83 FR 60347 - Geomagnetic Disturbance Reliability Standard; Reliability Standard for Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Federal Register Volume 83, Issue 227 (November 26, 2018)
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Federal Register Volume 83, Issue 227 (November 26, 2018)
| Page Range | 60347-60360 | |
| FR Document | 2018-25678 |
[Federal Register Volume 83, Number 227 (Monday, November 26, 2018)] [Rules and Regulations] [Pages 60347-60360] From the Federal Register Online [www.thefederalregister.org] [FR Doc No: 2018-25678] ----------------------------------------------------------------------- DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 18 CFR Part 40 [Docket Nos. RM18-8-000 and RM15-11-003; Order No. 851] Geomagnetic Disturbance Reliability Standard; Reliability Standard for Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. ACTION: Final rule. ----------------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) approves Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 (Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events). The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), the Commission-certified Electric Reliability Organization, submitted Reliability Standard TPL- 007-2 for Commission approval. The Commission also directs NERC to develop and submit modifications to Reliability Standard TPL-007-2: To require the development and implementation of corrective action plans to mitigate assessed supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities; and to authorize extensions of time to implement corrective action plans on a [[Page 60348]] case-by-case basis. In addition, the Commission accepts the revised GMD research work plan submitted by NERC. DATES: This rule will become effective January 25, 2019. FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:. Michael Gandolfo (Technical Information), Office of Electric Reliability, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-6817, Michael.Gandolfo@ferc.gov. Matthew Vlissides (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8408, Matthew.Vlissides@ferc.gov. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 1. Pursuant to section 215 of the Federal Power Act (FPA), the Commission approves Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 (Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events).\1\ The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC), the Commission- certified Electric Reliability Organization (ERO), submitted Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 for Commission approval in response to directives in Order No. 830.\2\ As discussed in this final rule, we determine that Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 better addresses the risks posed by geomagnetic disturbances (GMDs) to the Bulk-Power System, particularly with respect to the potential impacts of locally- enhanced GMD events, than currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL- 007-1 and complies with the Commission's directives in Order No. 830. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \1\ 16 U.S.C. 824o. \2\ Reliability Standard for Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events, Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215, (2016) reh'g denied, Order No. 830-A, 158 FERC ] 61,041 (2017). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2. GMD events occur when the sun ejects charged particles that interact with and cause changes in the earth's magnetic fields. GMD events have the potential to cause severe, wide-spread impacts on the Bulk-Power System.\3\ Currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-007- 1 requires applicable entities to assess the vulnerability of their transmission systems to a ``benchmark GMD event.'' An applicable entity that does not meet certain performance requirements, based on the results of the benchmark GMD vulnerability assessment, must develop and implement a corrective action plan to achieve the performance requirements. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \3\ Reliability Standards for Geomagnetic Disturbances, Order No. 779, 143 FERC ] 61,147, at P 3, reh'g denied, 144 FERC ] 61,113 (2013); see also Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, Background. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 3. The improvements in Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 are responsive to the directives in Order No. 830: (1) To revise the benchmark GMD event definition, as it pertains to the required GMD vulnerability assessments and transformer thermal impact assessments, so that the definition is not based solely on spatially-averaged data; (2) to require the collection of necessary geomagnetically induced current (GIC) monitoring and magnetometer data; and (3) to include a one-year deadline for the completion of corrective action plans and two- and four-year deadlines to complete mitigation actions involving non-hardware and hardware mitigation.\4\ As discussed below, Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 complies with these directives and improves upon the currently-effective version of the Reliability Standard by requiring applicable entities to: (1) In addition to the benchmark GMD event requirements, conduct supplemental GMD vulnerability assessments and thermal impact assessments, which apply a new supplemental GMD event definition that does not rely solely on spatially-averaged data; (2) obtain GIC and magnetometer data; and (3) meet the Commission-directed deadlines for the development and completion of tasks in corrective action plans. Accordingly, pursuant to section 215(d)(2) of the FPA, we approve Reliability Standard TPL- 007-2.\5\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \4\ ``Spatial averaging'' refers to the averaging of magnetometer readings over a geographic area. In developing the benchmark GMD event definition, the standard drafting team averaged several (but not all) geomagnetic field readings taken by magnetometers located within square geographical areas of 500 km per side. \5\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(2). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 4. In addition, as discussed in the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, we determine that it is appropriate, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA,\6\ to direct NERC to develop and submit modifications to Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 to require the development and completion of corrective action plans to mitigate assessed supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities.\7\ As discussed below, requiring corrective action plans for supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities is appropriate to ensure the reliability of the Bulk-Power System when confronted with locally-enhanced GMD events, just as corrective action plans are necessary to mitigate the effects of benchmark GMD events. Based on the record in this proceeding, we discern no technical barriers to either developing or complying with such a requirement. Moreover, the record supports issuance of a directive at this time notwithstanding comments in response to the NOPR advocating postponement of any directive until after the completion of additional GMD research. As discussed below, the relevant GMD research tasks are scheduled to be completed before the modified Reliability Standard must be submitted. The Commission directs NERC to submit the modified Reliability Standard for approval within 12 months from the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL- 007-2. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \6\ Id. 824o(d)(5). \7\ Geomagnetic Disturbance Reliability Standard, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 83 FR 23854 (May 23, 2018), 163 FERC ] 61,126 (2018) (NOPR). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5. We also determine that it is appropriate, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, to direct that NERC modify the provision in Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, Requirement R7.4 that allows applicable entities to exceed deadlines for completing corrective action plan tasks when ``situations beyond the control of the responsible entity [arise].'' The NOPR raised concerns regarding the appropriateness of a self-executing deadline extension and observed that it was inconsistent with guidance in Order No. 830 that extension requests be considered on a case-by-case basis.\8\ We recognize the point made in NERC's comments in response to the NOPR that, under NERC's proposal, ``NERC and Regional Entity staff would exercise their authority to review the reasonableness of any Corrective Action Plan delay, including reviewing the `situations beyond the control of the responsible entity' that are cited as causing the delay'' and that Requirement R7.4 is ``not so flexible . . . as to allow entities to extend Corrective Action Plan deadlines indefinitely or for any reason whatsoever.'' \9\ While we generally agree with the standard of review that NERC states it will use to assess the merits of extension requests, we conclude that such assessments should be made before any time extensions are permitted. By requiring prior approval of extension requests, the modified Reliability Standard will limit the potential for unwarranted delays in implementing corrective action plans while also providing NERC with an advance and more holistic understanding of where, to whom, and for how long, extensions are granted. We expect that the extension process developed by NERC in response to our directive will be timely and efficient such that applicable [[Page 60349]] entities will receive prompt responses after submitting to NERC or a Regional Entity, as appropriate, the extension request and associated information described in Requirement R7.4.\10\ We also direct NERC, as proposed in the NOPR, to prepare and submit a report addressing how often and why applicable entities are exceeding corrective action plan deadlines as well as the disposition of extension requests, which is due within 12 months from the date on which applicable entities must comply with the last requirement of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. Following receipt of the report, the Commission will determine whether further action is necessary. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \8\ Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 102. \9\ NERC Comments at 20-21. \10\ NOPR, 163 FERC ] 61,126 at P 50. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 6. The Commission, as discussed below, also accepts the revised GMD research work plan submitted by NERC on April 19, 2018.\11\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \11\ North American Electric Reliability Corporation, Filing, Docket No. RM15-11-003 (filed Apr. 19, 2018) (Revised GMD Research Work Plan). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- I. Background A. Section 215 and Mandatory Reliability Standards 7. Section 215 of the FPA requires the Commission to certify an ERO to develop mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards, subject to Commission review and approval. Once approved, the Reliability Standards may be enforced in the United States by the ERO, subject to Commission oversight, or by the Commission independently.\12\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \12\ 16 U.S.C. 824o(e). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B. GMD Primer 8. GMD events occur when the sun ejects charged particles that interact and cause changes in the earth's magnetic fields.\13\ Once a solar particle is ejected, it can take between 17 to 96 hours (depending on its energy level) to reach earth.\14\ A geoelectric field is the electric potential (measured in volts per kilometer (V/km)) on the earth's surface and is directly related to the rate of change of the magnetic fields.\15\ The geoelectric field has an amplitude and direction and acts as a voltage source that can cause GICs to flow on long conductors, such as transmission lines.\16\ The magnitude of the geoelectric field amplitude is impacted by local factors such as geomagnetic latitude and local earth conductivity.\17\ Geomagnetic latitude is the proximity to earth's magnetic north and south poles, as opposed to earth's geographic poles.\18\ Local earth conductivity is the ability of the earth's crust to conduct electricity at a certain location to depths of hundreds of kilometers down to the earth's mantle. Local earth conductivity impacts the magnitude (i.e., severity) of the geoelectric fields that are formed during a GMD event by, all else being equal, a lower earth conductivity resulting in higher geoelectric fields.\19\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \13\ See NERC, 2012 Special Reliability Assessment Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances on the Bulk Power System at i-ii (February 2012). \14\ Id. at ii. \15\ Id. \16\ Id. \17\ NERC, Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance Event Description, Docket No. 15-11-000, at 4 (filed June 28, 2016) (2016 NERC White Paper). \18\ Id. \19\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 9. GICs can flow in an electric power system with varying intensity depending on the various factors discussed above. As explained in the Background section of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, ``[d]uring a GMD event, geomagnetically[hyphen]induced currents (GIC) may cause transformer hot[hyphen]spot heating or damage, loss of Reactive Power sources, increased Reactive Power demand, and Misoperation(s), the combination of which may result in voltage collapse and blackout.'' C. Currently-Effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 and Order No. 830 1. Currently-Effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 10. Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 consists of seven requirements and applies to planning coordinators, transmission planners, transmission owners and generation owners who own or whose planning coordinator area or transmission planning area includes a power transformer with a high side, wye-grounded winding connected at 200 kV or higher. 11. Requirement R1 requires planning coordinators and transmission planners (i.e., ``responsible entities'') to determine the individual and joint responsibilities in the planning coordinator's planning area for maintaining models and performing studies needed to complete the GMD vulnerability assessment required in Requirement R4. Requirement R2 requires responsible entities to maintain system models and GIC system models needed to complete the GMD vulnerability assessment required in Requirement R4. Requirement R3 requires each responsible entity to have criteria for acceptable system steady state voltage performance for its system during the GMD conditions described in Attachment 1 of Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. Requirement R4 requires responsible entities to conduct a GMD vulnerability assessment every 60 months using the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1. Requirement R5 requires responsible entities to provide GIC flow information, based on the benchmark GMD event definition, to be used in the transformer thermal impact assessments required in Requirement R6, to each transmission owner and generator owner that owns an applicable transformer within the applicable planning area. Requirement R6 requires transmission owners and generator owners to conduct thermal impact assessments on solely and jointly owned applicable transformers where the maximum effective GIC value provided in Requirement R5 is 75 Amperes per phase (A/phase) or greater. Requirement R7 requires responsible entities to develop corrective action plans if the GMD vulnerability assessment concludes that the system does not meet the performance requirements in Table 1 of Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. 12. Calculation of the benchmark GMD event, against which applicable entities must assess their facilities, is fundamental to compliance with Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Requirement R3 states that ``[e]ach responsible entity, as determined in Requirement R1, shall have criteria for acceptable System steady state voltage performance for its System during the benchmark GMD event described in Attachment 1.'' 13. Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Attachment 1 states that the benchmark GMD event is composed of four elements: (1) A reference peak geoelectric field amplitude of 8 V/km derived from statistical analysis of historical magnetometer data; (2) a scaling factor to account for local geomagnetic latitude; (3) a scaling factor to account for local earth conductivity; and (4) a reference geomagnetic field time series or wave shape to facilitate time-domain analysis of GMD impact on equipment. The product of the first three elements is referred to as the regional peak geoelectric field amplitude. The benchmark GMD event defines the geoelectric field values used to compute GIC flows for a GMD vulnerability assessment, which is required in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1.\20\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \20\ See Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Requirements R4 and R5. Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 does not set a threshold amount of GIC flow that would constitute a vulnerable transformer. However, if a transformer is calculated to experience a maximum effective GIC flow during a benchmark GMD event of a least 75 A/phase, a thermal impact assessment of that transformer is required. See Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Requirement R6. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- [[Page 60350]] 14. For the purpose of determining a benchmark event that specifies what severity GMD events a responsible entity must assess for potential impacts on the Bulk-Power System, NERC determined that a 1-in-100 year GMD event would cause an 8 V/km reference peak geoelectric field amplitude at 60 degree north geomagnetic latitude using Qu[eacute]bec's earth conductivity.\21\ Scaling factors (i.e., multiplying values) are applied to this reference peak geoelectric field amplitude to adjust the 8 V/km value for different geomagnetic latitudes (scaling factors between 0.1 and 1.0) and earth conductivities (scaling factors between 0.21 and 1.17). NERC identified a reference geomagnetic field time series from an Ottawa, Ontario magnetic observatory during a 1989 GMD storm affecting Qu[eacute]bec. NERC used this to estimate a time series (i.e., 10-second values over a period of days) of the geoelectric field that is representative of what is expected to occur at 60 degree geomagnetic latitude during a 1-in-100 year GMD event. Such a time series is used in some methods of calculating the vulnerability of a transformer to damage from heating caused by GIC. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \21\ NERC used Qu[eacute]bec as the location for the reference peak 1-in-100 year GMD event because of its proximity to 60 degree geomagnetic latitude and its well understood earth model. By creating scaling factors, each entity can scale this reference peak geoelectric field and geoelectric field time series values to match its own expected field conditions. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 15. NERC used field measurements taken from the International Monitor for Auroral Geomagnetic Effects (IMAGE) magnetometer chain, which consists of 39 magnetometer stations in Northern Europe, for the period 1993-2013 to calculate the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude. As described in the 2016 NERC White Paper, to arrive at a reference peak geoelectric field amplitude of 8 V/km, NERC ``spatially averaged'' four different station groups each spanning a square area of approximately 500 km (roughly 310 miles) in width. 2. Order No. 830 16. On January 21, 2015, NERC submitted for Commission approval Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 in response to the directive in Order No. 779 that NERC develop one or more Reliability Standards to address the effects of GMD events on the electric grid.\22\ In Order No. 830, the Commission approved Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, concluding that Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 addressed the Commission's directive by requiring applicable Bulk-Power System owners and operators to conduct, on a recurring five-year cycle, initial and ongoing vulnerability assessments regarding the potential impact of a benchmark GMD event on the Bulk-Power System as a whole and on Bulk-Power System components. In addition, the Commission determined that Reliability Standard TPL- 007-1 requires applicable entities to develop and implement corrective action plans to mitigate vulnerabilities identified through those recurring vulnerability assessments and that potential mitigation strategies identified in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 include, but are not limited to, the installation, modification or removal of transmission and generation facilities and associated equipment. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \22\ Order No. 779, 144 FERC ] 61,113 at P 54. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 17. In Order No. 830, the Commission also determined that Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 should be modified. Specifically, Order No. 830 directed NERC to develop and submit modifications to Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 concerning: (1) The calculation of the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude component of the benchmark GMD event definition; (2) the collection and public availability of necessary GIC monitoring and magnetometer data; and (3) deadlines for completing corrective action plans and the mitigation measures called for in corrective action plans. Order No. 830 directed NERC to develop and submit these revisions for Commission approval within 18 months of the effective date of Order No. 830. 18. With respect to the calculation of the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude component of the benchmark GMD event definition, Order No. 830 expressed concern with relying solely on spatial averaging in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 because ``the use of spatial averaging in this context is new, and thus there is a dearth of information or research regarding its application or appropriate scale.'' \23\ While Order No. 830 directed that the peak geoelectric field amplitude should not be based solely on spatially-averaged data, the Commission indicated that this ``directive should not be construed to prohibit the use of spatial averaging in some capacity, particularly if more research results in a better understanding of how spatial averaging can be used to reflect actual GMD events.'' \24\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \23\ Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 45. \24\ Id. P 46. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- D. NERC Petition and Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 19. NERC states that Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 enhances currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 by addressing reliability risks posed by GMDs more effectively and implementing the directives in Order No. 830.\25\ NERC asserts that Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 reflects the latest in GMD understanding and provides a technically sound and flexible approach to addressing the concerns discussed in Order No. 830. NERC contends that the proposed modifications enhance reliability by expanding GMD vulnerability assessments to include severe, localized impacts and by implementing deadlines and processes to maintain accountability in the development, completion, and revision of corrective action plans developed to address identified vulnerabilities. Further, NERC states that the proposed modifications improve the availability of GMD monitoring data that may be used to inform GMD vulnerability assessments. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \25\ Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 is not attached to this final rule. Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 is available on the Commission's eLibrary document retrieval system in Docket No. RM18- 8-000 and on the NERC website, www.nerc.com. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 20. Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 modifies currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 by requiring applicable entities to: (1) Conduct supplemental GMD vulnerability and transformer thermal impact assessments in addition to the existing benchmark GMD vulnerability and transformer thermal impact assessments required in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1; (2) collect data from GIC monitors and magnetometers as necessary to enable model validation and situational awareness; and (3) develop necessary corrective action plans within one year from the completion of the benchmark GMD vulnerability assessment, include a two-year deadline for the implementation of non-hardware mitigation, and include a four-year deadline to complete hardware mitigation.