On January 19, 2026, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA or Government) issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC) to Troy R. Lehman, D.O., of Woodward, Oklahoma (Registrant). Request for Final Agency Action (RFAA), Exhibit (RFAAX) 1, at 1, 6. The OSC proposed the revocation of Registrant's Certificate of Registration No. BL7481649, alleging that Registrant lacks state authority to handle controlled substances in Oklahoma and materially falsified his registration renewal applications. Id. at 2-4 (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(1), 824(a)(3)).

On March 6, 2026, the Government submitted an RFAA to the Administrator requesting that the Agency issue a default final order revoking Registrant's registration. RFAA, at 3. After carefully reviewing the entire record and conducting the analysis as set forth in detail below, the Agency finds that Registrant is in default, finds that Registrant is without state authority, and finds that Registrant materially falsified his applications. Accordingly, the Agency grants the Government's RFAA and revokes Registrant's registration.

I. Default Determination

Under 21 CFR 1301.43, a registrant entitled to a hearing who fails to file a timely hearing request “within 30 days after the date of receipt of the [OSC] . . . shall be deemed to have waived their right to a hearing and to be in default” unless “good cause” is established for the failure. 21 CFR 1301.43(a), (c)(1). In the absence of a demonstration of good cause, a registrant who fails to timely file an answer also is “deemed to have waived their right to a hearing and to be in default.” 21 CFR 1301.43(c)(2). Unless excused, a default constitutes “an admission of the factual allegations of the [OSC].” 21 CFR 1301.43(e).

The OSC notified Registrant of his right to file a written request for hearing, and that if he failed to file such a request, he would be deemed to have waived his right to a hearing and be in default. RFAAX 1, at 5 (citing 21 CFR 1301.43). Here, Registrant did not request a hearing, and the Agency finds him to be in default. RFAA, at 2.^[1] “A default, unless excused, shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of the registrant's/applicant's right to a hearing and an admission of the factual allegations of the [OSC].” 21 CFR 1301.43(e). Because Registrant is in default and has not moved to excuse the default, the Agency finds that Registrant has admitted to the factual allegations in the OSC. 21 CFR 1301.43(c)(1), (e), (f)(1).

Further, “[i]n the event that a registrant . . . is deemed to be in default . . . DEA may then file a request for final agency action with the Administrator, along with a record to support its request. In such circumstances, the Administrator may enter a default final order pursuant to [21 CFR] 1316.67.” Id. at 1301.43(f)(1). Here, the Government has requested final agency action based on Registrant's default pursuant to 21 CFR 1301.43(c), (f), and 1301.46. RFAA, at 3; see also21 CFR 1316.67.

II. Lack of State Authority

A. Findings of Fact

The Agency finds that, in light of Registrant's default, the factual allegations in the OSC are deemed admitted. According to the OSC, the Oklahoma State Board of Osteopathic Examiners (Board) suspended Registrant from the practice of osteopathic medicine in Oklahoma on September 18, 2025. In addition, Registrant's Oklahoma osteopathic medical license expired by its own terms on June 30, 2026. RFAAX 1, at 3. Further, on October 31, 2025, Registrant's Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drug (OBNDD) license expired by its own terms. According to Oklahoma online records, of which the Agency takes official notice,^[2] Registrant's OBNDD registration is inactive. OBNDD, Registrant Search, obnddc.us.thentiacloud.net/​webs/​obnddc/​register (last visited date of signature of this Order).^[3] Accordingly, the Agency finds that Registrant is not licensed to practice medicine nor to handle controlled substances in Oklahoma, the state in which he is registered with DEA.^[4]

B. Discussion

Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3), the Attorney General is authorized to suspend or revoke a registration issued under 21 U.S.C. 823 “upon a finding that the registrant . . . has had his State license or registration suspended . . . [or] revoked . . . by competent State authority and is no longer authorized by State law to engage in the . . . dispensing of controlled substances.” With respect to a practitioner, DEA has also long held that the possession of authority to dispense controlled substances under the laws of the state in which a practitioner engages in professional practice is a fundamental condition for obtaining and maintaining a practitioner's registration. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 270 (2006). (“The Attorney General can register a physician to dispense controlled substances `if the applicant is authorized to dispense . . . controlled substances under the laws of the State in which he practices.' . . . The very definition of a `practitioner' eligible to prescribe includes physicians `licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted, by the United States or the jurisdiction in which he practices' to dispense controlled substances. § 802(21).”). The Agency has applied these principles consistently. See, e.g., Ashley Vermillion, N.P.,91 FR 35270, (2026); Henry-Norbert O. Ndekwe, M.D.,90 FR 15990 (2025); Lawrence Rudolph, D.M.D.,89 FR 79310 (2024).^[5]

