
[Docket No. RM18–8–000]
20426, Telephone: (202) 502–8408, (3) to include a one-year deadline for
Geomagnetic Disturbance Reliability Matthew.Vlissides@ferc.gov. the completion of corrective action
Standard plans and two- and four-year deadlines
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
to complete mitigation actions involving
AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory 1. Pursuant to section 215 of the
non-hardware and hardware mitigation,
Commission, Department of Energy. Federal Power Act (FPA), the
respectively.
Commission proposes to approve 4. While proposed Reliability
ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking.
Reliability Standard TPL–007–2 Standard TPL–007–2 addresses the first
SUMMARY: The Federal Energy (Transmission System Planned directive in Order No. 830 by requiring
Regulatory Commission (Commission) Performance for Geomagnetic applicable entities to conduct
proposes to approve Reliability Disturbance Events).1 The Commission supplemental GMD vulnerability and
Standard TPL–007–2 (Transmission also proposes to approve the associated thermal impact assessments, which do
System Planned Performance for violation risk factors and violation not rely solely upon on spatially-
Geomagnetic Disturbance Events). The severity levels, implementation plan, averaged data, the proposed Reliability
North American Electric Reliability and effective date for proposed Standard does not require applicable
Corporation (NERC), the Commission- Reliability Standard TPL–007–2. The entities to mitigate vulnerabilities
certified Electric Reliability North American Electric Reliability identified pursuant to such a
Organization, submitted proposed Corporation (NERC), the Commission- supplemental assessment.3 NERC’s
Reliability Standard TPL–007–2 for certified Electric Reliability proposal to modify the benchmark, but
Commission approval. Geomagnetic Organization (ERO), submitted proposed then allow entities the discretion to take
disturbance events (GMDs) occur when Reliability Standard TPL–007–2 for corrective action based solely on the
the sun ejects charged particles that approval in response to a Commission results of the spatially-averaged data
interact with and cause changes in the directive in Order No. 830.2 while taking under advisement (‘‘an
earth’s magnetic fields. Proposed Geomagnetic disturbance events (GMDs) evaluation of possible actions’’) the
Reliability Standard TPL–007–2 occur when the sun ejects charged results of the supplemental assessment,
modifies currently-effective Reliability particles that interact with and cause does not satisfy the clear intent of the
Standard TPL–007–1 by requiring changes in the earth’s magnetic fields. Commission’s directive. Moreover,
applicable entities to: Conduct This interaction can cause Order No. 830 reiterated the directive in
supplemental GMD vulnerability geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) Order No. 779 that NERC develop a
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assessments and thermal impact to flow in an electric power system and, second stage GMD Reliability Standard
assessments; obtain geomagnetically depending on various factors affecting requiring GMD vulnerability
induced current and magnetometer data; the intensity of the current, can result in
and meet certain deadlines for the 3 See Order No. 830, 156 FERC ¶ 61,215 at P 44
1 16 U.S.C. 824o (2012).
development and completion of tasks in (directing NERC to ‘‘develop revisions to the
2 Reliability Standard for Transmission System benchmark GMD event definition so that the
corrective action plans. In addition, the Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance reference peak geoelectric field amplitude
Commission proposes to direct NERC to Events, Order No. 830, 156 FERC ¶ 61,215 (2016), component is not based solely on spatially-averaged
develop and submit modifications to the reh’g denied, 158 FERC ¶ 61,041 (2017). data’’).
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assessments and that ‘‘owners and I. Background discussed above. As explained in the
operators [ ] develop and implement a Background section of the proposed
A. Section 215 and Mandatory
plan to protect against instability, Reliability Standard, ‘‘[d]uring a GMD
Reliability Standards
uncontrolled separation, or cascading event, geomagnetically-induced currents
failures of the Bulk-Power System.’’4 6. Section 215 of the FPA requires the (GIC) may cause transformer hot-spot
Accordingly, as discussed below, the Commission to certify an ERO to heating or damage, loss of Reactive
Commission proposes to direct that develop mandatory and enforceable Power sources, increased Reactive
NERC, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of Reliability Standards, subject to Power demand, and Misoperation(s), the
the FPA, develop and submit Commission review and approval. Once combination of which may result in
modifications to the Reliability approved, the Reliability Standards may voltage collapse and blackout.’’
Standard to require applicable entities be enforced in the United States by the
ERO, subject to Commission oversight, C. Currently-Effective Reliability
to develop and implement corrective
or by the Commission independently.8 Standard TPL–007–1 and Order No. 830
action plans to mitigate vulnerabilities
revealed by conducting supplemental B. GMD Primer 1. Currently-Effective Reliability
GMD vulnerability assessments.5 The Standard TPL–007–1
7. GMD events occur when the sun
Commission proposes to direct NERC to 9. Reliability Standard TPL–007–1
ejects charged particles that interact and
submit the modified Reliability consists of seven requirements and
cause changes in the earth’s magnetic
Standard for approval within 12 months applies to planning coordinators,
fields.9 Once a solar particle is ejected,
from the effective date of Reliability transmission planners, transmission
it can take between 17 to 96 hours
Standard TPL–007–2. owners and generation owners who own
(depending on its energy level) to reach
5. In addition, while proposed or whose planning coordinator area or
earth.10 A geoelectric field is the electric
Reliability Standard TPL–007–2 transmission planning area includes a
potential (measured in volts per
imposes deadlines for the preparation power transformer with a high side,
kilometer (V/km)) on the earth’s surface
and completion of tasks in corrective wye-grounded winding connected at
and is directly related to the rate of
action plans, Requirement R7.4 of the 200 kV or higher.
change of the magnetic fields.11 The
proposed Reliability Standard also 10. Requirement R1 requires planning
geoelectric field has an amplitude and
permits applicable entities to exceed coordinators and transmission planners
direction and acts as a voltage source
deadlines for completing corrective (i.e., ‘‘responsible entities’’) to
that can cause GICs to flow on long
action plan tasks when ‘‘situations determine the individual and joint
conductors, such as transmission
beyond the control of the responsible responsibilities in the planning
lines.12 The magnitude of the geoelectric
entity [arise].’’ As discussed below, the coordinator’s planning area for
field amplitude is impacted by local
Commission seeks comment on two maintaining models and performing
factors such as geomagnetic latitude and
options that it is considering regarding studies needed to complete the GMD
local earth conductivity.13 Geomagnetic
proposed Requirement R7.4. Under the vulnerability assessment required in
latitude is the proximity to earth’s
first option, the Commission would, Requirement R4. Requirement R2
magnetic north and south poles, as
pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the requires responsible entities to maintain
opposed to earth’s geographic poles.14
FPA, direct NERC to modify the system models and GIC system models
Local earth conductivity is the ability of
Reliability Standard to bring the needed to complete the GMD
the earth’s crust to conduct electricity at
proposed standard into alignment with vulnerability assessment required in
a certain location to depths of hundreds
the Commission’s direction in Order No. Requirement R4. Requirement R3
of kilometers down to the earth’s
830, through a process whereby NERC requires each responsible entity to have
mantle. Local earth conductivity
considers extensions on a case-by-case criteria for acceptable system steady
impacts the magnitude (i.e., severity) of
basis informed by proposed state voltage performance for its system
the geoelectric fields that are formed
Requirement R7.4.6 Under the second during the GMD conditions described in
during a GMD event by, all else being
option, the Commission would approve Attachment 1 of Reliability Standard
equal, a lower earth conductivity
proposed Requirement R7.4. Under both TPL–007–1. Requirement R4 requires
resulting in higher geoelectric fields.15
options, the Commission would direct responsible entities to conduct a GMD
8. GICs can flow in an electric power
NERC to prepare and submit a report vulnerability assessment every 60
system with varying intensity
regarding how often and why applicable months using the benchmark GMD
depending on the various factors
entities are exceeding corrective action event described in Attachment 1.