\26\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \26\ Unless otherwise indicated, the requirements of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 are substantively the same as the requirements in currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 21. In particular, Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 modifies Requirements R1 (identification of responsibilities), R2 (system and GIC system models) and R3 (criteria for acceptable System steady state) to extend the existing requirements pertaining to benchmark GMD assessments to the new supplemental GMD assessments. [[Page 60351]] Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 adds the newly mandated supplemental GMD vulnerability and transformer thermal impact assessments in new Requirements R8 (supplemental GMD vulnerability assessment), R9 (GIC flow information needed for supplemental GMD thermal impact assessments) and R10 (supplemental GMD thermal impact assessments). The supplemental GMD event definition contains a higher, non-spatially- averaged reference peak geoelectric field amplitude component than the benchmark GMD event definition (12 V/km versus 8 V/km). These three new requirements largely mirror existing Requirements R4, R5, and R6 that currently apply, and continue to apply, only to benchmark GMD vulnerability and transformer thermal impact assessments.\27\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \27\ An exception is the qualifying threshold for transformers required to undergo thermal impact assessments: For the supplemental GMD assessment the qualifying threshold for transformers is a maximum effective GIC value of 85 A/phase while the threshold for benchmark GMD event assessments is 75 A/phase. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 22. In addition, Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 includes two other new requirements, Requirements R11 and R12, that require applicable entities to gather GIC monitoring data (Requirement R11) and magnetometer data (Requirement R12). 23. Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 modifies existing Requirement R7 (corrective action plans) to create a one-year deadline for the development of corrective action plans and two and four-year deadlines to complete actions involving non-hardware and hardware mitigation, respectively, for vulnerabilities identified in the benchmark GMD assessment. The modifications to Requirement R7 include a provision allowing for extension of deadlines if ``situations beyond the control of the responsible entity determined in Requirement R1 prevent implementation of the [corrective action plan] within the timetable for implementation.'' E. NOPR 24. On May 17, 2018, the Commission issued a NOPR that proposed to approve Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 as the Reliability Standard largely addresses the directives in Order No. 830. However, the NOPR identified two aspects of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 that are inconsistent with Order No. 830: (1) The lack of any requirement to develop and implement corrective action plans in response to assessed supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities; and (2) a general allowance, per proposed Requirement R7.4, of extensions of time to complete corrective action plans as opposed to permitting extensions of time on a case-by-case basis. 25. Having identified these issues, the NOPR proposed to direct NERC, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, to develop and submit modifications to Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 to require applicable entities to develop and implement corrective action plans to mitigate vulnerabilities discovered through supplemental GMD vulnerability assessments. The NOPR proposed to direct NERC to submit the modified Reliability Standard for approval within 12 months from the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. The NOPR also sought comment on two options for addressing the Commission's concerns regarding the potential for undue delay of mitigation because of the proposed time- extension process in Requirement R7.4: (1) Direct NERC to bring Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 into alignment with Order No. 830 through a process whereby NERC or Regional Entities consider extensions on a case-by-case basis using the information that must be submitted under Requirement R7.4; or (2) approve the proposed provision without directing modifications. Under either option, NERC would prepare and submit a report regarding how often and why applicable entities are exceeding corrective action plan deadlines following implementation of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2.\28\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \28\ The NOPR proposed that the report, under the first option, would also include statistics describing how often extension requests were granted. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 26. The Commission received NOPR comments from nine entities. We address below the issues raised in the NOPR and comments as well as NERC's revised GMD research work plan and the comments submitted in response. The Appendix to this final rule lists the entities that filed comments in both matters. II. Discussion 27. Pursuant to section 215(d)(2) of the FPA, the Commission approves Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 as just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the public interest. We conclude that Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 is an improvement over currently- effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 and responds to the directives in Order No. 830: (1) To revise the benchmark GMD event definition, as it pertains to the required GMD Vulnerability Assessments and transformer thermal impact assessments, so that the definition is not based solely on spatially-averaged data; (2) to require the collection of necessary GIC monitoring and magnetometer data; and (3) to include a one-year deadline for the completion of corrective action plans and two and four-year deadlines to complete mitigation actions involving non- hardware and hardware mitigation, respectively.\29\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \29\ In its petition, NERC stated that it would address the directive in Order No. 830 on the collection of GIC monitoring and magnetometer data through a forthcoming NERC data request to applicable entities pursuant to Section 1600 of the NERC Rules of Procedure rather than through a Reliability Standard requirement. NERC Petition at 27. On February 7, 2018, NERC released a draft data request for a 45-day comment period. The NERC Board of Trustees (BOT) subsequently approved the GMD data request at the August 2018 BOT meeting. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 28. Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 complies with the directives in Order No. 830 by requiring, in addition to the benchmark GMD event vulnerability and thermal impact assessments, supplemental GMD vulnerability and thermal impact assessments. The supplemental GMD event definition in Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 contains a non- spatially-averaged reference peak geoelectric field amplitude component of 12 V/km, in contrast to the 8 V/km figure in the spatially-averaged benchmark GMD event definition. As NERC explains in its petition, the supplemental GMD event will be used to ``represent conditions associated with localized enhancement of the geomagnetic field during a severe GMD event for use in assessing GMD impacts.'' \30\ Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 therefore addresses the Commission's directive to modify currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 so that the benchmark GMD event does not rely solely on spatially-averaged data to calculate the reference peak geoelectric field amplitude. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \30\ NERC Petition at 12. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 29. As proposed in the NOPR, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, we also determine that it is appropriate to direct NERC to develop and submit modifications to Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 to require the development and completion of corrective action plans to mitigate assessed supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities. Given that NERC has acknowledged the potential for ``severe, localized impacts'' associated with supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities, we see no basis for requiring corrective action plans for benchmark GMD events but not for [[Page 60352]] supplemental GMD events.\31\ Based on the record in this proceeding, there appear to be no technical barriers to developing or complying with such a requirement. Moreover, as discussed below, the record supports issuance of a directive at this time, notwithstanding NOPR comments advocating postponement of any directive until after the completion of additional GMD research, because relevant GMD research is scheduled to be completed before the due date for submitting a modified Reliability Standard. The Commission therefore adopts the NOPR proposal and directs NERC to submit the modified Reliability Standard for approval within 12 months from the effective date of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \31\ NERC Petition at 4 (``these revisions would enhance reliability by expanding GMD Vulnerability Assessments to include severe, localized impacts and by implementing new deadlines and processes to maintain accountability in the development, completion, and revision of entity Corrective Action Plans developed to address identified vulnerabilities''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 30. We also determine, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, that it is appropriate to direct that NERC develop further modifications to Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, Requirement R7.4. Under NERC's proposal, applicable entities are allowed, without prior approval, to exceed deadlines for completing corrective action plan tasks when ``situations beyond the control of the responsible entity [arise].'' \32\ Instead, as discussed below, we direct NERC to develop a timely and efficient process, consistent with the Commission's guidance in Order No. 830, to consider time extension requests on a case-by-case basis. Our directive balances the availability of time extensions when applicable entities are presented with the types of uncontrollable delays identified in NERC's petition and NOPR comments with the need to ensure that the mitigation of known GMD vulnerabilities is not being improperly delayed through such requests. Further, as proposed in the NOPR, we direct NERC to prepare and submit a report addressing how often and why applicable entities are exceeding corrective action plan deadlines as well as the disposition of time extension requests. The report is due within 12 months from the date on which applicable entities must comply with the last requirement of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. Following receipt of the report, the Commission will determine whether further action is necessary. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \32\ In the Supplemental Material section of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, examples of situations beyond the control of the of the responsible entity include, but are not limited to, delays resulting from regulatory/legal processes, such as permitting; delays resulting from stakeholder processes required by tariff; delays resulting from equipment lead times; or delays resulting from the inability to acquire necessary Right-of-Way. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 31. The Commission, as discussed below, also accepts the revised GMD research work plan submitted by NERC on April 19, 2018. A. Corrective Action Plan for Supplemental GMD Event Vulnerabilities NOPR 32. The NOPR proposed to determine that the absence of a requirement to mitigate assessed supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities is inconsistent with Order No. 830, and Order No. 779, because the proposal does not require ``owners and operators [to] develop and implement a plan to protect against instability, uncontrolled separation, or cascading failures of the Bulk-Power System.'' \33\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \33\ NOPR, 163 FERC ] 61,126 at P 32. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 33. The NOPR explained that the Commission was not persuaded by NERC's justification that technical limitations--specifically the small number of observations used to define the supplemental GMD event and the availability of modeling tools to assist entities in assessing vulnerabilities--make requiring mitigation premature at this time.\34\ The NOPR, instead, accepted NERC's statement that the supplemental GMD event definition ``provides a technically justified method of assessing vulnerabilities to the localized peak effects of severe GMD events.'' \35\ The NOPR also observed that mitigation of supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities is appropriate because Reliability Standard TPL-007-2: (1) Does not prescribe how applicable entities must perform such studies, and thus may incorporate any uncertainties regarding the geographic size of such events into their studies; (2) there are commercially-available tools that could allow for modeling of supplemental GMD events; and (3) other methods could be used within the framework of the Reliability Standard to study planning areas (e.g., superposition or sensitivity studies) in conjunction with other power system modeling tools. The NOPR further recognized that research tasks under way pursuant to the GMD research work plan that are relevant to the supplemental GMD event definition are scheduled to be completed in 2019 and the results of such research should inform the work of the standard drafting team. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \34\ The Commission also rejected the assertion in NERC's petition that an evaluation of possible actions for supplemental GMD events that result in Cascading is similar to the treatment of extreme events in Reliability Standard TPL-001-4 (Transmission System Planning Performance Requirements). \35\ NOPR, 163 FERC ] 61,126 at P 35 (quoting NERC Petition at 13). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Comments 34. NERC does not support the proposed directive. NERC maintains that the provision in Requirement R8.3 that requires applicable entities to evaluate possible actions designed to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the adverse impacts of a supplemental GMD event ``is not merely advisory, but rather supports a range of potential mitigating actions, such as additional hardware mitigation, operating procedures, or other resilience actions to enhance recovery and restoration.'' \36\ NERC expounds on this by noting that the requirement to consider mitigation in Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 ``would directly support mitigation that is required by [Reliability Standard EOP-010-1].'' \37\ NERC also contends that it ``anticipates that the Corrective Action Plans, when needed to address performance requirements for the benchmark GMD event, will also provide a large degree of protection to the Bulk-Power System for events with locally-enhanced geomagnetic fields.'' \38\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \36\ NERC Comments at 9. \37\ Id. at 10. \38\ Id. at 11. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 35. NERC's comments reiterate the rationale in its petition that requiring mitigation ``would result in the de facto replacement of the benchmark GMD event with the proposed supplemental GMD event.'' \39\ NERC maintains that ``while the supplemental GMD event is strongly supported by data and analysis in ways that mirror the benchmark GMD event, there are aspects of it that are less definitive than the benchmark GMD event and less appropriate as the basis of requiring Corrective Action Plans.'' \40\ NERC also claims that the uncertainty of geographic size of the supplemental GMD event could not be addressed adequately by sensitivity analysis or through other methods because there are ``inherent sources of modeling uncertainty (e.g., earth conductivity model, substation grounding grid resistance values, transformer thermal and magnetic response models) . . . [and] introducing additional variables [[Page 60353]] for sensitivity analysis, such as the size of the localized enhancement, may not improve the accuracy of GMD Vulnerability Assessments.'' \41\ NERC further states that ``commercially-available modeling tools now advertise capabilities that could be used to model localized GMD enhancements, [but] to NERC's knowledge these capabilities have not been used extensively by planners, nor have the different software tools been benchmarked for consistency in results.'' \42\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \39\ Id. at 11-12; see also id. at 14 (``many entities would likely employ the most conservative approach for conducting supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments, which would be to apply extreme peak values uniformly over an entire planning area''). \40\ Id. at 13. \41\ Id. at 15. \42\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 36. NERC contends that completing the GMD work plan is a better alternative to the NOPR directive. Moreover, NERC states that it ``commits to initiate a review of TPL-007-2 following the completion of the GMD Research Work Plan to evaluate whether the standard continues to be supported by the available knowledge or whether additional refinements are necessary . . . [which] could result in modifications to, or additional support for, the proposed supplemental GMD event, and thereby inform what the TPL-007 standard should require in terms of mitigation based on supplemental GMD Vulnerability Assessments.'' \43\ In response to the NOPR's statement that the results of the GMD research work plan may inform the work of the standard drafting team tasked with carrying out the Commission's proposed directive, NERC comments state that ``it expects that the last of the project's deliverables will be ready by early 2020 . . . [but] [a]ny scientific research project schedule, however, must account for the possibility that additional time may be needed to explore potential findings or amend project approaches to provide more useful results.'' \44\ NERC states that while the technical report for Task 1 is scheduled to be completed by the fourth quarter of 2019 according to the revised GMD research work plan, NERC estimates that it will file a report with the Commission, after allowing a period of public comment, six months later (i.e., mid-2020).\45\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \43\ Id. at 18. \44\ Id. at 17. \45\ Revised GMD Research Work Plan at 5 (``NERC expects to submit [informational filings with the Commission] approximately six months following EPRI's completion of the associated technical report(s)''); id., Attachment 1 (Order No. 830 GMD Research Work Plan (April 2018)) at 7 (identifying ``Q4 2019'' as the estimated completion date of ``Final technical report to provide additional technical support for the existing supplementary (localized) benchmark; or, propose update to the benchmark, as appropriate''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 37. Trade Associations, Idaho Power, NE ISO, TVA and BPA do not support the proposed directive. They contend that requiring corrective action plans for supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities: (1) May be premature given the limited data regarding localized GMD events; (2) would address low-probability events that are unlikely to affect a wide area; and (3) could impose costs on applicable entities that outweigh the potential benefits of such a directive. Like NERC, these commenters support completing the GMD research work plan before considering mandating corrective action plans for supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities. Idaho Power, moreover, contends that it would be better for registered entities to gain experience with corrective action plans for benchmark GMD events before mandating corrective action plans for supplemental GMD events. Trade Associations state that instead of the NOPR directive, any Commission directive should be limited to requiring NERC to develop ``a study of the mitigation measures deployed and the effectiveness of these measures to mitigate benchmark GMD events before mandating mitigation measures on more localized events.'' \46\ Similarly, BPA maintains that instead of the NOPR directive, in order to assess the costs and benefits of requiring corrective action plans for supplemental GMD events, the Commission should require NERC to file periodic reports on supplemental GMD events and the possible actions to mitigate them. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \46\ Trade Associations Comments at 12. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 38. Resilient Societies and Reclamation support the NOPR directive. Reclamation states, and Resilient Societies concurs, that ``[a]n exercise to only identify vulnerabilities arising from localized GMD events is not a cost-effective use of resources unless accompanied by activities to mitigate the identified vulnerabilities.'' \47\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \47\ Reclamation Comments at 1; Resilient Societies Comments at 3. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Commission Determination 39. Pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, the Commission adopts the NOPR proposal and directs NERC to develop and submit modifications to Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 to require corrective action plans for assessed supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities. While Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 requires applicable entities to assess supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities, it does not require corrective action plans to address assessed vulnerabilities. Instead, Reliability Standard TPL- 007-2, Requirement R8.3 only requires applicable entities to make ``an evaluation of possible actions to reduce the likelihood or mitigate the consequences and adverse impacts of the events if a supplemental GMD event is assessed to result in Cascading.'' As the Commission observed in the NOPR, NERC's proposal differs significantly from Order No. 830 because the intent of the directive was not only to identify vulnerabilities arising from localized GMD events but also to mitigate such vulnerabilities. 40. The comments opposing the NOPR directive offer two rationales for approving Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 without directing modifications at this time: (1) Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 provides sufficient protection against supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities; and (2) requiring mitigation of supplemental GMD events is premature at this time. 41. With respect to the first rationale, NERC observes that the provision requiring applicable entities to consider supplemental GMD event mitigation is not ``merely advisory.'' However, there is no dispute that an applicable entity must ``consider'' mitigation under Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. What is significant is that after having done so, an applicable entity has no obligation under Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 to implement mitigation even if the applicable entity ``considered'' mitigation necessary to address an assessed supplemental GMD event vulnerability. 42. NERC also maintains that Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 requires transmission operators to ``develop, maintain, and implement a GMD Operating Procedure or Operating Process to mitigate the effects of GMD events on the reliable operation of its respective system.'' And in Order No. 779, the Commission determined that ``while the development of the required mitigation plan [for benchmark GMD event vulnerabilities] cannot be limited to considering operational procedures or enhanced training alone, operational procedures and enhanced training may be sufficient if that is verified by the vulnerability assessments.'' \48\ Again, NERC's point does not resolve the Commission's concern because Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 does not ensure mitigation of all supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities assessed under Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. That is because: (1) Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 applies, in relevant part, only to [[Page 60354]] transmission operators (viz., it does not apply to other applicable entity types, such as planning coordinators, transmission planners and generator owners, subject to Reliability Standard TPL-007-2); and (2) Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 does not require mitigation if the supplemental GMD event vulnerability cannot be addressed through operational procedures or enhanced training alone. Thus, Reliability Standard EOP-010-1 does not ensure satisfactory mitigation or provide an adequate substitute for mitigation as contemplated in Order No. 830. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \48\ Order No. 779, 143 FERC ] 61,147 at P 83. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 43. In addition, NERC asserts that the required mitigation of benchmark GMD event vulnerabilities could also address supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities. Of course that may occur in some circumstances, but that is not a substitute for requiring mitigation to the extent that benchmark GMD event mitigation does not completely address a supplemental GMD event vulnerability. Under Reliability Standard TPL- 007-2 there is currently no requirement to mitigate the remaining vulnerability to the Bulk-Power System. 44. Regarding the second rationale in the NOPR comments, NERC and other commenters reiterate the assertion in NERC's petition that it would be premature, from a technical standpoint, to require corrective action plans to address supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities. As reflected in the comment summary, these commenters instead request that NERC complete the GMD research work plan and then produce a report that assesses the possible need for modifications to Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. 45. The NOPR discussed how a standard drafting team could use new information gathered through the GMD research work plan to develop a modified Reliability Standard. The Commission noted that Task 1 of the GMD research work plan (Further Analyze Spatial Averaging Used in the Benchmark GMD Event), which encompasses localized GMD event research, would be delivered in 2019 according to the most recent version of the GMD research work plan (i.e., the revised GMD research work plan). The NOPR stated that ``[s]uch GMD research on localized events should inform the standard development process and aid applicable entities when implementing a modified Reliability Standard.'' \49\ While we appreciate that the informational filing for Task 1 may not be submitted to the Commission prior to the deadline for submitting a modified Reliability Standard, the underlying research in Task 1 is scheduled to be completed before then. As such, the standard drafting team and personnel working on the GMD research work plan could operate in parallel and share information to ensure that research relevant to the Commission's directive is incorporated into the modified Reliability Standard. Thus we are not persuaded by the comments seeking a delay of our directive. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \49\ NOPR, 163 FERC ] 61,126 at P 39. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 46. We are not persuaded by the other points raised by commenters to support their assertion that requiring corrective action plans is premature. First, NERC assumes that under such a requirement ``many'' applicable entities will adopt a ``conservative approach'' and use the supplemental GMD event definition in all GMD vulnerability assessments, thus effectively supplanting the benchmark GMD event definition. NERC bases this assumption on the standard drafting team's ``extensive experience in system planning and the relative immaturity of tools and methods for modeling localized enhancements.'' \50\ NERC acknowledges the discussion in the NOPR on how uncertainties regarding the supplemental GMD event definition--in particular the geographic size of localized events--are ameliorated by the flexibility afforded by Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. Specifically, Reliability Standard TPL- 007-2 permits applicable entities to apply the supplemental GMD event definition to an entire planning area or any subset of a planning area. However, NERC asserts that even with this flexibility, at least some applicable entities would default to using the supplemental GMD event definition in an overly-broad manner. Notwithstanding NERC's assertion, nothing in Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 requires applicable entities to apply the supplemental GMD event definition to an entire planning area or otherwise supplant the benchmark GMD event definition. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \50\ NERC Comments at 14. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 47. With respect to the statement in the NOPR that modeling tools are currently available to support corrective action plans, NERC admits that ``some commercially-available modeling tools now advertise capabilities that could be used to model localized GMD enhancements.'' \51\ However, NERC contends that to its ``knowledge these capabilities have not been used extensively by planners, nor have the different software tools been benchmarked for consistency in result.'' \52\ Given that GMDs have only recently been addressed in the Reliability Standards and there is currently no requirement to model and assess, let alone mitigate, localized GMD events, it is not unexpected that these modeling tools have not been used extensively for that purpose. Moreover, NERC does not assert that existing tools are incapable of performing the desired modeling function.\53\ Thus, NERC's objections on this point are not persuasive. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \51\ Id. at 15. \52\ Id. at 15-16. \53\ See also Trade Associations Comments at 8 (``Although current tools are available to model localized events, we understand that such modeling will require significant time as the processes involved are still largely manual, making it difficult to develop accurate, system-wide models that appropriately consider the localized impacts of the supplemental GMD event.''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 48. NERC does not offer support for its comment in response to the NOPR's observation that sensitivity analysis can serve, among other methods, as a method to refine the geographic scope of localized GMD impacts on planning areas. NERC responds that it ``does not believe that concerns regarding the uncertainty of the geographic size of the supplemental GMD event could be addressed adequately by sensitivity analysis or though other methods in planning studies.'' \54\ NERC claims there are already inherent sources of modeling uncertainty and that introducing another variable, such as the size of the localized enhancement, ``may not improve the accuracy of the GMD Vulnerability Analysis.'' \55\ And yet NERC's concern implies that the benchmark GMD event contains a geographic domain that does not itself inject uncertainties. However, as the Commission stated in Order No. 830, the geographic area for spatial averaging in the benchmark GMD event definition is itself a ``subjective'' figure.\56\ Indeed, in Order No. 830, as part of the GMD research work plan directive, to address the uncertainties surrounding the geographic scale of spatial averaging, the Commission directed that NERC should ``further analyze the area over which spatial averaging should be calculated for stability studies, including performing sensitivity analyses on squares less than 500 km per side (e.g., 100 km, 200 km),'' which NERC is addressing in Task 1.\57\ As [[Page 60355]] such, we see no basis, technical or otherwise, for not requiring corrective action plans for assessed supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities while requiring corrective action plans for assessed benchmark GMD event vulnerabilities consistent with the Commission's directions in Order Nos. 779 and 830. Accordingly, the Commission is not persuaded by the arguments of NERC and other commenters for the reasons discussed above, and directs that NERC develop modifications to Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 to require corrective action plans for assessed supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \54\ NERC Comments at 15. \55\ Id. \56\ Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 45 (quoting Pulkkinen, A., Bernabeu, E., Eichner, J., Viljanen, A., Ngwira, C., ``Regional-Scale High-Latitude Extreme Geoelectric Fields Pertaining to Geomagnetically Induced Currents,'' Earth, Planets and Space at 2 (June 19, 2015)). \57\ Id. P 26; see also revised GMD Research Work Plan (Task 1) at 6 (``further analyze the area over which spatial averaging should be used in stability studies and transformer thermal assessments by performing GIC analysis on squares less than 500 km per side (e.g., 100 km, 200 km) and using the results to perform power flow and transformer thermal assessments''). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- B. Corrective Action Plan Deadline Extensions NOPR 49. The NOPR stated that Requirement R7.4 of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 differs from Order No. 830 by allowing applicable entities to ``revise'' or ``update'' corrective action plans to extend deadlines. This provision contrasts with the guidance in Order No. 830 that ``NERC should consider extensions of time on a case-by-case basis.'' While agreeing that there should be a mechanism for allowing extensions of corrective action plan implementation deadlines, the NOPR expressed concern with unnecessary delays in implementing protection against GMD threats. 50. The NOPR identified two options for addressing Requirement R7.4. Under the first option, the Commission would, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, direct NERC to modify Reliability Standard TPL- 007-2 to comport with Order No. 830, by requiring that NERC and the Regional Entities, as appropriate, consider requests for extension of time on a case-by-case basis. Under this option, responsible entities seeking an extension would submit the information required by Requirement R7.4 to NERC and the Regional Entities for their consideration of the request. The Commission would also direct NERC to prepare and submit a report addressing the disposition of any such requests, as well as information regarding how often and why applicable entities are exceeding corrective action plan deadlines following implementation of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. Under such a directive, NERC would submit the report within 12 months from the date on which applicable entities must comply with the last requirement of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. Following receipt of the report, the Commission would determine whether further action is necessary. Under the second option, the Commission would approve proposed Requirement R7.4 but also direct NERC to prepare and submit the report described in the first option (without the statistics on disposition). Following receipt of the report, the Commission would determine whether further action is necessary. Comments 51. NERC supports the second option in the NOPR. NERC contends that Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 ``provides clarity and certainty regarding when an entity may extend a Corrective Action Plan mitigation deadline and what steps must be followed to maintain accountability and thus compliance with the standard.'' \58\ NERC also maintains that the proposal ``avoids the administrative burden, uncertainty, and further delay that could be associated with implementing a new ERO adjudication process, such as one that would be dedicated to evaluating GMD Corrective Action Plan deadline extensions on a case-by-case basis. '' \59\ To address concerns regarding the possible abuse of deadline extensions, NERC states that as ``part of the compliance monitoring and enforcement activities for the proposed standard, NERC and Regional Entity staff would exercise their authority to review the reasonableness of any Corrective Action Plan delay, including reviewing the `situations beyond the control of the responsible entity' that are cited as causing the delay.'' \60\ As noted in the Supplemental Material section of Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, NERC explains that examples of such situations include ``lengthy legal or regulatory processes, stakeholder processes required by tariff, or long equipment lead times.'' \61\ NERC, moreover, ``agrees that a report describing the results of NERC's monitoring of this provision could provide useful information . . . [and] therefore commits to prepare and submit to the Commission a report that describes how often and the reasons why entities in the United States are exceeding Corrective Action Plan deadlines.'' \62\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \58\ NERC Comments at 20. \59\ Id. \60\ Id. at 20-21. \61\ Id. at 20. \62\ Id. at 22. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 52. Trade Associations, BPA, ISO NE, Idaho Power, and TVA support the second option and echo the rationale for adopting the second option in NERC's comments. Trade Associations explain that while they previously supported a case-by-case exception process, they now believe NERC's proposal to be more efficient and effective. Trade Associations contend that a case-by-case approach would ``only increase administrative tasks for NERC and applicable entities . . . [and] would further delay any actions to mitigate rather than expedite the approval process.'' \63\ Trade Associations also maintain that Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 ``will not delay mitigation because this requirement is only applicable if circumstances are beyond the entity's control.'' \64\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \63\ Trade Associations Comments at 13. \64\ Id. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 53. Reclamation does not appear to support modifying Requirement R7 to institute a case-by-case time extension process. However, Reclamation comments that the sub-requirement in Requirement R7.4.1 requiring documentation of reasons for delaying corrective action plans should be eliminated because it ``is merely a compliance exercise and does not improve Bulk Electric System reliability.'' Reclamation makes the same contention regarding the sub-requirement in Requirement R7.4.2 that a revised corrective action plan describe the original corrective action plan. Commission Determination 54. Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, Requirement R7.4 differs from Order No. 830 by allowing applicable entities, under certain conditions, to extend corrective action plan implementation deadlines without prior approval. This conflicts with the Commission's guidance in Order No. 830 that, using its compliance discretion, ``NERC should consider extensions of time on a case-by-case basis.'' \65\ Based on our consideration of the record, we believe that the case-by-case review process contemplated by Order No. 830 is the appropriate means for considering extension requests. Accordingly, pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, we direct that NERC develop modifications to Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 to replace the time-extension provision in Requirement R7.4 with a process through which extensions of time are considered on a case-by-case basis. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \65\ Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 102. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 55. At the outset, we note that the extension process in Requirement R7.4 [[Page 60356]] applies only to the implementation of corrective action plans and not to the development of corrective action plans.\66\ NERC and other commenters supportive of the second option in the NOPR urge approval of Requirement R7.4 without modification largely because of the perceived uncertainty and burden associated with treating extension requests on a case-by-case basis. While it is true that granting extensions on a case-by-case basis involves more uncertainty and potential burdens versus the automatic extension of time afforded by Requirement R7.4, we must weigh this against the potential for abuse of Requirement R7.4 to unduly delay mitigation, as well as the delayed visibility that NERC would have into the deployment of needed GMD protections. Presented with these competing concerns, we conclude that the imperative to address known GMD vulnerabilities in a timely manner, and without unwarranted delays, is more compelling. We recognize that applicable entities that have a legitimate need for extensions require timely responses from NERC and Regional Entities, as appropriate. Accordingly, we expect that the extension process developed by NERC in response to our directive will be timely and efficient such that applicable entities will receive prompt responses after submitting to NERC or a Regional Entity, as appropriate, the extension request and associated information described in Requirement R7.4.\67\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \66\ Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, Requirement R7.4 (``[t]he [corrective action plan] shall . . . [b]e revised if situations beyond the control of the responsible entity . . . prevent implementation of the [corrective action plan] within the timetable for implementation''). \67\ NOPR, 163 FERC ] 61,126 at P 50. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 56. In reaching our determination on this issue, we considered NERC's NOPR comments, which attempted to address the concerns with Requirement R7.4 expressed in the NOPR, stating that NERC and Regional Entity compliance and enforcement staff will review the reasonableness of any delay in implementing corrective action plans, including reviewing the asserted ``situations beyond the control of the responsible entity'' cited by the applicable entity, and by citing specific examples of the types of delays that might justify the invocation of Requirement R7.4. NERC's comments also characterized Requirement R7.4 as being ``not so flexible . . . as to allow entities to extend Corrective Action Plan deadlines indefinitely or for any reason whatsoever.'' \68\ We generally agree with the standard of review that NERC indicates it will use to determine whether an extension of time to implement a corrective action plan is appropriate. However, the assessment of whether an extension of time is warranted is more appropriately made before an applicable entity is permitted to delay mitigation of a known GMD vulnerability. While NERC indicates that under proposed Requirement R7.4 there are compliance consequences for improperly delaying mitigation, mitigation of a known GMD vulnerability will nonetheless have been delayed, and we conclude it is important that any proposed delay be reviewed ahead of time. Therefore, we direct NERC to modify Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, Requirement R7.4 to develop a timely and efficient process, consistent with the Commission's guidance in Order No. 830, to consider time extension requests on a case-by-case basis. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \68\ NERC Comments at 20. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 57. We disagree with Reclamation's comment regarding Requirement R7.4.1, which requires a description of the circumstances necessitating mitigation delays, because it is at odds with NERC's NOPR comments, discussed above, in which NERC states that NERC and Regional Entities will review the reasons for delaying mitigation. Contrary to Reclamation's assertion that this requirement is ``merely a documentation exercise and does not improve [bulk electric system] reliability,'' unreasonable delays of mitigation could harm bulk electric system reliability by leaving it vulnerable to GMDs. Moreover, Requirement R7.4.2, also opposed by Reclamation, requiring that revised corrective action plans describe the original and previous revisions, provides compliance enforcement authorities with a revision history of the corrective action plan in a single document, thus facilitating compliance review. C. Other Issues Raised in NOPR Comments 58. Resilient Societies' comments raise three issues not addressed in the NOPR. First, Resilient Societies maintains that transformers that experience an estimated GIC above 15 A/phase should be subject to mandatory corrective action plans and the Commission should ``encourage owner-operators and their research partners to develop `Corrective Action Plans' for both [extra high voltage] transformers and for associated generation stations, even if these long replacement-time systems experience overstress at levels significantly below 75 amps per phase.'' Second, Resilient Societies states that the Commission should encourage best practices by industry beyond the mandatory requirements of the Reliability Standards, including allowing cost recovery for such practices. Third, Resilient Societies states that the Commission should address combined GMD and electromagnetic pulse (EMP) protection. 59. In Order No. 830, the Commission approved the 75 A/phase threshold in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 based on the record and despite objections from certain commenters. The Commission, however, directed further study of this issue as part of the GMD research work plan. Resilient Societies' comments provide no new basis for revisiting this issue at this time. Moreover, as reflected in the NOPR proposal, NERC has adequately supported the 85 A/phase threshold proposed in Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 for the supplemental GMD event analysis. However, new information resulting from the GMD research work plan will also be relevant to this higher threshold. We will consider such research at the appropriate time. 60. In Order No. 830, the Commission stated that ``cost recovery for prudent costs associated with or incurred to comply with Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 and future revisions to the Reliability Standard will be available to registered entities.'' \69\ It is therefore beyond the scope of this proceeding to determine, as a general matter, whether voluntary measures beyond those required to comply with the governing Reliability Standards are eligible for cost recovery. That said, jurisdictional entities may of course pursue such voluntary measures, and the Commission would consider appropriate cost recovery for those investments through a formula rate or other rate proceeding. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \69\ Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 24. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 61. The Commission in previous orders has indicated that the Commission's GMD proceedings are not directed to EMPs and thus Resilient Societies' comments on EMP are out-of-scope.\70\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \70\ See, e.g., Order No. 830, 156 FERC ] 61,215 at P 119. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- D. Revised GMD Research Work Plan 62. On April 19, 2018, NERC submitted a revised GMD research work plan in response to a Commission order issued on October 19, 2017.\71\ In the October 19 Order, the Commission accepted the initial GMD research work [[Page 60357]] plan filed by NERC on May 30, 2017. The Commission also directed NERC to file a final GMD research work plan within six months and ensure that the final GMD research work plan included a reevaluation of reliance on single station readings when adjusting for latitude as part of the benchmark GMD event definition. At NERC's request, the October 19 Order also provided guidance on how NERC should prioritize the tasks in the GMD research work plan. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \71\ Reliability Standard for Transmission System Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance Events, 161 FERC ] 61,048 (2017) (October 19 Order). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 63. Bardin and Resilient Societies submitted comments in response to the revised GMD research work plan, which largely focused on a request for combined research on GMDs and EMPs. As discussed above, however, EMPs are outside the scope of the Commission's directive regarding GMD research. Resilient Societies also submitted comments criticizing aspects of five tasks in the revised GMD research work plan. With respect to Tasks 1, 2, 8 and 9, Resilient Societies' criticism is based on the contention that the ``real-world data'' will not be used to verify models. For example, Resilient Societies contends that NERC will not use ``real-world'' GIC data to validate spatial averaging (Task 1) or latitude scaling (Task 2). These assertions, however, are refuted by the revised GMD research work plan. The revised GMD research work plan indicates that the research on spatial averaging includes an analysis of ``a large number (10-20) of localized extreme events and collection of both ground-based and space-based data around the times of these events.'' \72\ For latitude scaling, the revised GMD research work plan states that NERC will evaluate the scaling factor ``using existing models and developing new models to extrapolate, from historical data, the potential scaling of a 1-in-100 year GMD event on lower geomagnetic latitudes.'' \73\ In addition, NERC indicates that the data gathered through the Section 1600 data request ``will help validate various models used in calculating GIC's and assessing their impacts in data systems.'' \74\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \72\ Revised GMD Research Work Plan, Attachment 1 (Order No. 830 GMD Research Work Plan (April 2018)) at 2. \73\ Id. at 8. \74\ Id. at 19. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 64. Resilient Societies other comments are directed to an alleged lack of specificity, granularity or ``scientific assurance'' in the testing described in Tasks 5, 8 and 9 of the revised GMD research work plan. These criticisms are misplaced as they demand an unreasonable degree of detail in the revised GMD research work plan. For example, regarding Task 5, NERC states that it will ``validate[e] existing transformer tools with all data that is presently available and with upcoming field/laboratory test results.'' \75\ Resilient Societies, however, contends unpersuasively that ``NERC neglects to specify `all data that is presently available' . . . and the number of transformers to be employed in `upcoming field laboratory test results' and also neglects to disclose details of the test protocols to be used.'' \76\ Regarding harmonics (Tasks 8 and 9), Task 9 specifically includes ``tank vibration measurements,'' not just simulations.\77\ Moreover, Task 8 (Improving Harmonic Analysis Capabilities) is intended to develop more basic information than some of the other tasks in the revised GMD research work plan where industry has more knowledge. As with all of the revised GMD research work plan tasks (with the exception of Task 6, which deals with the Section 1600 data request), NERC will submit a report to the Commission on its findings. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \75\ Id. at 17. \76\ Resilient Societies Comments on Revised GMD Research Work Plan at 11. \77\ Id. at 25. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 65. As the revised GMD research work plan complies with Order No. 830 and the Commission's October 19 Order, we accept the revised GMD research work plan. III. Information Collection Statement 66. The collection of information contained in this final rule is subject to review by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) under section 3507(d) of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.\78\ OMB's regulations require review and approval of certain information collection requirements imposed by agency rules.\79\ Upon approval of a collection of information, OMB will assign an OMB control number and an expiration date. Respondents subject to the information collection requirements of a rule will not be penalized for failing to respond to the collection of information unless the collection of information displays a valid OMB control number. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \78\ 44 U.S.C. 3507(d). \79\ 5 CFR part 1320 (2018). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 67. In the NOPR, the Commission solicited comments on the need for this information, whether the information will have practical utility, the accuracy of the burden estimates, ways to enhance the quality, utility, and clarity of the information to be collected or retained, and any suggested methods for minimizing respondents' burden, including the use of automated information techniques. Specifically, the Commission asked that any revised burden or cost estimates submitted by commenters be supported by sufficient detail to understand how the estimates were generated. The Commission did not receive any comments regarding the Commission's burden estimates. 68. The Commission approves Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, which replaces currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. When compared to Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Reliability Standard TPL- 007-2 maintains the current information collection requirements, modifies existing Requirements R1 through R7 and adds new requirements in Requirements R8 through R12. 69. Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 includes new corrective action plan development and implementation deadlines in Requirement R7, new supplemental GMD vulnerability and transformer thermal impact assessments in Requirements R8 through R10, and requirements for applicable entities to gather magnetometer and GIC monitored data in Requirements R11 and R12. Deadlines in Requirement R7 for the development and implementation of corrective action plans would only change the timeline of such documentation and are not expected to revise the burden to applicable entities. The burden estimates for new Requirements R8 through R10 are expected to be similar to the burden estimates for Requirements R4 through R6 in currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 due to the closely-mirrored requirements.\80\ The Commission expects that only 25 percent or fewer of transmission owners and generator owners would have to complete a supplemental transformer thermal impact assessment per Requirement R10. Requirements R11 and R12 require applicable entities to have a process to collect GIC and magnetometer data from meters in planning coordinator planning areas. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \80\ NERC Petition at 14-17. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Public Reporting Burden: The burden and cost estimates below are based on the changes to the reporting and recordkeeping burden imposed by Reliability Standard TPL-007-2. Our estimates for the number of respondents are based on the NERC Compliance Registry as of March 3, 2018, which indicates there are 183 entities registered as transmission planner (TP), 65 planning coordinators (PC), 330 transmission owners (TO), 944 generator owners (GO) within the United States. However, due to significant overlap, the [[Page 60358]] total number of unique affected entities (i.e., entities registered as a transmission planner, planning coordinator, transmission owner or generator owner, or some combination of these functional entities) is 1,130 entities. This includes 188 entities that are registered as a transmission planner or planning coordinator (applicability for Requirements R7 to R9 and R11 to R12), and 1,119 entities registered as a transmission or generation owner (applicability for Requirement R10). Given the assumption above, there is an expectation that at most only 25 percent of the 1,119 entities (or 280 entities) will have to complete compliance activities for Requirement R10. The estimated burden and cost are as follow.\81\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \81\ Hourly costs are based on the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) figures for May 2017 (Sector 22, Utilities) for wages (https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/naics2_22.htm) and benefits for December 2017 (https://www.bls.gov/news.release/ecec.nr0.htm). We estimate that an Electrical Engineer (NAICS code 17-2071) would perform the functions associated with reporting requirements, at an average hourly cost (for wages and benefits) of $66.90 The functions associated with recordkeeping requirements, we estimate, would be performed by a File Clerk (NAICS code 43-4071) at an average hourly cost of $32.04 for wages and benefits. The estimated burden and cost are in addition to the burden and cost that are associated with the existing requirements in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 (and in the current OMB-approved inventory), which would continue under Reliability Standard TPL-007- 2. The requirements for NERC to provide reports to the Commission and to develop and submit modifications to Reliability Standard TPL- 007-2 are already covered under FERC-725 (OMB Control No. 1902- 0225). FERC-725N, Changes Due to Final Rule in Docket No. RM18-8 82 83 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Total annual Annual number of Total number of Average burden burden hrs. & Cost per Requirement (R) Number and type of responses per responses (1) x hrs. & cost per total annual cost respondent ($) respondents (1) respondent (2) (2) = (3) response (4) (rounded) (3) x (5) / (1) (4) = (5) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- R1 through R6 \84\............. No change......... No change......... No change.......... No change......... No change......... No change R7............................. 188 (PC and TP)... 1/5 (once for 37.6............... Rep. 5 hrs., Rep. 188 hrs., Rep. 1 hr., every five year $334.50; RK 5 $12,577; RK 188 $66.90; RK 1 hr., study). hrs., $160.20. hrs., $6,023. $32.04 R8............................. 188 (PC and TP)... 1/5 (once for 37.6............... Rep., 27 hrs., Rep. 1,015 hrs., Rep., 5.4 hrs., every five year $1,806.30; RK, 21 $67,917; RK 790 $361.26; RK 4.2 study). hrs., $672.84. hrs., $25,299. hrs., $134.57 R9............................. 188 (PC and TP)... 1/5 (once for 37.6............... Rep. 9 hrs., Rep. 338 hrs., Rep. 1.8 hrs., every five year $602.10; RK 7 $22,639; RK 263 $120.42; RK 1.4 study). hrs., $224.28. hrs., $8,432. hrs., $44.85 R10............................ 280 (25% of 1,119) 1/5 (once for 56................. Rep. 22 hrs., Rep. 1,232 hrs., Rep. 4.4 hrs., (GO and TO). every five year $1,471.80; RK 18 $82,421; RK 1,008 $294.36; RK 3.6 study). hrs., $576.72. hrs., $32,296. hrs., $115.34 R11............................ 188 (PC and TP)... 1 (on-going 188................ Rep. 10 hrs., Rep. 1,880 hrs., Rep. 10 hrs., reporting). $669; RK. 10 $125,772; RK $669; RK 10 hrs., hrs., $320.40. 1,880 hrs., $320.40 $60,235. R12............................ 188 (PC and TP)... 1 (on-going 188................ Rep. 10 hrs., Rep. 1,880 hrs. Rep. 10 hrs., reporting). $669; RK. 10 $125,772; RK $669; RK 10 hrs., hrs., 320.40. 1,880 hrs., $320.40 $60,235. Total Additional Hrs. and Cost .................. .................. ................... .................. Rep., 6,533 hrs., .................. (rounded), due to Final Rule $437,057; RK in RM18-8. 6,009 hrs., $192,528. -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Title: FERC-725N, Mandatory Reliability Standards: TPL Reliability Standards --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \82\ Rep.=reporting requirements; RK-recordkeeping requirements (Evidence Retention). \83\ For each Reliability Standard, the Measure shows the acceptable evidence (Reporting Requirement) for the associated Requirement (R numbers), and the Compliance section details the related Recordkeeping Requirement. \84\ While Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 extends the requirements in existing Reliability Standard TPL-007-1, Requirements R1 through R3 to the newly required supplemental GMD event analyses, the obligation to conduct the supplemental GMD event analyses is found in Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, Requirements R8 through R10. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Action: Revisions to an existing collection of information OMB Control No: 1902-0264 Respondents: Business or other for profit, and not for profit institutions. Frequency of Responses: \85\ Every five years (for Requirement R7- R10), annually (for Requirement R11 and R12), and ongoing. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \85\ The frequency of Requirements R1 through R6 in Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 is unchanged from the existing requirements in Reliability Standard TPL-007-1. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- Necessity of the Information: Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 implements the Congressional mandate of the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to develop mandatory and enforceable Reliability Standards to better ensure the reliability of the nation's Bulk-Power System. Specifically, these requirements address the threat posed by GMD events to the Bulk- Power System and conform to the Commission's directives to modify Reliability Standard TPL-007-1 as directed in Order No. 830. Internal review: The Commission has reviewed Reliability Standard TPL-007-2, and made a determination that its action is necessary to implement section 215 of the FPA. The Commission has assured itself, by means of its internal review, that there is specific, objective support for the burden estimates associated with the information requirements. 70. Interested persons may obtain information on the reporting requirements by contacting the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Office of the Executive Director, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426 [[Page 60359]] [Attention: Ellen Brown, email: DataClearance@ferc.gov, phone: (202) 502-8663, fax: (202) 273-0873]. 71. Comments concerning the collection of information and the associated burden estimate should be sent to the Commission in this docket and may also be sent to the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, Office of Management and Budget, 725 17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20503 [Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission]. Due to security concerns, comments should be sent electronically to the following email address: oira_submission@omb.eop.gov. Comments submitted to OMB should refer to FERC-725N and OMB Control No. 1902-0264. IV. Environmental Analysis 72. The Commission is required to prepare an Environmental Assessment or an Environmental Impact Statement for any action that may have a significant adverse effect on the human environment.\86\ The Commission has categorically excluded certain actions from this requirement as not having a significant effect on the human environment. Included in the exclusion are rules that are clarifying, corrective, or procedural or that do not substantially change the effect of the regulations being amended.\87\ The actions here fall within this categorical exclusion in the Commission's regulations. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \86\ Regulations Implementing the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Order No. 486, FERC Stats. & Regs. ] 30,783 (1987) (cross-referenced at 41 FERC ] 61,284). \87\ 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii) (2018). --------------------------------------------------------------------------- V. Regulatory Flexibility Act 73. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) \88\ generally requires a description and analysis of proposed rules that will have significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The definition of small business is provided by the Small Business Administration (SBA) at 13 CFR 121.201. The threshold for a small utility (using SBA's sub-sector 221) is based on the number of employees for a concern and its affiliates. As discussed above, Reliability Standard TPL-007-2 applies to a total of 1,130 unique planning coordinators, transmission planners, transmission owners, and generation owners.\89\ A small utility (and its affiliates) is defined as having no more than the following number of employees: --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \88\ 5 U.S.C. 601-12. \89\ In the NERC Registry, there are approximately 65 PCs, 188 TPs, 944 GOs, and 330 TOs (in the United States), which will be affected by this final rule. Because some entities serve in more than one role, these figures involve some double counting. ---------------------------------------------------------------------------For planning coordinators, transmission planners, and transmission owners (NAICS code 221121, Electric Bulk Power Transmission and Control), a maximum of 500 employees for generator owners, a maximum of 750 employees.\90\ --------------------------------------------------------------------------- \90\ The maximum number of employees for a generator owner (and its affiliates) to be ``small'' varies from 250 to 750 employees, depending on the type of generation (e.g., hydroelectric, nuclear, fossil fuel, wind). For this analysis, we use the most conservative threshold of 750 employees. --------------------------------------------------------------------------- 74. As estimated in the NOPR, the total cost to all entities (large and small) is $629,585 annually (or an average of $1,345.27 for each of the estimated 468 entities affected annually). For the estimated 280 generator owners and transmission owners affected annually, the average cost would be $409.70 per year. For the estimated 188 planning coordinators and transmission planners, the estimated average annual cost would be $2,738.84. The estimated annual cost to each affected entity varies from $409.70 to $2,738.84 and is not considered significant. The Commission did not receive any comments regarding these burden and cost estimates. 75. Accordingly, the Commission certifies that this final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. VI. Document Availability 76. In addition to publishing the full text of this document in the Federal Register, the Commission provides all interested persons an opportunity to view and/or print the contents of this document via the internet through FERC's Home Page (http://www.ferc.gov) and in FERC's Public Reference Room during normal business hours (8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Eastern time) at 888 First Street NE, Room 2A, Washington DC 20426. 77. From FERC's Home Page on the internet, this information is available on eLibrary. The full text of this document is available on eLibrary in PDF and Microsoft Word format for viewing, printing, and/or downloading. To access this document in eLibrary, type the docket number excluding the last three digits of this document in the docket number field. 78. User assistance is available for eLibrary and the FERC's website during normal business hours from FERC Online Support at (202) 502-6652 (toll free at 1-866-208-3676) or email at ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the Public Reference Room at (202) 502- 8371, TTY (202)502-8659. Email the Public Reference Room at public.referenceroom@ferc.gov. VII. Effective Date and Congressional Notification These regulations are effective January 25, 2019. The Commission has determined, with the concurrence of the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs of OMB that this rule is not a ``major rule'' as defined in section 351 of the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996. The rule will be provided to the Senate, House, Government Accountability Office, and the SBA. By the Commission. Commissioner McIntyre is not voting on this order. Issued: November 15, 2018. Kimberly D. Bose, Secretary. Note: The following appendix will not appear in the Code of Federal Regulations. APPENDIX--List of Commenters ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Abbreviation Commenter ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Bardin............................ David Bardin. BPA............................... Bonneville Power Administration. Idaho Power....................... Idaho Power Company. ISO NE............................ ISO New England Inc. NERC.............................. North American Electric Reliability Corporation. Reclamation....................... Bureau of Reclamation. Resilient Societies............... Foundation for Resilient Societies. Trade Associations................ American Public Power Association, Edison Electric Institute, Electricity Consumers Resource Council, Large Public Power Council, National Rural Electric Cooperative Association. TVA............................... Tennessee Valley Authority. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ [[Page 60360]] [FR Doc. 2018-25678 Filed 11-23-18; 8:45 am] BILLING CODE 6717-01-P
![Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 227 / Monday, November 26, 2018 / Rules and Regulations 60347
and is committed to considering other published in the Federal Register on Operators must cap cost-based
meritorious requests for relief. March 6, 2018. Order No. 841 amended incremental energy offers at $2,000/
[FR Doc. 2018–25602 Filed 11–23–18; 8:45 am] 18 CFR 35.28(g) by adding a further new MWh. The actual or expected costs
BILLING CODE 6351–01–P paragraph, which was also numbered underlying a resource’s cost-based
(g)(9).4 As a result, the regulatory text incremental energy offer above $1,000/
adopted in Order No. 841 incorrectly MWh must be verified before that offer
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY replaced—rather than added to—the can be used for purposes of calculating
regulatory text adopted in Order Nos. Locational Marginal Prices. If a resource
Federal Energy Regulatory 831 and 831–A. submits an incremental energy offer
Commission 4. In this Correcting Amendment, 18 above $1,000/MWh and the actual or
CFR 35.28(g) is corrected by restoring expected costs underlying that offer
18 CFR Part 35 the regulatory text from Order Nos. 831 cannot be verified before the market
[Docket Nos. RM16–5–000; RM16–5–001; and 831–A as new paragraph 18 CFR clearing process begins, that offer may
RM16–23–000; AD16–20–000] 35.28(g)(11). Nothing in this Correcting not be used to calculate Locational
Amendment is intended to alter any Marginal Prices and the resource would
Non-Discriminatory Open Access previous compliance requirements or be eligible for a make-whole payment if
Transmission Tariff; Corrections effective dates established under Order that resource is dispatched and the
Nos. 831, 831–A, or 841, nor does this resource’s actual costs are verified after-
AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory
Correcting Amendment affect any tariff the-fact. A resource would also be
Commission, Department of Energy.
changes previously accepted by the eligible for a make-whole payment if it
ACTION: Correcting amendment. Commission in compliance with these is dispatched and its verified cost-based
SUMMARY: This document corrects one orders. incremental energy offer exceeds
section of the regulations of the Federal $2,000/MWh. All resources, regardless
List of Subjects in 18 CFR Part 35
Energy Regulatory Commission, as of type, are eligible to submit cost-based
published in the Federal Register on Electric power rates, Electric utilities, incremental energy offers in excess of
March 6, 2018. This correction restores Non-discriminatory open access $1,000/MWh.
regulatory text that was inadvertently transmission tariffs. [FR Doc. 2018–25584 Filed 11–23–18; 8:45 am]
replaced with other regulatory text By the Commission. Commissioner BILLING CODE 6717–01–P
adopted in another, later final rule. McIntyre is not voting on this order.
DATES: Effective November 26, 2018. Issued: November 16, 2018.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Kimberly D. Bose, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Anne Marie Hirschberger, Office of the Secretary.
Federal Energy Regulatory
General Counsel, Federal Energy In consideration of the foregoing, 18 Commission
Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street CFR part 35 is corrected by making the
NE, Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502– following correcting amendments: 18 CFR Part 40
8387, annemarie.hirschberger@ferc.gov.
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: PART 35—FILING OF RATE [Docket Nos. RM18–8–000 and RM15–11–
SCHEDULES AND TARIFFS 003; Order No. 851]
I. Background
1. On November 17, 2016, the Federal ■ 1. The authority citation for part 35 Geomagnetic Disturbance Reliability
Energy Regulatory Commission continues to read as follows: Standard; Reliability Standard for
(Commission) issued Order No. 831 Transmission System Planned
Authority: 16 U.S.C. 791a–825r, 2601–
concerning offer caps in Regional Performance for Geomagnetic
2645; 31 U.S.C. 9701; 42 U.S.C. 7101–7352.
Transmission Organization (RTO) and Disturbance Events
■ 2. Amend § 35.28 by adding a new
Independent System Operator (ISO) AGENCY: Federal Energy Regulatory
paragraph (g)(11) to read as follows:
markets,1 which was published in the Commission.
Federal Register on December 5, 2016. § 35.28 Non-discriminatory open access ACTION: Final rule.
Order No. 831 amended 18 CFR 35.28 transmission tariff.
by adding new paragraph (g)(9). * * * * * SUMMARY: The Federal Energy
2. On November 9, 2017, the (g) * * * Regulatory Commission (Commission)
Commission issued Order No. 831–A,2 (11) A resource’s incremental energy approves Reliability Standard TPL–007–
which was published in the Federal offer must be capped at the higher of 2 (Transmission System Planned
Register on November 16, 2017. Order $1,000/MWh or that resource’s cost- Performance for Geomagnetic
No. 831–A further revised 18 CFR based incremental energy offer. For the Disturbance Events). The North
35.28(g)(9) regarding offer caps. purpose of calculating Locational American Electric Reliability
3. On February 15, 2018, the Marginal Prices, Regional Transmission Corporation (NERC), the Commission-
Commission issued Order No. 841 Organizations and Independent System certified Electric Reliability
concerning electric storage participation Organization, submitted Reliability
in RTO/ISO markets,3 which was and Independent System Operators, Order No. 841, Standard TPL–007–2 for Commission
83 FR 9580 (Mar. 6, 2018), FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ approval. The Commission also directs
1 Offer Caps in Markets Operated by Regional 31,398 (2018) (cross-referenced at 162 FERC ¶ NERC to develop and submit
Transmission Organizations and Independent 61,127).
