Federal Register Vol. 83, No.139,

The 504 Loan Program is a financing tool authorized under title V of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 (SBIAct) to provide small businesses with long-term, fixed-rate financing to help acquire major fixed assets for expansion or modernization. A Certified Development Company (CDC) is typically a private, nonprofit corporation set up to contribute to the economic development of its community. CDCs work with SBA and private sector lenders to provide financing to small businesses under the 504 Loan Program. In general, a 504 project includes: A loan obtained from a private sector lender with a senior lien covering at least 50 percent of the project cost; a loan obtained from a CDC with a junior lien covering up to 40 percent of the project cost (backed by a 100 percent SBA-guaranteed debenture); and a contribution from the Borrower of at least 10 percent of the project cost.

Under 13 CFR 120.821, a CDC is required to operate only within its designated Area of Operations approved by SBA, except as provided in 13 CFR 120.839. Each CDC's approved Area of Operations includes the entire State in which it is incorporated (see 13 CFR 120.810(b)). A CDC also may apply and be approved to expand its Area of Operations into a Local Economic Area under 13 CFR 120.835(b) or by becoming a Multi-State CDC under 13 CFR 120.835(c). Under 13 CFR 120.839, a CDC may submit a request to the Sacramento Loan Processing Center (SLPC) to make a 504 loan for a 504 Project outside its Area of Operations. In such case, the CDC must demonstrate that it can adequately fulfill its 504 program responsibilities for the 504 loan, including proper servicing, and have satisfactory SBA performance, as determined by SBA in its discretion. The SLPC may approve the application if, in addition to other requirements, (1) the CDC has previously assisted the business to obtain a 504 loan, (2) the existing CDC or CDCs serving the area agree to permit the applicant CDC to make the 504 loan, or (3) there is no CDC within the Area of Operations in which the 504 Project is located.

One of the statutory public policy goals of the 504 Loan Program is to achieve rural development. See section 501(d)(3)(D) of the SBIAct. Since 2013, a significant number of rural CDCs have voluntarily decertified, while SBA has approved only two new rural CDCs. SBA has historically found that increasing the CDC operating service area results in more 504 loan activity. However, in accordance with 13 CFR 120.835, CDCs are only permitted to expand their Area of Operations by requesting Local Economic Area expansion or Multi-State authority. This authority limits CDC expansion to areas and States contiguous to a CDC's Area of Operations.

In order to address this issue and increase lending in rural areas, SBA has developed the 504 Rural Pilot. This Pilot allows CDCs to make loans for 504 Projects with an address located in any county classified as “rural” by the U.S. Census Bureau if the 504 Project is located in the same SBA Region in which the CDC is incorporated. SBA expects that the expansion of a CDC's authority to process rural loans anywhere within their SBA-defined Region will result in increased lending and economic growth in rural markets.

Specifically, for purposes of the 504 Rural Pilot, SBA is waiving the following requirements in 13 CFR 120.839 (i.e., these requirements will not apply to 504 Rural Pilot loans):

(1) The CDC must apply to the Sacramento Loan Processing Center in order to make the 504 loan for the 504 Project outside of its Area of Operation;

(2) The CDC must demonstrate that it can adequately fulfill its 504 program responsibilities for the 504 loan;

(3) SBA must determine that the CDC has satisfactory SBA performance; and

(4) The CDC must have previously assisted the business to obtain a 504 loan, the existing CDC or CDCs serving the area agree to permit the outside CDC to make the 504 loan, or there is no CDC within the Area of Operations in which the 504 Project is located.

Under the 504 Rural Pilot, a CDC may make a 504 loan for a 504 Project located outside the CDC's Area of Operations only if the 504 Project address is located in a rural county that is in the same SBA Region in which the CDC is incorporated. For purposes of the 504 Rural Pilot, rural counties are those counties classified as “mostly rural” or “completely rural” by the U.S. Census Bureau in its most recent decennial census report, and are identified in the County Classification Lookup Table that can be downloaded at www.sba.gov/about-sba/sba-initiatives/sba-rural-lending-initiative or on the Welcome Screen for the Capital Access Financial System (CAFS). (CDCs must use the U.S. Census Bureau table for purposes of identifying rural counties for the 504 Rural Pilot, which may not be the same as the rural areas identified by the U.S. Department of Agriculture.) SBA Regions are defined as follows:

In making, closing, servicing, or liquidating a 504 Rural Pilot loan, CDCs must follow all other Loan Program Requirements under the 504 Loan Program, except that 504 Rural Pilot loans cannot be made using the CDC's delegated authority (i.e., PCLP or ALP authority). Although, as described above, CDCs will not be required “to demonstrate” that they can adequately fulfill their 504 program responsibilities for each 504 Rural Pilot loan before making the loan, CDCs will still be expected to fulfill all such program responsibilities with respect to these loans.

Unlike a Multi-State CDC, a CDC making a loan under this pilot will not be required to establish a separate loan committee to cover the State in which the rural 504 Project is located. In addition, the CDC must advise the local District Counsel where the 504 Project is located which Designated Attorney, or other attorney, will be closing the loan. (The attorney must be licensed in the State where the loan is being made.) CDCs should note that the CDC may not close the loan as an expedited loan unless the attorney is a Designated Attorney licensed to practice in the State where the 504 Project is located. The CDC is responsible for notifying the SLPC that a 504 loan application is being submitted under the 504 Rural Pilot.

SBA's waiver of the above requirements is authorized by 13 CFR 120.3 of its regulations, which provides that the SBA Administrator may suspend, modify or waive rules for a limited period of time to test new programs or ideas. The 504 Rural Pilot will be available for a two year period beginning today.

SBA will limit the number of loans made under the 504 Rural Pilot to not more than ten percent of the total number of 504 loans guaranteed by SBA in any fiscal year. While SBA does not expect the number of 504 Rural Pilot loans to reach that limit, SBA will provide public notice of the need to suspend lending under the 504 Rural Pilot for the remainder of the fiscal year if SBA determines that the number of pilot loans is approaching the limit.

SBA will be using the following criteria to evaluate the 504 Rural Pilot to determine how well it is achieving its objectives and other aspects of performance: (1) The measurable objectives to be achieved through the 504 Rural Pilot, including the number of small business concerns served, and the delinquency and default rates on the 504 Rural Pilot loans compared to regular 504 loans; (2) the number of CDCs that participate in the 504 Rural Pilot and their performance in making and servicing 504 Rural Pilot loans; and (3) the costs and standards of performance which, in order to be acceptable, must not impact the overall subsidy rate for the 504 Loan Program. For data collections to evaluate the effectiveness of this pilot, SBA will use ETran, SBA's electronic system for loan submission and servicing.

Reason for No Prior Notice and Comment Before Adoption

These special conditions have been subjected to the notice and comment period previously and this amendment is without substantive change from those previously issued. It is unlikely that prior public comment would result in a significant change from the substance contained herein. Therefore, the FAA has determined that prior public notice and comment are unnecessary and finds good cause exists for adopting these amended special conditions upon issuance. The FAA is requesting comments to allow interested persons to submit views that may not have been submitted in response to the prior opportunities for comment.

We invite interested people to take part in this rulemaking by sending written comments, data, or views. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the special conditions, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. We will consider all comments we receive by the closing date for comments.

We will consider comments filed late if it is possible to do so without incurring additional expense or delay. We may change these special conditions based on the comments we receive.

On January 25, 2016, Cranfield Aerospace Limited (CAL) applied for a supplemental type certificate to install winglets on the Textron Aviation Inc. (Textron) Model 525, with a Tamarack Active Technology Load Alleviation System to mitigate the winglet's adverse structural effects. The Textron Model 525 twin-turbofan engine airplane is certified in the normal category for eight seats, including a pilot, a maximum gross weight of 10,700 pounds, and a maximum altitude of 41,000 feet mean sea level. Because the applicable airworthiness regulations do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for this design feature, the FAA issued special conditions to provide an equivalent level of safety. After notice and opportunity for comment (81 FR 83737, November 22, 2016), Special Conditions No. 23-279-SC published in the Federal Register on January 5, 2017 (82 FR 1163).

These special conditions address several issues with the operation and failure of the load-relief system. Special Conditions No. 23-279-SC, paragraph 2(h), Further flights with known load-relief system failure, required a special flight permit (“ferry permit”) for additional flights after an annunciated failure or obvious system failure.

On February 15, 2018, CAL requested the FAA amend Special Condition No. 23-279-SC to remove the paragraph 2(h) and replace it with flight limitations used by the European Aviation Safety Agency. In the event of a load-relief system failure, these flight limitations allow the airplane to be moved to an appropriate maintenance facility without the need for a special flight permit.

The FAA will amend the special conditions to remove the special flight permit requirements, but finds no need to include any additional requirement regarding flights with known load relief system failure in these special conditions. Current regulatory requirements address this condition. Inoperative equipment requirements are contained in 14 CFR part 91. Section 91.213, Inoperative instruments and equipment, prohibits taking off in an aircraft with inoperative instruments or equipment unless there is an FAA-approved Minimum Equipment List (MEL) for the specific aircraft type. Without an FAA-approved MEL, operators must obtain a special flight permit in accordance with §§ 21.197, Special flight permits, and 21.199, Issue of special flight permits. Additional operational restrictions are not necessary for these special conditions.

On July 29, 2015, Cessna Aircraft Company transferred Type Certificate No. A1WI to Textron. As a result, these proposed amended special conditions reflect the current type certificate holder. In addition, these special conditions were intended to apply to all Model 525 airplanes on Type Certificate No. A1WI, and we have clarified that in this amendment.

Under the provisions of § 21.101, Cranfield Aerospace Limited must show that the Textron Model 525-series airplanes, as changed, continue to meet the applicable provisions of the regulations incorporated by reference in Type Certificate No. A1WI, revision 26, or the applicable regulations in effect on the date of application for the change. The regulations incorporated by reference in the type certificate are commonly referred to as the “original type certification basis.” The regulations incorporated by reference in Type Certificate No. A1WI, revision 26, are 14 CFR part 23 effective February 1, 1965, amendments 23-1 through 23-38 and 23-40.

If the Administrator finds the applicable airworthiness regulations (i.e., 14 CFR part 23) do not contain adequate or appropriate safety standards for the Textron Model 525-series because of a novel or unusual design feature, special conditions are prescribed under the provisions of § 21.16.

In addition to the applicable airworthiness regulations and special conditions, the Textron Model 525-series must comply with the fuel vent and exhaust emission requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the noise certification requirements of 14 CFR part 36.

The FAA issues special conditions, as defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in accordance with § 11.38, and they become part of the type-certification basis under § 21.101.

Special conditions are initially applicable to the model for which they are issued. Should the applicant apply for a supplemental type certificate to modify any other model included on the same type certificate to incorporate the same or similar novel or unusual design feature, the FAA would apply these special conditions to the other model under § 21.101.

The Textron Model 525-series will incorporate the following novel or unusual design features:

For airplanes equipped with systems that affect structural performance, either directly or as a result of a failure or malfunction, the applicant must take into account the influence of these systems and their failure conditions when showing compliance with the requirements of part 23, subparts Cand D.

The applicant must use the following criteria for showing compliance with these special conditions for airplanes equipped with flight control systems, autopilots, stability augmentation systems, load alleviation systems, flutter control systems, fuel management systems, and other systems that either directly or as a result of failure or malfunction affect structural performance. If these special conditions are used for other systems, it may be necessary to adapt the criteria to the specific system.

Notice of proposed Special Conditions No. 23-16-03-SC for the Cessna Model 525 airplane was published in the Federal Register on November 22, 2016 (81 FR 83737). No comments were received, and the special conditions were adopted—as proposed—in Special Condition No. 23-279-SC (82 FR 1163, January 5, 2017). Accordingly, these amended special conditions are being issued as final special conditions.

As discussed above, these special conditions are applicable to the Textron Model 525-series airplanes. Should Cranfield Aerospace Limited apply at a later date for a supplemental type certificate to modify any other model included on A1WI, revision 26, to incorporate the same novel or unusual design feature, the FAA would apply these special conditions to that model as well.

This action affects only certain novel or unusual design features on one model series of airplanes. It is not a rule of general applicability and it affects only the applicant who applied to the FAA for approval of these features on the airplane.

The authority citation for these special conditions is as follows:

Accordingly, pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the following special conditions are issued as part of the type certification basis for Textron Aviation Inc. Model 525-series airplanes modified by Cranfield Aerospace Limited.

The load alleviation system must comply with the following:

(a) A warning, which is clearly distinguishable to the pilot under expected flight conditions without requiring the pilot's attention, must be provided for any failure in the load alleviation system or in any other automatic system that could result in an unsafe condition if the pilot was not aware of the failure. Warning systems must not activate the control system.

(b) The design of the load alleviation system or of any other automatic system must permit initial counteraction of failures without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength, by either the deactivation of the system or a failed portion thereof, or by overriding the failure by movement of the flight controls in the normal sense.

(1) If deactivation of the system is used to counteract failures, the control for this initial counteraction must be readily accessible to each pilot while operating the control wheel and thrust control levers.

(2) If overriding the failure by movement of the flight controls is used, the override capability must be operationally demonstrated.

(c) It must be shown that, after any single failure of the load alleviation system, the airplane must be safely controllable when the failure or malfunction occurs at any speed or altitude within the approved operating limitations that is critical for the type of failure being considered;

(d) It must be shown that, while the system is active or after any single failure of the load alleviation system—

(1) The controllability and maneuverability requirements of part 23, subpart D, are met within a practical operational flight envelope (e.g., speed, altitude, normal acceleration, and airplane configuration) that is described in the Airplane Flight Manual (AFM); and

(2) The trim, stability, and stall characteristics are not impaired below a level needed to permit continued safe flight and landing.

(a) Proper precautions must be taken to prevent inadvertent or improper operation of the load alleviation system. It must be demonstrated that with the load alleviation system operating throughout its operational range, a pilot of average strength and skill level is able to continue safe flight with no objectionable increased workload.

(b) The load alleviation system must be designed so that, when any one connecting or transmitting element in the primary flight control system fails, adequate control for safe flight and landing is available.

(c) The load alleviation system must be irreversible unless the control surface is properly balanced and has no unsafe flutter characteristics. The system must have adequate rigidity and reliability in the portion of the system from the control surface to the attachment of the irreversible unit to the airplane structure.

(d) It must be demonstrated the airplane is safely controllable and a pilot can perform all maneuvers and operations necessary to affect a safe landing following any load alleviation system runaway not shown to be extremely improbable, allowing for appropriate time delay after pilot recognition of the system runaway. The demonstration must be conducted at critical airplane weights and center of gravity positions.

(a) It must be shown by operation tests that, when the flight control system and the load alleviation systems are operated and loaded as prescribed in paragraph (c) of this section, the flight control system and load alleviation systems are free from—

(1) Jamming;

(2) Excessive friction; and

(3) Excessive deflection.

(b) The operation tests in paragraph (a) of this section must also show the load alleviation system and associated surfaces do not restrict or prevent aileron control surface movements, or cause any adverse response of the ailerons, under the loading prescribed in paragraph (c) of this section that would prevent continued safe flight and landing.

(c) The prescribed test loads are for the entire load alleviation and flight control systems, loads corresponding to the limit air loads on the appropriate surfaces.

Note: Advisory Circular (AC) 23-17C, “Systems and Equipment Guide to Certification of Part 23 Airplanes,” provides guidance on potential methods of compliance with this section and other regulations applicable to this STC project.

(a) Each detail of the load alleviation system and related moveable surfaces must be designed and installed to prevent jamming, chafing, and interference from cargo, passengers, loose objects, or the freezing of moisture.

(b) There must be means in the cockpit to prevent the entry of foreign objects into places where they would jam any one connecting or transmitting element of the load alleviation system.