plan deadlines following entities will be required to comply with is Requirement R5 requires responsible
implementation of the proposed Requirement R7 54 months following the effective entities to provide GIC flow
Reliability Standard. Under such a date of Reliability Standard TPL–007–2. If proposed information, based on the benchmark
directive, NERC would submit the Reliability Standard TPL–007–2 becomes effective
after January 1, 2021, the last requirement
GMD event definition, to be used in the
report within 12 months from the date applicable entities will be required to comply with transformer thermal impact assessments
on which applicable entities must is Requirement R8 72 months following the required in Requirement R6, to each
comply with the last requirement of effective date of Reliability Standard TPL–007–2. transmission owner and generator
Reliability Standard TPL–007–2.7 8 16 U.S.C. 824o(e).
owner that owns an applicable
9 See NERC, 2012 Special Reliability Assessment
Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances
transformer within the applicable
4 Order No. 830, 156 FERC ¶ 61,215 at P 7.
on the Bulk Power System at i–ii (February 2012), planning area. Requirement R6 requires
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5 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(5).
6 Order No. 830, 156 FERC ¶ 61,215 at P 102.
http://www.nerc.com/files/2012GMD.pdf. transmission owners and generator
7 NERC’s proposed implementation plan provides
10 Id. at ii.
owners to conduct thermal impact
11 Id.
that, depending on the effective date of Reliability assessments on solely and jointly owned
12 Id.
Standard TPL–007–2, applicable entities will be
13 NERC, Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance
applicable transformers where the
required to comply with the requirements of the maximum effective GIC value provided
proposed Reliability Standard on a staggered Event Description, Docket No. 15–11–000, at 4
schedule. For example, if proposed Reliability (filed June 28, 2016) (2016 NERC White Paper). in Requirement R5 is 75 amps per phase
Standard TPL–007–2 becomes effective before 14 Id. (A/phase) or greater. Requirement R7
January 1, 2021, the last requirement applicable 15 Id. requires responsible entities to develop
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![23856 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 100 / Wednesday, May 23, 2018 / Proposed Rules
corrective action plans if the GMD latitudes (scaling factors between 0.1 assessments and that potential
vulnerability assessment concludes that and 1.0) and earth conductivities mitigation strategies identified in
the system does not meet the (scaling factors between 0.21 and 1.17). Reliability Standard TPL–007–1
performance requirements in Table 1 of NERC identified a reference include, but are not limited to, the
Reliability Standard TPL–007–1. geomagnetic field time series from an installation, modification or removal of
11. Calculation of the benchmark Ottawa, Ontario magnetic observatory transmission and generation facilities
GMD event, against which applicable during a 1989 GMD storm affecting and associated equipment.
entities must assess their facilities, is Québec. NERC used this to estimate a 15. In Order No. 830, the Commission
fundamental to compliance with time series (i.e., 10-second values over also determined that Reliability
Reliability Standard TPL–007–1. a period of days) of the geoelectric field Standard TPL–007–1 should be
Reliability Standard TPL–007–1, that is representative of what is modified. Specifically, Order No. 830
Requirement R3 states that ‘‘[e]ach expected to occur at 60 degree directed NERC to develop and submit
responsible entity, as determined in geomagnetic latitude during a 1-in-100 modifications to Reliability Standard
Requirement R1, shall have criteria for year GMD event. Such a time series is TPL–007–1 concerning: (1) The
acceptable System steady state voltage used in some methods of calculating the calculation of the reference peak
performance for its System during the vulnerability of a transformer to damage geoelectric field amplitude component
benchmark GMD event described in from heating caused by GIC. of the benchmark GMD event definition;
Attachment 1.’’ 13. NERC used field measurements (2) the collection and public availability
Reliability Standard TPL–007–1, taken from the International Monitor for of necessary GIC monitoring and
Attachment 1 states that the benchmark Auroral Geomagnetic Effects (IMAGE) magnetometer data; and (3) deadlines
GMD event is composed of four magnetometer chain, which consists of for completing corrective action plans
elements: (1) A reference peak 39 magnetometer stations in Northern and the mitigation measures called for
geoelectric field amplitude of 8 V/km Europe, for the period 1993–2013 to in corrective action plans. Order No.
derived from statistical analysis of calculate the reference peak geoelectric 830 directed NERC to develop and
historical magnetometer data; (2) a field amplitude. As described in the submit these revisions for Commission
scaling factor to account for local 2016 NERC White Paper, to arrive at a approval within 18 months of the
geomagnetic latitude; (3) a scaling factor reference peak geoelectric field effective date of Order No. 830.
to account for local earth conductivity; amplitude of 8 V/km, NERC ‘‘spatially 16. With respect to the calculation of
and (4) a reference geomagnetic field averaged’’ four different station groups the reference peak geoelectric field
time series or wave shape to facilitate each spanning a square area of amplitude component of the benchmark
time-domain analysis of GMD impact on approximately 500 km (roughly 310 GMD event definition, Order No. 830
equipment. The product of the first miles) in width.18 expressed concern with relying solely
three elements is referred to as the on spatial averaging in Reliability
regional peak geoelectric field 2. Order No. 830 Standard TPL–007–1 because ‘‘the use
amplitude. The benchmark GMD event 14. On January 21, 2015, NERC of spatial averaging in this context is
defines the geoelectric field values used submitted for Commission approval new, and thus there is a dearth of
to compute GIC flows for a GMD Reliability Standard TPL–007–1 in information or research regarding its
vulnerability assessment, which is response to a directive in Order No. 779, application or appropriate scale.’’ 20
required in Reliability Standard TPL– which directed NERC to develop one or While Order No. 830 directed that the
007–1.16 more Reliability Standards to address peak geoelectric field amplitude should
12. For the purpose of determining a the effects of GMD events on the electric not be based solely on spatially-
benchmark event that specifies what grid.19 In Order No. 830, the averaged data, the Commission
severity GMD events a responsible Commission approved Reliability indicated that this ‘‘directive should not
entity must assess for potential impacts Standard TPL–007–1, concluding that be construed to prohibit the use of
on the Bulk-Power System, NERC Reliability Standard TPL–007–1 spatial averaging in some capacity,
determined that a 1-in-100 year GMD addressed the Commission’s directive particularly if more research results in
event would cause an 8 V/km reference by requiring applicable Bulk-Power a better understanding of how spatial
peak geoelectric field amplitude at 60 System owners and operators to averaging can be used to reflect actual
degree north geomagnetic latitude using conduct, on a recurring five-year cycle, GMD events.’’ 21
Québec’s earth conductivity.17 Scaling initial and ongoing vulnerability
factors (i.e., multiplying values) are D. NERC Petition and Proposed
assessments regarding the potential Reliability Standard TPL–007–2
applied to this reference peak impact of a benchmark GMD event on
geoelectric field amplitude to adjust the the Bulk-Power System as a whole and 17. NERC states that proposed
8 V/km value for different geomagnetic on Bulk-Power System components. In Reliability Standard TPL–007–2
addition, the Commission determined enhances currently-effective Reliability
16 See Reliability Standard TPL–007–1,
that Reliability Standard TPL–007–1 Standard TPL–007–1 by addressing
Requirements R4 and R5. Reliability Standard TPL–
007–1 does not set a threshold amount of GIC flow requires applicable entities to develop reliability risks posed by GMDs more
that would constitute a vulnerable transformer. and implement corrective action plans effectively and implementing the
However, if a transformer is calculated to to mitigate vulnerabilities identified directives in Order No. 830.22 NERC
experience a maximum effective GIC flow during a asserts that proposed Reliability
benchmark GMD event of a least 75 A/phase, a through those recurring vulnerability
Standard TPL–007–2 reflects the latest
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thermal impact assessment of that transformer is
required. See Reliability Standard TPL–007–1, 18 ‘‘Spatial Averaging’’ refers to the averaging of