System Operators, Order No. 831, FERC Stats. & 4 On February 28, 2018, the Commission issued modifications to Reliability Standard
Regs. ¶ 31,387 (2016) (cross-referenced at 157 FERC an Errata Notice for Order No. 841. Electric Storage TPL–007–2: To require the development
¶ 61,115), order on reh’g and clarification, Order Participation in Markets Operated by Regional and implementation of corrective action
No. 831–A, 82 FR 53403 (Nov. 16, 2017), FERC Transmission Organizations and Independent
Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,394 (2017).
plans to mitigate assessed supplemental
System Operators, Errata Notice, Docket Nos.
2 Order No. 831–A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,394.
RM16–23–000, AD16–20–000 (Feb. 28, 2018).
GMD event vulnerabilities; and to
3 Electric Storage Participation in Markets Among other things, the Errata Notice revised 18 authorize extensions of time to
Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations CFR 35.28(g)(9). implement corrective action plans on a
VerDate Sep<11>2014 16:13 Nov 23, 2018 Jkt 247001 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\26NOR1.SGM 26NOR1](https://thefederalregister.org/doc/83_FR_60574/page/1.svg)
![60348 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 227 / Monday, November 26, 2018 / Rules and Regulations
case-by-case basis. In addition, the implement a corrective action plan to record in this proceeding, we discern no
Commission accepts the revised GMD achieve the performance requirements. technical barriers to either developing
research work plan submitted by NERC. 3. The improvements in Reliability or complying with such a requirement.
DATES: This rule will become effective Standard TPL–007–2 are responsive to Moreover, the record supports issuance
January 25, 2019. the directives in Order No. 830: (1) To of a directive at this time
revise the benchmark GMD event notwithstanding comments in response
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:.
definition, as it pertains to the required to the NOPR advocating postponement
Michael Gandolfo (Technical GMD vulnerability assessments and of any directive until after the
Information), Office of Electric transformer thermal impact completion of additional GMD research.
Reliability, Federal Energy Regulatory assessments, so that the definition is not As discussed below, the relevant GMD
Commission, 888 First Street NE, based solely on spatially-averaged data; research tasks are scheduled to be
Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502– (2) to require the collection of necessary completed before the modified
6817, Michael.Gandolfo@ferc.gov. geomagnetically induced current (GIC) Reliability Standard must be submitted.
Matthew Vlissides (Legal Information), monitoring and magnetometer data; and The Commission directs NERC to
Office of the General Counsel, Federal (3) to include a one-year deadline for submit the modified Reliability
Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 the completion of corrective action Standard for approval within 12 months
First Street NE, Washington, DC plans and two- and four-year deadlines from the effective date of Reliability
20426, (202) 502–8408, to complete mitigation actions involving Standard TPL–007–2.
Matthew.Vlissides@ferc.gov. non-hardware and hardware 5. We also determine that it is
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: mitigation.4 As discussed below, appropriate, pursuant to section
1. Pursuant to section 215 of the Reliability Standard TPL–007–2 215(d)(5) of the FPA, to direct that
Federal Power Act (FPA), the complies with these directives and NERC modify the provision in
Commission approves Reliability improves upon the currently-effective Reliability Standard TPL–007–2,
Standard TPL–007–2 (Transmission version of the Reliability Standard by Requirement R7.4 that allows applicable
System Planned Performance for requiring applicable entities to: (1) In entities to exceed deadlines for
Geomagnetic Disturbance Events).1 The addition to the benchmark GMD event completing corrective action plan tasks
North American Electric Reliability requirements, conduct supplemental when ‘‘situations beyond the control of
Corporation (NERC), the Commission- GMD vulnerability assessments and the responsible entity [arise].’’ The
certified Electric Reliability thermal impact assessments, which NOPR raised concerns regarding the
Organization (ERO), submitted apply a new supplemental GMD event appropriateness of a self-executing
Reliability Standard TPL–007–2 for definition that does not rely solely on deadline extension and observed that it
Commission approval in response to spatially-averaged data; (2) obtain GIC was inconsistent with guidance in Order
directives in Order No. 830.2 As and magnetometer data; and (3) meet No. 830 that extension requests be
discussed in this final rule, we the Commission-directed deadlines for considered on a case-by-case basis.8 We
determine that Reliability Standard the development and completion of recognize the point made in NERC’s
TPL–007–2 better addresses the risks tasks in corrective action plans. comments in response to the NOPR that,
posed by geomagnetic disturbances Accordingly, pursuant to section under NERC’s proposal, ‘‘NERC and
(GMDs) to the Bulk-Power System, 215(d)(2) of the FPA, we approve Regional Entity staff would exercise
particularly with respect to the potential Reliability Standard TPL–007–2.5 their authority to review the
impacts of locally-enhanced GMD 4. In addition, as discussed in the reasonableness of any Corrective Action
events, than currently-effective Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, we Plan delay, including reviewing the
Reliability Standard TPL–007–1 and determine that it is appropriate, ‘situations beyond the control of the
complies with the Commission’s pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the responsible entity’ that are cited as
directives in Order No. 830. FPA,6 to direct NERC to develop and causing the delay’’ and that
2. GMD events occur when the sun submit modifications to Reliability Requirement R7.4 is ‘‘not so flexible
ejects charged particles that interact Standard TPL–007–2 to require the . . . as to allow entities to extend
with and cause changes in the earth’s development and completion of Corrective Action Plan deadlines
magnetic fields. GMD events have the corrective action plans to mitigate indefinitely or for any reason
potential to cause severe, wide-spread assessed supplemental GMD event whatsoever.’’ 9 While we generally agree
impacts on the Bulk-Power System.3 vulnerabilities.7 As discussed below, with the standard of review that NERC
Currently-effective Reliability Standard requiring corrective action plans for states it will use to assess the merits of
TPL–007–1 requires applicable entities supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities extension requests, we conclude that
to assess the vulnerability of their is appropriate to ensure the reliability of such assessments should be made before
transmission systems to a ‘‘benchmark the Bulk-Power System when any time extensions are permitted. By
GMD event.’’ An applicable entity that confronted with locally-enhanced GMD requiring prior approval of extension
does not meet certain performance events, just as corrective action plans requests, the modified Reliability
requirements, based on the results of the are necessary to mitigate the effects of Standard will limit the potential for
benchmark GMD vulnerability benchmark GMD events. Based on the unwarranted delays in implementing
assessment, must develop and corrective action plans while also
4 ‘‘Spatial averaging’’ refers to the averaging of
providing NERC with an advance and
magnetometer readings over a geographic area. In more holistic understanding of where,
1 16 U.S.C. 824o. developing the benchmark GMD event definition,
2 Reliability Standard for Transmission System the standard drafting team averaged several (but not to whom, and for how long, extensions
Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance all) geomagnetic field readings taken by are granted. We expect that the
Events, Order No. 830, 156 FERC ¶ 61,215, (2016) magnetometers located within square geographical extension process developed by NERC
reh’g denied, Order No. 830–A, 158 FERC ¶ 61,041 areas of 500 km per side.
5 16 U.S.C. 824o(d)(2).
in response to our directive will be
(2017).
3 Reliability Standards for Geomagnetic 6 Id. 824o(d)(5). timely and efficient such that applicable
Disturbances, Order No. 779, 143 FERC ¶ 61,147, 7 Geomagnetic Disturbance Reliability Standard,
8 Order No. 830, 156 FERC ¶ 61,215 at P 102.
at P 3, reh’g denied, 144 FERC ¶ 61,113 (2013); see Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 83 FR 23854 (May
also Reliability Standard TPL–007–2, Background. 23, 2018), 163 FERC ¶ 61,126 (2018) (NOPR). 9 NERC Comments at 20–21.
VerDate Sep<11>2014 16:13 Nov 23, 2018 Jkt 247001 PO 00000 Frm 00016 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\26NOR1.SGM 26NOR1](https://thefederalregister.org/doc/83_FR_60574/page/2.svg)
![Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 227 / Monday, November 26, 2018 / Rules and Regulations 60349
entities will receive prompt responses local earth conductivity.17 Geomagnetic responsible entities to conduct a GMD
after submitting to NERC or a Regional latitude is the proximity to earth’s vulnerability assessment every 60
Entity, as appropriate, the extension magnetic north and south poles, as months using the benchmark GMD
request and associated information opposed to earth’s geographic poles.18 event described in Attachment 1.
described in Requirement R7.4.10 We Local earth conductivity is the ability of Requirement R5 requires responsible
also direct NERC, as proposed in the the earth’s crust to conduct electricity at entities to provide GIC flow
NOPR, to prepare and submit a report a certain location to depths of hundreds information, based on the benchmark
addressing how often and why of kilometers down to the earth’s GMD event definition, to be used in the
applicable entities are exceeding mantle. Local earth conductivity transformer thermal impact assessments
corrective action plan deadlines as well impacts the magnitude (i.e., severity) of required in Requirement R6, to each
as the disposition of extension requests, the geoelectric fields that are formed transmission owner and generator
which is due within 12 months from the during a GMD event by, all else being owner that owns an applicable
date on which applicable entities must equal, a lower earth conductivity transformer within the applicable
resulting in higher geoelectric fields.19 planning area. Requirement R6 requires
comply with the last requirement of
9. GICs can flow in an electric power transmission owners and generator
Reliability Standard TPL–007–2. system with varying intensity owners to conduct thermal impact
Following receipt of the report, the depending on the various factors assessments on solely and jointly owned
Commission will determine whether discussed above. As explained in the applicable transformers where the
further action is necessary. Background section of Reliability maximum effective GIC value provided
6. The Commission, as discussed Standard TPL–007–2, ‘‘[d]uring a GMD in Requirement R5 is 75 Amperes per
below, also accepts the revised GMD event, geomagnetically-induced currents phase (A/phase) or greater. Requirement
research work plan submitted by NERC (GIC) may cause transformer hot-spot R7 requires responsible entities to
on April 19, 2018.11 heating or damage, loss of Reactive develop corrective action plans if the
Power sources, increased Reactive GMD vulnerability assessment
I. Background Power demand, and Misoperation(s), the concludes that the system does not meet
A. Section 215 and Mandatory combination of which may result in the performance requirements in Table
Reliability Standards voltage collapse and blackout.’’ 1 of Reliability Standard TPL–007–1.
12. Calculation of the benchmark
C. Currently-Effective Reliability
7. Section 215 of the FPA requires the GMD event, against which applicable
Standard TPL–007–1 and Order No. 830
Commission to certify an ERO to entities must assess their facilities, is
develop mandatory and enforceable 1. Currently-Effective Reliability fundamental to compliance with
Reliability Standards, subject to Standard TPL–007–1 Reliability Standard TPL–007–1.
Commission review and approval. Once 10. Reliability Standard TPL–007–1 Reliability Standard TPL–007–1,
approved, the Reliability Standards may consists of seven requirements and Requirement R3 states that ‘‘[e]ach
be enforced in the United States by the applies to planning coordinators, responsible entity, as determined in
ERO, subject to Commission oversight, transmission planners, transmission Requirement R1, shall have criteria for
or by the Commission independently.12 owners and generation owners who own acceptable System steady state voltage
or whose planning coordinator area or performance for its System during the
B. GMD Primer benchmark GMD event described in
transmission planning area includes a
power transformer with a high side, Attachment 1.’’
8. GMD events occur when the sun 13. Reliability Standard TPL–007–1,
ejects charged particles that interact and wye-grounded winding connected at Attachment 1 states that the benchmark
cause changes in the earth’s magnetic 200 kV or higher.
11. Requirement R1 requires planning GMD event is composed of four
fields.13 Once a solar particle is ejected, elements: (1) A reference peak
it can take between 17 to 96 hours coordinators and transmission planners
(i.e., ‘‘responsible entities’’) to geoelectric field amplitude of 8 V/km
(depending on its energy level) to reach derived from statistical analysis of
earth.14 A geoelectric field is the electric determine the individual and joint historical magnetometer data; (2) a
responsibilities in the planning
potential (measured in volts per scaling factor to account for local
coordinator’s planning area for
kilometer (V/km)) on the earth’s surface geomagnetic latitude; (3) a scaling factor
maintaining models and performing
and is directly related to the rate of to account for local earth conductivity;
studies needed to complete the GMD
change of the magnetic fields. The 15
and (4) a reference geomagnetic field
vulnerability assessment required in
geoelectric field has an amplitude and time series or wave shape to facilitate
Requirement R4. Requirement R2
direction and acts as a voltage source requires responsible entities to maintain time-domain analysis of GMD impact on
that can cause GICs to flow on long system models and GIC system models equipment. The product of the first
conductors, such as transmission needed to complete the GMD three elements is referred to as the
lines.16 The magnitude of the geoelectric vulnerability assessment required in regional peak geoelectric field
field amplitude is impacted by local Requirement R4. Requirement R3 amplitude. The benchmark GMD event
factors such as geomagnetic latitude and requires each responsible entity to have defines the geoelectric field values used
criteria for acceptable system steady to compute GIC flows for a GMD
10 NOPR, 163 FERC ¶ 61,126 at P 50.
state voltage performance for its system vulnerability assessment, which is
11 North American Electric Reliability
during the GMD conditions described in required in Reliability Standard TPL–
Corporation, Filing, Docket No. RM15–11–003 (filed 007–1.20
Apr. 19, 2018) (Revised GMD Research Work Plan). Attachment 1 of Reliability Standard
12 16 U.S.C. 824o(e). TPL–007–1. Requirement R4 requires 20 See Reliability Standard TPL–007–1,
13 See NERC, 2012 Special Reliability Assessment
Requirements R4 and R5. Reliability Standard TPL–
Interim Report: Effects of Geomagnetic Disturbances 17 NERC, Benchmark Geomagnetic Disturbance 007–1 does not set a threshold amount of GIC flow
on the Bulk Power System at i–ii (February 2012). Event Description, Docket No. 15–11–000, at 4 that would constitute a vulnerable transformer.
14 Id. at ii. (filed June 28, 2016) (2016 NERC White Paper). However, if a transformer is calculated to
15 Id. 18 Id.
experience a maximum effective GIC flow during a
16 Id. 19 Id. Continued
VerDate Sep<11>2014 16:13 Nov 23, 2018 Jkt 247001 PO 00000 Frm 00017 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\26NOR1.SGM 26NOR1](https://thefederalregister.org/doc/83_FR_60574/page/3.svg)
![Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 227 / Monday, November 26, 2018 / Rules and Regulations 60351
Reliability Standard TPL–007–2 adds R7.4, of extensions of time to complete assessments, so that the definition is not
the newly mandated supplemental GMD corrective action plans as opposed to based solely on spatially-averaged data;
vulnerability and transformer thermal permitting extensions of time on a case- (2) to require the collection of necessary
impact assessments in new by-case basis. GIC monitoring and magnetometer data;
Requirements R8 (supplemental GMD 25. Having identified these issues, the and (3) to include a one-year deadline
vulnerability assessment), R9 (GIC flow NOPR proposed to direct NERC, for the completion of corrective action
information needed for supplemental pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the plans and two and four-year deadlines
GMD thermal impact assessments) and FPA, to develop and submit to complete mitigation actions involving
R10 (supplemental GMD thermal impact modifications to Reliability Standard non-hardware and hardware mitigation,
assessments). The supplemental GMD TPL–007–2 to require applicable entities respectively.29
event definition contains a higher, non- to develop and implement corrective
spatially-averaged reference peak action plans to mitigate vulnerabilities 28. Reliability Standard TPL–007–2
geoelectric field amplitude component discovered through supplemental GMD complies with the directives in Order
than the benchmark GMD event vulnerability assessments. The NOPR No. 830 by requiring, in addition to the
definition (12 V/km versus 8 V/km). proposed to direct NERC to submit the benchmark GMD event vulnerability
These three new requirements largely modified Reliability Standard for and thermal impact assessments,
mirror existing Requirements R4, R5, approval within 12 months from the supplemental GMD vulnerability and
and R6 that currently apply, and effective date of Reliability Standard thermal impact assessments. The
continue to apply, only to benchmark TPL–007–2. The NOPR also sought supplemental GMD event definition in
GMD vulnerability and transformer comment on two options for addressing Reliability Standard TPL–007–2
thermal impact assessments.27 the Commission’s concerns regarding contains a non-spatially-averaged
22. In addition, Reliability Standard the potential for undue delay of reference peak geoelectric field
TPL–007–2 includes two other new mitigation because of the proposed amplitude component of 12 V/km, in
requirements, Requirements R11 and time-extension process in Requirement contrast to the 8 V/km figure in the
R12, that require applicable entities to R7.4: (1) Direct NERC to bring spatially-averaged benchmark GMD
gather GIC monitoring data Reliability Standard TPL–007–2 into event definition. As NERC explains in
(Requirement R11) and magnetometer alignment with Order No. 830 through its petition, the supplemental GMD
data (Requirement R12). a process whereby NERC or Regional event will be used to ‘‘represent
23. Reliability Standard TPL–007–2 Entities consider extensions on a case- conditions associated with localized
modifies existing Requirement R7 by-case basis using the information that enhancement of the geomagnetic field
(corrective action plans) to create a one- must be submitted under Requirement during a severe GMD event for use in
year deadline for the development of R7.4; or (2) approve the proposed assessing GMD impacts.’’ 30 Reliability
corrective action plans and two and provision without directing
four-year deadlines to complete actions Standard TPL–007–2 therefore
modifications. Under either option, addresses the Commission’s directive to
involving non-hardware and hardware NERC would prepare and submit a
mitigation, respectively, for modify currently-effective Reliability
report regarding how often and why Standard TPL–007–1 so that the
vulnerabilities identified in the applicable entities are exceeding
benchmark GMD assessment. The benchmark GMD event does not rely
corrective action plan deadlines
modifications to Requirement R7 solely on spatially-averaged data to
following implementation of Reliability
include a provision allowing for calculate the reference peak geoelectric
Standard TPL–007–2.28
extension of deadlines if ‘‘situations 26. The Commission received NOPR field amplitude.