(c) Each element of the load alleviation system must have design features, or must be distinctively and permanently marked, to minimize the possibility of incorrect assembly that could result in malfunctioning of the control system.

(a) The load alleviation control surface must be designed so that during normal operation, when the surface has been placed in any position, it will not move from that position unless the control is adjusted or is moved by the operation of a load alleviation system.

(b) The rate of movement of the control surface in response to the load alleviation system controls must give satisfactory flight and performance characteristics under steady or changing conditions of airspeed, engine power, attitude, flap configuration, speedbrake position, and during landing gear extension and retraction.

(a) The load alleviation system and related movable surfaces as a system must—

(1) Be synchronized by a mechanical interconnection between the movable surfaces or by an approved equivalent means; or

(2) Be designed so the occurrence of any failure of the system that would result in an unsafe flight characteristic of the airplane is extremely improbable; or

(b) The airplane must be shown to have safe flight characteristics with any combination of extreme positions of individual movable surfaces.

(c) If an interconnection is used in multiengine airplanes, it must be designed to account for unsymmetrical loads resulting from flight with the engines on one side of the plane of symmetry inoperative and the remaining engines at takeoff power. For single-engine airplanes, and multiengine airplanes with no slipstream effects on the load alleviation system, it may be assumed that 100 percent of the critical air load acts on one side and 70 percent on the other.

The load alleviation system must comply with §§ 23.675, 23.681, and 23.693 as written and no unique special condition will be required for these regulations.

If applicable, other control systems used on the Textron Model 525-series may require a showing of compliance with §§ 23.672, 23.675, 23.677, 23.681, 23.683, 23.685, 23.693, 23.697, and 23.701 as written for this STC project.

(a) The criteria defined herein only address the direct structural consequences of the system responses and performances and cannot be considered in isolation but should be included in the overall safety evaluation of the airplane. These criteria may in some instances duplicate standards already established for this evaluation. These criteria are only applicable to structure whose failure could prevent continued safe flight and landing. Specific criteria that define acceptable limits on handling characteristics or stability requirements when operating in the system degraded or inoperative mode are not provided in this special condition.

(b) Depending upon the specific characteristics of the airplane, additional studies may be required that go beyond the criteria provided in this special condition in order to demonstrate the capability of the airplane to meet other realistic conditions such as alternative gust or maneuver descriptions for an airplane equipped with a load alleviation system.

(c) The following definitions are applicable to this special condition.

(1) Structural performance: Capability of the airplane to meet the structural requirements of 14 CFR part 23.

(2) Flight limitations: Limitations that can be applied to the airplane flight conditions following an in-flight occurrence and that are included in the flight manual (e.g., speed limitations, avoidance of severe weather conditions, etc.).

(3) Reserved.

(4) Probabilistic terms: The probabilistic terms (probable, improbable, extremely improbable) used in this special condition are the same as those used in § 23.1309. For the purposes of this special condition, extremely improbable for normal, utility, and acrobatic category airplanes is defined as 10− 8 per hour. For commuter category airplanes, extremely improbable is defined as 10− 9 per hour.

(5) Failure condition: The term failure condition is the same as that used in § 23.1309, however this special condition applies only to system failure conditions that affect the structural performance of the airplane (e.g., system failure conditions that induce loads, change the response of the airplane to inputs such as gusts or pilot actions, or lower flutter margins).

(d) General. The following criteria (paragraphs (e) through (i)) will be used in determining the influence of a system and its failure conditions on the airplane structure.

(e) System fully operative. With the system fully operative, the following apply:

(1) Limit loads must be derived in all normal operating configurations of the system from all the limit conditions specified in subpart C (or defined by special condition or equivalent level of safety in lieu of those specified in subpart C), taking into account any special behavior of such a system or associated functions or any effect on the structural performance of the airplane that may occur up to the limit loads. In particular, any significant nonlinearity (rate of displacement of control surface, thresholds or any other system nonlinearities) must be accounted for in a realistic or conservative way when deriving limit loads from limit conditions.

(2) The airplane must meet the strength requirements of part 23 (static strength and residual strength for failsafe or damage tolerant structure), using the specified factors to derive ultimate loads from the limit loads defined above. The effect of nonlinearities must be investigated beyond limit conditions to ensure the behavior of the system presents no anomaly compared to the behavior below limit conditions. However, conditions beyond limit conditions need not be considered when it can be shown that the airplane has design features that will not allow it to exceed those limit conditions.

(3) The airplane must meet the aeroelastic stability requirements of § 23.629.

(f) System in the failure condition. For any system failure condition not shown to be extremely improbable, the following apply:

(1) At the time of occurrence. Starting from 1-g level flight conditions, a realistic scenario, including pilot corrective actions, must be established to determine the loads occurring at the time of failure and immediately after failure.

(i) For static strength substantiation, these loads, multiplied by an appropriate factor of safety that is related to the probability of occurrence of the failure, are ultimate loads to be considered for design. The factor of safety is defined in figure 1.

(ii) For residual strength substantiation, the airplane must be able to withstand two thirds of the ultimate loads defined in subparagraph (f)(1)(i).

(iii) For pressurized cabins, these loads must be combined with the normal operating differential pressure.

(iv) Freedom from aeroelastic instability must be shown up to the speeds defined in § 23.629(f). For failure conditions that result in speeds beyond VD/MD, freedom from aeroelastic instability must be shown to increased speeds, so that the margins intended by § 23.629(f) are maintained.

(v) Failures of the system that result in forced structural vibrations (oscillatory failures) must not produce loads that could result in detrimental deformation of primary structure.

(2) For the continuation of the flight. For the airplane, in the system failed state and considering any appropriate reconfiguration and flight limitations, the following apply:

(i) The loads derived from the following conditions (or defined by special condition or equivalent level of safety in lieu of the following conditions) at speeds up to VC/MC, or the speed limitation prescribed for the remainder of the flight, must be determined:

(A) The limit symmetrical maneuvering conditions specified in §§ 23.321, 23.331, 23.333, 23.345, 23.421, 23.423, and 23.445.

(B) The limit gust and turbulence conditions specified in §§ 23.341, 23.345, 23.425, 23.443, and 23.445.

(C) The limit rolling conditions specified in § 23.349 and the limit unsymmetrical conditions specified in §§ 23.347, 23.427, and 23.445.

(D) The limit yaw maneuvering conditions specified in §§ 23.351, 23.441, and 23.445.

(E) The limit ground loading conditions specified in §§ 23.473 and 23.493.

(ii) For static strength substantiation, each part of the structure must be able to withstand the loads in paragraph (f)(2)(i) of this special condition multiplied by a factor of safety depending on the probability of being in this failure state. The factor of safety is defined in figure 2.

(iii) For residual strength substantiation, the airplane must be able to withstand two thirds of the ultimate loads defined in paragraph (f)(2)(ii) of this special condition. For pressurized cabins, these loads must be combined with the normal operating pressure differential.

(iv) If the loads induced by the failure condition have a significant effect on fatigue or damage tolerance then their effects must be taken into account.

(v) Freedom from aeroelastic instability must be shown up to a speed determined from figure 3. Flutter clearance speeds V′ and V″ may be based on the speed limitation specified for the remainder of the flight using the margins defined by § 23.629.

(vi) Freedom from aeroelastic instability must also be shown up to V′ in figure 3 above, for any probable system failure condition combined with any damage required or selected for investigation by §§ 23.571 through 23.574.

(3) Consideration of certain failure conditions may be required by other sections of 14 CFR part 23 regardless of calculated system reliability. Where analysis shows the probability of these failure conditions to be less than 10−8 for normal, utility, or acrobatic category airplanes or less than 10−9 for commuter category airplanes, criteria other than those specified in this paragraph may be used for structural substantiation to show continued safe flight and landing.

(g) Failure indications. For system failure detection and indication, the following apply:

(1) The system must be checked for failure conditions, not extremely improbable, that degrade the structural capability below the level required by part 23 or significantly reduce the reliability of the remaining system. As far as reasonably practicable, the flightcrew must be made aware of these failures before flight. Certain elements of the control system, such as mechanical and hydraulic components, may use special periodic inspections, and electronic components may use daily checks, in lieu of detection and indication systems to achieve the objective of this requirement. These certification maintenance requirements must be limited to components that are not readily detectable by normal detection and indication systems and where service history shows that inspections will provide an adequate level of safety.

(2) The existence of any failure condition, not extremely improbable, during flight that could significantly affect the structural capability of the airplane and for which the associated reduction in airworthiness can be minimized by suitable flight limitations, must be signaled to the flightcrew. The probability of not annunciating these failure conditions must be extremely improbable (unannunciated failure). For example, failure conditions that result in a factor of safety between the airplane strength and the loads of subpart C below 1.25, or flutter margins below V″, must be signaled to the flightcrew during flight.

(h) Fatigue and damage tolerance. If any system failure would have a significant effect on the fatigue or damage evaluations required in §§ 23.571 through 23.574, then these effects must be taken into account.

This AD is a final rule that involves requirements affecting flight safety, and we did not provide you with notice and an opportunity to provide your comments prior to it becoming effective. However, we invite you to participate in this rulemaking by submitting written comments, data, or views. We also invite comments relating to the economic, environmental, energy, or federalism impacts that resulted from adopting this AD. The most helpful comments reference a specific portion of the AD, explain the reason for any recommended change, and include supporting data. To ensure the docket does not contain duplicate comments, commenters should send only one copy of written comments, or if comments are filed electronically, commenters should submit them only one time. We will file in the docket all comments that we receive, as well as a report summarizing each substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this rulemaking during the comment period. We will consider all the comments we receive and may conduct additional rulemaking based on those comments.

EASA, which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union, has issued Emergency AD No. 2017-0020-E, dated February 7, 2017, to correct an unsafe condition for Airbus Helicopters Model AS 350 B, AS 350 BA, AS 350 BB, AS 350 B1, AS 350 B2, AS 350 B3, AS 355 E, AS 355 F, AS 355 F1, AS 355 F2, AS 355 N and AS 355 NP helicopters with modification (MOD) 075601 or MOD 076602 installed. EASA advises of several reports of damaged horn-side TR pitch rod elastomeric ball joints, and of an on-going investigation to determine the cause of the damage. EASA states that this condition could result in loss of control of the helicopter. To address this unsafe condition, the EASA AD requires repetitive inspections of the TR pitch rod. While the inspections are contained in the Airworthiness Limitations Section of the helicopter maintenance manual, the EASA AD reduces the interval from 50 flight hours to 10 flight hours.

These helicopters have been approved by the aviation authority of France and are approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to our bilateral agreement with France, EASA, its technical representative, has notified us of the unsafe condition described in the EASA AD. We are issuing this AD because we evaluated all information provided by EASA and determined the unsafe condition exists and is likely to exist or develop on other helicopters of these same type designs.

We reviewed Airbus Helicopters Emergency Alert Service Bulletin (EASB) No. 05.00.86 for Model AS350-series helicopters and EASB No. 05.00.75 for Model AS355-series helicopters, both Revision 1 and both dated February 6, 2017. This service information contains procedures for inspecting the TR pitch change rod elastomeric ball joint for damage.

This AD requires, for helicopters with a TR pitch change rod elastomeric ball joint installed, within 10 hours time-in-service (TIS) and thereafter at intervals not exceeding 10 hours TIS, inspecting each face of the TR pitch rod blade side ball joint for debonding, extrusion, and a crack. If there is debonding, extrusion, or a crack with a circumference of 90 degrees or more, this AD requires replacing the TR pitch rod before further flight. Airbus Helicopters identifies the installation of a TR pitch change rod elastomeric ball joint as MOD 075601 or MOD 076602.

The EASA AD applies to Airbus Helicopters Model AS 350 BB helicopters. This AD does not as that model is not type-certificated in the U.S.

We consider this AD to be an interim action. If final action is later identified, we might consider further rulemaking then.

We estimate that this AD affects 896 helicopters of U.S. Registry.

We estimate that operators may incur the following costs in order to comply with this AD. At an average labor rate of $85 per hour, inspecting the TR pitch rod ball joint requires 0.5 hour, for a cost of $43 per helicopter and $38,528 for the U.S. fleet, per inspection cycle.

If required, replacing a TR pitch rod requires one work-hour and required parts cost $3,174, for a cost per helicopter of $3,259.

An unsafe condition exists that requires the immediate adoption of this AD without providing an opportunity for public comments prior to adoption. The FAA has found that the risk to the flying public justifies waiving notice and comment prior to adoption of this rule because the inspections required by this AD must be accomplished within 10 hours TIS and thereafter every 10 hours TIS. Therefore, we find good cause that notice and opportunity for prior public comment are impracticable. In addition, for the reason stated above, we find that good cause exists for making this amendment effective in less than 30 days.

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. “Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs,” describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in “Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national Government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed, I certify that this AD:

1. Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866;

2. Is not a “significant rule” under DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979);

3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska to the extent that it justifies making a regulatory distinction; and

4. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

We prepared an economic evaluation of the estimated costs to comply with this AD and placed it in the AD docket.

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to all ATR-GIE Avions de Transport Régional Model ATR72 airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on March 22, 2018 (83 FR 12508). The NPRM was prompted by a determination that more restrictive maintenance instructions and airworthiness limitations are necessary. The NPRM proposed to require revising the maintenance or inspection program, as applicable, to incorporate new or revised maintenance instructions and airworthiness limitations. We are issuing this AD to address fatigue cracking, damage, and corrosion in principal structural elements, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane.

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union, has issued EASA AD 2017-0223R1, dated December 15, 2017 (referred to after this as the Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information, or “the MCAI”), to correct an unsafe condition for all ATR-GIE Avions de Transport Régional Model ATR72 airplanes. The MCAI states:

This AD requires revising the maintenance or inspection program to incorporate certain maintenance instructions and airworthiness limitations. The unsafe condition is fatigue cracking, damage, and corrosion in principal structural elements, which could result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane. You may examine the MCAI in the AD docket on the internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2018-0166.

We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this final rule. The following presents the comment received on the NPRM and the FAA's response.

Empire Airlines asked that airworthiness limitations (AWL) task number 572401-1, identified in table 1 to paragraph (h) of this AD, be changed to AWL task number 572402-1. Empire Airlines stated that AWL task number 572401-1 corresponds to maintenance review board report (MRBR) task numbers ZL-500-01-1 and ZL-600-01-1; and the MRBR task numbers ZL-520-01-1 and ZL-620-01-1, identified in table 1 to paragraph (h) of this AD, correspond with AWL task number 572402-1. Empire Airlines provided substantiation data to this effect.

We agree with the commenter that a typographical error was made in the AWL task number 572401-1, identified in table 1 to paragraph (h) of this AD. We have corrected this error accordingly.

The FAA recently became aware of an issue related to the applicability of ADs that require incorporation of an airworthiness limitations section (ALS) revision into an operator's maintenance or inspection program.

Typically, when these types of ADs are issued by civil aviation authorities of other countries, they apply to all airplanes covered under an identified type certificate (TC). The corresponding FAA AD typically retains applicability to all of those airplanes.

In addition, U.S. operators must operate their airplanes in an airworthy condition, in accordance with 14 CFR 91.7(a). Included in this obligation is the requirement to perform any maintenance or inspections specified in the ALS, and in accordance with the ALS as specified in 14 CFR 43.16 and 91.403(c), unless an alternative has been approved by the FAA.

When a type certificate is issued for a type design, the specific ALS, including revisions, is a part of that type design, as specified in 14 CFR 21.31(c).

The sum effect of these operational and maintenance requirements is an obligation to comply with the ALS defined in the type design referenced in the manufacturer's conformity statement. This obligation may introduce a conflict with an AD that requires a specific ALS revision if new airplanes are delivered with a later revision as part of their type design.