20 Order No. 830, 156 FERC ¶ 61,215 at P 45.
Requirement R6. magnetometer readings over a geographic area. The
17 NERC used Québec as the location for the standard drafting team averaged several (but not all) 21 Id. P 46.
reference peak 1-in-100 year GMD event because of geomagnetic field readings taken by magnetometers 22 Proposed Reliability Standard TPL–007–2 is
its proximity to 60 degree geomagnetic latitude and located within square geographical areas of 500 km not attached to this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
its well understood earth model. By creating scaling per side. (NOPR). Proposed Reliability Standard TPL–007–2
factors, each entity can scale this reference peak 19 Reliability Standards for Geomagnetic is available on the Commission’s eLibrary
geoelectric field and geoelectric field time series Disturbances, Order No. 779, 143 FERC ¶ 61,147, document retrieval system in Docket No. RM18–8–
values to match its own expected field conditions. reh’g denied, 144 FERC ¶ 61,113 (2013). 000 and on the NERC website, www.nerc.com.
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![Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 100 / Wednesday, May 23, 2018 / Proposed Rules 23857
in GMD understanding and provides a benchmark GMD event definition (12 V/ 23. Proposed Reliability Standard
technically sound and flexible approach km versus 8 V/km). These three new TPL–007–2 complies with the directives
to addressing the concerns discussed in requirements largely mirror existing in Order No. 830 by requiring, in
Order No. 830. NERC contends that the Requirements R4, R5, and R6 that addition to the benchmark GMD event
proposed modifications enhance currently apply, and would continue to vulnerability and thermal impact
reliability by expanding GMD apply, only to benchmark GMD assessments, supplemental GMD
vulnerability assessments to include vulnerability and transformer thermal vulnerability and thermal impact
severe, localized impacts and by impact assessments.24 assessments. The supplemental GMD
implementing deadlines and processes 20. In addition, proposed Reliability event definition in proposed Reliability
to maintain accountability in the Standard TPL–007–2 includes two other Standard TPL–007–2 contains a non-
development, completion, and revision new requirements, Requirements R11 spatially-averaged reference peak
of corrective action plans developed to and R12, that require applicable entities geoelectric field amplitude component
address identified vulnerabilities. to gather GIC monitored data of 12 V/km, in contrast to the 8 V/km
Further, NERC states that the proposed (Requirement R11) and magnetometer figure in the spatially-averaged
modifications improve the availability data (Requirement R12). benchmark GMD event definition. As
of GMD monitoring data that may be 21. Proposed Reliability Standard NERC explains in its petition, the
used to inform GMD vulnerability TPL–007–2 modifies existing supplemental GMD event will be used
assessments. Requirement R7 (corrective action to ‘‘represent conditions associated with
18. Proposed Reliability Standard plans) to create a one-year deadline for localized enhancement of the
TPL–007–2 modifies currently-effective the development of corrective action geomagnetic field during a severe GMD
Reliability Standard TPL–007–1 by plans and two and four-year deadlines event for use in assessing GMD
requiring applicable entities to: (1) to complete actions involving non- impacts.’’ 26 Proposed Reliability
Conduct supplemental GMD hardware and hardware mitigation, Standard TPL–007–2 therefore
vulnerability and transformer thermal respectively, for vulnerabilities addresses the Commission’s directive to
impact assessments in addition to the identified in the benchmark GMD modify currently-effective Reliability
existing benchmark GMD vulnerability assessment. The proposed modifications Standard TPL–007–1 so that the
and transformer thermal impact to Requirement R7 include a provision benchmark GMD event does not rely
assessments required in Reliability allowing for extension of deadlines if solely on spatially-averaged data to
Standard TPL–007–1; (2) collect data ‘‘situations beyond the control of the calculate the reference peak geoelectric
from GIC monitors and magnetometers responsible entity determined in field amplitude.
as necessary to enable model validation Requirement R1 prevent 24. While proposed Reliability
and situational awareness; and (3) implementation of the [corrective action Standard TPL–007–2 addresses the first
develop necessary corrective action plan] within the timetable for directive in Order No. 830 by requiring
plans within one year from the implementation.’’ applicable entities to conduct
completion of the benchmark GMD supplemental GMD vulnerability and
vulnerability assessment, include a two- II. Discussion thermal impact assessments, the
year deadline for the implementation of 22. Pursuant to section 215(d) of the proposed Reliability Standard does not
non-hardware mitigation, and include a FPA, the Commission proposes to require applicable entities to mitigate
four-year deadline to complete approve Reliability Standard TPL–007– such vulnerabilities. Instead, proposed
hardware mitigation.23 2 as just, reasonable, not unduly Reliability Standard TPL–007–2,
19. In particular, proposed Reliability discriminatory or preferential, and in Requirement R8.3 only requires
Standard TPL–007–2 modifies the public interest. Proposed Reliability applicable entities to make ‘‘an
Requirements R1 (identification of Standard TPL–007–2 addresses the evaluation of possible actions designed
responsibilities) and R2 (system and GIC directives in Order No. 830 to modify to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the
system models) to extend the existing currently-effective Reliability Standard consequences and adverse impacts of
requirements pertaining to benchmark TPL–007–1: (1) To revise the benchmark the event(s)’’ if a supplemental GMD
GMD assessments to the proposed GMD event definition, as it pertains to event is assessed to result in
supplemental GMD assessments. the required GMD Vulnerability Cascading.27 As discussed below,
Proposed Reliability Standard TPL– Assessments and transformer thermal NERC’s proposal differs significantly
007–2 adds the newly mandated impact assessments, so that the from Order No. 830 because the intent
supplemental GMD vulnerability and definition is not based solely on of the directive was not only to identify
transformer thermal impact assessments spatially-averaged data; (2) to require vulnerabilities arising from localized
in new Requirements R8 (supplemental the collection of necessary GIC
GMD vulnerability assessment), R9 (GIC monitoring and magnetometer data; and monitoring and magnetometer data through a
flow information needed for (3) to include a one-year deadline for forthcoming NERC data request to applicable
supplemental GMD thermal impact entities pursuant to Section 1600 of the NERC Rules
the completion of corrective action of Procedure rather than through a Reliability
assessments) and R10 (supplemental plans and two and four-year deadlines Standard requirement. On February 7, 2018, NERC
GMD thermal impact assessments). The to complete mitigation actions involving released a draft data request for a 45-day comment
supplemental GMD event definition non-hardware and hardware mitigation, period. After reviewing the comments, NERC
contains a higher, non-spatially- indicates that it intends to seek authorization from
respectively.25 the NERC Board of Trustees to issue the data
averaged reference peak geoelectric field
daltland on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with PROPOSALS
request in August 2018. NERC Petition at 27.
amplitude component than the 24 An exception is the qualifying threshold for 26 NERC Petition at 12.
transformers required to undergo thermal impact 27 The NERC Glossary defines Cascading as
23 Unless otherwise indicated, the requirements assessments: For the supplemental GMD assessment ‘‘uncontrolled successive loss of System Elements
of proposed Reliability Standard TPL–007–2 are the qualifying threshold for transformers is a triggered by an incident at any location . . .
substantively the same as the requirements in maximum effective GIC value of 85 A/phase while [c]ascading results in widespread electric service
currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL–007–1. the threshold for benchmark GMD event interruption that cannot be restrained from
Proposed Reliability Standard TPL–007–2 contains assessments is 75 A/phase. sequentially spreading beyond an area
conforming and other non-substantive 25 NERC states that it will address the directive predetermined by studies.’’ Glossary of Terms Used
modifications that are not addressed in this NOPR. in Order No. 830 on public dissemination of GIC in NERC Reliability Standards (January 31, 2018).