beyond the control of the responsible comments from nine entities. We 29. As proposed in the NOPR,
entity determined in Requirement R1 address below the issues raised in the pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the
prevent implementation of the NOPR and comments as well as NERC’s FPA, we also determine that it is
[corrective action plan] within the revised GMD research work plan and appropriate to direct NERC to develop
timetable for implementation.’’ the comments submitted in response. and submit modifications to Reliability
E. NOPR The Appendix to this final rule lists the Standard TPL–007–2 to require the
entities that filed comments in both development and completion of
24. On May 17, 2018, the Commission matters. corrective action plans to mitigate
issued a NOPR that proposed to approve
II. Discussion assessed supplemental GMD event
Reliability Standard TPL–007–2 as the
Reliability Standard largely addresses vulnerabilities. Given that NERC has
27. Pursuant to section 215(d)(2) of acknowledged the potential for ‘‘severe,
the directives in Order No. 830. the FPA, the Commission approves
However, the NOPR identified two localized impacts’’ associated with
Reliability Standard TPL–007–2 as just,
aspects of Reliability Standard TPL– supplemental GMD event
reasonable, not unduly discriminatory
007–2 that are inconsistent with Order vulnerabilities, we see no basis for
or preferential, and in the public
No. 830: (1) The lack of any requirement requiring corrective action plans for
interest. We conclude that Reliability
to develop and implement corrective benchmark GMD events but not for
Standard TPL–007–2 is an improvement
action plans in response to assessed over currently-effective Reliability
29 In its petition, NERC stated that it would
supplemental GMD event Standard TPL–007–1 and responds to address the directive in Order No. 830 on the
vulnerabilities; and (2) a general the directives in Order No. 830: (1) To collection of GIC monitoring and magnetometer
allowance, per proposed Requirement revise the benchmark GMD event data through a forthcoming NERC data request to
definition, as it pertains to the required applicable entities pursuant to Section 1600 of the
27 An exception is the qualifying threshold for NERC Rules of Procedure rather than through a
GMD Vulnerability Assessments and Reliability Standard requirement. NERC Petition at
transformers required to undergo thermal impact
assessments: For the supplemental GMD assessment transformer thermal impact 27. On February 7, 2018, NERC released a draft data
the qualifying threshold for transformers is a request for a 45-day comment period. The NERC
maximum effective GIC value of 85 A/phase while 28 The NOPR proposed that the report, under the Board of Trustees (BOT) subsequently approved the
the threshold for benchmark GMD event first option, would also include statistics describing GMD data request at the August 2018 BOT meeting.
assessments is 75 A/phase. how often extension requests were granted. 30 NERC Petition at 12.
VerDate Sep<11>2014 16:13 Nov 23, 2018 Jkt 247001 PO 00000 Frm 00019 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\26NOR1.SGM 26NOR1](https://thefederalregister.org/doc/83_FR_60574/page/5.svg)
![60352 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 227 / Monday, November 26, 2018 / Rules and Regulations
supplemental GMD events.31 Based on months from the date on which tasks under way pursuant to the GMD
the record in this proceeding, there applicable entities must comply with research work plan that are relevant to
appear to be no technical barriers to the last requirement of Reliability the supplemental GMD event definition
developing or complying with such a Standard TPL–007–2. Following receipt are scheduled to be completed in 2019
requirement. Moreover, as discussed of the report, the Commission will and the results of such research should
below, the record supports issuance of determine whether further action is inform the work of the standard drafting
a directive at this time, notwithstanding necessary. team.
NOPR comments advocating 31. The Commission, as discussed Comments
postponement of any directive until below, also accepts the revised GMD
after the completion of additional GMD research work plan submitted by NERC 34. NERC does not support the
research, because relevant GMD on April 19, 2018. proposed directive. NERC maintains
research is scheduled to be completed that the provision in Requirement R8.3
before the due date for submitting a A. Corrective Action Plan for that requires applicable entities to
modified Reliability Standard. The Supplemental GMD Event evaluate possible actions designed to
Commission therefore adopts the NOPR Vulnerabilities NOPR reduce the likelihood or mitigate the
proposal and directs NERC to submit 32. The NOPR proposed to determine adverse impacts of a supplemental GMD
the modified Reliability Standard for that the absence of a requirement to event ‘‘is not merely advisory, but rather
approval within 12 months from the mitigate assessed supplemental GMD supports a range of potential mitigating
effective date of Reliability Standard event vulnerabilities is inconsistent actions, such as additional hardware
TPL–007–2. with Order No. 830, and Order No. 779, mitigation, operating procedures, or
30. We also determine, pursuant to because the proposal does not require other resilience actions to enhance
section 215(d)(5) of the FPA, that it is ‘‘owners and operators [to] develop and recovery and restoration.’’ 36 NERC
appropriate to direct that NERC develop implement a plan to protect against expounds on this by noting that the
further modifications to Reliability instability, uncontrolled separation, or requirement to consider mitigation in
Standard TPL–007–2, Requirement cascading failures of the Bulk-Power Reliability Standard TPL–007–2 ‘‘would
R7.4. Under NERC’s proposal, System.’’ 33 directly support mitigation that is
applicable entities are allowed, without 33. The NOPR explained that the required by [Reliability Standard EOP–
prior approval, to exceed deadlines for Commission was not persuaded by 010–1].’’ 37 NERC also contends that it
completing corrective action plan tasks NERC’s justification that technical ‘‘anticipates that the Corrective Action
when ‘‘situations beyond the control of limitations—specifically the small Plans, when needed to address
the responsible entity [arise].’’ 32 number of observations used to define performance requirements for the
Instead, as discussed below, we direct the supplemental GMD event and the benchmark GMD event, will also
NERC to develop a timely and efficient availability of modeling tools to assist provide a large degree of protection to
process, consistent with the entities in assessing vulnerabilities— the Bulk-Power System for events with
Commission’s guidance in Order No. make requiring mitigation premature at locally-enhanced geomagnetic fields.’’ 38
830, to consider time extension requests this time.34 The NOPR, instead, 35. NERC’s comments reiterate the
on a case-by-case basis. Our directive accepted NERC’s statement that the rationale in its petition that requiring
balances the availability of time supplemental GMD event definition mitigation ‘‘would result in the de facto
extensions when applicable entities are ‘‘provides a technically justified method replacement of the benchmark GMD
presented with the types of of assessing vulnerabilities to the event with the proposed supplemental
uncontrollable delays identified in localized peak effects of severe GMD GMD event.’’ 39 NERC maintains that
NERC’s petition and NOPR comments events.’’ 35 The NOPR also observed that ‘‘while the supplemental GMD event is
with the need to ensure that the mitigation of supplemental GMD event strongly supported by data and analysis
mitigation of known GMD vulnerabilities is appropriate because in ways that mirror the benchmark GMD
vulnerabilities is not being improperly Reliability Standard TPL–007–2: (1) event, there are aspects of it that are less
delayed through such requests. Further, Does not prescribe how applicable definitive than the benchmark GMD
as proposed in the NOPR, we direct entities must perform such studies, and event and less appropriate as the basis
NERC to prepare and submit a report thus may incorporate any uncertainties of requiring Corrective Action Plans.’’ 40
addressing how often and why regarding the geographic size of such NERC also claims that the uncertainty of
applicable entities are exceeding events into their studies; (2) there are geographic size of the supplemental
corrective action plan deadlines as well commercially-available tools that could GMD event could not be addressed
as the disposition of time extension allow for modeling of supplemental adequately by sensitivity analysis or
requests. The report is due within 12 GMD events; and (3) other methods through other methods because there are
could be used within the framework of ‘‘inherent sources of modeling
31 NERC Petition at 4 (‘‘these revisions would
the Reliability Standard to study uncertainty (e.g., earth conductivity
enhance reliability by expanding GMD
Vulnerability Assessments to include severe, planning areas (e.g., superposition or model, substation grounding grid
localized impacts and by implementing new sensitivity studies) in conjunction with resistance values, transformer thermal
deadlines and processes to maintain accountability other power system modeling tools. The and magnetic response models) . . .
in the development, completion, and revision of [and] introducing additional variables
entity Corrective Action Plans developed to address
NOPR further recognized that research
identified vulnerabilities’’). 36 NERC
32 In the Supplemental Material section of 33 NOPR, 163 FERC ¶ 61,126 at P 32. Comments at 9.
34 The 37 Id. at 10.
Reliability Standard TPL–007–2, examples of Commission also rejected the assertion in
38 Id. at 11.
situations beyond the control of the of the NERC’s petition that an evaluation of possible
responsible entity include, but are not limited to, actions for supplemental GMD events that result in 39 Id. at 11–12; see also id. at 14 (‘‘many entities
delays resulting from regulatory/legal processes, Cascading is similar to the treatment of extreme would likely employ the most conservative
such as permitting; delays resulting from events in Reliability Standard TPL–001–4 approach for conducting supplemental GMD
stakeholder processes required by tariff; delays (Transmission System Planning Performance Vulnerability Assessments, which would be to
resulting from equipment lead times; or delays Requirements). apply extreme peak values uniformly over an entire
resulting from the inability to acquire necessary 35 NOPR, 163 FERC ¶ 61,126 at P 35 (quoting planning area’’).
Right-of-Way. NERC Petition at 13). 40 Id. at 13.
VerDate Sep<11>2014 16:13 Nov 23, 2018 Jkt 247001 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\26NOR1.SGM 26NOR1](https://thefederalregister.org/doc/83_FR_60574/page/6.svg)
![Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 227 / Monday, November 26, 2018 / Rules and Regulations 60353
for sensitivity analysis, such as the size the proposed directive. They contend Reliability Standard TPL–007–2,
of the localized enhancement, may not that requiring corrective action plans for Requirement R8.3 only requires
improve the accuracy of GMD supplemental GMD event applicable entities to make ‘‘an
Vulnerability Assessments.’’ 41 NERC vulnerabilities: (1) May be premature evaluation of possible actions to reduce
further states that ‘‘commercially- given the limited data regarding the likelihood or mitigate the
available modeling tools now advertise localized GMD events; (2) would consequences and adverse impacts of
capabilities that could be used to model address low-probability events that are the events if a supplemental GMD event
localized GMD enhancements, [but] to unlikely to affect a wide area; and (3) is assessed to result in Cascading.’’ As
NERC’s knowledge these capabilities could impose costs on applicable the Commission observed in the NOPR,
have not been used extensively by entities that outweigh the potential NERC’s proposal differs significantly
planners, nor have the different software benefits of such a directive. Like NERC, from Order No. 830 because the intent
tools been benchmarked for consistency these commenters support completing of the directive was not only to identify
in results.’’ 42 the GMD research work plan before vulnerabilities arising from localized
36. NERC contends that completing considering mandating corrective action GMD events but also to mitigate such
the GMD work plan is a better plans for supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities.
alternative to the NOPR directive. vulnerabilities. Idaho Power, moreover, 40. The comments opposing the
Moreover, NERC states that it ‘‘commits contends that it would be better for NOPR directive offer two rationales for
to initiate a review of TPL–007–2 registered entities to gain experience approving Reliability Standard TPL–
following the completion of the GMD with corrective action plans for 007–2 without directing modifications
Research Work Plan to evaluate whether benchmark GMD events before at this time: (1) Reliability Standard
the standard continues to be supported mandating corrective action plans for TPL–007–2 provides sufficient
by the available knowledge or whether supplemental GMD events. Trade protection against supplemental GMD
additional refinements are necessary Associations state that instead of the event vulnerabilities; and (2) requiring
. . . [which] could result in NOPR directive, any Commission mitigation of supplemental GMD events
modifications to, or additional support directive should be limited to requiring is premature at this time.
for, the proposed supplemental GMD NERC to develop ‘‘a study of the 41. With respect to the first rationale,
event, and thereby inform what the mitigation measures deployed and the NERC observes that the provision
TPL–007 standard should require in effectiveness of these measures to requiring applicable entities to consider
terms of mitigation based on mitigate benchmark GMD events before supplemental GMD event mitigation is
supplemental GMD Vulnerability mandating mitigation measures on more not ‘‘merely advisory.’’ However, there
Assessments.’’ 43 In response to the localized events.’’ 46 Similarly, BPA is no dispute that an applicable entity
NOPR’s statement that the results of the maintains that instead of the NOPR must ‘‘consider’’ mitigation under
GMD research work plan may inform directive, in order to assess the costs Reliability Standard TPL–007–2. What
the work of the standard drafting team and benefits of requiring corrective is significant is that after having done
tasked with carrying out the action plans for supplemental GMD so, an applicable entity has no
Commission’s proposed directive, NERC events, the Commission should require obligation under Reliability Standard
comments state that ‘‘it expects that the NERC to file periodic reports on TPL–007–2 to implement mitigation
last of the project’s deliverables will be supplemental GMD events and the even if the applicable entity
ready by early 2020 . . . [but] [a]ny possible actions to mitigate them. ‘‘considered’’ mitigation necessary to
scientific research project schedule, 38. Resilient Societies and address an assessed supplemental GMD
however, must account for the Reclamation support the NOPR event vulnerability.
possibility that additional time may be directive. Reclamation states, and 42. NERC also maintains that
needed to explore potential findings or Resilient Societies concurs, that ‘‘[a]n Reliability Standard EOP–010–1
amend project approaches to provide exercise to only identify vulnerabilities requires transmission operators to
more useful results.’’ 44 NERC states that arising from localized GMD events is ‘‘develop, maintain, and implement a
while the technical report for Task 1 is not a cost-effective use of resources GMD Operating Procedure or Operating
scheduled to be completed by the fourth unless accompanied by activities to Process to mitigate the effects of GMD
quarter of 2019 according to the revised mitigate the identified events on the reliable operation of its
GMD research work plan, NERC vulnerabilities.’’ 47 respective system.’’ And in Order No.
estimates that it will file a report with 779, the Commission determined that
Commission Determination ‘‘while the development of the required
the Commission, after allowing a period
39. Pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of mitigation plan [for benchmark GMD
of public comment, six months later
the FPA, the Commission adopts the event vulnerabilities] cannot be limited
(i.e., mid-2020).45
37. Trade Associations, Idaho Power, NOPR proposal and directs NERC to to considering operational procedures or
NE ISO, TVA and BPA do not support develop and submit modifications to enhanced training alone, operational
Reliability Standard TPL–007–2 to procedures and enhanced training may
41 Id. at 15. require corrective action plans for be sufficient if that is verified by the
42 Id.
assessed supplemental GMD event vulnerability assessments.’’ 48 Again,
43 Id. at 18. vulnerabilities. While Reliability NERC’s point does not resolve the
44 Id. at 17. Standard TPL–007–2 requires Commission’s concern because
45 Revised GMD Research Work Plan at 5 (‘‘NERC
applicable entities to assess Reliability Standard EOP–010–1 does
expects to submit [informational filings with the not ensure mitigation of all
Commission] approximately six months following supplemental GMD event
EPRI’s completion of the associated technical vulnerabilities, it does not require supplemental GMD event vulnerabilities
report(s)’’); id., Attachment 1 (Order No. 830 GMD corrective action plans to address assessed under Reliability Standard
Research Work Plan (April 2018)) at 7 (identifying
assessed vulnerabilities. Instead, TPL–007–2. That is because: (1)
‘‘Q4 2019’’ as the estimated completion date of Reliability Standard EOP–010–1
‘‘Final technical report to provide additional
technical support for the existing supplementary 46 Trade
Associations Comments at 12. applies, in relevant part, only to
(localized) benchmark; or, propose update to the 47 Reclamation
Comments at 1; Resilient Societies
benchmark, as appropriate’’). Comments at 3. 48 Order No. 779, 143 FERC ¶ 61,147 at P 83.