To address this conflict, the FAA has approved alternative methods of compliance (AMOCs) that allow operators to incorporate the most recent ALS revision into their maintenance/inspection programs, in lieu of the ALS revision required by the AD. This eliminates the conflict and enables the operator to comply with both the AD and the type design.

However, compliance with AMOCs is normally optional, and we recently became aware that some operators choose to retain the AD-mandated ALS revision in their fleet-wide maintenance/inspection programs, including those for new airplanes delivered with later ALS revisions, to help standardize the maintenance of the fleet. To ensure that operators comply with the applicable ALS revision for newly delivered airplanes containing a later revision than that specified in an AD, we plan to limit the applicability of ADs that mandate ALS revisions to those airplanes that are subject to an earlier revision of the ALS, either as part of the type design or as mandated by an earlier AD.

This AD therefore applies to ATR-GIE Avions de Transport Régional Model ATR72-101, -102, -201, -202, -211, -212, and -212A airplanes with an original certificate of airworthiness or original export certificate of airworthiness that was issued on or before the date of approval of the ALS revision identified in this AD. Operators of airplanes with an original certificate of airworthiness or original export certificate of airworthiness issued after that date must comply with the airworthiness limitations specified as part of the approved type design and referenced on the type certificate data sheet.

We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comment received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting this final rule with the change described previously and minor editorial changes. We have determined that these minor changes:

• Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the NPRM for addressing the unsafe condition; and

• Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was already proposed in the NPRM.

We also determined that these changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this final rule.

ATR-GIE Avions de Transport Régional has issued the ATR72 Time Limits document, Revision 15, dated May 2, 2017. This service information describes preventive maintenance requirements and includes updated limitations, tasks, thresholds and intervals to be incorporated into the maintenance or inspection program. This service information is reasonably available because the interested parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.

We estimate that this AD affects 26 airplanes of U.S. registry.

We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD:

We have determined that revising the maintenance or inspection program takes an average of 90 work-hours per operator, although we recognize that this number may vary from operator to operator. In the past, we have estimated that this action takes 1 work-hour per airplane. Since operators incorporate maintenance or inspection program changes for their affected fleet(s), we have determined that a per-operator estimate is more accurate than a per-airplane estimate. Therefore, we estimate the total cost per operator to be $7,650 (90 work-hours × $85 per work-hour).

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: “General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

This AD is issued in accordance with authority delegated by the Executive Director, Aircraft Certification Service, as authorized by FAA Order 8000.51C. In accordance with that order, issuance of ADs is normally a function of the Compliance and Airworthiness Division, but during this transition period, the Executive Director has delegated the authority to issue ADs applicable to transport category airplanes and associated appliances to the Director of the System Oversight Division.

This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

(1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866,

(2) Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and

(4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

Discussion

We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR part 39 by adding an AD that would apply to certain Airbus Model A318 series airplanes; Model A319 series airplanes; Model A320-211, -212, -214, -216, -231, -232, and -233 airplanes; and Model A321-111, -112, -131, -211, -212, -213, -231, and -232 airplanes. The NPRM published in the Federal Register on November 27, 2017 (82 FR 55955) (“the NPRM”). The NPRM was prompted by reports of early cracking on certain holes of the crossbeam splicing at certain fuselage frames. The NPRM proposed to require repetitive inspections for cracking of the fastener holes in certain fuselage frames, and depending on airplane configuration, would provide an optional terminating action to the repetitive inspections. We are issuing this AD to address cracking at two upper rows of fasteners of the crossbeam splicing at frame (FR)16 and FR20, on both the left-hand (LH) and right-hand (RH) sides, which can result in reduced structural integrity of the airplane due to the failure of structural components.

The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which is the Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union, has issued EASA AD 2016-0139, dated July 14, 2016 (referred to after this as the Mandatory Continuing Airworthiness Information, or “the MCAI”), to correct an unsafe condition for certain Model A318 series airplanes; Model A319 series airplanes; Model A320-211, -212, -214, -216, -231, -232, and -233 airplanes; and Model A321-111, -112, -131, -211, -212, -213, -231, and -232 airplanes. The MCAI states:

Related investigative actions include checking the edge margins of the holes. Corrective actions include reaming affected crossbeams and frames and cold working the frames. You may examine the MCAI in the AD docket on the internet at http://www.regulations.gov by searching for and locating Docket No. FAA-2017-1093.

We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing this AD. The following presents the comments received on the NPRM and the FAA's response to each comment.

American Airlines (AAL) and United Airlines (UAL) requested that the repair instructions in paragraph (l) of the proposed AD be revised to remove requirements to obtain new repair instructions for any airplanes on which repairs were done using the instructions in an Airbus RDAS. AAL noted that the original RDAS approval was given by an EASA Design Organization Approval (DOA), so new approval should not be needed. Instead, AAL suggested that the issuer of the RDASs should be required to revise the RDASs as necessary. UAL noted that an RDAS already defines repair life and inspection instructions or limits. UAL also noted that the MCAI does not require obtaining new repair instructions, but instead says to accomplish the repair instructions given in the RDAS for repaired fastener holes.

We disagree to require the issuer of the RDAS to revise the RDAS. An RDAS is an Airbus document that is not approved by the FAA, and the FAA has no authority to require Airbus to revise the RDAS.

We agree with the requests to remove the requirement to obtain repair instructions in paragraph (l) of this AD. We have confirmed that EASA intended the corresponding paragraph in the MCAI to be informational, rather than a new requirement. We have revised paragraph (l) of this AD to note that the information on the next inspection and compliance time for the inspection of repaired holes is specified in the applicable RDAS; therefore, there is no requirement to obtain and follow new instructions.

UAL requested that we revise paragraph (l) of the proposed AD to state that previous repair instructions that superseded ALI 531110 also terminate the inspections required by paragraph (g) of the proposed AD for the repaired holes. UAL noted that they had several RDASs that state that the inspection requirements of the RDAS supersede ALI 531110 for the repaired fasteners. UAL stated that these repairs involved enlarging the holes and fasteners, thereby making it impossible for them to accomplish the inspections in accordance with Airbus Service Bulletin A320-53-1286, Revision 01, dated December 22, 2015.

We disagree with revising paragraph (l) of this AD to specify terminating action to paragraph (g) of this AD. An operator who is unable to complete certain requirements in this AD due to existing repairs may request an alternative method of compliance (AMOC) under the provisions of paragraph (s)(1) of this AD.

AAL requested that paragraph (n) of the proposed AD be revised to remove requirements to obtain new repair instructions for any airplanes on which repairs were done using the instructions in an Airbus RDAS unrelated to ALI task 531110. AAL noted that the original RDAS approval was given by an EASA DOA, so new approval should not be needed. Instead, AAL suggested that the issuer of the RDASs should be required to revise the RDASs as necessary.

UAL requested that paragraph (n) of the proposed AD be removed. UAL stated that determining if a repair is unrelated to ALI task 531110 may be inconclusive, since the ALI task is an inspection that may or may not be referenced in a documented repair. UAL added that each repair approval will have damage tolerance considerations regardless of how the damage was found. UAL further noted that if a repair unrelated to ALI task 531110 prevents inspection or repair as specified in the proposed AD, operators would need to request an AMOC.

We disagree with the commenters' requests. EASA has determined that repairs unrelated to ALI task 531110, which could include minor repairs unrelated to the unsafe condition, may not adequately address the unsafe condition. For this reason, operators must request new corrective actions for such repairs, as specified in paragraph (n) of this AD.

UAL and AAL requested that paragraphs (i) and (j) of the proposed AD be revised to list specific affected manufacturer serial numbers (MSNs). In addition, UAL and AAL requested that the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) revise the Airbus RDASs to correct any problems. AAL pointed out that the original RDAS was approved by an EASA DOA and stated that operators should therefore not be required to obtain a new approval. UAL requested that if we do not provide revised RDASs or a list of affected MSNs, we instead provide a pre-defined solution for the repair. UAL suggested that we should provide instructions for replacing EN6114 fasteners with EN6115 fasteners. UAL further requested that if the repairs require case-by-case evaluations, the repair instructions should define the repair compliance time, rather than having a set 24 month compliance time, which may not work for every configuration.

UAL also noted that the issue with Airbus Repair Instruction R53112926 issue A or B is that it called out the wrong fastener; EN6115 should have been used instead of EN6114.

UAL requested that we add a statement to paragraph (j) of this AD stating that no additional repair instructions are needed if a repair was accomplished using Airbus Repair Instruction R53112926 issue A or B and EN6115 fasteners.

We disagree with the commenters' requests to revise paragraphs (i) and (j) of this AD to list specific affected MSNs. EASA, as the state of design authority, and Airbus have both stated that they do not have knowledge of prior approved repairs; therefore we do not have a list of affected MSNs. In addition, an RDAS is an Airbus document that is not approved by the FAA, and the FAA has no authority to require Airbus to revise the RDAS. Therefore, each existing repair must be individually analyzed before a new corrective action can be provided. For this reason, we are not able to provide a single pre-defined solution for the repair that would address every affected configuration. We have determined that 24 months is an appropriate time frame to address the unsafe condition related to the EN6114 fasteners. An AMOC in accordance with paragraph (s)(1) of this AD may be requested if additional time is needed to address the unsafe condition.

We do not agree to add a statement to paragraphs (i) or (j) of this AD regarding no additional repair instructions are necessary if those repairs were applied with the installation of EN6115 fasteners, but we do agree to clarify that paragraphs (i) and (j) of this AD only apply to airplanes on which Airbus Repair Instruction R53112926 issue A or B or any other repair involving the installation of EN6114 fasteners was applied. If EN6115 fasteners were installed in the accomplishment of Airbus Repair Instruction R53112926 issue A or B or any other repair, the actions specified in paragraphs (i) or (j) of this AD are not required on the repaired airplane.

UAL requested that we update paragraph (k) of the proposed AD to reflect corrections to Airbus Service Bulletin A320-53-1295, including Appendixes 01 and 02, dated June 29, 2015. UAL noted that Airbus has released Operators Information Transmission (OIT) 15-0097, Revision 01, dated January 7, 2016, to correct discrepancies in the effectivity section and existing hole diameters for certain subtasks in Airbus Service Bulletin A320-53-1295, including Appendixes 01 and 02, dated June 29, 2015.

We agree with the commenter's request for the reasons provided. We have added paragraph (r) to this AD to clarify the hole-diameter correction provided in Airbus OIT 15-0097, Revision 01, dated January 7, 2016. We have also updated other paragraphs of this AD that refer to Airbus Service Bulletin A320-53-1295, including Appendixes 01 and 02, dated June 29, 2015, to include this exception. We also acknowledge the discrepancy in the effectivity section of Airbus Service Bulletin A320-53-1295, including Appendixes 01 and 02, dated June 29, 2015, and the correction provided in Airbus OIT 15-0097, Revision 01, dated January 7, 2016. However, the applicability of this AD does not refer to Airbus Service Bulletin A320-53-1295, including Appendixes 01 and 02, dated June 29, 2015. Therefore, we have not changed this AD in this regard.

Virgin America requested that we review the title of table 1 to paragraphs (g) and (n) of this AD. Virgin America noted that the related MCAI table refers to airplanes having not embodied any of “mod 20416 and mod 21999,” while the proposed AD refers to “pre-modification 20416 or pre-modification 21999” airplanes. Virgin America suggested this might be a typographical error, and asked that it be corrected if it is in error.

We acknowledge that the wording in the MCAI and this AD is not the same and agree to clarify. Table 1 of the MCAI is intended to apply to airplanes that have not embodied any part of modification 20416 or any part of modification 21999. Therefore, it is accurate to state “pre-modification 20416 or pre-modification 21999 airplanes.” We have not changed this AD in this regard.

UAL requested that we verify the service bulletins referenced in the proposed AD are at the latest revision level. UAL noted this would eliminate the need to request an AMOC immediately following publication of this AD.

We agree with the commenter's request. We have verified that no revisions of the referenced service information have been published since we issued our proposed AD.

We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received, and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting this AD with the changes described previously and minor editorial changes. We have determined that these minor changes:

• Are consistent with the intent that was proposed in the NPRM for correcting the unsafe condition; and

• Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was already proposed in the NPRM.

We also determined that these changes will not increase the economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of this AD.

Airbus has issued the following service information.

• Service Bulletin A320-53-1286, Revision 01, dated December 22, 2015, which describes procedures for rototest inspections for cracking of the holes in certain fuselage frames and crossbeams.

• Service Bulletin A320-53-1295, including Appendixes 01 and 02, dated June 29, 2015, which describes procedures for modifying the airplane, including cold working instructions in certain fuselage frames and crossbeams.

This service information is reasonably available because the interested parties have access to it through their normal course of business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES section.

We estimate that this AD affects 928 airplanes of U.S. registry. We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD:

We have received no definitive data that would enable us to provide cost estimates for the on-condition actions specified in this AD.

Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.

We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: “General requirements.” Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this rulemaking action.

This AD is issued in accordance with authority delegated by the Executive Director, Aircraft Certification Service, as authorized by FAA Order 8000.51C. In accordance with that order, issuance of ADs is normally a function of the Compliance and Airworthiness Division, but during this transition period, the Executive Director has delegated the authority to issue ADs applicable to transport category airplanes to the Director of the System Oversight Division.

We determined that this AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government.

For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:

1. Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866,

2. Is not a “significant rule” under the DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),

3. Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and

4. Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

Background

A commercial pilot who receives a disqualifying DOT drug or alcohol test result, refuses a DOT drug or alcohol test, or violates § 91.17(a)(1) through (4) is subject to the revocation of airman certificates issued under 14 CFR part 61 and airman medical certificates issued under 14 CFR part 67. Under 14 CFR 61.13(d)(2), unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator, a person whose pilot, flight instructor, or ground instructor certificate has been revoked may not apply for any certificate, rating, or authorization for one year after the date the FAA issued the revocation order.

Many commercial pilots who receive a disqualifying DOT drug or alcohol test result, refuse a DOT drug or alcohol test, or violate § 91.17(a)(1) through (4) promptly enter into the Human Intervention Motivation Study (“HIMS”) program, which is a substance recovery program for such pilots.1 If a pilot undergoes evaluation, and successfully completes appropriate treatment and remains under comprehensive continuing care in accordance with the HIMS program, the pilot may become eligible for an authorization for special issuance of an airman medical certificate (“special issuance”) well before the completion of an FAA investigation into the matter, initiation of legal enforcement action based on the investigation, and passage of the time period specified in 14 CFR 61.13(d)(2).2

Indeed, following the discovery of a disqualifying DOT drug or alcohol test result, DOT drug or alcohol test refusal, or violation of 14 CFR 91.17(a)(1) through (4), the FAA Office of Aerospace Medicine, Drug Abatement Division (“AAM-800”) investigates the apparent violation, which includes interviews and the collection of evidence, and develops an enforcement investigative report (“EIR”), which is subject to AAM-800 management review. If AAM-800 management deems the EIR sufficient, it transmits the EIR to the Office of the Chief Counsel's Enforcement Division (“AGC-300”) for additional review to ensure, among other things, evidentiary sufficiency and compliance with law and policy. Consistent with FAA policy, AGC-300 issues an order revoking pilot and airman medical certificates only after the thorough review necessary to ensure that legal enforcement action involving the revocation of certificates is appropriate. Although the FAA normally issues emergency orders of revocation for the types of drug or alcohol violations discussed in this notification, the FAA necessarily takes the appropriate amount of time to ensure that the issuance of the order is reasonable and supportable. Accordingly, the period of time between the FAA's discovery of a drug or alcohol violation and the issuance of a certificate action can be lengthy. Further, the additional time period specified in 14 CFR 61.13(d)(2) adds up to a year after the issuance of an order of revocation. During the period from the discovery of the violation to the expiration of the time period specified in 14 CFR 61.13(d)(2), a pilot may have long successfully completed recovery steps necessary to be found qualified for a special issuance.