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![23858 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 100 / Wednesday, May 23, 2018 / Proposed Rules
GMD events but also to mitigate such individual station measurements rather geoelectric field is a 1-in-100 year
vulnerabilities. Moreover, Order No. 830 than spatially-averaged measurements, extreme value determined using
reiterated the directive in Order No. 779 and thus includes localized statistical analysis of historical
that NERC develop a second stage GMD enhancement of field strength above the geomagnetic field data. NERC explains
Reliability Standard requiring GMD average value found in the benchmark that the fundamental difference in the
vulnerability assessments and that GMD event. NERC contends that the supplemental GMD event amplitude is
‘‘owners and operators [ ] develop and supplemental GMD event thus that it is based on geomagnetic field
implement a plan to protect against addresses the directive in Order No. 830 observations taken at individual
instability, uncontrolled separation, or to revise Reliability Standard TPL–007– observation stations (i.e., localized
cascading failures of the Bulk-Power 1 to account for the effects of localized measurements), instead of the spatially-
System.’’ 28 Accordingly, the peaks that could potentially affect averaged geoelectric fields used in the
Commission proposes to direct NERC, reliable operations. benchmark GMD event. NERC states
pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the 27. NERC maintains that the that the result of the extreme value
FPA, to develop and submit benchmark GMD event and analysis shows that the supplemental
modifications to the Reliability supplemental GMD event are similar in GMD event peak of 12 V/km is above
Standard to require applicable entities structure but the supplemental GMD the upper limit of the 95 percent
to develop and implement corrective event contains differences to account for confidence interval for a 100-year
action plans to mitigate supplemental localized impacts. NERC explains that, interval, while the same confidence
GMD event vulnerabilities. The like the benchmark GMD event, the interval with spatially-averaged data
Commission proposes to direct NERC to supplemental GMD event defines the (i.e., the benchmark GMD event) is 8
submit the modified Reliability geomagnetic and geoelectric field values V/km.
Standard for approval within 12 months used to compute GIC flows for use in a 30. NERC indicates that the corrective
from the effective date of Reliability GMD vulnerability assessment and is action plans mandated in Requirement
Standard TPL–007–2. composed of four elements: (1) R7 continue to apply only if an entity
25. In addition, as discussed below, Reference peak geoelectric field has identified system performance
the Commission seeks comment on the amplitude of 12 V/km derived from issues through the benchmark GMD
need for Requirement R7.4 of proposed statistical analysis of historical vulnerability assessments. NERC
Reliability Standard TPL–007–2, which magnetometer data; (2) scaling factors to explains that mitigation for assessed
allows applicable entities to extend account for local geomagnetic latitude; supplemental GMD vulnerabilities are
corrective action plan implementation (3) scaling factors to account for local addressed in proposed Requirement
deadlines, as compared to a process earth conductivity; and (4) a locally- R8.3, which states that if a responsible
whereby NERC considers extensions on enhanced reference geomagnetic field entity concludes that there would be
a case-by-case basis, as suggested in time series or waveform to facilitate ‘‘Cascading’’ caused by the
Order No. 830.29 After reviewing the time-domain analysis of GMD impact on supplemental GMD event, the entity
comments, the Commission may equipment. shall conduct an analysis of possible
approve the requirement but direct 28. NERC states that the higher
actions to reduce the likelihood or
NERC to prepare and submit a report reference peak geoelectric field
mitigate the impacts of the event.31
concerning the use of corrective action amplitude (12 V/km compared to 8 V/
km used in the benchmark GMD event) 31. NERC states that the standard
plan deadline extensions as allowed drafting team determined that requiring
under proposed Reliability Standard and local enhancements to the
geomagnetic field time series or corrective action plans in response to
TPL–007–2, Requirement R7.4. Under assessed supplemental GMD event
such a directive, NERC would submit waveform are distinguishing
characteristics of the supplemental vulnerabilities would not be appropriate
the report within 12 months from the at this time because the supplemental
date on which applicable entities must GMD event and are intended to
represent conditions associated with GMD event definition uses a small
comply with the last requirement of number of observed localized enhanced
Reliability Standard TPL–007–2. localized enhancement of the
geomagnetic field during a severe GMD geoelectric field events that provide
Alternatively, pursuant to section only general insight into the geographic
215(d)(5) of the FPA, the Commission event for use in assessing GMD
impacts.30 size of localized events during severe
may direct NERC to modify the solar storms.32 NERC also contends that
Reliability Standard to remove 29. In developing the supplemental
GMD event, NERC indicates that the currently available modeling tools do
Requirement R7.4. not provide entities with capabilities to
standard drafting team ensured that the
A. Corrective Action Plan for peak geoelectric field does not rely on model localized enhancements within a
Supplemental GMD Event spatial averaging of geomagnetic field severe GMD event realistically.33 As a
Vulnerabilities data. NERC states that, like the value in result, NERC claims that applicable
the existing benchmark GMD event, the entities may need to employ
NERC Petition conservative approaches when
supplemental GMD event peak
26. In requiring applicable entities to performing the supplemental GMD
assess their vulnerabilities to a 30 NERC states that the supplemental GMD event vulnerability assessment, such as
supplemental GMD event, NERC states waveform is more severe than the benchmark GMD applying the localized peak geoelectric
that geomagnetic fields during severe event waveform because it includes a five-minute field over an entire planning area.34
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duration enhanced peak up to 12 V/km for the
GMD events can be spatially reference earth model and 60 degree geomagnetic
NERC states that, for these reasons,
non-uniform with higher and lower latitude. NERC Petition at 13. NERC explains that ‘‘requiring mandatory mitigation may
strengths across a geographic region. this synthetic enhancement represents the observed not provide effective reliability benefit
NERC explains that the supplemental localized, rapid magnetic field variation periods