VerDate Sep<11>2014 16:13 Nov 23, 2018 Jkt 247001 PO 00000 Frm 00021 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\26NOR1.SGM 26NOR1](https://thefederalregister.org/doc/83_FR_60574/page/7.svg)
![60354 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 227 / Monday, November 26, 2018 / Rules and Regulations
transmission operators (viz., it does not the deadline for submitting a modified result.’’ 52 Given that GMDs have only
apply to other applicable entity types, Reliability Standard, the underlying recently been addressed in the
such as planning coordinators, research in Task 1 is scheduled to be Reliability Standards and there is
transmission planners and generator completed before then. As such, the currently no requirement to model and
owners, subject to Reliability Standard standard drafting team and personnel assess, let alone mitigate, localized GMD
TPL–007–2); and (2) Reliability working on the GMD research work plan events, it is not unexpected that these
Standard EOP–010–1 does not require could operate in parallel and share modeling tools have not been used
mitigation if the supplemental GMD information to ensure that research extensively for that purpose. Moreover,
event vulnerability cannot be addressed relevant to the Commission’s directive NERC does not assert that existing tools
through operational procedures or is incorporated into the modified are incapable of performing the desired
enhanced training alone. Thus, Reliability Standard. Thus we are not modeling function.53 Thus, NERC’s
Reliability Standard EOP–010–1 does persuaded by the comments seeking a objections on this point are not
not ensure satisfactory mitigation or delay of our directive. persuasive.
provide an adequate substitute for 46. We are not persuaded by the other 48. NERC does not offer support for
mitigation as contemplated in Order No. points raised by commenters to support its comment in response to the NOPR’s
830. their assertion that requiring corrective observation that sensitivity analysis can
43. In addition, NERC asserts that the action plans is premature. First, NERC serve, among other methods, as a
required mitigation of benchmark GMD assumes that under such a requirement method to refine the geographic scope of
event vulnerabilities could also address ‘‘many’’ applicable entities will adopt a localized GMD impacts on planning
supplemental GMD event ‘‘conservative approach’’ and use the areas. NERC responds that it ‘‘does not
vulnerabilities. Of course that may supplemental GMD event definition in believe that concerns regarding the
occur in some circumstances, but that is all GMD vulnerability assessments, thus uncertainty of the geographic size of the
not a substitute for requiring mitigation effectively supplanting the benchmark supplemental GMD event could be
to the extent that benchmark GMD event GMD event definition. NERC bases this addressed adequately by sensitivity
mitigation does not completely address assumption on the standard drafting analysis or though other methods in
a supplemental GMD event team’s ‘‘extensive experience in system planning studies.’’ 54 NERC claims there
vulnerability. Under Reliability planning and the relative immaturity of are already inherent sources of
Standard TPL–007–2 there is currently tools and methods for modeling modeling uncertainty and that
no requirement to mitigate the localized enhancements.’’ 50 NERC introducing another variable, such as
remaining vulnerability to the Bulk- acknowledges the discussion in the the size of the localized enhancement,
Power System. NOPR on how uncertainties regarding ‘‘may not improve the accuracy of the
44. Regarding the second rationale in the supplemental GMD event GMD Vulnerability Analysis.’’ 55 And
the NOPR comments, NERC and other definition—in particular the geographic yet NERC’s concern implies that the
commenters reiterate the assertion in size of localized events—are benchmark GMD event contains a
NERC’s petition that it would be ameliorated by the flexibility afforded geographic domain that does not itself
premature, from a technical standpoint, by Reliability Standard TPL–007–2. inject uncertainties. However, as the
to require corrective action plans to Specifically, Reliability Standard TPL– Commission stated in Order No. 830,
address supplemental GMD event 007–2 permits applicable entities to the geographic area for spatial averaging
vulnerabilities. As reflected in the apply the supplemental GMD event in the benchmark GMD event definition
comment summary, these commenters definition to an entire planning area or is itself a ‘‘subjective’’ figure.56 Indeed,
instead request that NERC complete the any subset of a planning area. However, in Order No. 830, as part of the GMD
GMD research work plan and then NERC asserts that even with this research work plan directive, to address
produce a report that assesses the flexibility, at least some applicable the uncertainties surrounding the
possible need for modifications to entities would default to using the geographic scale of spatial averaging,
Reliability Standard TPL–007–2. supplemental GMD event definition in the Commission directed that NERC
45. The NOPR discussed how a an overly-broad manner. should ‘‘further analyze the area over
standard drafting team could use new Notwithstanding NERC’s assertion, which spatial averaging should be
information gathered through the GMD nothing in Reliability Standard TPL– calculated for stability studies,
research work plan to develop a 007–2 requires applicable entities to including performing sensitivity
modified Reliability Standard. The apply the supplemental GMD event analyses on squares less than 500 km
Commission noted that Task 1 of the definition to an entire planning area or per side (e.g., 100 km, 200 km),’’ which
GMD research work plan (Further otherwise supplant the benchmark GMD NERC is addressing in Task 1.57 As
Analyze Spatial Averaging Used in the event definition.
Benchmark GMD Event), which 47. With respect to the statement in 52 Id. at 15–16.
encompasses localized GMD event the NOPR that modeling tools are 53 See also Trade Associations Comments at 8
research, would be delivered in 2019 currently available to support corrective (‘‘Although current tools are available to model
localized events, we understand that such modeling
according to the most recent version of action plans, NERC admits that ‘‘some will require significant time as the processes
the GMD research work plan (i.e., the commercially-available modeling tools involved are still largely manual, making it difficult
revised GMD research work plan). The now advertise capabilities that could be to develop accurate, system-wide models that
NOPR stated that ‘‘[s]uch GMD research appropriately consider the localized impacts of the
used to model localized GMD supplemental GMD event.’’).
on localized events should inform the enhancements.’’ 51 However, NERC 54 NERC Comments at 15.
standard development process and aid contends that to its ‘‘knowledge these 55 Id.
applicable entities when implementing capabilities have not been used 56 Order No. 830, 156 FERC ¶ 61,215 at P 45
a modified Reliability Standard.’’ 49 extensively by planners, nor have the (quoting Pulkkinen, A., Bernabeu, E., Eichner, J.,
While we appreciate that the different software tools been Viljanen, A., Ngwira, C., ‘‘Regional-Scale High-
Latitude Extreme Geoelectric Fields Pertaining to
informational filing for Task 1 may not benchmarked for consistency in Geomagnetically Induced Currents,’’ Earth, Planets
be submitted to the Commission prior to and Space at 2 (June 19, 2015)).
50 NERC Comments at 14. 57 Id. P 26; see also revised GMD Research Work
49 NOPR, 163 FERC ¶ 61,126 at P 39. 51 Id. at 15. Plan (Task 1) at 6 (‘‘further analyze the area over
VerDate Sep<11>2014 16:13 Nov 23, 2018 Jkt 247001 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\26NOR1.SGM 26NOR1](https://thefederalregister.org/doc/83_FR_60574/page/8.svg)
![Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 227 / Monday, November 26, 2018 / Rules and Regulations 60355
such, we see no basis, technical or report within 12 months from the date 52. Trade Associations, BPA, ISO NE,
otherwise, for not requiring corrective on which applicable entities must Idaho Power, and TVA support the
action plans for assessed supplemental comply with the last requirement of second option and echo the rationale for
GMD event vulnerabilities while Reliability Standard TPL–007–2. adopting the second option in NERC’s
requiring corrective action plans for Following receipt of the report, the comments. Trade Associations explain
assessed benchmark GMD event Commission would determine whether that while they previously supported a
vulnerabilities consistent with the further action is necessary. Under the case-by-case exception process, they
Commission’s directions in Order Nos. second option, the Commission would now believe NERC’s proposal to be more
779 and 830. Accordingly, the approve proposed Requirement R7.4 but efficient and effective. Trade
Commission is not persuaded by the also direct NERC to prepare and submit Associations contend that a case-by-case
arguments of NERC and other the report described in the first option approach would ‘‘only increase
commenters for the reasons discussed (without the statistics on disposition). administrative tasks for NERC and
above, and directs that NERC develop Following receipt of the report, the applicable entities . . . [and] would
modifications to Reliability Standard Commission would determine whether further delay any actions to mitigate
TPL–007–2 to require corrective action further action is necessary. rather than expedite the approval
plans for assessed supplemental GMD process.’’ 63 Trade Associations also
Comments
event vulnerabilities. maintain that Reliability Standard TPL–
51. NERC supports the second option 007–2 ‘‘will not delay mitigation
B. Corrective Action Plan Deadline in the NOPR. NERC contends that because this requirement is only
Extensions Reliability Standard TPL–007–2 applicable if circumstances are beyond
NOPR ‘‘provides clarity and certainty the entity’s control.’’ 64
regarding when an entity may extend a 53. Reclamation does not appear to
49. The NOPR stated that Corrective Action Plan mitigation support modifying Requirement R7 to
Requirement R7.4 of Reliability deadline and what steps must be institute a case-by-case time extension
Standard TPL–007–2 differs from Order followed to maintain accountability and process. However, Reclamation
No. 830 by allowing applicable entities thus compliance with the standard.’’ 58 comments that the sub-requirement in
to ‘‘revise’’ or ‘‘update’’ corrective NERC also maintains that the proposal Requirement R7.4.1 requiring
action plans to extend deadlines. This ‘‘avoids the administrative burden, documentation of reasons for delaying
provision contrasts with the guidance in uncertainty, and further delay that corrective action plans should be
Order No. 830 that ‘‘NERC should could be associated with implementing eliminated because it ‘‘is merely a
consider extensions of time on a case- a new ERO adjudication process, such compliance exercise and does not
by-case basis.’’ While agreeing that there as one that would be dedicated to improve Bulk Electric System
should be a mechanism for allowing evaluating GMD Corrective Action Plan reliability.’’ Reclamation makes the
extensions of corrective action plan deadline extensions on a case-by-case same contention regarding the sub-
implementation deadlines, the NOPR basis. ’’ 59 To address concerns regarding requirement in Requirement R7.4.2 that
expressed concern with unnecessary the possible abuse of deadline a revised corrective action plan describe
delays in implementing protection extensions, NERC states that as ‘‘part of the original corrective action plan.
against GMD threats. the compliance monitoring and
50. The NOPR identified two options enforcement activities for the proposed Commission Determination
for addressing Requirement R7.4. Under standard, NERC and Regional Entity 54. Reliability Standard TPL–007–2,
the first option, the Commission would, staff would exercise their authority to Requirement R7.4 differs from Order
pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the review the reasonableness of any No. 830 by allowing applicable entities,
FPA, direct NERC to modify Reliability Corrective Action Plan delay, including under certain conditions, to extend
Standard TPL–007–2 to comport with reviewing the ‘situations beyond the corrective action plan implementation
Order No. 830, by requiring that NERC control of the responsible entity’ that are deadlines without prior approval. This
and the Regional Entities, as cited as causing the delay.’’ 60 As noted conflicts with the Commission’s
appropriate, consider requests for in the Supplemental Material section of guidance in Order No. 830 that, using its
extension of time on a case-by-case Reliability Standard TPL–007–2, NERC compliance discretion, ‘‘NERC should
basis. Under this option, responsible explains that examples of such consider extensions of time on a case-
entities seeking an extension would situations include ‘‘lengthy legal or by-case basis.’’ 65 Based on our
submit the information required by regulatory processes, stakeholder consideration of the record, we believe
Requirement R7.4 to NERC and the processes required by tariff, or long that the case-by-case review process
Regional Entities for their consideration equipment lead times.’’ 61 NERC, contemplated by Order No. 830 is the
of the request. The Commission would moreover, ‘‘agrees that a report appropriate means for considering
also direct NERC to prepare and submit describing the results of NERC’s extension requests. Accordingly,
a report addressing the disposition of monitoring of this provision could pursuant to section 215(d)(5) of the
any such requests, as well as provide useful information . . . [and] FPA, we direct that NERC develop
information regarding how often and therefore commits to prepare and modifications to Reliability Standard
why applicable entities are exceeding submit to the Commission a report that TPL–007–2 to replace the time-
corrective action plan deadlines describes how often and the reasons extension provision in Requirement
following implementation of Reliability why entities in the United States are R7.4 with a process through which
Standard TPL–007–2. Under such a exceeding Corrective Action Plan extensions of time are considered on a
directive, NERC would submit the deadlines.’’ 62 case-by-case basis.
55. At the outset, we note that the
which spatial averaging should be used in stability 58 NERC extension process in Requirement R7.4
Comments at 20.
studies and transformer thermal assessments by 59 Id.
performing GIC analysis on squares less than 500
60 Id. at 20–21. 63 Trade Associations Comments at 13.
km per side (e.g., 100 km, 200 km) and using the
61 Id. at 20. 64 Id.
results to perform power flow and transformer
thermal assessments’’). 62 Id. at 22. 65 Order No. 830, 156 FERC ¶ 61,215 at P 102.
VerDate Sep<11>2014 16:13 Nov 23, 2018 Jkt 247001 PO 00000 Frm 00023 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\26NOR1.SGM 26NOR1](https://thefederalregister.org/doc/83_FR_60574/page/9.svg)
![60356 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 227 / Monday, November 26, 2018 / Rules and Regulations
applies only to the implementation of indicates it will use to determine the Commission should encourage best
corrective action plans and not to the whether an extension of time to practices by industry beyond the
development of corrective action implement a corrective action plan is mandatory requirements of the
plans.66 NERC and other commenters appropriate. However, the assessment of Reliability Standards, including
supportive of the second option in the whether an extension of time is allowing cost recovery for such
NOPR urge approval of Requirement warranted is more appropriately made practices. Third, Resilient Societies
R7.4 without modification largely before an applicable entity is permitted states that the Commission should
because of the perceived uncertainty to delay mitigation of a known GMD address combined GMD and
and burden associated with treating vulnerability. While NERC indicates electromagnetic pulse (EMP) protection.
extension requests on a case-by-case that under proposed Requirement R7.4 59. In Order No. 830, the Commission
basis. While it is true that granting there are compliance consequences for approved the 75 A/phase threshold in
extensions on a case-by-case basis improperly delaying mitigation, Reliability Standard TPL–007–1 based
involves more uncertainty and potential mitigation of a known GMD on the record and despite objections
burdens versus the automatic extension vulnerability will nonetheless have been from certain commenters. The
of time afforded by Requirement R7.4, delayed, and we conclude it is Commission, however, directed further
we must weigh this against the potential important that any proposed delay be study of this issue as part of the GMD
for abuse of Requirement R7.4 to unduly reviewed ahead of time. Therefore, we research work plan. Resilient Societies’
delay mitigation, as well as the delayed direct NERC to modify Reliability comments provide no new basis for
visibility that NERC would have into the Standard TPL–007–2, Requirement R7.4 revisiting this issue at this time.
deployment of needed GMD protections. to develop a timely and efficient Moreover, as reflected in the NOPR
Presented with these competing process, consistent with the proposal, NERC has adequately
concerns, we conclude that the Commission’s guidance in Order No. supported the 85 A/phase threshold
imperative to address known GMD 830, to consider time extension requests proposed in Reliability Standard TPL–
vulnerabilities in a timely manner, and on a case-by-case basis. 007–2 for the supplemental GMD event
without unwarranted delays, is more 57. We disagree with Reclamation’s analysis. However, new information
compelling. We recognize that comment regarding Requirement R7.4.1, resulting from the GMD research work
applicable entities that have a legitimate which requires a description of the plan will also be relevant to this higher
need for extensions require timely circumstances necessitating mitigation threshold. We will consider such
responses from NERC and Regional delays, because it is at odds with research at the appropriate time.
Entities, as appropriate. Accordingly, NERC’s NOPR comments, discussed 60. In Order No. 830, the Commission
we expect that the extension process above, in which NERC states that NERC stated that ‘‘cost recovery for prudent
developed by NERC in response to our and Regional Entities will review the costs associated with or incurred to
directive will be timely and efficient reasons for delaying mitigation. comply with Reliability Standard TPL–
such that applicable entities will receive Contrary to Reclamation’s assertion that 007–1 and future revisions to the
prompt responses after submitting to this requirement is ‘‘merely a Reliability Standard will be available to
NERC or a Regional Entity, as documentation exercise and does not registered entities.’’ 69 It is therefore
appropriate, the extension request and improve [bulk electric system] beyond the scope of this proceeding to
associated information described in reliability,’’ unreasonable delays of determine, as a general matter, whether
Requirement R7.4.67 mitigation could harm bulk electric voluntary measures beyond those
56. In reaching our determination on system reliability by leaving it required to comply with the governing
this issue, we considered NERC’s NOPR vulnerable to GMDs. Moreover, Reliability Standards are eligible for cost
comments, which attempted to address Requirement R7.4.2, also opposed by recovery. That said, jurisdictional
the concerns with Requirement R7.4 Reclamation, requiring that revised entities may of course pursue such
expressed in the NOPR, stating that corrective action plans describe the voluntary measures, and the
NERC and Regional Entity compliance original and previous revisions, Commission would consider
and enforcement staff will review the provides compliance enforcement appropriate cost recovery for those
reasonableness of any delay in authorities with a revision history of the investments through a formula rate or
implementing corrective action plans, corrective action plan in a single other rate proceeding.
including reviewing the asserted document, thus facilitating compliance 61. The Commission in previous
‘‘situations beyond the control of the review. orders has indicated that the
responsible entity’’ cited by the Commission’s GMD proceedings are not
C. Other Issues Raised in NOPR
applicable entity, and by citing specific directed to EMPs and thus Resilient
Comments
examples of the types of delays that Societies’ comments on EMP are out-of-
might justify the invocation of 58. Resilient Societies’ comments scope.70
Requirement R7.4. NERC’s comments raise three issues not addressed in the
NOPR. First, Resilient Societies D. Revised GMD Research Work Plan
also characterized Requirement R7.4 as
being ‘‘not so flexible . . . as to allow maintains that transformers that 62. On April 19, 2018, NERC
entities to extend Corrective Action Plan experience an estimated GIC above 15 submitted a revised GMD research work
deadlines indefinitely or for any reason A/phase should be subject to mandatory plan in response to a Commission order
whatsoever.’’ 68 We generally agree with corrective action plans and the issued on October 19, 2017.71 In the
the standard of review that NERC Commission should ‘‘encourage owner- October 19 Order, the Commission
operators and their research partners to accepted the initial GMD research work
66 Reliability Standard TPL–007–2, Requirement develop ‘Corrective Action Plans’ for
R7.4 (‘‘[t]he [corrective action plan] shall . . . [b]e both [extra high voltage] transformers 69 Order No. 830, 156 FERC ¶ 61,215 at P 24.
revised if situations beyond the control of the and for associated generation stations, 70 See, e.g., Order No. 830, 156 FERC ¶ 61,215 at
responsible entity . . . prevent implementation of P 119.
the [corrective action plan] within the timetable for
even if these long replacement-time 71 Reliability Standard for Transmission System
implementation’’). systems experience overstress at levels Planned Performance for Geomagnetic Disturbance
67 NOPR, 163 FERC ¶ 61,126 at P 50. significantly below 75 amps per phase.’’ Events, 161 FERC ¶ 61,048 (2017) (October 19
68 NERC Comments at 20. Second, Resilient Societies states that Order).
VerDate Sep<11>2014 16:13 Nov 23, 2018 Jkt 247001 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\26NOR1.SGM 26NOR1](https://thefederalregister.org/doc/83_FR_60574/page/10.svg)
![Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 227 / Monday, November 26, 2018 / Rules and Regulations 60357
plan filed by NERC on May 30, 2017. example, regarding Task 5, NERC states including the use of automated
The Commission also directed NERC to that it will ‘‘validate[e] existing information techniques. Specifically,
file a final GMD research work plan transformer tools with all data that is the Commission asked that any revised
within six months and ensure that the presently available and with upcoming burden or cost estimates submitted by
final GMD research work plan included field/laboratory test results.’’ 75 Resilient commenters be supported by sufficient
a reevaluation of reliance on single Societies, however, contends detail to understand how the estimates
station readings when adjusting for unpersuasively that ‘‘NERC neglects to were generated. The Commission did
latitude as part of the benchmark GMD specify ‘all data that is presently not receive any comments regarding the
event definition. At NERC’s request, the available’ . . . and the number of Commission’s burden estimates.