Under the new prompt settlement procedure, the FAA will send notification to commercial pilots who receive a disqualifying DOT drug or alcohol test result, refuse a DOT drug or alcohol test, or violate § 91.17(a)(1) through (4) in commercial operations. The notification will inform the pilot that he or she may contact AAM-800 within ten days of receipt of the notice to request consideration for a prompt settlement of the legal enforcement action. The FAA will send the notification soon after it discovers the violation.

If the pilot requests to be considered for the new settlement procedure, the FAA will determine whether the pilot is eligible for the process. The procedure is not available where there is a question about a pilot's qualification to hold a certificate other than that presented by the disqualifying DOT drug or alcohol test result, refusal to submit to a DOT test, or violation of § 91.17(a)(1) through (4), or where the pilot is not a first-time violator of these drug or alcohol testing provisions. If the FAA deems application of the prompt settlement procedure is appropriate, AGC-300 enforcement counsel will provide the pilot, or his or her legal representative, a formal agreement that sets forth the conditions for prompt settlement. The terms of the settlement agreement will normally include the following provisions.

(1) The settlement agreement must be executed by the parties within ten days after the FAA transmits the agreement to the pilot.

(2) The FAA will issue an emergency order revoking all certificates the pilot holds that were issued under 14 CFR parts 61 and 67 immediately upon receiving the fully executed settlement agreement.

(3) The emergency order of revocation will: (i) Require the immediate surrender of all certificates the pilot holds that were issued under 14 CFR parts 61 and 67 to enforcement counsel; (ii) notify the pilot that the failure to immediately surrender these certificates could subject the pilot to further legal enforcement action, including a civil penalty; and (iii) inform the pilot that the FAA will not accept an application for a new certificate issued under 14 CFR part 61 for a period of a year from the date of the issuance of the emergency order of revocation.

(4) The pilot will waive all appeal rights from the emergency order of revocation.

(5) The parties will agree to bear their own costs and attorney fees, if any, in connection with the matter.

(6) The pilot will agree to not initiate any litigation before any court, tribunal, or administrative entity concerning any costs or attorney fees, including applications under the Equal Access to Justice Act, incurred as a result of the above-referenced matter.

(7) The pilot will agree to waive any and all causes of action against the FAA and its current and/or former officials and employees relating to the above-referenced matter.

This procedure is expected to allow pilots who have established qualifications to hold a new 14 CFR part 61 certificate, and have met the requirements under 14 CFR part 67 for a special issuance consistent with participation in the HIMS program, to more quickly assume commercial flight crewmember duties. Indeed, it should allow pilots to apply for a new pilot certificate closer in time to a determination that the pilot is eligible for a special issuance (following timely evaluation, treatment, and continuing comprehensive care in accordance with the HIMS program). Further, the added predictability of this process should allow pilots who have received a disqualifying DOT drug or alcohol test result, refused to submit to a DOT test, or violated § 91.17(a)(1) through (4) to focus effort and energy on the treatment and recovery process, and allow both the pilot and FAA to better allocate limited resources.

Multnomah County, the bridge owner, has requested a temporary deviation from the operating schedule for the Hawthorne Bridge across the Willamette River, mile 13.1, at Portland, OR. The requested deviation is to accommodate a filming event for a movie. To facilitate this event, the draw of the subject bridge will be allowed to remain in the closed-to-navigation position, and need not open to marine traffic from 6 p.m. on September 1, 2018, to 12:01 a.m. on September 2, 2018. The Hawthorne Bridge provides a vertical clearance of 49 feet in the closed-to-navigation position referenced to the vertical clearance above Columbia River Datum 0.0. The normal operating schedule is in 33 CFR 117.897(c)(3)(v). Waterway usage on this part of the Willamette River includes vessels ranging from commercial tug and barge to small pleasure craft. The Coast Guard requested objections to this deviation from local mariners via the Local Notice Mariners, and email. No objections were submitted to the Coast Guard.

Vessels able to pass through the bridge in the closed-to-navigation position may do so at any time. The bridge will be able to open for emergencies, and there is no immediate alternate route for vessels to pass. The Coast Guard will inform the users of the waterway, through our Local and Broadcast Notices to Mariners, of the change in operating schedule for the bridge so that vessel operators can arrange their transits to minimize any impact caused by the temporary deviation.

In accordance with 33 CFR 117.35(e), the drawbridge must return to its regular operating schedule immediately at the end of the effective period of this temporary deviation. This deviation from the operating regulations is authorized under 33 CFR 117.35.

The Coast Guard will enforce the regulations in 33 CFR 165.1123 for a safety zone on the waters of San Diego Bay, CA for the San Diego, CA POPS Fireworks Display in 33 CFR 165.1123, Table 1, Item 1 of that section, from 9:00 p.m. through 10:00 p.m. on specific evenings from June 28, 2018 to September 2, 2018. This action is being taken to provide for the safety of life on navigable waterways during the fireworks events. Our regulation for Southern California Annual Firework Events for the San Diego Captain of the Port Zone identifies the regulated areas for the events. Under the provisions of 33 CFR 165.1123, a vessel may not enter the regulated area, unless it receives permission from the Captain of the Port, or his designated representative. Spectator vessels may safely transit outside the regulated area but may not anchor, block, loiter, or impede the transit of participants or official patrol vessels. The Coast Guard may be assisted by other Federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies in enforcing this regulation.

This document is issued under authority of 33 CFR 165.1123 and 5 U.S.C. 552(a). In addition to this document in the Federal Register, the Coast Guard will provide the maritime community with advance notification of this enforcement period via the Local Notice to Mariners and local advertising by the event sponsor.

If the Captain of the Port or his designated representative determines that the regulated area need not be enforced for the full duration stated on this document, he or she may use a Broadcast Notice to Mariners or other communications coordinated with the event sponsor to grant general permission to enter the regulated area.

In FR 2018-14863 appearing on page 32208 in the Federal Register of Thursday, July 12, 2018, the following correction is made:

The purpose of this rule is to eliminate a redundant safety zone and remove several requirements from a Regulated Navigation Area that are no longer necessary. There currently exists, in 33 CFR 165.923, certain navigational, environmental, and operational restrictions on all vessels transiting the navigable waters located adjacent to and over the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' Aquatic Nuisance Species electric dispersal fish barrier. Title 33 CFR 165.923(a)(1) establishes a safety zone in the CSSC from mile marker 296.1 to mile marker 296.7. Additionally, 33 CFR 165.923(b)(1) establishes a regulated navigation area from mile marker 295.5 to mile marker 297.2. There also exists, in 33 CFR 165.930, a safety zone from mile marker 286.0 to mile marker 333.3 that includes the totality of the safety zone in 33 CFR 165.923(a)(1), rendering it redundant.

In 2013, the U.S. Coast Guard Research and Development Center completed a marine safety risk assessment for the waters of the CSSC in the vicinity of the Aquatic Nuisance Species EDBS near Romeoville, Illinois. The overarching goal of the risk assessment was to determine the adequacy of present risk mitigation strategies and, if necessary, recommend alternatives to the present strategies. The report generated at the conclusion of the risk assessment noted confusion among waterway users regarding the boundaries and requirements for the safety zone and RNA outlined in 33 CFR 165.923. The report also identified certain requirements still in effect, which had basis in the existing rule, that have since changed over the period of the rule and no longer apply.

On January 30, 2018, the Coast Guard published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) titled “Regulated Navigation Area, Chicago Sanitary and Ship Canal, Romeoville, IL” (USCG-2017-1095), 83 FR 4171. The NPRM discussed the need for the rule and invited the public to comment on the proposed regulatory action. During the comment period that ended April 30, 2018, we received two comments. One comment was not relevant to the proposed rule. The second comment, from the American Waterways Operators, stated support for the proposed RNA amendments.

The Coast Guard is issuing this rule under 33 U.S.C. 1231.

The purpose of this rulemaking is to address recommended amendments to the regulations based on the aforementioned report's conclusions and recommendations. The changes are intended to improve safety, reduce confusion and eliminate unnecessary burden to vessels transiting the safety zone and RNA of the CSSC in the vicinity of the EDBS near Romeoville, Illinois.

As noted above, we received two comments on our NPRM published January 30, 2018. Other than some minor stylistic changes, there are no changes in the regulatory text of this rule from the proposed rule in the NPRM.

The purpose of the safety zone delineated in § 165.923(a)(1) is to inhibit the potential transfer of live Silver or Asian carp, viable eggs or gametes into the waterway north of the electric barrier. To serve this purpose, the safety zone requirements outlined in 33 CFR 165.923(a)(2) restrict vessels transiting with non-potable water on board if they intend to release that water in any form within or on the other side of the safety zone. A larger safety zone, described at 33 CFR 165.930(a)(2), also encompasses this same area. That safety zone, however, does not contain regulations for the transit of non-potable water.

The Coast Guard will eliminate the CSSC safety zone outlined in 33 CFR 165.923(a)(1). This revision eliminates redundancy in regulations by using the larger safety zone delineated in 33 CFR 165.930(a)(2) to regulate the CSSC. The requirements in 33 CFR 165.923(a)(2) for the transit of non-potable water will be preserved, but incorporated into the CSSC's RNA regulations in what is now 33 CFR 165.923(b)(2). Therefore, 33 CFR 165.923(b) will become 33 CFR 165.923(a) with the elimination of the safety zone. The following paragraphs describe additional changes made to the RNA regulations.

The Coast Guard will remove the RNA's bow boat requirement in 33 CFR 165.923(b)(2)(ii)(C). The RNA currently requires that all up-bound and down-bound tows that consist of barges carrying flammable liquid cargoes (Grade A through C, flashpoint below 140 degrees Fahrenheit, or heated to within 15 degrees Fahrenheit of flash point) engage the services of a bow boat at all times until the entire tow is clear of the RNA. The original bow boat requirement was intended to reduce the possibility of a spark-induced event due to allision between a barge carrying flammable liquid cargo and barges at the Will County Generating Station Coal Wharf (RDB MM 296.0) while the facility conducted coal loading and barge fleeting. At times barge fleets were three-wide (approximately 105 feet), extended into the 160-wide cut, less than 500 feet downstream of Barrier II-A. Since barge loading and fleeting ceased in September 2012, the basis for this requirement no longer exists.

The Coast Guard is modifying the requirement in 33 CFR 165.923(b)(2)(ii)(E) that require commercial tows be made up with only wire rope to ensure electrical connectivity between all segments of the tow. The purpose of this requirement is to ensure electrical connectivity between all segments of the tow to prevent arcing while transiting the electric barrier and to prevent high contact potentials between vessels in the tow. However, the Coast Guard recognizes that adequate means of securing a tow configuration are not exclusive to the use of wire rope and towboats frequently use high-tensile strength aramid, high-modulus polyethylene, or composite fiber ropes (“soft-lines”) as wing-wires or face-wires, and occasionally as barge lashings. Government observers have seen towboats use a single, wire-rope from barge winch to towboat h-bitt, thus providing adequate electrical connectivity, if sufficiently taut, and contacting bare-metal surfaces. The Coast Guard thus will continue to require that commercial tows transiting the RNA ensure the maintenance of electrical connectivity between all segments of the tow through use of wire rope, but allow use of soft lines to be used in addition to secure a tow. To account for use of soft-lines, the Coast Guard proposed to eliminate the requirement that a tow exclusively use wire rope, by removing the words “with only” from the paragraph and allowing an appropriate alternative.

Finally, the Coast Guard will add a requirement to the RNA regulations that all vessels transit the RNA at a “no-wake” speed. Currently, the RNA does not provide a maximum safe speed for vessels transiting the RNA. Throughout the course of the marine risk assessment, the project team ascertained that the largest marine safety risk is electric shock to a person in the water. Video recordings and shore-observer accounts indicate that many, smaller recreational vessels transit the EDBS at a speed that generates significant wake. Also, light-boat transits drag a wake that causes surging of barges moored to the loading facility just north of the pipeline arch. A no-wake zone will reduce this risk not only to persons aboard vessels, but also to persons working ashore alongside the RNA.

The aforementioned changes to the RNA regulations will require a slight reordering of what is now 33 CFR 165.923(b)(2)(ii)(A) through (K). With the removal of the safety zone, these regulations will be found in 33 CFR 165.923(a). The removal of the bow boat requirement in 33 CFR 165.923(b)(2)(ii)(C) will cause the other requirements to move up a letter, becoming the new 33 CFR 165.923(a)(2)(ii)(C) through (J). The “no wake” requirement will then become the new 33 CFR 165.923(a)(2)(ii)(K) and the requirements for the transit of non-potable water will be added in a new 33 CFR 165.923(a)(2)(ii)(L).

We developed this rule after considering numerous statutes and Executive orders related to rulemaking. Below we summarize our analyses based on a number of these statutes and Executive orders, and we discuss First Amendment rights of protestors.

Executive Orders 12866 and 13563 direct agencies to assess the costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if regulation is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits. Executive Order 13563 emphasizes the importance of quantifying both costs and benefits, of reducing costs, of harmonizing rules, and of promoting flexibility.

Executive Order 13771 directs agencies to control regulatory costs through a budgeting process. This rule has not been designated a “significant regulatory action,” under Executive Order 12866. Accordingly, this rule has not been reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and pursuant to OMB guidance it is exempt from the requirements of Executive Order 13771.

The rule updates an already existing rule. It adds minor changes to that already existing rule. These changes involve the elimination of a redundant safety zone, the removal of several requirements from a Regulated Navigational Area that are no longer necessary, and adds a “no wake” requirement to the safety zone. Each of these is discussed in greater depth below. We anticipate that it will have minimal impact on the economy, will not interfere with other agencies, will not adversely alter the budget of any grant or loan recipients, and will not raise any novel legal or policy issues. A summary of the reasoning for this is provided below. For a more thorough explanation of the reasoning the reader is advised to refer to the NPRM on this rule that was published in the Federal Register on January 30, 2018.

This final rule eliminates the CSSC safety zone outlined in 33 CFR 165.923(a)(1). This will reduce redundancy in regulations as the CSSC safety zone is already regulated in an equivalent manner by the larger safety zone delineated in 33 CFR 165.930(a)(2). Hence it is expected that there will be no cost impact associated with this change. In addition, it will reduce confusion and uncertainty that the public may face. The American Waterways Operators (AWO), in a comment made to the docket, agrees with this assessment.1 The AWO, in its comment, stated “removing the redundant safety zone will decrease confusion for vessels operators in the transiting area”.

A second change made by this rule is the incorporation of the requirements for the transit of non-potable water, contained in 33 CFR 165.930(a)(2), into 33 CFR 165.923(b)(2). As this is only a move of the water transit requirements from one section of the CFR to another part of the CFR no costs experienced. In addition, the public will face less uncertainty due to the reduction of overlapping regulatory requirements.