associated with ionospheric sources during some
GMD event was derived using severe GMD events. Id. NERC observes that such
31 NERC Petition at 23.
32 Id.
GMD conditions could result in increased
28 Order No. 830, 156 FERC ¶ 61,215 at P 7. 33 Id.
transformer heating for short durations during a
29 Id. P 102. severe GMD event due to increased GIC flows. Id. 34 Id. at 24.
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or use resources optimally.’’ 35 NERC assist entities in assessing geographic footprint of the
contends that the approach used in vulnerabilities, make requiring supplemental GMD event could be
proposed Reliability Standard TPL– mitigation premature at this time; and addressed by applicable entities through
007–2 for the supplemental GMD event (2) requiring only an evaluation of sensitivity analysis and other methods
provides entities with flexibility to possible actions for supplemental GMD within the planning studies. The
consider and select mitigation actions events that result in Cascading is similar proposed Reliability Standard does not
based on their circumstances and is to the treatment of extreme events in prescribe how applicable entities must
similar to the approach used in Reliability Standard TPL–001–4 perform such studies; so applicable
Reliability Standard TPL–001–4, (Transmission System Planning entities may incorporate this
Requirement R3.5 for extreme events.36 Performance Requirements). uncertainty into their studies. Indeed,
35. We believe, based on the Attachment 1 (Calculating Geoelectric
Commission Proposal information before us, that it is Fields for the Benchmark and
32. NERC’s proposal not to require reasonable to require applicable entities Supplemental GMD Events) of proposed
corrective action plans for supplemental to mitigate supplemental GMD event Reliability Standard TPL–007–2 states
GMD event vulnerabilities differs vulnerabilities because, as NERC that ‘‘Planners have flexibility to
significantly from Order No. 830 contends, the supplemental GMD event determine how to apply the localized
because the intent and clear meaning of ‘‘provides a technically justified method peak geoelectric field over the planning
the directive was not only to identify of assessing vulnerabilities to the area in performing GIC calculations.’’ 43
vulnerabilities arising from localized localized peak effects of severe GMD Attachment 1 provides that an
GMD events but also to mitigate such events.’’ 40 While the supplemental applicable entity may apply the
vulnerabilities. Order No. 830 reiterated GMD event possesses characteristics supplemental GMD event definition
the directive in Order No. 779 that that differentiate it from the benchmark over the entire planning area; apply
NERC develop a second stage GMD GMD event (i.e., geographic area, peak some combination of the benchmark
Reliability Standard requiring GMD amplitude, duration, and geoelectric GMD event and supplemental GMD
vulnerability assessments and that field waveform), both events were event over portions of a planning area;
‘‘owners and operators [ ] develop and developed by the standard drafting team or use ‘‘[o]ther methods to adjust the
implement a plan to protect against using a common framework. The benchmark GMD event analysis to
instability, uncontrolled separation, or standard drafting team determined the account for the localized geoelectric
cascading failures of the Bulk-Power peak amplitude of the supplemental field enhancement of the supplemental
System.’’ 37 By contrast, proposed GMD event using generalized extreme GMD event.’’ 44 The flexibility afforded
Reliability Standard TPL–007–2 allows value statistical analysis methods, as it to applicable entities by proposed
supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities did for the benchmark GMD event, and Reliability Standard TPL–007–2 to
to potentially go unmitigated even, for found a consistent result of 12 V/km determine the geographic size of the
example, if an applicable entity assesses with a 95 percent confidence interval. supplemental GMD event, in our view,
that the supplemental GMD event Generalized extreme value analysis is addresses NERC’s concern.
causes Cascading.38 well-supported in the technical 37. The Supplemental Geomagnetic
33. Moreover, in Order No. 830, the literature and, in approving the Disturbance Event Description
Commission directed NERC to ‘‘develop benchmark GMD event, was previously appended to NERC’s petition further
revisions to the benchmark GMD event accepted in Order No. 830. The basic supports the supplemental GMD event
definition so that the reference peak waveform used for the supplemental definition by stating that ‘‘[b]ased on the
geoelectric field amplitude component GMD event is the same waveform used above analysis and the previous work
is not based solely on spatially-averaged in the benchmark GMD event.41 Similar associated with the benchmark GMD
data.’’ 39 NERC’s proposal to modify the to the methodology for determining event, it is reasonable to incorporate a
benchmark, but then allow applicable peak amplitude, the benchmark GMD second (or supplemental) assessment
entities the discretion to take corrective event waveform was previously into TPL-007-2 to account for the
action based solely on the results of the considered appropriate in Order No. potential impact of a local enhancement
spatially-averaged benchmark analysis 830. While the supplemental GMD in both the network analysis and the
while taking under advisement (‘‘an event waveform includes a ‘‘five-minute transformer thermal assessment(s).’’ 45
evaluation of possible actions’’) the duration enhanced peak up to 12 V/ The Supplemental GMD Event White
km,’’ NERC does not suggest that the Paper also states that ‘‘[g]iven the
results of the supplemental assessment,
duration of the enhanced peak is current state of knowledge regarding the
does not satisfy the clear intent of the
unrepresentative of the behavior of spatial extent of a local geomagnetic
Commission’s directive.
localized enhancements. field enhancements, upper geographic
34. Further, we are not persuaded by 36. NERC contends that the low boundaries, such as the values used in
NERC’s reasoning that: (1) Existing number of real-world observations on the approaches above, are reasonable
technical limitations, specifically the which the supplemental GMD event is but are not definitive.’’ 46
limited number of observations used to based calls into question the accuracy of 38. With respect to NERC’s contention
define the supplemental GMD event and its geographic size.42 However, any regarding the unavailability of modeling
the availability of modeling tools to uncertainty regarding the size of the tools, we are not persuaded. We
35 Id.
understand that there are commercially
40 NERC Petition at 13. available tools that could allow for
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36 Id.
41 Id. (‘‘Both the benchmark and supplemental
37 Order No. 830, 156 FERC ¶ 61,215 at P 7. GMD event waveforms are based on 10-second 43 Proposed Reliability Standard TPL–007–2,
38 Proposed Reliability Standard TPL–007–2, sampling interval magnetic field data from the
Requirement R8.3 (‘‘If the analysis concludes there Ottawa observatory recorded during the March 13– Attachment 1, Applying the Localized Peak
is Cascading caused by the supplemental GMD 14, 1989 GMD event.’’). Geoelectric Field in the Supplemental GMD Event.
44 Id.
event described in Attachment 1, an evaluation of 42 Id. at 23 (‘‘[the] small number of observed
possible actions designed to reduce the likelihood localized enhanced geoelectric field events . . . 45 NERC Petition, Exhibit I (Supplemental
or mitigate the consequences and adverse impacts provide only general insight into the geographic Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description) at 12
of the event(s) shall be conducted.’’). size of localized events during severe solar (Supplemental GMD Event White Paper).
39 Id. at 44. storms’’). 46 Id. at 13.
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modeling of supplemental GMD TPL–001–4 to justify only requiring an specifies the completion of non-
events.47 In addition to these modeling evaluation of possible actions for hardware and hardware mitigation
tools, other methods could be used supplemental GMD events that result in within two and four years of
within the framework of the Reliability Cascading in light of the directive in development of the corrective action
Standard to study planning areas (e.g., Order No. 830. In Order No. 830, the plan, respectively.