Pursuant to Oklahoma's Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Act, “[e]very person who manufactures, distributes, dispenses, prescribes, administers or uses for scientific purposes any controlled dangerous substance within or into this state . . . shall obtain a registration issued by the Director of the [OBNDD], in accordance with rules promulgated by the Director.” Okla. Stat. tit. 63, § 2-302(A) (2026).^[6]

Here, the undisputed evidence in the record is that Registrant currently lacks authority to handle controlled substances in Oklahoma because his OBNDD registration is expired and his medical license was suspended, expired, and is now cancelled. As discussed above, a person must hold a valid OBNDD registration to dispense a controlled substance in Oklahoma. Thus, because Registrant lacks authority to practice medicine and handle controlled substances in Oklahoma, Registrant is not eligible to maintain a DEA registration. Accordingly, the Agency will order that Registrant's DEA registration be revoked.

III. Material Falsification

A. Findings of Fact

The Agency finds that, in light of Registrant's default, the factual allegations in the OSC are deemed admitted. 21 CFR 1301.43(e). Accordingly, Registrant is deemed to have admitted to each of the following facts.^[7] On September 17, 2001, Registrant applied for and was subsequently granted a DEA registration as a practitioner in Schedules II through V. RFAAX 1, at 4. On December 9, 2010, the Oklahoma State Board of Osteopathic Examiners (Board) issued an Order of Probation with Conditions, placing Registrant's Oklahoma medical license on probation until September 22, 2011. Id. Thereafter, Registrant applied to renew his DEA registration multiple times on the following dates: March 28, 2013; March 22, 2016; February 27, 2019; March 2, 2022; and March 31, 2025. Id.

Each of the five renewal application forms contained Liability Question 3 which asks: “[h]as the applicant ever surrendered (for cause) or had a state professional license or controlled substance registration revoked, suspended, denied, restricted, or placed on probation, or is any such action pending?” Id. On each of the five renewal applications, Registrant answered “no” to Liability Question 3. Id. Registrant's “no” answers was false in light of the 2010 probation on his Oklahoma medical license. Id. Accordingly, the Agency finds that Registrant falsely answered Liability Question 3 on five renewal applications.

B. Discussion

A DEA registration may be denied, suspended, or revoked upon a finding that the applicant or registrant materially falsified any application filed pursuant to or required by the Controlled Substances Act (CSA). 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(1).^[8] To present a prima facie case for material falsification, the Government's record evidence must show (1) the submission of an application, (2) containing a false statement and/or omitting information that the application requires, (3) when the submitter knew or should have known that the statement is false and/or that the omitted information existed and the application required its disclosure, and (4) the false statement and/or required but omitted information is material, that is, it “connect[s] to at least one of [the section 823] factors that, according to the CSA, [the Administrator] `shall' consider” when analyzing “whether issuing a registration `would be inconsistent with the public interest.' ” Frank Joseph Stirlacci, M.D.,85 FR 45229, 45238 (2020) (citing 21 U.S.C. 823 and Kungys, 485 U.S. at 771). The Government must establish material falsification with record evidence that is clear, unequivocal, and convincing. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 772; Stirlacci, 85 FR at 45230-39.

First, the Government must prove that the applicant or registrant submitted an application for registration pursuant to the CSA. 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(1); see also21 U.S.C. 822 (persons required to register); 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1) (registration requirements).

Second, the Government must prove that the application contained a false statement or omitted information that ( printed page 72915) the application required, either of which may constitute a material falsity. See, e.g., Emed Medical Company LLC and Med Assist Pharmacy,88 FR 21719, 21720 (2023) (applicant falsely answered “no” to Liability Question 3 on seventeen applications when the true answer was “yes”); Richard J. Settles, D.O.,81 FR 64940, 64945-46 (2016) (applicant failed to disclose an interim consent agreement restricting his license based on findings that he issued controlled substance prescriptions without federal or state legal authority to do so). In making this assessment, the Agency will examine the entire application, including registrant's “yes/no” answers to the liability questions and any follow-up response(s). Daniel A. Glick, D.D.S.,80 FR 74800, 74802, 74808-09 (2015). To establish an omission, the Government must show both that omitted information existed and that the application required inclusion of that information. See, e.g., Richard A. Herbert, M.D.,76 FR 53942, 53956 (2011) (omission of a probation which the application required to be identified); Michel P. Toret, M.D.,82 FR 60041, 60042 (2017) (Voluntary Surrender Form alone is insufficient evidence to find material falsification based on registrant's “no” answer to the question regarding “surrender[s] (for cause)”).