A third change the rule will make will be the elimination of the RNA's bow boat requirement, contained in 33 CFR 165.923(b)(2)(ii)(C). The RNA currently requires that all up and down bound tows that consist of barges carrying flammable liquid cargoes engage the services of a bow boat at all times until the entire tow is clear of the RNA.2 The purpose of this requirement of 33 CFR 165.923(b)(2)(ii)(C) was to reduce the possibility of a spark-induced event due to allision between a barge carrying flammable liquid cargo and barges at the Will County Generating Station Coal Warf (RDB MM 296.0) while the facility conducted coal loading and barge fleeting. As barge loading and fleeting at this facility stopped in September 2012, the basis of this requirement no longer exists. Hence there are expected to be reduced costs, for the regulated public, associated with the removal of this requirement.3

A fourth change involves the modification of the requirement in 33 CFR 165.923(b)(2)(ii)(E) relating to wire ropes used in commercial tows. Currently this requires that only wire rope be used in commercial tows. The purpose is to ensure electrical connectivity between all segments of the tow during the duration of the tow. This reduces the possibility of an accident stemming from the loss of power to any segment of the tow. However, the Coast Guard recognizes that there are high-tensile strength aramid, high-modulus polyethylene or composite fiber ropes (“soft-lines”) that also provide adequate electrical connectivity. The modification hence expands the ability of in-scope vessels to use these forms of ropes as well as wire ropes. This, in turn, provides vessel owners greater flexibility in terms of the type of ropes they use at with no additional cost being imposed by the regulation.

Lastly, the Coast Guard proposed to add a requirement to the RNA regulations that all vessels transit the RNA at a “no-wake” speed. The new “no-wake” requirement is contained in the new 33 CFR 165.923(a)(2)(ii)(K). Currently, the RNA does not provide a maximum safe speed for vessels transiting the RNA. This “no-wake” requirement is expected to reduce the danger posed by electrocution to persons on board vessels or falling overboard as well as to persons walking alongside the RNA on shore.4 Wakes currently caused by vessels exceeding a “no-wake” speed carry this danger because, in the RNA, the Aquatic Nuisance Species electric dispersal fish barrier generates a highly charged electrical field.

The Coast Guard received two comments in response to the NPRM published with respect to this final rule. One comment was not relevant to the proposed rule. The second comment, from the American Waterways Operators, stated that it agreed with a number of the proposed RNA amendments made in the NPRM (and included in this final rule). The AWO's comments in favor of many of the proposed changes have already been mentioned above. The AWO had no negative comments in response to any of the proposed RNA amendments.

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 601-612, as amended, requires Federal agencies to consider the potential impact of regulations on small entities during rulemaking. The term “small entities” comprises small businesses, not-for-profit organizations that are independently owned and operated and are not dominant in their fields, and governmental jurisdictions with populations of less than 50,000. The Coast Guard received no comments from the Small Business Administration on this rulemaking. The Coast Guard certifies under 5 U.S.C. 605(b) that this rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

The revision of the safety zone and RNA will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities because the proposed revision imposes minor additional requirements on industry; and provides clarity to preexisting requirements by removing redundancies. This rule, by removing the bow boat requirement due to the ceased barge loading and fleeting operations, is expected to reduce regulated costs.

The increased flexibility provided to small entity vessel owners and operators by permitting them to use, in addition to wire ropes, high-tensile strength aramid, high-modulus polyethylene or composite fiber ropes (“soft-lines”) is also expected to have no cost impact on them while simultaneously providing them with greater flexibility on the types of wires they can use.

Small businesses may send comments on the actions of Federal employees who enforce, or otherwise determine compliance with, Federal regulations to the Small Business and Agriculture Regulatory Enforcement Ombudsman and the Regional Small Business Regulatory Fairness Boards. The Ombudsman evaluates these actions annually and rates each agency's responsiveness to small business. If you wish to comment on actions by employees of the Coast Guard, call 1-888-REG-FAIR (1-888-734-3247). The Coast Guard will not retaliate against small entities that question or complain about this rule or any policy or action of the Coast Guard.

This rule will not call for a new collection of information under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501-3520) nor will it modify an existing collection.

A rule has implications for federalism under Executive Order 13132, Federalism, if it has a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various levels of government. We have analyzed this rule under that Order and have determined that it is consistent with the fundamental federalism principles and preemption requirements described in Executive Order 13132.

Also, this rule does not have tribal implications under Executive Order 13175, Consultation and Coordination with Indian Tribal Governments, because it does not have a substantial direct effect on one or more Indian tribes, on the relationship between the Federal Government and Indian tribes, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities between the Federal Government and Indian tribes. If you believe this rule has implications for federalism or Indian tribes, please contact the person listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section.

The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (2 U.S.C. 1531-1538) requires Federal agencies to assess the effects of their discretionary regulatory actions. In particular, the Act addresses actions that may result in the expenditure by a State, local, or tribal government, in the aggregate, or by the private sector of $100,000,000 (adjusted for inflation) or more in any one year. Though this rule will not result in such an expenditure, we do discuss the effects of this rule elsewhere in this preamble.

We have analyzed this rule under Department of Homeland Security Directive 023-01 and Commandant Instruction M16475.1D, which guide the Coast Guard in complying with the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321-4370f), and have determined that this action is one of a category of actions that do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment. This rule involves revisions of the safety zone and RNA that provide clarity to preexisting requirements. Normally such actions are categorically excluded from further review under paragraph L60 of Appendix A, Table 1 of DHS Instruction Manual 023-01-001-01, Rev. 01. Paragraph L60 pertains to establishing, disestablishing, or changing Regulated Navigation Areas and Safety Zones. A Record of Environmental Consideration supporting this determination is available in the docket where indicated under ADDRESSES.

The Coast Guard respects the First Amendment rights of protesters. Protesters are asked to contact the person listed in the FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT section to coordinate protest activities so that your message can be received without jeopardizing the safety or security of people, places or vessels.

For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Coast Guard amends 33 CFR part 165 as follows:

The Coast Guard will enforce the safety zone listed in Table 2 of 33 CFR 165.160 on the specified date and time as indicated in the table below.

Under the provisions of 33 CFR 165.160, vessels may not enter the safety zone unless given permission from the COTP or a designated representative. Spectator vessels may transit outside the safety zones but may not anchor, block, loiter in, or impede the transit of other vessels. The Coast Guard may be assisted by other Federal, State, or local law enforcement agencies in enforcing this regulation.

This document is issued under authority of 33 CFR 165.160(a) and 5 U.S.C. 552(a). In addition to this notice of enforcement in the Federal Register, the Coast Guard will provide mariners with advanced notification of enforcement periods via the Local Notice to Mariners and marine information broadcasts.

If the COTP determines that a safety zone need not be enforced for the full duration stated in this document, a Broadcast Notice to Mariners may be used to grant general permission to enter the safety zone.

In the delay rule (83 FR 6458), the list of regulations in the DATES section in the first column on page 6459, for which the effective date is delayed until July 1, 2019, inadvertently excluded § 685.300(b)(11), (b)(12), and (d) through (i). Those regulations were properly included in the list of regulations for which the effective date is delayed in the body of the document (in the third column of page 6459) and discussed elsewhere in the document. However, to effectuate this correction and restore the Code of Federal Regulations to properly reflect the delay, we are publishing amendatory language that will remove these provisions.

In accordance with the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 553, it is the Secretary's practice to offer interested parties the opportunity to comment on proposed regulations. However, the actions in this document are merely to correct a technical error, and thus, the Secretary has determined that publication of a proposed rule is unnecessary under 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(B).

Accessible Format: Individuals with disabilities can obtain this document in an accessible format (e.g., braille, large print, audiotape, or compact disc) on request to the contact person listed under FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.

Electronic Access to This Document: The official version of this document is the document published in the Federal Register. You may access the official edition of the Federal Register and the Code of Federal Regulations via the Federal Digital System at: www.thefederalregister.org/fdsys. At this site you can view this document, as well as all other documents of this Department published in the Federal Register, in text or Portable Document Format (PDF). To use PDF you must have Adobe Acrobat Reader, which is available free at the site.

You may also access documents of the Department published in the Federal Register by using the article search feature at: www.federalregister.gov. Specifically, through the advanced search feature at this site, you can limit your search to documents published by the Department.

For the reasons discussed in the preamble, the Secretary of Education amends part 685 of title 34 of the Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

Throughout this document whenever “we,” “us,” or “our” is used, we mean EPA. This supplementary information section is arranged as follows:

On February 2, 2017, and supplemented on November 8, 2017, MDEQ submitted a request to incorporate revisions to Michigan's Air Pollution Control Rules in Chapter 336, Part 9—Emissions Limitations and Prohibitions—Miscellaneous (Part 9) in the Michigan SIP. Michigan submitted revisions to three separate rules in Part 9: R 336.1902—“Adoption of standards by reference” (Rule 902); R 336.1916—“Affirmative defense for excess emissions during start-up or shutdown” (Rule 916); and R 336.1930—“Emission of carbon monoxide from ferrous cupola operations” (Rule 930). This rule will only take action on Rule 930. The revisions to Rule 902 have already been approved into Michigan's SIP, and the revisions to Rule 916 will be addressed in a future action.

Michigan's Rule 930 specifies CO emission limits for large ferrous cupola operations with a melting capacity of 20 tons or more per hour. Rule 930 currently approved into the Michigan SIP only applies to ferrous cupola operations in Saginaw, Macomb, Oakland, and Wayne Counties in Michigan. The rule is designed to require installation of afterburner control system, or equivalent, which reduces the CO emissions from the ferrous cupola by 90 percent.

On May 3, 2018 (83 FR 19497), EPA published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPR) proposing approval of Michigan's Part 9 Rule submitted by MDEQ on February 2, 2017, and supplemented on November 8, 2017, as a revision into Michigan's SIP. Specifically, we proposed to approve the revision that updates the applicability of Rule 930 to: (1) Remove an obsolete compliance date and requires immediate compliance, (2) remove the areas of the state that no longer contain ferrous cupola sources subject to the rule, and (3) correct the citation to a Federal test method to determine CO emission rates for rule compliance. The specific details of Michigan's SIP revision and the rationale for EPA's approval are discussed in the NPR.

EPA received no comments on the proposed action.

EPA is approving Michigan's Part 9, specifically for Rule 930 submitted by MDEQ on February 2, 2017, and supplemented on November 8, 2017, as a revision to the Michigan SIP.

In this rule, EPA is finalizing regulatory text that includes incorporation by reference. In accordance with requirements of 1 CFR 51.5, EPA is finalizing the incorporation by reference of the Michigan Regulations described in the amendments to 40 CFR part 52 set forth below. EPA has made, and will continue to make, these documents generally available through www.regulations.gov, and at the EPA Region 5 Office (please contact the person identified in the For Further Information Contact section of this preamble for more information). Therefore, these materials have been approved by EPA for inclusion in the State implementation plan, have been incorporated by reference by EPA into that plan, are fully federally enforceable under sections 110 and 113 of the CAA as of the effective date of the final rulemaking of EPA's approval, and will be incorporated by reference in the next update to the SIP compilation.1

Under the Clean Air Act, the Administrator is required to approve a SIP submission that complies with the provisions of the Clean Air Act and applicable Federal regulations. 42 U.S.C. 7410(k); 40 CFR 52.02(a). Thus, in reviewing SIP submissions, EPA's role is to approve state choices, provided that they meet the criteria of the Clean Air Act. Accordingly, this action merely approves state law as meeting Federal requirements and does not impose additional requirements beyond those imposed by state law. For that reason, this action:

• Is not a significant regulatory action subject to review by the Office of Management and Budget under Executive Orders 12866 (58 FR 51735, October 4, 1993) and 13563 (76 FR 3821, January 21, 2011);

• Is not an Executive Order 13771 (82 FR 9339, February 2, 2017) regulatory action because SIP approvals are exempted under Executive Order 12866;

• Does not impose an information collection burden under the provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.);

• Is certified as not having a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.);

• Does not contain any unfunded mandate or significantly or uniquely affect small governments, as described in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 (Pub. L. 104-4);

• Does not have Federalism implications as specified in Executive Order 13132 (64 FR 43255, August 10, 1999);

• Is not an economically significant regulatory action based on health or safety risks subject to Executive Order 13045 (62 FR 19885, April 23, 1997);

• Is not a significant regulatory action subject to Executive Order 13211 (66 FR 28355, May 22, 2001);

• Is not subject to requirements of section 12(d) of the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995 (15 U.S.C. 272 note) because application of those requirements would be inconsistent with the Clean Air Act; and

• Does not provide EPA with the discretionary authority to address, as appropriate, disproportionate human health or environmental effects, using practicable and legally permissible methods, under Executive Order 12898 (59 FR 7629, February 16, 1994).

In addition, the SIP is not approved to apply on any Indian reservation land or in any other area where EPA or an Indian tribe has demonstrated that a tribe has jurisdiction. In those areas of Indian country, the rule does not have tribal implications and will not impose substantial direct costs on tribal governments or preempt tribal law as specified by Executive Order 13175 (65 FR 67249, November 9, 2000).

The Congressional Review Act, 5 U.S.C. 801 et seq., as added by the Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, generally provides that before a rule may take effect, the agency promulgating the rule must submit a rule report, which includes a copy of the rule, to each House of the Congress and to the Comptroller General of the United States. EPA will submit a report containing this action and other required information to the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, and the Comptroller General of the United States prior to publication of the rule in the Federal Register. A major rule cannot take effect until 60 days after it is published in the Federal Register. This action is not a “major rule” as defined by 5 U.S.C. 804(2).

Under section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, petitions for judicial review of this action must be filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit by September 17, 2018. Filing a petition for reconsideration by the Administrator of this final rule does not affect the finality of this action for the purposes of judicial review nor does it extend the time within which a petition for judicial review may be filed, and shall not postpone the effectiveness of such rule or action. This action may not be challenged later in proceedings to enforce its requirements. (See section 307(b)(2).)

40 CFR part 52 is amended as follows:

The NFIP enables property owners to purchase Federal flood insurance that is not otherwise generally available from private insurers. In return, communities agree to adopt and administer local floodplain management measures aimed at protecting lives and new construction from future flooding. Section 1315 of the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 4022, prohibits the sale of NFIP flood insurance unless an appropriate public body adopts adequate floodplain management measures with effective enforcement measures. The communities listed in this document no longer meet that statutory requirement for compliance with program regulations, 44 CFR part 59. Accordingly, the communities will be suspended on the effective date in the third column. As of that date, flood insurance will no longer be available in the community. We recognize that some of these communities may adopt and submit the required documentation of legally enforceable floodplain management measures after this rule is published but prior to the actual suspension date. These communities will not be suspended and will continue to be eligible for the sale of NFIP flood insurance. A notice withdrawing the suspension of such communities will be published in the Federal Register.

In addition, FEMA publishes a Flood Insurance Rate Map (FIRM) that identifies the Special Flood Hazard Areas (SFHAs) in these communities. The date of the FIRM, if one has been published, is indicated in the fourth column of the table. No direct Federal financial assistance (except assistance pursuant to the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act not in connection with a flood) may be provided for construction or acquisition of buildings in identified SFHAs for communities not participating in the NFIP and identified for more than a year on FEMA's initial FIRM for the community as having flood-prone areas (section 202(a) of the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. 4106(a), as amended). This prohibition against certain types of Federal assistance becomes effective for the communities listed on the date shown in the last column. The Administrator finds that notice and public comment procedures under 5 U.S.C. 553(b), are impracticable and unnecessary because communities listed in this final rule have been adequately notified.

Each community receives 6-month, 90-day, and 30-day notification letters addressed to the Chief Executive Officer stating that the community will be suspended unless the required floodplain management measures are met prior to the effective suspension date. Since these notifications were made, this final rule may take effect within less than 30 days.

National Environmental Policy Act. FEMA has determined that the community suspension(s) included in this rule is a non-discretionary action and therefore the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) does not apply.

Regulatory Flexibility Act. The Administrator has determined that this rule is exempt from the requirements of the Regulatory Flexibility Act because the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, as amended, Section 1315, 42 U.S.C. 4022, prohibits flood insurance coverage unless an appropriate public body adopts adequate floodplain management measures with effective enforcement measures. The communities listed no longer comply with the statutory requirements, and after the effective date, flood insurance will no longer be available in the communities unless remedial action takes place.