superposition or sensitivity studies) in Commission directed NERC to modify 43. NERC maintains that proposed
conjunction with other power system the proposed Reliability Standard to Reliability Standard TPL–007–2 also
modeling tools. However, we will assess and address the risks posed by recognizes that there may be
consider any comments that enhanced localized GMD events to the circumstances outside of a responsible
substantiate NERC’s position. Bulk-Power System. In contrast, in entity’s control that could prevent the
39. In addition, the Commission approving Reliability Standard TPL– completion of a mitigation activity
recognized in Order No. 830 that an 001–4, the Commission did not direct within the specified timetable. NERC
improved understanding of GMDs is NERC to further modify the Reliability cites as examples delays due to
necessary and directed NERC to conduct Standard to address the risks posed by regulatory or legal processes, such as
certain GMD-related research. The GMD extreme events. Accordingly, the permitting; delays from stakeholder
research directed in Order No. 830 is treatment of extreme events under processes required by tariffs; delays
meant to address technical limitations Reliability Standard TPL–001–4 does resulting from equipment lead times; or
regarding GMD mitigation, among other not support the notion here that delays resulting from the inability to
areas. In the preliminary GMD research applicable entities should, as NERC acquire necessary right-of-way. NERC
work plan submitted by NERC on May suggests, have the ‘‘the flexibility to . . . explains that in such circumstances, a
30, 2017, NERC stated that the consider mitigation.’’ 51 However, as responsible entity may maintain
Commission in Order No. 830 ‘‘noted its with the mitigation of benchmark GMD compliance by revising its corrective
concern that a spatially-averaged event vulnerabilities, we agree with action plan in accordance with
benchmark may not adequately account NERC that any required mitigation of Requirement R7.4. NERC states that
for localized peak geoelectric fields that supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities under Requirement R7.4, the
could potentially affect reliable should be flexible in terms of how responsible entity shall revise its
operations.’’ 48 In response, NERC applicable entities choose to mitigate corrective action plan if events beyond
indicated that it will conduct ‘‘(i) such vulnerabilities. NERC’s petition its control prevent implementation
research [Task 1 of the GMD research already stresses that proposed within the original timetable. NERC
work plan] to improve understanding of Reliability Standard TPL–007–2 affords explains that in the revised corrective
the characteristics and spatial scales of flexibility as to how applicable entities action plan, the responsible entity must
localized geoelectric field enhancements apply the supplemental GMD event to provide justification for its revised
caused by severe GMD events; and (ii) their planning areas.52 timetable by documenting: (1) The
research to determine the impacts of 41. Accordingly, the Commission circumstances causing the delay; (2)
spatial averaging assumptions on [Bulk- proposes to direct NERC, pursuant to description of the original corrective
Power System] reliability.’’ 49 NERC section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, to develop action plan and any changes; and (3)
estimated that Task 1, which includes and submit modifications to the revisions to selected actions, including
the development of better models, will Reliability Standard to require the use of any operating procedures if
require approximately 24–36 months to applicable entities to develop and applicable, along with an updated
complete from start of work. Such GMD implement corrective action plans to timetable for completion. NERC states
research on localized events should mitigate supplemental GMD event that the revised corrective action plan
inform the standard development vulnerabilities. The Commission shall be updated at least annually and
process and aid applicable entities proposes to direct NERC to submit the the responsible entity must then provide
when implementing a modified modified Reliability Standard for its revised corrective action plan to
Reliability Standard.50 approval within 12 months from the recipients of the original corrective
40. We are also not persuaded by effective date of Reliability Standard action plan (i.e., reliability coordinator,
NERC’s reliance on Reliability Standard TPL–007–2. The Commission seeks adjacent planning coordinator(s),
comments from NERC and other adjacent transmission planner(s),
47 See, e.g., Siemens Power Technologies
interested entities on this proposal. functional entities referenced in the
International, GIC Module to Analyze Geomagnetic corrective action plan, and any
Disturbances on the Grid, Features Summary, B. Corrective Action Plan Deadline
http://w3.usa.siemens.com/smartgrid/us/en/ functional entity that submits a written
Extensions NERC Petition
transmission-grid/products/grid-analysis-tools/ request and has a reliability related need
transmission-system-planning/Documents/PTI_FF_ 42. NERC states that proposed for the information).
EN_SWPE_GIC_1412.pdf; PowerWorld, Simulator, Reliability Standard TPL–007–2, 44. NERC contends that this proposal
Geomagnetically Induced Current (GIC), https://
www.powerworld.com/products/simulator/add-ons-
Requirement R7.2 requires responsible is consistent with other Commission-
2/simulator-gic. entities to develop a corrective action approved Reliability Standards. NERC
48 NERC, Geomagnetic Disturbance Research plan within one year of the benchmark cites Reliability Standard FAC–003–4,
Work Plan of the North American Electric GMD vulnerability assessment, if the Requirement R7 and asserts that it
Reliability Corporation, Docket No. RM15–11–002,
at 8 (filed May 30, 2017).
entity concludes that its System does provides that an entity may modify its
49 Id. not meet the performance requirements annual vegetation work plan in light of
50 On April 19, 2018, NERC submitted a revised for the steady state planning benchmark circumstances beyond the entity’s
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GMD Work Plan that is currently pending before the GMD event. NERC indicates that under control, such as a natural disaster or
Commission. NERC, Revised Geomagnetic Requirement R7.3, the corrective action other circumstance. NERC also cites
Disturbance Research Work Plan of the North
American Electric Reliability Corporation, Docket plan shall include a timeline that Reliability Standard PRC–004–5(i),
No. 15–11–003 (filed April 19, 2018). The revised Requirement R5 and contends that
51 NERC Petition at 24 (emphasis added).
GMD Work Plan provides additional detail to the under that Reliability Standard a
previous version. NERC now estimates that Task 1 52 NERC Petition, Exhibit I at 13 (‘‘Proposed
deliverables will be completed in 2019. Id., TPL-007-2 provides flexibility for planners to
responsible entity that owns a
Attachment 1 (Order No. 830 GMD Research Work determine how to apply the supplemental GMD protection system component that
Plan (April 2018)) at 7. event to the planning area.’’). caused a misoperation shall either
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develop a corrective action plan or distance]) and must be documented.’’ In prepare and submit a report addressing
explain in a declaration why corrective contrast, proposed Requirement R7.4 the disposition of any such requests, as
actions are beyond the entity’s control could enable applicable entities to delay well as information regarding how often
or would not improve reliability. mitigation that would avoid the damage and why applicable entities are
of known GMD vulnerabilities. exceeding corrective action plan
Commission Proposal
Accordingly, the extensions of time deadlines following implementation of
45. Proposed Reliability Standard permitted by Reliability Standard FAC– the proposed Reliability Standard.56
TPL–007–2 satisfies Order No. 830 by 003–4, because they may not result in Under such a directive, NERC would
incorporating the deadlines set out by the damage contemplated by the submit the report within 12 months
the Commission for the development Reliability Standard, are not from the date on which applicable
and implementation of corrective action comparable, as NERC asserts, to failure entities must comply with the last
plans. However, Requirement R7.4 of to mitigate an existing GMD requirement of Reliability Standard
the proposed Reliability Standard vulnerability in a timely manner. TPL–007–2. Following receipt of the
differs from Order No. 830 by allowing 48. NERC also compares the report, the Commission would
applicable entities to ‘‘revise’’ or corrective action plan provision in determine whether further action is
‘‘update’’ corrective action plans to proposed Reliability Standard TPL– necessary.
extend deadlines. This provision 007–2 with Reliability Standard PRC– 51. Under the second option, the
contrasts with the Commission’s 004–5(i), Requirement R5, which allows Commission would approve proposed
guidance in Order No. 830 that ‘‘NERC ‘‘a responsible entity that owns a Requirement R7.4 but also direct NERC
should consider extensions of time on a Protection System component that to prepare and submit a report regarding
case-by-case basis.’’ 53 caused a Misoperation . . . [to] either how often and why applicable entities
46. NERC contends that the proposed develop a Corrective Action Plan or are exceeding corrective action plan
Reliability Standard ‘‘would implement explain in a declaration why corrective deadlines following implementation of
the Commission directed deadlines for actions are beyond the entity’s control the proposed Reliability Standard.