October 19 Order also provided transformers to be employed in 68. The Commission approves
guidance on how NERC should ‘upcoming field laboratory test results’ Reliability Standard TPL–007–2, which
prioritize the tasks in the GMD research and also neglects to disclose details of replaces currently-effective Reliability
work plan. the test protocols to be used.’’ 76 Standard TPL–007–1. When compared
63. Bardin and Resilient Societies Regarding harmonics (Tasks 8 and 9), to Reliability Standard TPL–007–1,
submitted comments in response to the Task 9 specifically includes ‘‘tank Reliability Standard TPL–007–2
revised GMD research work plan, which vibration measurements,’’ not just maintains the current information
largely focused on a request for simulations.77 Moreover, Task 8 collection requirements, modifies
combined research on GMDs and EMPs. (Improving Harmonic Analysis existing Requirements R1 through R7
As discussed above, however, EMPs are Capabilities) is intended to develop and adds new requirements in
outside the scope of the Commission’s more basic information than some of the Requirements R8 through R12.
directive regarding GMD research. other tasks in the revised GMD research 69. Reliability Standard TPL–007–2
Resilient Societies also submitted work plan where industry has more includes new corrective action plan
comments criticizing aspects of five knowledge. As with all of the revised development and implementation
tasks in the revised GMD research work GMD research work plan tasks (with the deadlines in Requirement R7, new
plan. With respect to Tasks 1, 2, 8 and exception of Task 6, which deals with supplemental GMD vulnerability and
9, Resilient Societies’ criticism is based the Section 1600 data request), NERC transformer thermal impact assessments
on the contention that the ‘‘real-world will submit a report to the Commission in Requirements R8 through R10, and
data’’ will not be used to verify models. on its findings. requirements for applicable entities to
For example, Resilient Societies 65. As the revised GMD research work gather magnetometer and GIC monitored
contends that NERC will not use ‘‘real- plan complies with Order No. 830 and data in Requirements R11 and R12.
world’’ GIC data to validate spatial the Commission’s October 19 Order, we Deadlines in Requirement R7 for the
averaging (Task 1) or latitude scaling development and implementation of
accept the revised GMD research work
(Task 2). These assertions, however, are corrective action plans would only
plan.
refuted by the revised GMD research change the timeline of such
work plan. The revised GMD research III. Information Collection Statement documentation and are not expected to
work plan indicates that the research on 66. The collection of information revise the burden to applicable entities.
spatial averaging includes an analysis of contained in this final rule is subject to The burden estimates for new
‘‘a large number (10–20) of localized review by the Office of Management and Requirements R8 through R10 are
extreme events and collection of both Budget (OMB) under section 3507(d) of expected to be similar to the burden
ground-based and space-based data the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995.78 estimates for Requirements R4 through
OMB’s regulations require review and R6 in currently-effective Reliability
around the times of these events.’’ 72 For
Standard TPL–007–1 due to the closely-
latitude scaling, the revised GMD approval of certain information
mirrored requirements.80 The
research work plan states that NERC collection requirements imposed by
Commission expects that only 25
will evaluate the scaling factor ‘‘using agency rules.79 Upon approval of a
percent or fewer of transmission owners
existing models and developing new collection of information, OMB will
and generator owners would have to
models to extrapolate, from historical assign an OMB control number and an
complete a supplemental transformer
data, the potential scaling of a 1-in-100 expiration date. Respondents subject to
thermal impact assessment per
year GMD event on lower geomagnetic the information collection requirements
Requirement R10. Requirements R11
latitudes.’’ 73 In addition, NERC of a rule will not be penalized for failing
and R12 require applicable entities to
indicates that the data gathered through to respond to the collection of
have a process to collect GIC and
the Section 1600 data request ‘‘will help information unless the collection of
magnetometer data from meters in
validate various models used in information displays a valid OMB planning coordinator planning areas.
calculating GIC’s and assessing their control number. Public Reporting Burden: The burden
impacts in data systems.’’ 74 67. In the NOPR, the Commission and cost estimates below are based on
64. Resilient Societies other solicited comments on the need for this the changes to the reporting and
comments are directed to an alleged information, whether the information recordkeeping burden imposed by
lack of specificity, granularity or will have practical utility, the accuracy Reliability Standard TPL–007–2. Our
‘‘scientific assurance’’ in the testing of the burden estimates, ways to estimates for the number of respondents
described in Tasks 5, 8 and 9 of the enhance the quality, utility, and clarity are based on the NERC Compliance
revised GMD research work plan. These of the information to be collected or Registry as of March 3, 2018, which
criticisms are misplaced as they demand retained, and any suggested methods for indicates there are 183 entities
an unreasonable degree of detail in the minimizing respondents’ burden, registered as transmission planner (TP),
revised GMD research work plan. For 65 planning coordinators (PC), 330
75 Id. at 17.
72 Revised 76 Resilient Societies Comments on Revised GMD
transmission owners (TO), 944 generator
GMD Research Work Plan, Attachment
1 (Order No. 830 GMD Research Work Plan (April Research Work Plan at 11. owners (GO) within the United States.
2018)) at 2. 77 Id. at 25. However, due to significant overlap, the
73 Id. at 8. 78 44 U.S.C. 3507(d).
74 Id. at 19. 79 5 CFR part 1320 (2018). 80 NERC Petition at 14–17.
VerDate Sep<11>2014 16:13 Nov 23, 2018 Jkt 247001 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\26NOR1.SGM 26NOR1](https://thefederalregister.org/doc/83_FR_60574/page/11.svg)
![Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 227 / Monday, November 26, 2018 / Rules and Regulations 60359
[Attention: Ellen Brown, email: small utility (using SBA’s sub-sector www.ferc.gov) and in FERC’s Public
DataClearance@ferc.gov, phone: (202) 221) is based on the number of Reference Room during normal business
502–8663, fax: (202) 273–0873]. employees for a concern and its hours (8:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Eastern
71. Comments concerning the affiliates. As discussed above, time) at 888 First Street NE, Room 2A,
collection of information and the Reliability Standard TPL–007–2 applies Washington DC 20426.
associated burden estimate should be to a total of 1,130 unique planning 77. From FERC’s Home Page on the
sent to the Commission in this docket coordinators, transmission planners, internet, this information is available on
and may also be sent to the Office of transmission owners, and generation eLibrary. The full text of this document
Information and Regulatory Affairs, owners.89 A small utility (and its is available on eLibrary in PDF and
Office of Management and Budget, 725 affiliates) is defined as having no more Microsoft Word format for viewing,
17th Street NW, Washington, DC 20503 than the following number of printing, and/or downloading. To access
[Attention: Desk Officer for the Federal employees: this document in eLibrary, type the
Energy Regulatory Commission]. Due to • For planning coordinators, docket number excluding the last three
security concerns, comments should be transmission planners, and transmission digits of this document in the docket
sent electronically to the following owners (NAICS code 221121, Electric number field.
email address: oira_submission@ Bulk Power Transmission and Control),
omb.eop.gov. Comments submitted to a maximum of 500 employees 78. User assistance is available for
OMB should refer to FERC–725N and • for generator owners, a maximum of eLibrary and the FERC’s website during
OMB Control No. 1902–0264. 750 employees.90 normal business hours from FERC
74. As estimated in the NOPR, the Online Support at (202) 502–6652 (toll
IV. Environmental Analysis total cost to all entities (large and small) free at 1–866–208–3676) or email at
72. The Commission is required to is $629,585 annually (or an average of ferconlinesupport@ferc.gov, or the
prepare an Environmental Assessment $1,345.27 for each of the estimated 468 Public Reference Room at (202) 502–
or an Environmental Impact Statement entities affected annually). For the 8371, TTY (202)502–8659. Email the
for any action that may have a estimated 280 generator owners and Public Reference Room at
significant adverse effect on the human transmission owners affected annually, public.referenceroom@ferc.gov.
environment.86 The Commission has the average cost would be $409.70 per VII. Effective Date and Congressional
categorically excluded certain actions year. For the estimated 188 planning Notification
from this requirement as not having a coordinators and transmission planners,
significant effect on the human the estimated average annual cost would These regulations are effective
environment. Included in the exclusion be $2,738.84. The estimated annual cost January 25, 2019. The Commission has
are rules that are clarifying, corrective, to each affected entity varies from determined, with the concurrence of the
or procedural or that do not $409.70 to $2,738.84 and is not Administrator of the Office of
substantially change the effect of the considered significant. The Commission Information and Regulatory Affairs of
regulations being amended.87 The did not receive any comments regarding OMB that this rule is not a ‘‘major rule’’
actions here fall within this categorical these burden and cost estimates. as defined in section 351 of the Small
exclusion in the Commission’s 75. Accordingly, the Commission Business Regulatory Enforcement
regulations. certifies that this final rule will not have Fairness Act of 1996. The rule will be
a significant economic impact on a provided to the Senate, House,
V. Regulatory Flexibility Act
substantial number of small entities. Government Accountability Office, and
73. The Regulatory Flexibility Act of the SBA.
1980 (RFA) 88 generally requires a VI. Document Availability
description and analysis of proposed 76. In addition to publishing the full By the Commission. Commissioner
McIntyre is not voting on this order.
rules that will have significant text of this document in the Federal Issued: November 15, 2018.
economic impact on a substantial Register, the Commission provides all
Kimberly D. Bose,
number of small entities. The definition interested persons an opportunity to
of small business is provided by the view and/or print the contents of this Secretary.
Small Business Administration (SBA) at document via the internet through Note: The following appendix will not
13 CFR 121.201. The threshold for a FERC’s Home Page (http:// appear in the Code of Federal Regulations.
APPENDIX—LIST OF COMMENTERS
Abbreviation Commenter
Bardin .............................................. David Bardin.
BPA ................................................. Bonneville Power Administration.
Idaho Power .................................... Idaho Power Company.
ISO NE ............................................ ISO New England Inc.
NERC .............................................. North American Electric Reliability Corporation.
Reclamation .................................... Bureau of Reclamation.
Resilient Societies ........................... Foundation for Resilient Societies.
Trade Associations ......................... American Public Power Association, Edison Electric Institute, Electricity Consumers Resource Council,
Large Public Power Council, National Rural Electric Cooperative Association.
TVA ................................................. Tennessee Valley Authority.
86 Regulations Implementing the National 88 5 U.S.C. 601–12. 90 The maximum number of employees for a
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Order No. 486, 89 In the NERC Registry, there are approximately generator owner (and its affiliates) to be ‘‘small’’
FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 30,783 (1987) (cross- 65 PCs, 188 TPs, 944 GOs, and 330 TOs (in the varies from 250 to 750 employees, depending on the
referenced at 41 FERC ¶ 61,284). United States), which will be affected by this final type of generation (e.g., hydroelectric, nuclear,
87 18 CFR 380.4(a)(2)(ii) (2018). rule. Because some entities serve in more than one fossil fuel, wind). For this analysis, we use the most
role, these figures involve some double counting. conservative threshold of 750 employees.
VerDate Sep<11>2014 16:13 Nov 23, 2018 Jkt 247001 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\26NOR1.SGM 26NOR1](https://thefederalregister.org/doc/83_FR_60574/page/13.svg)
![60360 Federal Register / Vol. 83, No. 227 / Monday, November 26, 2018 / Rules and Regulations
[FR Doc. 2018–25678 Filed 11–23–18; 8:45 am] COTP Captain of the Port IV. Discussion of the Rule
BILLING CODE 6717–01–P DHS Department of Homeland Security
FR Federal Register This rule establishes a temporary
NPRM Notice of proposed rulemaking safety zone on November 19, 2018
§ Section through November 30, 2018, within 250
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND yards of vessels and machinery being
U.S.C. United States Code
SECURITY used by personnel to conduct diving
II. Background Information and and equipment recovery operations, at
Coast Guard Regulatory History approximately 39°49.3002′ N Latitude,
33 CFR Part 165 The Coast Guard is issuing this ¥75°22.8966′ W Longitude, in the
temporary rule without prior notice and Marcus Hook Range of the Delaware
[Docket Number USCG–2018–0913]
opportunity to comment pursuant to River. During diving and equipment
authority under section 4(a) of the recovery operations, persons or vessels
RIN 1625–AA00
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) (5 will not be permitted to enter the safety
Safety Zone; Delaware River, Dredging zone without obtaining permission from
U.S.C. 553(b)). This provision
Operation Equipment Recovery, the COTP or the COTP’s designated
authorizes an agency to issue a rule
Marcus Hook Range, Chester, PA representative. Vessels wishing to
without prior notice and opportunity to
transit the safety zone in the clear side
AGENCY: Coast Guard, DHS. comment when the agency for good
of the main navigational channel may
cause finds that those procedures are
ACTION: Temporary final rule. do so if they can make satisfactory
‘‘impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary
passing arrangements with dredge NEW
SUMMARY: The Coast Guard is to the public interest.’’ Under 5 U.S.C.
YORK or tug INDIAN DAWN in
establishing a temporary safety zone for 553(b)(B), the Coast Guard finds that
accordance with the Navigational Rules
navigable waters within a 250-yard good cause exists for not publishing a
in 33 CFR subchapter E via VHF–FM 88
radius of Great Lakes Dredge & Dock notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM)
at least 1 hour prior to arrival and at 30
Company vessels and machinery with respect to this rule because it is
minutes prior to arrival to arrange safe
conducting emergency diving and impracticable and contrary to the public passage. If vessels are unable to make
equipment removal operations in the interest to do so. The rule must be satisfactory passing arrangements with
Delaware River within Marcus Hook established by November 18, 2018, to the dredge NEW YORK or tug INDIAN
Range near Chester, Pennsylvania. The serve its purpose of providing safety DAWN, they may request permission
safety zone is needed to protect during the recovery of a broken hydro- from the COTP, or his designated
personnel, vessels, and the marine hammer associated with dredging representative, to enter and transit the
environment from potential hazards operations. The Coast Guard was safety zone on VHF–FM channel 16. All
created by broken equipment removal notified of the recovery operation vessels must operate at the minimum
operations. Entry of vessels or persons schedule on November 18, 2018, and a safe speed necessary to maintain
into this zone is prohibited unless safety zone must be established by steerage and reduce wake while
specifically authorized by the Captain of November 18, 2018 to address the transiting the safety zone. The Coast
the Port Delaware Bay or a designated hazards associated with diving and Guard will issue a Broadcast Notice to
representative. equipment removal operations. Mariners via VHF–FM marine channel
DATES: This rule is effective without Under 5 U.S.C. 553(d)(3), the Coast 16 and Marine Safety Information
actual notice from November 19, 2018 Guard finds that good cause exists for Bulletin further defining specific work
through November 26, 2018. For the making this rule effective less than 30 locations and traffic patterns.
purposes of enforcement, actual notice days after publication in the Federal
V. Regulatory Analyses
will be used from November 26, 2018 Register. Delaying the effective date of
through November 30, 2018. This rule this rule would be impracticable and We developed this rule after
may be withdrawn if the project is contrary to the public interest because considering numerous statutes and
completed before the stated end date. immediate action is needed to mitigate Executive orders related to rulemaking.
This rule will be enforced continuously the potential safety hazards associated Below we summarize our analyses
each day the rule is in effect. with diving and equipment removal based on a number of these statutes and
ADDRESSES: To view documents operations. Executive orders, and we discuss First
mentioned in this preamble as being Amendment rights of protestors.
III. Legal Authority and Need for Rule
available in the docket, go to http://
www.regulations.gov, type USCG–2018– A. Regulatory Planning and Review
The Coast Guard is issuing this rule
0913 in the ‘‘SEARCH’’ box and click under authority in 33 U.S.C. 1231. The Executive Orders 12866 and 13563
‘‘SEARCH.’’ Click on Open Docket Captain of the Port Delaware Bay direct agencies to assess the costs and
Folder on the line associated with this (COTP) has determined that potential benefits of available regulatory
rule. hazards associated with emergency alternatives and, if regulation is
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: If diving and equipment recovery necessary, to select regulatory
you have questions on this rule, call or operations beginning November 19, approaches that maximize net benefits.
email Petty Officer Thomas Welker, U.S. 2018, will be a safety concern for Executive Order 13771 directs agencies
Coast Guard, Sector Delaware Bay, anyone within a 250-yard radius of to control regulatory costs through a
Waterways Management Division; diving and equipment recovery vessels budgeting process. This rule has not
telephone (215) 271–4814, email and machinery. This rule is needed to been designated a ‘‘significant
Thomas.J.Welker@uscg.mil. protect personnel, vessels, and the regulatory action,’’ under Executive
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: marine environment in the navigable Order 12866. Accordingly, this rule has
waters within the safety zone while the not been reviewed by the Office of
I. Table of Abbreviations operations to recover the broken hydro- Management and Budget (OMB), and
CFR Code of Federal Regulations hammer are being conducted. pursuant to OMB guidance it is exempt
VerDate Sep<11>2014 16:13 Nov 23, 2018 Jkt 247001 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 4700 Sfmt 4700 E:\FR\FM\26NOR1.SGM 26NOR1](https://thefederalregister.org/doc/83_FR_60574/page/14.svg)
Document Created: 2018-11-24 00:51:39
Document Modified: 2018-11-24 00:51:39
| Category | Regulatory Information | |
| Collection | Federal Register | |
| sudoc Class | AE 2.7: GS 4.107: AE 2.106: | |
| Publisher | Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Administration | |
| Section | Rules and Regulations | |
| Action | Final rule. | |
| Dates | This rule will become effective January 25, 2019. | |
| Contact | . Michael Gandolfo (Technical Information), Office of Electric Reliability, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-6817, [email protected] Matthew Vlissides (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8408, [email protected] | |
| FR Citation | 83 FR 60347 |
2024 Federal Register | Disclaimer | Privacy Policy
USC | CFR | eCFR