Regulatory Classification. This final rule is not a significant regulatory action under the criteria of section 3(f) of Executive Order 12866 of September 30, 1993, Regulatory Planning and Review, 58 FR 51735.

Executive Order 13132, Federalism. This rule involves no policies that have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132.

Executive Order 12988, Civil Justice Reform. This rule meets the applicable standards of Executive Order 12988.

Paperwork Reduction Act. This rule does not involve any collection of information for purposes of the Paperwork Reduction Act, 44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.

Accordingly, 44 CFR part 64 is amended as follows:

In the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act (MAP-21) (Pub. L. 112-141, July 6, 2012), Congress directed FTA to establish a comprehensive Public Transportation Safety Program (codified at 49 U.S.C. 5329), one element of which is the Public Transportation Safety Certification Training Program (PTSCTP). As a first step to implementing the PTSCTP, FTA developed requirements for the interim safety certification training program (interim training program) which became effective on May 28, 2015 (see 80 FR 10619). FTA then published a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) in the Federal Register on December 3, 2015 (80 FR 75639), which generally proposed to adopt the interim training program requirements for the PTSCTP final rule. As noted in Appendix A, the requirements in this final rule reduce the number of required training hours from a total of 181 hours (22.625 days) to 143 hours (17.875 days).

More recently, Congress enacted the Fixing America's Surface Transportation Act (“FAST”) (Pub. L. 114-94, Dec. 4, 2015). FAST did not make any amendments to 49 U.S.C. 5329(c)(1), the statute authorizing the PTSCTP, that would affect today's rulemaking. Therefore, for convenience and accurate context, this rule will refer to MAP-21 throughout the preamble for consistency with the NPRM.

Today's rule revises the minimum training requirements for State Safety Oversight Agency (SSOA) personnel and contractors who conduct safety audits and examinations of public transportation systems that receive Federal transit funds. The rule also provides minimum training requirements for transit agency employees who are directly responsible for safety oversight of public transportation systems that receive Federal transit funds. Although not subject to this rule, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 5329(c)(1), FTA personnel and contractors who conduct safety audits and examinations of rail public transportation systems will adhere to the applicable SSOA training requirements listed in Appendix A.

This rulemaking is issued under the authority of 49 U.S.C. 5329(c)(1), which requires the Secretary of Transportation to establish a public transportation safety certification training program for Federal and State employees, or other designated personnel, who conduct safety audits and examinations of public transportation systems, and employees of public transportation agencies directly responsible for safety oversight. The Secretary is authorized to issue regulations to carry out the general provisions of this statutory requirement pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 5329(c)(2) and (f)(7).

Today's rule adds a new part 672, Public Transportation Safety Certification Training Program, to title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations. The purpose of the rule is to provide minimum requirements to enhance the proficiency of transit safety oversight professionals. In general, FTA maintained much of what was proposed in the NPRM. The mandatory training requirements apply to personnel who conduct safety audits and examinations of rail transit systems, and transit personnel with direct safety oversight responsibility of rail transit systems. Participation in the PTSCTP remains voluntary for State personnel, employees of bus transit agencies and the contractors directly responsible for safety oversight of public bus transportation systems.

In general, FTA has retained the approach to costs contained in the NPRM. FTA quantified, to the extent possible, the costs associated with this rule. FTA expects that the codification of the PTSCTP will help promote a safety culture within the transit industry. This safety culture should help instill a transit agency-wide appreciation for shared goals, shared beliefs, best practices, and positive and vigilant attitudes towards safety.

Where appropriate, FTA has modified the analysis for this rule from that of the NPRM. For example, in response to comments, FTA revised the hourly wage rate upward to better reflect average labor rates including benefits within the public transportation sector and factored in modest travel costs for attendance. Also, FTA has eliminated the 36-hour Transit System Security course and the 2-hour SMS Gap online course as mandatory components of the PTSCTP program. This change has resulted in a reduced burden on course participants. The regulatory analysis is conducted in two parts. First, under Executive Order 12866, by comparing the costs of issuing the rule in relation to practice prior to MAP-21 and second, under Executive Order 13771, since this final rule is considered a deregulatory action due to the reduction in existing safety training requirements.

FTA used data from the Transportation Safety Institute (TSI) and reviewed the public transit workforce's participation in FTA's voluntary safety training programs to establish a maximum and minimum number of personnel, including contractors, that would be affected by the PTSCTP. The interim training program on which this rule is modeled became effective on May 28, 2015. Thus far, enrollment in the interim training program aligns with the assumptions FTA posed in the NPRM.

To determine annual costs for recipients to implement PTSCTP requirements, we continue with a minimum and maximum case scenario. For the minimum case, we maintain an assumption that all designated personnel under this program have received the Transit Safety and Security Program (TSSP) Certificate and require only the safety management system (SMS) portion of the coursework described in Appendix A of this rule. For the maximum case, we assume no one subject to the rule has a TSSP Certificate. In this scenario, all designated personnel will have to complete both the TSSP (minus the Transit System Security (TSS) course) and SMS coursework over a three (3) year period. However, in response to comments, some travel costs are now included for attending courses if participants are unable to attend locally. Also, since TSSP training was previously provided by TSI, the cost of that cannot be attributed to this final rule. The cost numbers were adjusted accordingly. As a result of the changes above, and extending the analysis period to ten years instead of three to include refresher training and staff turnover, the maximum cost estimate is adjusted to approximately $1.0 million annualized at 7 percent discount rate instead of the undiscounted $2.6 million per year over a three year period as noted in the NPRM.

This final rule will replace the interim safety training program provisions issued in February 2015. The final rule eliminates two training provisions as mentioned above. The cost of the final rule therefore reduces the costs of the interim provisions by over $51,000 over a ten year period, discounted at a 7 percent rate for the minimum case scenario and $1.6 million respectively for the maximum case scenario, resulting in a net benefit for the agencies. This results in an annualized cost savings (benefits) of $7,300 and $2,258 respectively for the two scenarios at the 7 percent discount rate.

We note that these costs do not reflect costs associated with any additional countermeasures that better trained personnel will take to increase safety that they would not have identified prior to the training. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(6)(C)(iv), recipients may use up to 0.5 percent of their FTA formula funds to cover up to 80 percent of costs of PTSCTP eligible expenditures.

On October 3, 2013, FTA issued an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) in the Federal Register on all aspects of FTA's safety authority, including the training program. (See 78 FR 61251 at http://www.thefederalregister.org/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-10-03/pdf/2013-23921.pdf). FTA noted that there are discrete and different skill-sets required for those who perform safety audit and examination functions compared to those who are directly responsible for safety oversight. Recognizing this distinction, FTA outlined its vision for the PTSCTP which included a wholly new FTA-sponsored training curriculum to enhance the technical proficiency of each category of these safety professionals.

On April 30, 2014, FTA published a document in the Federal Register requesting comment on its proposed vision for the interim training program. A number of the proposed requirements for the interim training program were based partly on recommendations provided by commenters to the ANPRM (see 79 FR 24363). FTA evaluated comments received in response to the document and promulgated the final interim training program requirements in a Federal Register document dated February 27, 2015 (see 80 FR 10619).

On December 3, 2015, FTA published a Federal Register document proposing to adopt the interim training program as the requirements for the PTSCTP (see 80 FR 75639). FTA reviewed comments to the NPRM and with this document promulgates the PTSCTP rule as 49 CFR part 672. This rule primarily applies to recipients of Chapter 53 funding; however, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 5329(c)(1), the SSOA training requirements listed in Appendix A also apply to FTA personnel and contractors that conduct safety audits and examinations of rail transit systems.

FTA proposed to utilize the interim training program requirements as the foundation for the PTSCTP. Similar to the interim training program, FTA proposed that the initial focus of the PTSCTP should be on enhancing the technical proficiency of safety oversight professionals in the rail transit industry. However, recognizing that safety is a priority for all public transit providers, safety oversight personnel of other modes of public transportation were encouraged to participate voluntarily. For that reason, FTA proposed that the initial mandatory PTSCTP requirements provide safety management system and technical training for Federal and SSOA personnel and their contractors, and rail transit agency personnel directly responsible for safety oversight of rail transit systems. Safety oversight personnel of recipients such as State Departments of Transportation (DOTs) and bus transit providers would be voluntary participants.

Nineteen commenters responded to the NPRM as follows: Seven (7) public transportation agencies; three (3) State Safety Oversight Agencies; one (1) member of the public; one (1) Federal safety agency; two (2) national safety associations; two (2) national public transportation associations; two (2) State Department of Transportations (DOTs); and, one (1) letter representing five (5) State DOTs. FTA reviewed all comments and noted that only one commenter provided remarks that were not responsive to the scope of the NPRM. Following is a summary of the comments received and FTA's responses.

FTA proposed to implement 49 U.S.C. 5329(c)(1), by establishing a uniform curriculum of safety certification training to enhance the technical proficiency of individuals who are directly responsible for safety oversight of public transportation systems not subject to the safety oversight requirements of another Federal agency. FTA also noted that the rule would not preempt a State from implementing its own safety certification training requirements for public transportation systems subject to its jurisdiction.

A commenter to this section expressed appreciation for FTA's effort to adopt a uniform training curriculum and establish guidelines for all individuals who are directly responsible for safety oversight of public transportation agencies. Another commenter noted that FTA's framework provides a training standard for system safety and ensures a basic level of competency in SMS across the public transportation industry.

FTA Response: Upon review, FTA determined the proposed text requires clarification and is revising the text of paragraph (a) to include reference to personnel who conduct safety audits and examinations of public transportation agencies in this section. Additionally, the phrase “not subject to the safety oversight requirements of another Federal agency” that was proposed in the NPRM is not included in the final rule because the definition for “public transportation agency” indicates this exception. The remainder of the proposed text is included in the final rule.

FTA proposed that in general, the rule would apply to all recipients of Federal public transportation funding under Chapter 53 of Title 49 of the United States Code. FTA noted, however, in order to manage Federal and local resources, the initial mandatory requirements would apply to SSOA personnel and contractors conducting safety audits and examinations, as well as Rail Transit Agency (RTA) personnel directly responsible for safety oversight of rail transit systems not subject to the requirements of the Federal Railroad Administration. All other recipients of Chapter 53 funding would be able to participate voluntarily in the PTSCTP.

In response to the NPRM, one commenter disagreed with FTA's approach and recommended that both rail and bus transit system personnel be required participants in the PTSCTP. The commenter noted that motor vehicle crashes are the second-leading cause of unintentional death in the United States. The commenter stated that bus operations would benefit from defensive driving training as well as SMS and other specific safety training.

Conversely, commenters affiliated with State DOTs and small bus transit providers agreed that FTA should not require safety oversight personnel from these entities to be mandatory participants. Many of these commenters referred to the excellent safety record of bus transit providers to support the exclusion of these entities from mandatory PTSCTP participation. The commenters stated that FTA should limit regulatory burdens on States and subrecipient transit agencies that receive funding for rural transit. Several commenters indicated that the final rule should expressly affirm that it does not apply to bus service providers other than on a voluntary basis.

A few commenters indicated that the rule should be revised to include FTA personnel and its contractors that conduct safety audits and examinations as mandatory participants. These commenters noted that FTA should be subject to the same training requirements as SSOA employees and contractors.

FTA Response: FTA continues to believe the initial focus of the PTSCTP should be on rail public transit providers and the Federal and State personnel who conduct safety audits and examinations. As noted in the preamble of the ANPRM published in 2013, the intent is to initially focus regulatory efforts on those responsible for safety oversight of rail transit systems. FTA adopted this approach because the increased potential for catastrophic accidents, loss of life, and property damage associated with rail transit warranted the most immediate attention (see 78 FR 61252).

FTA reiterates that although the initial regulatory focus is primarily on rail safety, safety in the bus transit industry will not be ignored. In addition, FTA continues to expand resources and partner with groups that promote bus safety. Recognizing that resources must be expended judiciously and enforcement efforts must be prioritized, FTA believes the current safety environment within the bus transit industry supports the option for voluntary participation in FTA's safety training program.

However, it is important to note that FTA is developing a more systematic safety reporting regime for the public transit industry. FTA is also increasing its capability for reviewing and analyzing safety data and trends across the industry. Should analysis of safety data and trends indicate increased safety risk in the bus transit industry, FTA retains authority to implement mandatory training requirements for bus transit safety oversight personnel.

In response to commenters who indicated this rule should apply also to FTA personnel conducting safety audits and examinations, FTA notes this rulemaking applies specifically to recipients of Federal transit funds under Chapter 53, Title 49 of the United States Code. However, FTA agrees that FTA personnel and contractors should observe the same training requirements as SSOA personnel and contractors. Accordingly, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 5329(c)(1), this final rule requires FTA safety oversight personnel and contractors that conduct safety audits and examinations of rail fixed guideway public transportation systems to adhere to the same SSOA training courses noted in Appendix A. For the reasons herein, the text proposed in the NPRM is included in the final rule with clarifying edits. In paragraph (b), the phrase “that are not subject to the requirements of the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA)” was removed because the definition of “rail fixed guideway public transportation systems” includes the statement that such systems are not subject to FRA's jurisdiction. The text of paragraphs (a) and (c) are included in the final rule as proposed in the NPRM.

This section proposed definitions for some key terms in the rule. Many of the terms carry the same or similar meaning as used in other FTA documents. Additionally, some new terms were proposed with definitions consistent with common use.

Seven commenters responded to this section. One commenter stated that the term “contractor” should be revised to include RTA contractors that implement the RTA's safety program. Another commenter indicated the definition should be broadened to include all those who provide contracted services, supplies, or equipment to FTA recipients. Yet another commenter indicated the definition should be revised to include individuals and entities that perform safety-related tasks for an RTA through contract or other agreement.

Two commenters indicated the terms “safety audit” and “safety examination” required clarification. One questioned whether there is a practical difference between an examination conducted as part of the audit and the analysis of acts performed in conjunction with the examination. The other commenter indicated the definition for both terms require more specificity in order to distinguish between the activities associated with the terms and clarify who performs an examination.

A commenter indicated that the definition for “designated personnel” should be revised to include FTA safety oversight personnel and contractors in order to make them subject to this rule. Other commenters indicated that FTA needed to provide more clarity regarding the definition for “directly responsible for safety oversight” relative to RTA designated personnel. Another commenter suggested that the definition for “State Safety Oversight Agency” should not include reference to 49 CFR part 659 since that rule is set to expire.

FTA Response: FTA believes the definition for “contractor” proposed in the NPRM sufficiently describes entities that provide safety audit and examination services to FTA and SSOAs. However, FTA agrees with commenters who indicated the definition should be amended to include contractors that provide services to public transportation agencies. FTA also amended section 672.13 to include RTA contractors.

With regard to commenters who recommended revising the definition for “designated personnel” to include FTA personnel and contractor support, as noted earlier, this rule generally applies to FTA recipients; therefore, FTA personnel and contractors are not included in this definition. However, as noted with the “contractor” definition, subparagraph (1) of this definition is revised to also include contractors that provide safety oversight services to rail transit agencies.

FTA concurs with commenters regarding the definition for “directly responsible for safety oversight.” For clarity, FTA is revising the definition of the term relative to section 672.13(a), in recognition that RTA safety oversight personnel are already quite familiar with the safety oversight program requirements pursuant to 49 CFR part 659.