Third, the Government must prove that the applicant or registrant knew or should have known that the statement is false and/or that the omitted information existed and the application required its disclosure. See John J. Cienki, M.D.,63 FR 52293, 52295 (1998) (“[I]n finding that there has been a material falsification of an application, it must be determined that the applicant knew or should have known that the response given to the liability question was false.”); Samuel Arnold, D.D.S.,63 FR 8687, 8688 (1998) (“It is also undisputed that Respondent knew that his Ohio dental license had previously been suspended.”); Bobby Watts, M.D.,58 FR 46995, 46995 (1993) (“Respondent knew that the Tennessee Board of Medical Examiners had suspended his medical license on May 7, 1987, and had placed his state medical license on probation on May 2, 1988.”); see also Stirlacci, 85 FR at 45236-37 & nn.22-23 (collecting cases).

Fourth, the Government must prove that the false statement and/or required but omitted information is “material.” Kungys holds that a statement is material if it is “predictably capable of affecting, i.e., had a natural tendency to affect, the [Agency's] official decision,” or stated differently, “had a natural tendency to influence the decision.” Kungys, 485 U.S. at 771-72. However, “[i]t makes no difference that a specific falsification did not exert influence so long as it had the capacity to do so.” United States v. Alemany Rivera, 781 F.2d 229, 234 (1st Cir. 1985). As already discussed, materiality, for the purposes of the CSA, is tied to what the Administrator “shall” consider when determining whether issuance of a registration “would be inconsistent with the public interest.” 21 U.S.C. 823; Kungys, 485 U.S. at 771-72; Stirlacci, 85 FR at 45234, 45238.

The Government has the burden of proof in this proceeding. 21 CFR 1301.44. Here, the Agency finds based on clear, unequivocal, and convincing record evidence that the Government presents a prima facie case that Registrant submitted a materially false application. 21 U.S.C. 823, 824(a)(1).

Registrant is deemed to have admitted that he applied to renew his DEA registration five times following Oklahoma's placement of Registrant's state license on probation in 2010. RFAAX 1, at 4. On each occasion, the renewal application contained Liability Question 3 which asked whether Registrant had surrendered (for cause) or had a state professional license or controlled substance registration revoked, suspended, denied, restricted, or placed on probation, or if any such action was pending. Id. Each renewal application clearly required Registrant to answer yes or no to Liability Question 3. Registrant answered “no” each time when the correct answer was “yes.” Id. Thus, Registrant falsified five renewal applications by failing to acknowledge his 2010 state license probation when he knew or should have known that the response given to the liability question was false each time he renewed his registration. Id.

In addition, the falsities were material. Liability Question 3 is intended to obtain information relevant to conduct the analysis required by 21 U.S.C. 823 and 824. Specifically, 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3) and (4) require the Administrator to consider whether the applicant has had a state license or registration suspended, revoked, or denied by state authority, whether the applicant is authorized to dispense controlled substances under state law, and whether the applicant has committed acts inconsistent with the public interest. Further, the public interest factors require the Administrator to consider the recommendation of state licensing boards, the applicant's experience in handling controlled substances, the applicant's compliance with state laws related to controlled substances, and other conduct which may threaten public safety. 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1)(A), (B), (D), (E). Liability Question 3, in other words, is tethered to provisions which the Administrator is required by statute to consider when reviewing applications for registration. Stirlacci, 85 FR at 45238. Thus, a false answer to Liability Question 3 is material.

By omitting the 2010 probation of his state license, Registrant “deprived [DEA] of information potentially relevant to” the analysis that the Administrator is statutorily mandated to conduct. Stirlacci, 85 FR at 45234-35; 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), 824(a). Thus, omission of this information directly affected the public interest analysis that DEA was required to make when it reviewed his registration application. 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), 824(a); Stirlacci, 85 FR at 45238. Stated differently, the omissions were material because they were “predictably capable of affecting . . . [DEA's] official decision” regarding whether Registrant met “the requirements for” registration. Kungys, 485 U.S. at 771.