Corrective Action Plans and mitigation, or would not improve reliability.’’ We Under such a directive, NERC would
along with a process to maintain are not persuaded that NERC’s proposal submit the report within 12 months
accountability and communication with to allow self-declared extensions of time from the date on which applicable
affected entities when circumstances in Requirement R7.4 is supported by the entities must comply with the last
beyond a responsible entity’s control quoted language in Reliability Standard requirement of Reliability Standard
affect the entity’s ability to complete PRC–004–5(i), Requirement R5 because TPL–007–2. Following receipt of the
implementation within the original Requirement R5 does not allow for report, the Commission would
deadlines.’’ 54 Given the complexities extensions of time. Rather, Requirement determine whether further action is
and potential novelty of steps applicable R5 permits the registered entity to necessary.
entities may take to mitigate the risks of declare that it cannot carry out
GMDs, we agree with NERC that there corrective actions (e.g., because the III. Information Collection Statement
should be a mechanism for allowing misoperation occurred on facilities it 52. The collection of information
extensions of corrective action plan does not own or control) or because the contained in this Notice of Proposed
implementation deadlines. However, we corrective action would not improve Rulemaking is subject to review by the
would like to avoid unnecessary delay Bulk-Power System reliability. Office of Management and Budget
in implementing protection against Moreover, the Guidelines and Technical (OMB) under section 3507(d) of the
GMD threats. Moreover, we are not Basis document accompanying Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.57
persuaded that the proposal is Reliability Standard PRC–004–5(i) OMB’s regulations require review and
supported by the precedent cited by concludes by stating that a ‘‘declaration approval of certain information
NERC because the Reliability Standards that no further corrective actions will be collection requirements imposed by
NERC cites are distinguishable. taken is expected to be used sparingly.’’ agency rules.58 Upon approval of a
47. NERC maintains that provisions 49. Given these concerns, the collection of information, OMB will
similar to Requirement R7.4 are found Commission is considering two options assign an OMB control number and an
in two Reliability Standards. NERC in response to Requirement R7.4 of the expiration date. Respondents subject to
states that Reliability Standard FAC– proposed Reliability Standard. The the information collection requirements
003–4, Requirement R7, allows a Commission seeks comment from NERC of a rule will not be penalized for failing
registered entity to modify its annual and other interested entities on each of to respond to the collection of
vegetation work plan in light of these proposals. information unless the collection of
circumstances beyond the entity’s 50. Under the first option, the
information displays a valid OMB
control. While Reliability Standard Commission would, pursuant to section
control number.
FAC–003–4, Requirement R7 permits 215(d)(5) of the FPA, direct NERC to 53. We solicit comments on the
modifications to annual vegetation work modify the proposed Reliability Commission’s need for this information,
plans, the modifications cannot result in Standard to comport with Order No. whether the information will have
a registered entity’s failure to avoid the 830, by requiring that NERC and the practical utility, the accuracy of the
damage contemplated by Requirement Regional Entities, as appropriate, burden estimates, ways to enhance the
R7—vegetation encroachment: consider requests for extension of time quality, utility, and clarity of the
‘‘Modifications to the work plan in on a case-by-case basis.55 Under this
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response to changing conditions or to option, responsible entities seeking an 56 Under proposed Requirement R7.4, when an
findings from vegetation inspections extension would submit the information applicable entity extends a corrective action plan
may be made (provided they do not required by proposed Requirement R7.4 deadline, it must revise the corrective action plan
to NERC and the Regional Entities for to explain the ‘‘[c]ircumstances causing the delay
allow encroachment of vegetation into for fully or partially implementing the selected
the [minimum vegetation clearance their consideration of the request. The actions.’’ NERC could use this information to
Commission would also direct NERC to populate the proposed report.
53 Order No. 830, 156 FERC ¶ 61,215 at P 102. 57 44 U.S.C. 3507(d) (2012).
54 NERC Petition at 22. 55 Order No. 830, 156 FERC ¶ 61,215 at P 102. 58 5 CFR part 1320 (2017).
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![Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 100 / Wednesday, May 23, 2018 / Proposed Rules 23863
FERC–725N, CHANGES PROPOSED IN NOPR IN DOCKET NO. RM18–8 61 62—Continued
Average Total annual burden
Number and Annual number Total number of burden hours hours and total Cost per
Requirement (R) type of of responses per responses and cost per annual cost respondent ($)
respondents respondent response (rounded)
(1) (2) (1) × (2) = (3) (4) (3) × (4) = (5) (5) ÷ (1)
Total Additional ........................... ........................... ........................... ........................... Rep., 6,533 ...............
Hrs. and Cost hrs., $437,057; RK
(rounded), due 6,009.
to NOPR in hrs., $192,528 ...........
RM18–8.
Title: FERC–725N, Mandatory DataClearance@ferc.gov, phone: (202) 221) is based on the number of
Reliability Standards: TPL Reliability 502–8663, fax: (202) 273–0873]. employees for a concern and its
Standards. Comments concerning the proposed affiliates. As discussed above, proposed
Action: Proposed revisions to an collection of information and the Reliability Standard TPL–007–2 would
existing collection of information. associated burden estimate should be apply to a total of 1,130 unique
OMB Control No: 1902–0264. sent to the Commission in this docket planning coordinators, transmission
Respondents: Business or other for and may also be sent to the Office of planners, transmission owners, and
profit, and not for profit institutions. Information and Regulatory Affairs, generation owners.67 A small utility
Frequency of Responses: 63 Every five Office of Management and Budget, 725 (and its affiliates) is defined as having
years (for Requirement R7–R10), 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20503 no more than the following number of
annually (for Requirement R11 and [Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal employees:
R12). Energy Regulatory Commission]. Due to
security concerns, comments should be • For planning coordinators,
Necessity of the Information: transmission planners, and
Proposed Reliability Standard TPL– sent electronically to the following
email address: oira_submission@ transmission owners (NAICS code
007–2, if adopted, would implement the 221121, Electric Bulk Power
Congressional mandate of the Energy omb.eop.gov. Comments submitted to
OMB should refer to FERC–725N and Transmission and Control), a
Policy Act of 2005 to develop maximum of 500 employees
mandatory and enforceable Reliability OMB Control No. 1902–0264.
Standards to better ensure the reliability • for generator owners, a maximum of
IV. Environmental Analysis 750 employees.68
of the nation’s Bulk-Power System.
57. The Commission is required to 59. The total cost to all entities (large
Specifically, these requirements address
prepare an Environmental Assessment
the threat posed by GMD events to the and small) is $629,585 annually (or an
or an Environmental Impact Statement
Bulk-Power System and conform to the average of $1,345.27 for each of the
for any action that may have a
Commission’s directives to modify estimated 468 entities affected
significant adverse effect on the human
Reliability Standard TPL–007–1 as annually). For the estimated 280
environment.64 The Commission has
directed in Order No. 830. generator owners and transmission
categorically excluded certain actions
Internal review: The Commission has owners affected annually, the average
from this requirement as not having a
reviewed proposed Reliability Standard cost would be $409.70 per year. For the
significant effect on the human
TPL–007–2, and made a determination estimated 188 planning coordinators
environment. Included in the exclusion
that its action is necessary to implement and transmission planners, the
are rules that are clarifying, corrective,
section 215 of the FPA. The estimated average annual cost would be
or procedural or that do not
Commission has assured itself, by substantially change the effect of the $2,738.84. The estimated annual cost to
means of its internal review, that there regulations being amended.65 The each affected entity varies from $409.70
is specific, objective support for the actions proposed here fall within this to $2,738.84 and is not considered
burden estimates associated with the categorical exclusion in the significant.
information requirements. Commission’s regulations. 60. Accordingly, the Commission
56. Interested persons may obtain certifies that the proposals contained in
information on the reporting V. Regulatory Flexibility Act this NOPR will not have a significant
requirements by contacting the Federal 58. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of economic impact on a substantial
Energy Regulatory Commission, Office 1980 (RFA) 66 generally requires a number of small entities. The
of the Executive Director, 888 First description and analysis of proposed Commission seeks comment on this
Street NE, Washington, DC 20426 rules that will have significant certification.