With regard to the terms “safety audit” and “safety examination”, FTA agrees with those commenters who indicated the proposed definition for both terms should be reconciled. The terms are not unknown nor uncommon to those responsible for safety oversight of RTA systems. FTA, SSOA, and RTA personnel are familiar with activities associated with safety audits and examinations as the terms relate to 49 CFR part 659 requirements, as well as the new SSO program rule at 49 CFR part 674. Further, it is unreasonable to interpret the term “examination” as it appears 49 U.S.C. 5329(c)(1) to refer to anything other than examinations related to the safety of public transportation systems. Therefore, to remain consistent with the terms as they appear in statute, the term safety audit will be included in the final rule but the term “safety examination” will be modified to “examination” to align with the definition as it appears in 49 CFR 670.5. It is also noted that safety audits and examinations will generally be conducted by Federal and/or State personnel and contractors.

Lastly, FTA agrees in part with the commenter who suggested the definition of “State Safety Oversight Agency” should be revised in reference to 49 CFR part 659. FTA notes 49 U.S.C. 5329(d)(2) provides an RTA's System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) developed pursuant to 49 CFR part 659 shall remain in effect until FTA publishes a final rule for Public Transportation Agency Safety Plans. SSOAs will continue to oversee RTAs' SSPPs until the RTAs are required to adopt Public Transportation Agency Safety Plans in compliance with the future final rulemaking under 49 U.S.C. 5329(d). In recognition of this fact, this definition is revised in the final rule to include reference to the new rule at 49 CFR part 674, as well as 49 CFR part 659. The remaining definitions proposed in the NPRM are included in this rule with minor edits to certain terms to ensure consistency with other FTA safety rulemakings.

FTA proposed that the SSOA identify personnel who conduct safety audits and examinations of the RTA(s) subject to its jurisdiction. In general, those identified would be SSOA employees and contractors whose duties include on-site safety audits and examinations of rail public transportation systems. FTA proposed this would include the SSOA managers and supervisors with direct authority over such SSOA personnel.

FTA proposed that once identified, designated personnel would have 3 years to complete the applicable PTSCTP training requirements. FTA also proposed that designated personnel would be required to complete at least one hour of refresher training every 2 years after completing the initial mandatory training. FTA further proposed that the SSOA would have discretion to determine the subject area and duration for such training. FTA also proposed that the interim training program requirements become the initial training requirements for this rule. The interim requirements were republished as Section IV of the NPRM. However, FTA did not seek comment on the curriculum of the interim training program since it was developed through public notice and comment and effective only since May 28, 2015.

Five commenters responded to this section. One commenter indicated that State personnel, such as commissioners and directors, should not be required to participate in the PTSCTP requirements. The commenter stated that these individuals do not actually conduct safety audits and examinations of the rail transit systems under their jurisdiction. Other commenters indicated that FTA personnel and contractors should be included as designated personnel.

Regarding refresher training, several commenters felt the two-year interval for refresher training was sufficient. However, one commenter disagreed with the two-year timeframe, indicating that more robust refresher training should be required annually with a minimum requirement of at least four hours of training. The commenter also stated that the initial timeframe for completing PTSCTP requirements should be less than the three years FTA proposed. One commenter recommended that FTA be more specific as to the required elements for refresher training. Another commenter stated that FTA should require at least one class of refresher training every two years without identifying a time limit for the class. Yet another commenter stated that refresher training should at minimum include the “technical training component” and “knowledge of agency” elements outlined in Section IV of the NPRM.

FTA Response: In general, FTA believes those with direct management and supervisory responsibility of SSOA personnel and contractors that conduct safety audits and examinations should be subject to the PTSCTP training requirements. However, as indicated by a commenter, there are SSOA management personnel who do not directly oversee SSOA personnel and contractors. Conversely, there are managers and supervisors who do. In either case, FTA recognizes an SSOA is better situated to determine which managers and supervisors require technical knowledge or perform functions identified in the technical training plan each SSOA is required to develop to comport with 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(3)(E). For example, knowledge of railroad components is required only by those individuals actually conducting the examinations and audits of those specific railroad components, but not necessarily knowledge required of SSOA managers.

In short, some SSOA managers and supervisors will not be subject to PTSCTP requirements; however, those with direct supervisory responsibility of SSOA personnel and contractors subject to this part should share a common framework for understanding issues of risk and mitigation. For that reason, these managers and supervisors should at minimum undertake the SMS and TSSP curriculum identified in Appendix A. As indicated earlier, the SSOA will consult with FTA as it develops its technical training plan. This consultation should assist the SSOA with determining which of its personnel and contractor support should participate in the PTSCTP. However, FTA does not expect directors or commissioners, or similar State DOT personnel not involved in the day-to-day operations of an SSOA to be identified as designated personnel.

In response to comments suggesting the proposed three-year timeframe for completing the initial PTSCTP requirements is too long, FTA notes that RTAs and SSOAs already engage in significant safety training including the voluntary TSSP which underpins the PTSCTP requirements. FTA disagrees that the PTSCTP requirements should be completed in less than three years. FTA believes such a requirement would unduly burden recipients while not significantly contributing to public transportation safety. Furthermore, FTA notes that 49 U.S.C. 5329 provides additional tools that FTA can utilize if it finds that targeted training or remedial action is required immediately.

In response to comments regarding proposed refresher training requirements, from the onset FTA has stated its intent to take a comprehensive approach to safety training requirements. FTA recognizes there will be safety training requirements in other rules FTA is implementing for the National Public Transportation Safety Program (National Safety Program) which may apply also to some PTSCTP participants. FTA continues to believe that refresher training should be relevant to a recipient's specific circumstances and the recipient is in the best position to determine the subject matter and timeframe allotted for such training. In addition, FTA will provide guidance to assist recipients with identifying relevant subject matter for safety oversight refresher training.

FTA believes the proposed requirements are sufficient and that a one-year training completion requirement or annual refresher training requirement would not provide significant value considering other safety training initiatives will be occurring during the same timeframe. For these reasons, the proposed rule text is included in the final rule except FTA omitted paragraph (c), which provided that the Reference Document was available on the FTA website. The training curriculum and requirements are now found in Appendix A to this rule.

In the NPRM, FTA proposed that a recipient be required to identify its personnel whose job function is “directly responsible for safety oversight” of the public transportation system. FTA noted that the unique organizational framework of public transit systems does not reasonably allow for uniform designation of positions or functions that are “directly responsible for safety oversight.”

FTA stated that once identified, designated personnel would have three years to complete the applicable training for the PTSCTP. FTA also proposed that designated personnel would be required to complete at least one hour of refresher training every two years following the completion of the initial PTSCTP requirements. FTA further stated that RTA personnel would be mandatory participants while State DOT and bus transit system personnel would be voluntary participants. All recipients would have discretion to determine the subject area and time for biannual refresher training. Seven commenters provided responses to this section. In general, commenters responded to FTA's proposed timeframe for completing the PTSCTP requirements; however, two commenters indicated they were unable to locate the specific requirements of the Reference Document.

One commenter stated that employees of rail systems should be required to meet the training requirements as soon as possible in order to ensure the safest transit operations for passengers. Several other commenters indicated that the three-year period for completing the required training should be extended because of potential scheduling conflicts. The commenters noted that FTA's course availability is not always conducive to transit personnel being able to attend the training. Some commenters also indicated that there may be instances where the course location could interfere with attendance. One commenter suggested that FTA provide its training schedule as far in advance as possible in order to assist recipients with minimizing travel costs. The commenter also recommended that FTA increase the number of online courses.

One commenter indicated that FTA should not require the Transit System Security (TSS) course as a mandatory component of the PTSCTP curriculum since security matters are not generally under the purview of safety oversight personnel. Two commenters noted that the proposed rule required rail transit agencies to provide technical training to SSOA personnel and suggested that FTA instead develop specific rail transit technical training courses.

Regarding the requirement to identify personnel who are directly responsible for safety oversight, one commenter recommended that such personnel be limited to policymaking officials with broad safety accountabilities, rather than each employee who has a function or duty specific to an agency's safety plan. The commenter suggested that the rule apply only to those individuals who are accountable for the overall development, implementation, and review of the agency's safety program. Another commenter indicated that FTA use an approach in which it amplifies an SMS model where implementation of the agency safety plan is the shared responsibility of every position within the system (i.e., safety, operations, maintenance, human resources, training, and administration). The commenter further suggested that FTA provide guidance, or identify criteria to assist agencies with objectively identifying staff subject to the PTSCTP requirements.

FTA Response: As noted in response to the section above, FTA disagrees with commenters who suggested that three years is not enough time to complete the required training. FTA has no indication that the current level of course offerings will not support completion of the requirements within three years. Review of the registration data website for interim training program registration indicates a significant number of those enrolling in the PTSCTP have already completed all, or some portion of the required TSSP component of the certificate program. However, FTA is providing additional course delivery dates to alleviate the potential burden due to the perceived lack of availability.

To facilitate course availability and predictability, FTA will continue to expand its capacity for delivering the PTSCTP curriculum at sites around the country and publish schedules as early as possible. Where appropriate, FTA will also work on expanding web based courses to increase training opportunities and further reduce costs associated with the PTSCTP.

Regarding SSOA training by RTAs, FTA did not propose a requirement for RTAs to provide technical training to SSOA personnel. However, FTA encourages SSOAs and RTAs to engage in joint training as much as practicable. This collaboration will only serve to promote a common framework of knowledge and improve communication between the RTA and the State regulator. Any training agreements between SSOAs and RTAs will be developed between the respective parties. If an RTA incurs additional expenses when including SSOA personnel with its training, then the parties can negotiate reimbursement for such expenses since SSOA training is an eligible expenditure of 49 U.S.C. 5329(e) grant funds.

FTA disagrees with commenters who suggested that FTA identify designated personnel for public transportation agencies. As commenters indicated in response to question 52 of the ANPRM that preceded the NPRM to this rule, each agency has its specific organizational construct and assignment of safety oversight functions. FTA continues to believe that each agency should have discretion to determine which functions and positions are directly responsible for safety oversight of the agency. However, FTA will provide guidance to assist RTAs with objectively identifying such personnel.

FTA agrees with commenters who indicated that employees who are in a position to be accountable for the development, implementation, and review of the agency's safety program should participate in the PTSCTP. This would also include RTA contractors. But the designation should not be limited only to personnel with management responsibility for the agency's safety plan. The designation should also include staff with primary responsibility for developing, implementing, and monitoring the agency's safety plan, as well as personnel who implement and execute SSOA requirements at the RTA. Depending on the size and organizational framework of the agency, this could be a few personnel or a sizable office or branch. The following guidance is provided to assist RTAs with identifying designated personnel:

SSOA's Program Standard—Processes and procedures an RTA must have in place to comply with the standard: Who at the RTA is responsible for developing, implementing or maintaining the following elements of the program standard?

(1) Program management;

(2) Program standard development;

(3) Program policy and objectives;

(4) Oversight of the agency safety plans and internal safety reviews (who will respond to the SSOA if the SSOA determines the plans are inadequate?);

(5) Triennial SSOA audits of Rail Public Transportation Agency Safety Plans (who will participate in the audit process and follow up on any findings or recommendations?);

(6) Accident notification (who is responsible for making appropriate notifications to FTA, SSOAs or when applicable FRA?);

(7) Investigations (who will conduct internal accident investigations or coordinate RTA investigations in accordance with the SSO program standard and any agreements in effect?), (if the RTA does not agree with elements of an SSOA report, who will submit a written dissent from the report?);

(8) Corrective action plans (CAPs) (who is responsible for developing and carrying out the CAPs required by the SSOA?), (who will manage an issued CAP, identifying steps to minimize, control, correct, or eliminate the risks and hazards identified by the CAP, the schedule for taking those actions, and the individuals responsible for taking those actions?), (who will periodically report to the SSOA on its progress in carrying out the CAP?), (who will collect, track, and analyze data on occurrences to develop leading indicators, to prevent the likelihood of future events, and to inform the practice of SMS across the RTA?).

FTA recognizes recipients may have questions as to which positions or functions should be designated as PTSCTP participants. Recipients may contact FTA via email at [email protected] for assistance.

For the reasons herein, proposed paragraph (a) is revised to include RTA contractors and the phrase “not subject to the safety oversight of another Federal agency” is removed because the definition of “rail fixed guideway public transportation systems” includes the statement that such systems are not subject to FRA's jurisdiction. Paragraphs (b) and (c) are included in the final rule as proposed in the NPRM and proposed paragraph (d) is omitted now that the PTSCTP curriculum and training requirements are listed in Appendix A to this rule.

In the NPRM, FTA acknowledged that participants who have completed safety training from entities other than FTA should be able to have that training reviewed to determine if it is equivalent to the competencies of the PTSCTP curriculum. To that end, FTA proposed that a participant provide official documentation to FTA from the organization that conducted the training. FTA stated that the documentation should indicate the date(s) and subject matter of the training. In addition, the participant would be required to provide a narrative summary of the training objectives and the competencies obtained as a result of the training.

Six commenters responded to this section. In general, commenters agreed that FTA should review other safety training for PTSCTP equivalency. However, most did not agree with FTA's proposed process. Three commenters indicated that FTA should proactively evaluate training provided by other organizations. Commenters indicated the participant should not have to describe how the training meets the competency of the PTSCTP curriculum. One commenter recommended that FTA “grandfather” existing transit agency personnel who possess five years of experience executing the requirements of 49 CFR part 659. The commenter also stated that FTA should provide PTSCTP credit for personnel who possess a Certified Safety Professional credential/license. Another commenter suggested that FTA broadly and favorably consider equivalent training requests from those holding safety credentials, and degrees in safety. Lastly, one commenter noted that FTA should establish an objective measure for evaluating prior training and certification that is predictable, transparent, and fast.

FTA Response: In general, FTA agrees with commenters who indicated there should be an expedited and transparent process for evaluating safety training provided by entities other than FTA. To that end, FTA continues to refine its process for evaluating a participant's prior safety training. At this time, FTA is not prepared to provide independent approval of prior safety training or safety professional certifications without the participant providing official documentation and describing how the training or designation meets the objectives of the specific requirements of the PTSCTP. As the training program matures, FTA anticipates that it will offer a list of courses and training that meet the PTSCTP requirements. Accordingly, the final rule includes the text as proposed in the NPRM.

In the NPRM, FTA noted that an essential requirement of any training program is the maintenance of adequate records of training. To that end, FTA proposed to maintain an electronic record of each PTSCTP participant via its online enrollment process. However, FTA stated that the recipient would be required to ensure that its personnel periodically update their information with his or her course completion information. Designated personnel can enroll for the program and update their individual training records as they complete the applicable training requirements by following the instructions provided at FTA's training website. The following web address provides participants with enrollment and registration information: h ttps:/ / www.transit.dot.gov/regulations-and-guidance/safety/safety-training. Further, each recipient will be responsible for maintaining an updated training record for its designated personnel.

Additionally, FTA proposed that each SSOA maintain training records to document the technical training of its designated personnel for at least five years from the date the record is created. FTA noted this documentation would assist the SSOA in complying with the grant requirements in accordance 49 U.S.C. 5329(e)(3)(E) by documenting that SSOA personnel and contractors have received training to perform requisite safety oversight functions.

FTA received three comments to this section. One commenter indicated this section should be revised to require FTA to also maintain records of its personnel and contractors that are subject to PTSCTP training requirements. Commenters agreed that designated personnel should enroll through FTA's safety database; however, two commenters indicated that FTA should be responsible for updating the participant's training completion information, not the recipient.

One commenter stated that an SSOA should not be responsible for maintaining training records for its contractors. The commenter stated that SSOAs should be able to require a contractor to provide certification showing the contractor has completed the required training. The commenter suggested that once a contractor has provided the initial documentation, the SSOA should not be required to maintain their training records and the contractor should be responsible for maintaining their own records. The commenter also indicated that SSOA management should be able to rely on the FTA database to track the progress and status of SSOA personnel and contractors without the need for additional tracking mechanisms.