In sum, the Agency finds clear, unequivocal, and convincing record evidence that Registrant's response to Liability Question 3 was materially false for failure to disclose the 2010 probation of his state medical license. 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(1); 21 CFR 1301.43(e). The Agency further finds that the Government has established a prima facie case for material falsification, that Registrant did not rebut that prima facie case, and that there is clear, unequivocal, and convincing record evidence supporting revocation. 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(1).

C. Sanction

Where, as here, the Government has presented a prima facie case showing that a registrant submitted a materially false renewal application, the burden shifts to Registrant to show why he can be trusted with a registration. Morall v. Drug Enf't Admin., 412 F.3d 165, 181 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, LLC v. Drug Enf't Admin., 881 F.3d 823, 830 (11th Cir. 2018); Garrett Howard Smith, M.D.,83 FR 18882, 18904 (2018). The issue of trust is a fact-dependent determination based on the circumstances presented by the individual practitioner. Jeffrey Stein, M.D.,84 FR 46968, 46972 (2019); see also Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, 881 F.3d at 833. Moreover, as past performance is the best predictor of future performance, DEA Administrators have required that a registrant who has committed acts inconsistent with the public interest must accept responsibility for those acts ( printed page 72916) and demonstrate that the registrant will not engage in future misconduct. Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, 881 F.3d at 833; ALRA Labs, Inc. v. Drug Enf't Admin., 54 F.3d 450, 452 (7th Cir. 1995). Historically, the Agency has considered acceptance of responsibility, egregiousness, and deterrence when making this assessment. See Michael Bouknight,90 FR 31247, 31250 (2025); Sasha Melissa Ikramelahai,90 FR 32017, 32020-21 (2025); Frank Joseph Stirlacci, M.D.,85 FR 45229, 45239-40 (2020). Acceptance of responsibility must be unequivocal. Janet S. Pettyjohn, D.O.,89 FR 82639, 82641 (2024); Mohammed Asgar, M.D.,83 FR 29569, 29573 (2018); see also Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, 881 F.3d at 830-31.

In addition, a registrant's candor during the investigation and hearing, if one is requested, is an important factor in determining acceptance of responsibility and the appropriate sanction. See Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, 881 F.3d at 830-31; Hoxie v. Drug Enf't Admin., 419 F.3d 477, 483-84 (6th Cir. 2005). Further, the Agency has found that the egregiousness and extent of the misconduct are significant factors in determining the appropriate sanction. Jones Total Health Care Pharmacy, 881 F.3d at 833 n.4, 834. The Agency also considers the need to deter similar acts by a registrant and by the community of registrants. Stein, 84 FR at 46972-73.

Here, Registrant did not timely request a hearing, and was therefore deemed to be in default. 21 CFR 1301.43(c)(1), (e), (f)(1); RFAA, at 1-4. To date, Registrant has not filed a motion with the Office of the Administrator to excuse the default. 21 CFR 1301.43(c)(1). Registrant has thus failed avail himself of the opportunity to refute the Government's case. As such, Registrant has not accepted responsibility for the proven violations, has made no representations regarding his future compliance with the CSA, and has not made any demonstration that he can be trusted with registration.

Moreover, the evidence presented by the Government shows that Registrant repeatedly supplied DEA with materially false information for over a decade in five renewal applications. This further demonstrates that Registrant cannot be trusted with the responsibilities of holding a controlled substances registration. Accordingly, the Agency will order the revocation of Registrant's registration.^[9]

Order

Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(1) and (a)(3), I hereby revoke DEA Certificate of Registration No. BL7481649 issued to Troy R. Lehman, D.O. Further, pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 823(g)(1), I hereby deny any pending applications of Troy R. Lehman, D.O., to renew or modify this registration, as well as any other pending application of Troy R. Lehman, D.O., for additional registration in Oklahoma. This Order is effective December 14, 2026.

Signing Authority

This document of the Drug Enforcement Administration was signed on November 3, 2026, by DEA Administrator Terrance C. Cole. That document with the original signature and date is maintained by DEA. For administrative purposes only, and in compliance with requirements of the Office of the Federal Register, the undersigned DEA Federal Register Liaison Officer has been authorized to sign and submit the document in electronic format for publication, as an official document of DEA. This administrative process in no way alters the legal effect of this document upon publication in the Federal Register .