[Attention: Ellen Brown, email: economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. The definition 67 In the NERC Registry, there are approximately
61 Rep. = reporting requirements; RK = of small business is provided by the 65 PCs, 188 TPs, 944 GOs, and 330 TOs (in the
daltland on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with PROPOSALS
recordkeeping requirements. Small Business Administration (SBA) at United States), which will be affected by this
62 For each Reliability Standard, the Measure NOPR. Because some entities serve in more than
13 CFR 121.201. The threshold for a
shows the acceptable evidence (Reporting one role, these figures involve some double
Requirement) for the associated Requirement (R small utility (using SBA’s sub-sector counting.
numbers), and the Compliance section details the 68 The maximum number of employees for a
related Recordkeeping Requirement. 64 Regulations Implementing the National
generator owner (and its affiliates) to be ‘‘small’’
63 The frequency of Requirements R1 through R6 Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Order No. 486, varies from 250 to 750 employees, depending on the
in proposed Reliability Standard TPL–007–2 is FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 30,783 (1987). type of generation (e.g., hydroelectric, nuclear,
65 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii) (2017).
unchanged from the existing requirements in fossil fuel, wind). For this analysis, we use the most
Reliability Standard TPL–007–1. 66 5 U.S.C. 601–12 (2012). conservative threshold of 750 employees.
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![23864 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 100 / Wednesday, May 23, 2018 / Proposed Rules
VI. Comment Procedures or email at ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, receive comments by hand delivery or
61. The Commission invites interested or the Public Reference Room at 202– courier.
502–8371, TTY 202–502–8659. Email Instructions: Direct your comments to
persons to submit comments on the
the Public Reference Room at docket number COE–2017–0011. All
matters and issues proposed in this
public.referenceroom@ferc.gov. comments received will be included in
notice to be adopted, including any
By direction of the Commission.
the public docket without change and
related matters or alternative proposals
may be made available on-line at http://
that commenters may wish to discuss. Issued: May 17, 2018.
www.regulations.gov, including any
Comments are due July 23, 2018. Nathaniel J. Davis, Sr., personal information provided, unless
Comments must refer to Docket No. Deputy Secretary. the commenter indicates that the
RM18–8–000, and must include the [FR Doc. 2018–11001 Filed 5–22–18; 8:45 am] comment includes information claimed
commenter’s name, the organization BILLING CODE 6717–01–P to be Confidential Business Information
they represent, if applicable, and their
(CBI) or other information whose
address in their comments.
disclosure is restricted by statute. Do
62. The Commission encourages
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE not submit information that you
comments to be filed electronically via
consider to be CBI, or otherwise
the eFiling link on the Commission’s Department of the Army, Corps of protected, through regulations.gov or
website at http://www.ferc.gov. The Engineers email. The regulations.gov website is an
Commission accepts most standard
anonymous access system, which means
word processing formats. Documents 33 CFR Part 334 we will not know your identity or
created electronically using word
[COE–2017–0011] contact information unless you provide
processing software should be filed in
it in the body of your comment. If you
native applications or print-to-PDF
James River, Skiffes Creek and send an email directly to the Corps
format and not in a scanned format.
Warwick River Surrounding Joint Base without going through regulations.gov,
Commenters filing electronically do not
Langley-Eustis (JBLE-Eustis), Virginia; your email address will be
need to make a paper filing.
Restricted Areas and Danger Zones automatically captured and included as
63. Commenters that are not able to
part of the comment that is placed in the
file comments electronically must send AGENCY: United States Army Corps of public docket and made available on the
an original of their comments to: Engineers, DoD. internet. If you submit an electronic
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking comment, we recommend that you
Secretary of the Commission, 888 First and request for comments. include your name and other contact
Street NE, Washington, DC 20426.
SUMMARY: The Corps of Engineers is information in the body of your
64. All comments will be placed in
proposing to amend an existing comment and with any disk or CD–ROM
the Commission’s public files and may
permanent danger zone in the waters of you submit. If we cannot read your
be viewed, printed, or downloaded
the James River, Skiffes Creek and comment because of technical
remotely as described in the Document
Warwick River in Newport News, difficulties and cannot contact you for
Availability section below. Commenters
Virginia. JBLE-Eustis contains a military clarification, we may not be able to
on this proposal are not required to
port berthing numerous Army vessels consider your comment. Electronic
serve copies of their comments on other
and conducts exercises to include small comments should avoid the use of any
commenters.
craft testing and live fire training special characters, any form of
VII. Document Availability activities. The proposed amendment is encryption, and be free of any defects or
65. In addition to publishing the full necessary to protect the public from viruses.
Docket: For access to the docket to
text of this document in the Federal hazards associated with training and
read background documents or
Register, the Commission provides all mission operations, and to protect
comments received, go to
interested persons an opportunity to government assets, missions, and the
www.regulations.gov. All documents in
view and/or print the contents of this base population in general. The
the docket are listed. Although listed in
document via the internet through the proposed amendment increases the
the index, some information is not
Commission’s Home Page (http:// restricted areas and creates danger zones
publicly available, such as CBI or other
www.ferc.gov) and in the Commission’s surrounding the existing installation
information whose disclosure is
Public Reference Room during normal and firing ranges.
restricted by statute. Certain other
business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. DATES: Written comments must be
material, such as copyrighted material,
Eastern time) at 888 First Street NE, submitted on or before June 22, 2018. is not placed on the internet and will be
Room 2A, Washington DC 20426. ADDRESSES: You may submit comments, publicly available only in hard copy
66. From the Commission’s Home identified by docket number COE– form.
Page on the internet, this information is 2017–0011, by any of the following
available on eLibrary. The full text of FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Mr.
methods:
this document is available on eLibrary Federal eRulemaking Portal: http:// David Olson, Headquarters, Operations
in PDF and Microsoft Word format for www.regulations.gov. Follow the and Regulatory Community of Practice,
viewing, printing, and/or downloading. instructions for submitting comments. Washington, DC at 202–761–4922, or
To access this document in eLibrary, Email: david.b.olson@usace.army.mil. Nicole Woodward, Corps of Engineers,
daltland on DSKBBV9HB2PROD with PROPOSALS
type the docket number, excluding the Include the docket number, COE–2017– Norfolk District, Regulatory Branch, at
last three digits of this document in the 0011, in the subject line of the message. 757–201–7122.
docket number field. Mail: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: Pursuant
67. User assistance is available for Attn: CECW–CO–R (David B. Olson), to its authorities in Section 7 of the
eLibrary and the Commission’s website 441 G Street NW, Washington, DC Rivers and Harbors Act of 1917 (40 Stat.
during normal business hours from the 20314–1000. 266; 33 U.S.C. 1) and Chapter XIX of the
Commission’s Online Support at 202– Hand Delivery/Courier: Due to Army Appropriations Act of 1919 (40
502–6652 (toll free at 1–866–208–3676) security requirements, we cannot Stat. 892; 33 U.S.C. 3), the Corps of
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Document Created: 2018-05-22 23:49:00
Document Modified: 2018-05-22 23:49:00
| Category | Regulatory Information | |
| Collection | Federal Register | |
| sudoc Class | AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106: | |
| Publisher | Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration | |
| Section | Proposed Rules | |
| Action | Notice of proposed rulemaking. | |
| Dates | Comments are due July 23, 2018. | |
| Contact | Justin Kelly (Technical Information), Office of Electric Reliability, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426, Telephone: (301) 665-1394, [email protected] Matthew Vlissides (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426, Telephone: (202) 502-8408, [email protected] | |
| FR Citation | 83 FR 23854 |
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