FTA Response: FTA concurs with commenters who indicated that FTA should administer and maintain the records for PTSCTP participants. However, FTA's ability to access participant training records for the PTSCTP does not relieve a recipient of the responsibility for ensuring its designated personnel, including its contractors, are in compliance with this part. The recipient is in the best position to ensure its designated personnel are timely updating course completion information. Furthermore, this process will assist the recipient with certifying compliance with this part.

FTA also agrees that a recipient, including an SSOA, should not be responsible for developing and maintaining training records for contractors. The contractor should be responsible for documenting and maintaining training records for its personnel. However, the recipient is responsible for ensuring its contractors comply with this part. To that end, a recipient may require its contractors to provide timely training documentation for contractor personnel subject to this part. To assist with grant documentation requirements, an SSOA should retain records of both its personnel and contractors in accordance with the timeframe prescribed in section 672.21(c) of this part.

As noted previously, this rule does not apply to FTA personnel and contractors. However, training records for FTA personnel are maintained in accordance with Federal standards; therefore, FTA disagrees with commenters who indicated this section should be revised to apply to FTA. However, as indicated by commenters, paragraph (b) is amended by replacing the term “maintain” with the term “retain” in reference to an SSOA's responsibility for the training records of its contractors. Paragraph (a) is included in the final rule as proposed, but subparagraphs (c)(1) through (5) are not included because Appendix A provides information required for SSOA technical training records.

FTA proposed a requirement for the safekeeping and limited release of information maintained in accordance with the requirements of this part. FTA stated that information maintained in the training records should not be released without the consent of the participant for whom the record is maintained, except in limited circumstances. FTA further noted that a participant should receive a copy of his or her training records without cost to him or her upon request.

In the NPRM, FTA stated that a recipient would be required to provide appropriate Federal and SSOA personnel access to all of the recipient's facilities where required training is conducted. In addition, the recipient would be required to grant access to all training records required to be maintained by this part to appropriate U.S. Department of Transportation personnel and appropriate State officials who are responsible for safety oversight of public transportation systems. Additionally, a recipient would provide information regarding a participant's training when requested by the National Transportation Safety Board when such request is made as part of an accident investigation.

FTA Response: FTA received no comments directly related to this section. Accordingly, the text proposed in the NPRM is included in the final rule.

FTA noted in the NPRM that recipients are required annually to certify their compliance with Federal grant requirements as a condition for receiving Federal funding. FTA proposed that recipients for whom the PTSCTP training requirements are mandatory should self-certify compliance with this part through the annual FTA certification and assurances process. FTA proposed that the recipient identify someone within the organization as authorized to certify compliance with this part on behalf of the recipient.

One commenter to this section stated that FTA should annually certify its compliance with the PTSCTP requirements. Two other commenters indicated that similar to FTA's current annual certification and assurance process, a recipient's chief executive, such as the General Manager or equivalent, should be the official authorized to certify compliance. One of the commenters stated that a recipient's board of directors primarily performs policy-setting duties and should not be asked to certify safety compliance as it would be beyond their scope. Lastly, one commenter asked if the annual certification requirement also applied to SSOAs.

FTA Response: The proposed rule stated that the recipient's governing body or authority should identify the person responsible for certifying the recipient's compliance with this part. FTA did not indicate that the governing body or chief executive would specifically have to certify the recipient's compliance with this part.

Currently, recipients undergo FTA's annual self-certification and assurance process as a condition of receiving Federal transit funds administered through FTA (see https://www.fta.dot.gov/funding/grantee-resources/certifications-and-assurances/certifications-assurances). Each recipient, including an SSOA, is required to annually certify compliance with numerous Federal requirements as a condition for receiving Chapter 53 funds. However, FTA is not a recipient; therefore, FTA is not included in the annual certification process. For recipients however, annual certification of compliance with this part will now be included with FTA's annual certifications and assurance. Consequently, a recipient is required to designate an authorized representative for the purpose of signing the certification on behalf of the recipient. Accordingly, the text proposed in the NPRM is included in the final rule.

This section was proposed in the NPRM to outline options available to FTA when a recipient does not comply with the requirements of this part. This section indicated the Administrator's discretion to withhold Federal funds and provided a notice and comment period for recipients.

Two commenters responded to this section. One commenter suggested the section be revised to include its applicability to SSOAs unless they are considered recipients. The other commenter indicated that absent clarification regarding how to identify designated personnel there is the possibility for an uneven identification of personnel across different agencies which could lead to a situation, where in hindsight, the Administrator may decide that a recipient has failed to comply with the requirements.

FTA Response: FTA has reviewed this section in conjunction with the provisions of the Public Transportation Safety Program Safety Program (see 49 CFR part 670). FTA has determined that the provisions therein provide a recipient with sufficient notice and due process regarding the Administrator's authority and enforcement actions for noncompliance with this part. Therefore, FTA is not including proposed section 672.33 in this final rule.

FTA proposed adopting the interim training program requirements listed in Section IV of the NPRM as the initial training requirements for the PTSCTP. FTA noted that the interim requirements were developed with public notice and comment and only became effective on May 28, 2015. For that reason, FTA only requested comments about the effectiveness of the curriculum and technical training requirements.

A number of commenters addressed FTA's proposed implementation of the PTSCTP and its applicability which we have already discussed; however, one commenter directly addressed the effectiveness of the proposed curriculum. The commenter noted that FTA should not require the Transit System Security (TSS) course as a mandatory component of the PTSCTP curriculum since security matters are not generally under the purview of safety oversight personnel.

FTA Response: FTA agrees with the commenter and has revised the PTSCTP curriculum so that the TSS course is no longer a required component. FTA recognizes the value of the TSS course and will continue to offer it, but concurs that security is not within the general scope of training required to implement 49 U.S.C. 5329(c)(1) safety oversight requirements. Additionally, FTA has determined that the course objectives for the 2-hour online “SMS Gap course” training are now included in the online “SMS Awareness” course and the “SMS Principles for Transit” course; therefore, it is no longer a requirement.

For clarity, FTA is renaming the “SMS Principles for Rail Transit” to “SMS Principles for Transit” in order to reflect its broader applicability across the industry. In addition, the “SMS Principles for SSO Programs” course is currently under development and is not expected to be available by the effective date of this rule; therefore, participants will have three years from the course's date of availability to complete it. The curriculum for the PTSCTP is revised accordingly and appears as Appendix A to this part and is no longer referred to as the Reference Document as noted in the NPRM. FTA will continue to evaluate the effectiveness of the PTSCTP requirements and should FTA determine revisions are warranted, FTA will seek public comment prior to doing so.

Before MAP-21, FTA funded and supported a wide variety of safety training at no direct cost to the transit industry and participants engaged in the training on a voluntary basis. Subsequently, MAP-21 mandated that FTA develop an interim training safety certification program to enhance the technical qualifications of designated personnel directly responsible for safety oversight of public transportation systems in advance of a final rule for the Public Transportation Safety Certification Training Program. FTA noted that the interim program requirements were a condition of receiving Federal grant funding under sections 5307, 5311, and 5329 of title 49, United States Code. Although the interim program was not promulgated as a rulemaking, pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 5334(k), FTA sought public comment on the interim provisions. It was noted that most of a participant's cost in the interim program would be an eligible expenditure of Federal financial assistance provided under sections 5307, 5311, and 5329 grants and no cost benefit analysis was conducted. FTA will now incorporate many components of the interim program in the final rule for the PTSCTP; however, with a lessened regulatory burden for required participants.

The regulatory analyses below include the cost estimates for the final rule as required by Executive Order 12866 (Regulatory Planning and Review), using pre-MAP-21 estimates as the base line with revisions based on comments to the NPRM. The analysis also includes a deregulatory action cost estimate as required by Executive Order 13771 (Reducing Regulation and Controlling Regulatory Costs), as the cost of the final rule is less than the cost of the interim rule.

For the initial analysis to assess the costs for the PTSCTP, FTA first reviewed data from the Transportation Safety Institute (TSI) the organization that provides FTA sponsored training for transit grantees and stakeholders. Using the TSI attendance data for the transit safety courses and knowledge of how SSOAs and rail transit agencies are organized, FTA developed a maximum and minimum number of personnel, to include employees and contractors that would be affected by the PTSCTP. FTA also reviewed the number of FTA personnel who participate in safety audits and examinations and determined the number of FTA personnel that would be required to undergo some level of training and certification.

In developing annual costs for personnel that would attend the PTSCTP, FTA assumed a minimum and maximum case scenario. Under the minimum case scenario, it is assumed that no additional staff will take the TSSP other than the ones who are already doing so. The TSI data prior to MAP-21 shows that on average 250 individuals attended the four TSSP courses, ranging from 175 attendees for transit rail incident investigations to 345 attendees for the transit rail system safety course. Given the total number of transit and SSOA entities, there were between two to three individuals per agency on average attending the courses already. The only additional training taken would be for the Safety Management System curriculum. In addition, to meet the requirements of this rule, the agencies would need to apply for certification for courses attended at TSI or at another venue and to maintain records of the training completed. The cost of the additional effort is included below.

The maximum case scenario assumes a higher number of attendees than the current practice and assumes no prior completion of safety training. This scenario is being presented to show the cost of the rule if the level of attendance increases due to the publication of this final rule and if the training already taken by individuals does not satisfy the TSSP course requirements under this final rule.

FTA notes that this analysis includes only the costs that could be quantified, which are those costs associated with the training, certification and record keeping. It does not reflect costs associated with any additional countermeasures that better trained personnel might take to increase safety that they would not have identified prior to taking the training.

The initial cost-benefit analysis was provided in the NPRM for public comment. Several commenters asked if additional Federal funding would be available to pay for the training and asked why additional funding is not available for RTAs, but available to SSOAs.

FTA Response: Funding determinations are made by Congress through statutory parameters for Chapter 53 recipients, including RTAs. In this instance, the training costs associated with the PTSCTP are an eligible expense for the Federal grants available to RTAs. However, Congress has provided funding for the State Safety Oversight program to eliminate the conflict of interest inherent between SSOAs and RTAs when RTAs provide funding to SSOAs that provide oversight of these RTAs. Furthermore, the incremental cost per RTA is not expected to be significant considering many agency employees already undertake or have completed most of the required courses. Additionally, much of the new SMS training is available online at no additional monetary cost, except staff time.

Several commenters noted the additional cost burden of travel to meet the training requirements if the courses are not available locally or online. One commenter indicated that its costs could be approximately $3,000 per course per employee to take the TSSP courses. It was also mentioned that employees will be away from their jobs to attend the training and this will result in loss of productivity. One commenter requested that costs be shown on a per capita basis for each recipient instead of the aggregate estimate reflected in the NPRM.

FTA Response: FTA does not expect agencies to incur significant additional travel costs since much of the SMS training is available online and FTA plans to increase its capacity to deliver training locally, which will provide more opportunities to attend without incurring additional expenses. FTA will also make training schedules available earlier to support improved scheduling. However, recognizing there may be occasions where travel may be required; FTA is including estimated travel costs in the revised assumptions for this rule.

Regarding cost estimates (labor cost), the assumptions herein reflect the loss of individual productivity to attend the training. It is anticipated that this cost will be regained through benefits from improved safety performance of the agencies. However, FTA notes that it is a challenge to project costs per recipient because each recipient is responsible for identifying which of its safety oversight personnel will be required participants. Furthermore, participants will have varying degrees of requirements to fulfill depending on their prior TSSP participation.

To determine aggregate costs, FTA made the following revisions to its analysis. FTA is now using the hourly wage rate for a transit manager from the 2016 Bureau of Labor Statistics to represent the average cost for personnel attending the training. The wage rate is adjusted to account for benefits and other employee compensation cost to reflect the full agency cost. The revised estimate also considers travel costs, assuming that 5 percent of required participants may not be able to attend courses locally. Furthermore, the Transit System Security (TSS) is eliminated, thus reducing the required training from 140 hours over three years to 104 hours over the same period. The TSS training remains available for participants, but is optional.

Additionally, FTA has eliminated the 2-hour SMS Gap course, which reduces the number of SMS training from 41 hours over three years to 39 hours over the same period. This results in lower personnel training costs relative to PTSCTP compliance costs, but does not significantly reduce FTA's cost for providing the training.

For the minimum case, we continued with the assumption that all designated personnel under this program had already completed the required courses and would require only the SMS portion of the curriculum. This assumption is supported given the popularity of the TSSP within the industry. It is supported further by the level of voluntary participation of transit industry personnel obtained from current graduation/attendance data at TSI.

For the maximum case, we continue with the assumption that no one subject to the rule has a TSSP Certificate. In this case, all designated personnel would have to take and complete both the TSSP (minus the TSS course) and SMS coursework over the allotted three-year period. The table below shows the estimated counts used in our analysis. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the total designated personnel under this rule would undertake one-third of the total coursework each year. The required training would be completed over a period of three years.

Next, we determined the training by course that would be required of each person within the scope of the PTSCTP.

The TSSP consists of three courses.1 The Table below lists the courses and duration.

The SMS curriculum consists of two in-person courses and two online training sessions. While SSO personnel will be required to now take 39 hours of total training, rail transit agency personnel will no longer be required to take the 2 hour SMS Gap course.

An average wage rate of $86.11 is assumed for those taking training under this program, based on 2016 Bureau of Labor Statistics data on average wages for transit managers, including an adjustment for benefits and other employee compensation costs.2 Using this wage assumption, we have revised Lower Bound and Upper Bound costs for attendance as depicted in the table below.

In addition to the training requirements for certification, RTA personnel are required to attend one hour of training every two years to maintain the certification of their own choosing. This would add an ongoing annual cost of $13,347 for the minimum case scenario and just over $21,527 for the maximum case scenario.

To allow for situations where staff are unable to attend local training, travel costs are estimated. Based on current air and hotel rates, and hourly wage rate of $86.11, transportation cost of $600 and lodging and meals of $250 per day and travel time cost of $690 for eight hours of travel time is estimated. It is unknown how many participants would need to travel to attend training. However, training is frequently provided by FTA across the country and agencies have three years in which to complete the training; therefore, only a small percentage are expected to travel. FTA estimated the cost assuming that only 5 percent of the required participants may travel to another location to attend a course out of state. The table below shows the annual travel costs for attending safety training courses.

To comply with the requirements of the final rule, SSOAs and RTAs will incur time to designate appropriate staff for training; seek evaluation for safety training previously taken to ensure compliance with FTA requirements; keep records of training completed and ensure certification. The total annual costs of these activities are estimated to be $212,735. The same cost estimate is applied to the lower and upper bound, although the cost would be higher for the lower bound since the course evaluation will not be needed if all personnel attend the new training, as assumed for the upper bound estimates.

Next, we assessed costs associated with developing, managing, and administering the coursework for the PTSCTP. First, we reviewed the course catalog for TSI and determined the percentage of courses required by the PTSCTP of the total courses offered—a little more than one-fourth (six courses plus three online courses out of 21 total courses or about 29 percent) of the total course offerings would be required of the combined TSSP/SMS training under this rule. Furthermore, of the total days of coursework offered by TSI, 30 percent were attributable to the TSSP/SMS coursework. To be conservative, we used a 30 percent weighting for allocating fixed costs and allocated full costs where we were able to identify costs resulting from the TSSP and/or SMS training components. Using data from FTA's budget for TSI, the cost for the administration of courses, contract costs, and costs for the development of new coursework, we developed the program costs. We factored no facility costs as regional transit agencies or FTA Regional Offices host courses. Lastly, no tuition fees are associated with taking the coursework for public agency employees, other than a small fee for course materials.

The total cost for FTA to deliver the courses required under PTSTCP was about $1.4 million. However, since the TSSP training was previously provided prior to MAP-21, this cost is excluded from estimating the incremental cost of this rule. SMS training courses have been more recently developed to support safety goals, thus that is the only cost included here.